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This thesis presents a possibility of agency theology. In order to research this issue, the 
notion of agency is investigated and interpreted objectively. First, the thesis looks closely 
at German philosophers who have enabled the notion of agency to be embodied, 
especially Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx, who carried out extensive research into agency as 
a linking factor between subject and object.  Then, it examines agency theory, as used 
by modern philosophers to analyse the nature of human beings, mentality, self and action, 
which are difficult to construe scientifically.  
However, these philosophical attempts cannot resolve the connection between religious, 
transcendent domains and actual domains. In particular, Barth argues that the divine realm 
cannot be understood by the rational efforts of human beings. Thus, Barth criticizes the 
human-centred theology of the 18th and 19th centuries, which states that all yardsticks 
originate from human beings. However, modern scientific theologians and natural 
theologians have opened up the possibility of discovering the connecting point between 
God, humans and the created world through scientific research. 
 
The contradiction between the ability of reason and divine self-attestation demands 
synthesis. This thesis argues that these philosophical and theological approaches can be 
synthesized in missiological aspects. However, the history of imperialism has tainted 
 iii 
mission, leading to the argument that mission is now of questionable value. Given the 
stigma associated with mission, there are difficulties in the mediation and reconciliation 
of God and people outside of God. 
Therefore, as an alternative, this thesis presents agency theology, which links God, human 
beings and the world. Agency theology is a theology of connection, an action theology 
which acts to solve concrete problems in the world, and an apostolate theology, which 
works continuously to transform the world with apostolicity.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Presentation of a Problem and Overview of the Study 
 
 
The effort to connect scientifically and logically the gaps between subject and object, 
transcendence and immanence and abstract and actuality is fundamental to philosophy 
and theology. The issue is one of elucidating a moving process between the two extremes.  
More specifically, it is the task of explaining how human being was formed, and by 
whom. It extends beyond academic explanations of connections between theology and 
the world, to involve questions on how current politics, economics, culture and religions 
are shaped. These issues are central to this thesis. While there may be various methods 
and approaches to resolve them, I argue that out of many alternatives, ‘agency’ is key. 
 
The term ‘agency’ has been widely used with different definitions and meanings. The key 
meaning of agency is connection, which implies the presumption that the world should 
not be understood in isolated compartments. Human beings and the world are always 
connected into something. Through these relationships and connections, we can identify 
what is happening in our lives and in our environment. In other words, through the agency 
that inter-connects the subject and the object, the identity of the subject and the content 
of the object are revealed. The same relationship can be observed when subject and 
predicate in a sentence are connected by copula in order to transfer specific meaning. 
Another meaning of agency can be interpreted by the use of the verbs ‘do’ and ‘perform’.1 
In order to find out who the subject is, the subject must be expressed by actions. The 
                                                 
1 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Acts and Other Events (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 24. 
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specific actions that present the subject (called Action 1 [A1], [A2], [A3], [A4] … [An]) 
are the agencies of the subject. The agent is the performer who practices the will and 
presence of the subject by taking actions. Therefore, scholars who research actions will 
encounter logical problems if they seek to explain those actions without acknowledging 
agents. Thus, the materials or properties of action are elucidated by the agency theory.2 
Thirdly, agency originates from the subject, and is sent to a particular context where it 
can perform the will of the subject. Having completed that task, agency then returns to 
the subject. Therefore, there is no agency without subject and if agency diverts from the 
will of the subject, it loses its meaning. However, agency is related not only to subject, 
but also to object. Having been sent by the subject it becomes object and establishes a 
close relationship between subject and object.  
 
The term ‘agency’ is widely used in various areas of academia. The concept of agency 
has played a significant role in sociology.3 It is also actively studied in philosophy,4 
ethics,5 education, and psychology.6 If the studies of agency are understood accurately 
and applied properly with regard to the Christian mission, this will open the door to a new 
                                                 
2 Alvin I. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Antony Flew 
and Godfrey Vesey, Agency and Necessity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); David Charles, “Emotion, 
cognition and Action”, in: Agency and Action, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 55, ed. John 
Hyman and Helen Steward (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
3 See for example, Barry Barnes, Understanding Agency: Social Theory and Responsible Action 
(London: Sage Publication, 2000); Margaret S. Archer, Being Human: The Problem of Agency (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
4 Michael E. Bratman, Structures of Agency: Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); 
Gary Watson, Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004); Irving 
Thalberg, Enigmas of Agency (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1972); Catriona Mackenzie, “Practical 
Identity and Narrative Agency”, in: Practical Identity and Narrative Agency, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and 
Kim Akins (New York: Routledge, 2008); Carol Rovane, The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary 
Metaphysics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
5 George W. Harris, Agent-centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 
6  Hindy Lauer Schachter, Public Agency Communication: Theory and Practice (Chicago: 
Nelson-Hall, 1983). 
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identity of mission theology. However, the notion of agency has not been extensively 
applied in Christian mission studies. Of course, the co-relationship between Christian 
mission and church, missionaries, para-church, mission policies, culture, art and Christian 
documents are often regarded as examples of God’s agency, and some research articles 
and books do deal with these forms of agency. For example, in Bruce J. Nicholls edited 
book entitled The Church - God’s Agent for Change, the church is regarded as God’s 
main agent, with a key role in the Christian mission.7 Robert King, in his book The 
Meaning of God, illustrates ‘agency’ in ‘the dimension of systematic theology’. 8 In 
addition, we can find research on agents in the field of cross-cultural ministry; for 
example, in Agents of Transformation: A Guide for Effective Cross-Cultural Ministry, 
Sherwood G. Lingenfelt regards Christian cultural workers as agents of transformation 
‘who bring the good news of the gospel to members of a community’.9 When we seek a 
theory of agency consistently applied and embedded into concrete contexts, we can draw 
on Laurent W. Ramambason’s thesis, Missiology: Its Subject-Matter and Method - A 
Study of Mission-Doers in Madagascar,10 but this work, too, does not provide us with an 
‘agency theology’ as part of mission theology.  
 
However much we widen our search, it is hard to find comprehensive studies on agency 
theory in Christian mission studies, albeit, as mentioned before, the notion of ‘agent’ or 
‘agency’ does appear in a number of mission studies related researches. Hence, this vital 
theme requires further investigation, not only to illuminate elements of missiological 
                                                 
7  Bruce Nicholls, The Church (Exeter, UK: Published on behalf of the World Evangelical 
Fellowship by the Paternoster Press, 1986). 
8 Robert H. King, The Meaning Of God (London: S.C.M. Press, 1974). 
9 Sherwood G Lingenfelter, Agents of Transformation: A Guide for Effective Cross-Cultural 
Ministry (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1996), 9. 
10 Laurent W. Ramambason, Missiology: Its Subject-Matter and Method (Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang GmbH, 1999). 
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direction, methodology, and theory, but also, as indicated by the title of this thesis, 
potentially as an important theory of Christian theology. 
 
If the concept of agency could be applied in theology with precise and extensive 
terminology, theology would become a more elaborated and systematic academic study, 
with less logical leaps and bounds. 11  Of course, theology uses speculative and 
metaphysical concepts, hence will rarely give hard evidence, but with a deepened thinking 
about core terms like ‘agency’ we may also deepen missiological and theological 
discourses.  
The term ‘agency’ can connect logically heaven and earth, the transcendent and the finite. 
First, agency theology creates a bridge between theology and people. It enables human 
beings to interpret the world and disclose their true identity, which is the ultimate task of 
theology. Otherwise theology would fail to demonstrate the relationship between God and 
human being logically and academically; it would become a vague area, full of abstract 
words. Secondly, agency theory gives a clear explanation of the holistic content of 
theology, and facilitates a connective theology by building a bridge between God and 
human being. Therefore, while considering agency theology as one category of theology, 
this thesis aims to establish the possibility and potential of an agency theology that 
connects God, humanity, the world and church.  
 
1.2 The Methodologies and Limits of the Study 
 
                                                 
11 Herb Gruning tried to disclose the relationship between God and His activity through the notion 
of agency (Herb Gruning, “Divine - Cosmic Interaction Some Contemporary Alternatives” [Doctor of 
Philosophy diss., McGill University, 1998]). 
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In order to move into a new area of ‘agency theology’, it is necessary to clarify the 
meaning of agency. The term is widely used in diverse areas. This thesis does not aim to 
analyse every detail or present every definition; nor will it attempt to explain all existing 
agency models or the concepts of mediation that connects the transcendent world with 
the finite or the individual with society. The major focus of this thesis is to introduce the 
concept of agency in placing it into its philosophical history as a kind of preparation for 
a theoretical foundation of agency theology. It cannot provide a developed agency 
theology itself. To achieve the rather modest purpose, the main task is to analyse and 
interpret the concept of agency as presented in the works of Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. 
 
Here, the choice of Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx as main interlocutors is guided by the fact 
that their key ideas relate to the topic of ‘connection’, and they acknowledge the important 
role of the agent to solve the problem. Throughout his philosophy, Hegel examined how 
consciousness and absolute spirit are specifically connected to citizen, society, culture 
and politics. Considering the nature of human being as the starting point for specifying 
religion and theology, Feuerbach identified the issue of connection between the human, 
religion and nature. Then, according to his belief that the connection studied by these two 
scholars was far distant from actuality, Marx expanded the concept of connections into 
politics and economics. He considered human agency, the proletariat, as the key power 
to correct and solve the problems of isolation and contradiction. The intellectual 
inheritance of these main interlocutors provides a foundation to elaborate the theories of 
modern agency scholars.    
 
Hence the thesis adopts the method of literature review, with reference first to the works 
of these three philosophers who provided the foundation of agency theory, and then to 
 6 
the writings of other scholars who have interpreted and structured their ideas. In order to 
strengthen understanding of the foundation of agency theory, this study will include the 
background and contextual information of how the philosophers developed their ideas, 
and will therefore draw upon much apparently indirectly related content. Rather than 
finding solutions to specific issues or questions, the scholars’ quotes about agency will 
be explained and discussed. Then, their concept of agency will be examined and 
compared to the ideas of modern agency scholars. The comparative analysis will help to 
establish the concept of agency broadly and clearly. 
 
Agency means building a bridge between I and thou, I and the world, religion and society, 
transcendent being and finite being, or subject and object. Therefore, in order to study the 
meaning and content of agency, this study adopts the dialectic approach.  
 
Following the philosophical review of agency, the thesis adopts the method of theological 
review. In particular it examines the ideas of Barth, who criticized 19th century humanism 
and humanistic theology. Barth clearly pointed out the problem of regarding ‘human’ as 
the absolute being, showing the limitation in the concept of humanistic and reasoning-
oriented agency. In his historical analysis of Protestant theology of the 19th century he 
used the term ‘the Living Man’, to argue that while ideas, arts, books and philosophers 
have passed away, they remain alive as a ‘living voice’. Barth was certain that this living 
voice could be analysed, because the voice is the subject matter of history. Hence, he 
shows that Protestant theology of the 19th century can be analysed and explained as 
academic study, and can be a guide for modern theology. Barth insisted that human beings 
acquire knowledge of the transcendent world and understand God only when God reveals 
Himself. The statement ‘God reveals Himself’ implies that God is Himself the agent. 
 7 
Jesus Christ incarnated in order to become the agency connecting between human and 
God. Jesus Christ ‘the Word’ came to the world as the Word of incarnation and revelation. 
In Barth’s work the concept of God’s agency is clearly shown to mean that ‘God needs 
to reveal Himself’ in order for humanity to understand Him.  
 
In the analysis of history, Barth emphasized the role of God, particularly to connect God 
and the human. His approach was markedly different from the humanistic main 
interlocutors considered here in terms of connections between abstract and actuality, 
transcendence and immanence. In fact, the reason for choosing Barth as the anti-thesis to 
those humanistic interlocutors is that he analysed and reflected their ideas. Then, he 
clearly presented a new study about faith beyond humanistic boundaries. 
 
From the philosophical perspective, the concept of connect (agency) is ‘thesis’. From the 
perspective of Barth, God’s agency is ‘anti-thesis’. These two notions are connective 
concepts from completely opposite points of view. Therefore, in this study, it is necessary 
to devote considerable discussion to the ideas and theological positions presented by 
Barth. Taking Barth’s position, the argument of this thesis is that the synthesis of the two 
positions creates mission theology, a context wherein various theological positions are 
practiced. In response to the limitations pointed out by critics of mission theology, agency 
theology is suggested as an alternative means of possible synthesis between thesis and 
anti-thesis. Thus, the overall structure of this study consists of dialectic structures taking 
Hegel’s approach of thesis-antithesis-synthesis to explain agency and agency theology. 
Using the deductive method, the meaning and content of agency theology will be 
explained in a wide dialectical frame. As Barth made clear the relationship between God 
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and human and between subject and object, the possibility and potential of agency 
theology will be explained in terms of the analogy of relation. 
 
1.3 Outline and Plan of the Study 
 
In order to establish the possibility and potentiality of agency theology, it is necessary to 
examine the meanings of agency in different contexts, and to investigate how agency 
theory became specified as an academic theory. Those scholars who have applied 
problem-solving methods to the concept of agency have limited their investigations to 
particular side issues. For example, Michael E. Bratman and Margaret S. Archer focus on 
how the intentions, ego, wills and desires of human beings are expressed through their 
actions, while sociologists examine the structure and responsibility of agency as the 
connection between human and society. In other areas (e.g. ethics), agency is associated 
with the question of how responsibility and justice can be practiced in the world. Such 
specific issues are not sufficient to build the foundation and concepts of agency theology.  
 
If agency is the connective concept within a relationship, this implies fundamental 
questions, such as ‘what are connected to what?’ Here, the first task is to find 
philosophical answers regarding how the ideal world is connected to reality, and how the 
transcendent world is connected to the world of senses. Therefore, Chapter 2 introduces 
the German philosopher Hegel, and his explanations of how consciousness becomes 
reality and how absolute knowledge becomes specific academy, culture, citizen society 
and nation. The investigation in Chapter 2 demonstrates Hegel’s notion of Entäußerung, 
as presented in his publications, Die Phänomenologie des Geistes, Philosophy of Rig-
 9 
ht, and The Jena System, 1804-5. The concept of Entäußerung is an important 
connecting point which enables people to express themselves through labour, and to build 
human society. This study clarifies Hegel’s view of agency by acknowledging that 
Entäußerung has become the agency which connects the subject and the object. Although 
Hegel’s idea of agency attempts to specify and solve the abstract ideas in religion, it is 
still impossible to completely comprehend the religious mysteries in the world of 
metaphysics. Therefore, Chapter 3 focuses on Feuerbach’s criticism of Hegel, in which 
he argued that ‘the mystery of religion and theology lies in the essence of human being’. 
While studying the relationship between religion and humanism and the relationship 
between God and human, Feuerbach discovered the phenomenon of reversal between the 
subject and the object, whereby human (the subject) has become the object and religion 
(the object) has turned out to be the subject. Feuerbach arrived at this discovery with the 
help of Hegel’s concept of Entäußerung and dialectic approach. However, he made it 
clear that religion, which is projected by the essence of man, is actually an isolated form 
of human nature. Therefore religion, God and theology (the object) should be closely 
examined based on the essence of human being (the subject). In other words, religion, 
theologies and gods take the role of the agency which describes the essence of man.  
 
One of the major problems in the concept of agency explained by Hegel and Feuerbach 
is the lack of connection between theology and the specific context of the world and 
human life. The key elements of the human world are economy, politics, culture, and 
social structures. The question of how human beings can live without isolating themselves 
from the world, fulfilling their ability by their labours, is clearly presented in Marx, and 
Chapter 3 also considers his question of how human alienation appears in the world. 
Based on publications such as Ö konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 
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1844, Die deutsche Ideologie, Grundrisse zur Kritik der politischen Ӧkonomie, and Das 
Kapital, the chapter examines Marx’s ideas about agency.  
 
Chapter 4 examines key theories about agency as presented by several scholars. 
Connective theory is closely examined in terms of the structures, meanings, and content 
of agency theory.  
However, there are limitations to explaining theological issues using scientific knowledge.  
Here, we need to consider Barth’s argument that in order for humans to understand Him, 
God must reveal Himself. As Wittgenstein acknowledged in the later stages of his 
philosophical career, there are mysteries that cannot be explained by reasoning or science. 
Barth’s theology departed from the prevailing reasoning-oriented understanding, taking a 
totally different approach in order to show who the agency is, and how that agency guides 
the human being to understand the transcendent area. According to Barth, God Himself 
is the one who reveals His world and His will and He is the agency. Through the process 
of agency, humans can reason and understand God. Furthermore, human beings can 
understand the transcendent world through God’s self-revelation. This is the way in which 
the infinite God relates to finite humanity, what Barth called ‘the knowledge of faith’. 
Hence, Barth’s theology needs to be extensively investigated in terms of the concept of 
agency. Chapter 5 examines how Barth understands the notion of agency, and how he 
applies it in works such as Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, Natural Theo
-logy: Comprising ‘Nature and Grace’ By Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the R
eply ‘No!’ By Dr. Karl Barth’ and Church Dogmatics. 
 
In the history of mission, the issue of agency has remained a constant throughout the 
periods of emergence, growth and decline of Christianity. Chapter 6 presents the trends 
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of mission theology from the perspective of agency. In particular, Bosch recommends 
ecumenical mission as a new mission paradigm. After reviewing Bosch’s ideas, the 
chapter presents important debates about agency, focusing on the relationship between 
church and mission. The debate is categorized into several trends of mission theology. 
While examining the limitation of each trend, agency theology will be presented as an 
alternative idea to mission theology. 
1.4 The Aim and Contribution of the Study 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to establish the possibility of agency theology as an 
alternative to mission theology. In other words, the aim is to reconceptualize mission 
theology as agency theology. There are two main reasons for this. First, the term ‘mission’ 
is heavily criticized today, and has been abandoned by many. It is seen by an increasing 
number of scholars as being misused or stigmatized, tainted by the expanding imperialism 
that accompanied missionaries over past centuries.12 In fact, we are faced with frequent 
calls for a ‘mission moratorium’ 13  and a radical rethinking of mission. Jeff Cox is 
probably the most outspoken scholar to have highlighted the close connection between 
colonialism and mission, in his book The British Missionary Enterprise since 1700.14 For 
instance, Cox notes that the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts 
                                                 
12 Articles on these issues include: Ian H. Douglas and John B. Carman, “The Post-Colonial 
Crisis of Missions”, and Horst Gründer, “Christian Mission and Colonial Expansion - Historical and 
Structural Connections”. 
13 The main officially published calls were by Emerito P. Napil and John G. Gatu. Addressing 
the National Council of Churches Department of Overseas Ministries in New York, Gatu stated that all 
missionaries should return home and withdraw completely from their mission fields for at least five years 
in order to solve many problems in Mission. (John G. Gatu, “Missionary, Go Home”, International 
Documentation 63, [July 1974], 70).    
14 Jeff Cox, The British Missionary Enterprise Since 1700 (London: Routledge, 2008). 
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(SPG), and the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge15 (SPCK) managed slave 
farms in order to raise mission funds. The Church Missionary Society (CMS) is also 
implicated in involvement in slavery.16 In the early nineteenth century, it was common 
for slave farms to be given to mainstream mission boards as a donation when the Christian 
owners returned to Britain. The mission boards did not free the slaves, but kept them, 
using the income as missionary funds. This example shows that, whether intentionally or 
not, the imperialist colonialist policies and the mission boards were closely related.  
 
The second reason for the reconceptualization is related to the development of the latest 
communication facilities and means of transportation, which have caused exponential 
alterations to the global village.17 Since the content of ‘mission’ has changed, it seems 
anachronistic to keep the same terminology. However many times David Bosch refers to 
the paradigm shift in mission, can rational human beings who are entangled with the form 
of language really create a new paradigm? In other words, we should have found another 
more appropriate word for ‘mission’ but have so far failed to do so. Jesus’ words ‘Neither 
do men put new wine into old wine-skins: else the skins burst, and the wine is spilled, 
and the skins perish: but they put new wine into fresh wineskins, and both are preserved’ 
(Matthew 9:17),18 reinforce the importance of what needs to be done.  
 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 36-37, 44-47. 
16 Ibid., 88. Cox indicates that “the CMS secured passage of the two men to Sierra Leone in 1804. 
One of them became government chaplain, and the other disgraced the mission by becoming involved in 
the slave trade.”    
17  See, Theo Sundermeier, “Interkulturelle Theologie im Kontext der Glogalisierung”, In 
Intercultural Perceptions and Prospects of World Christianity. 150. Eds. Richard Friedli/ Jan A. B. 
Jongeneel/ Klaus Koschorke/ Theo Sundermeier/ Werner Ustorf (Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang, 2010), 
59-69. 
18 The Holy Bible containing the Old and New Testaments [Being the Version set Forth A.D. 
1611], The New Testament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1891), 7. 
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This thesis does not propose ‘agency’ as a replacement for ‘mission’, since it highlights 
only the specific element of transmission, leaving aside numerous other aspects which 
have been and are covered by mission studies. Nevertheless, our focus on a critical 
reflexion of the communicative moments of ‘mission’ may enhance our understanding of 
related areas. Before starting to work out the breadth of the notion of ‘agency’ in mission 
studies, one has to face the problem that the term is used without much questioning, both 
in that field and in the wider area of theological studies.  
 
To gain an insight into the semantics and epistemology of agency, we must first make a 
‘detour’ to its prominent use in philosophical intellectual history. Three names come 
instantaneously to mind when we approach ‘agency’ in the history of ideas: Georg 
Wilhelm Hegel, his pupil Ludwig Feuerbach, and his adept Karl Marx. That is why we 
attempt to assemble Hegel’s, Feuerbach’s and Marx’s important notions of agency, before 
we add the thoughts of modern scholars who study agency and, to some extent, 
consciously or unconsciously deploy earlier philosophical concepts. This approach leads 
us, of course, beyond the boundaries of mission theology in the modern era, but it creates 
a philosophical-theological basis for developing an agency theology.  
 
In summarizing the various definitions of agency, we find twelve main types:  
1. The agency shares objective and subjective identity as an executer (reflection): Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.  
2. The agency is the mediator of the object and the subject (dialectic): Hegel, again. 
3. The agency excludes self-consciousness and is embodied in culture or Zeitgeist 
(actuality): Hegel, too. 
4. The agency reveals hidden secrets as a discloser (projection): Ludwig Feuerbach. 
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5. The agency transforms from “I” to another “I” or “thou” or “the object” 
(objectification): Feuerbach, again. 
6. The agency is the transformer of history, the proletariat that activates self-activity 
(transformation): Karl Marx. 
7. The agency is a process of self-creation of the subject as self-activity (objectification): 
Marx, again. 
8. The agency is a logical tool which explains the embodiment of human beings’ volition, 
desire and intention (causation, reduction): Margaret S. Archer, Michael E. Bratman. 
9. The agency is the self and person which triggers certain action and behaviour 
(causation): Alvin I. Goldman. 
10. The agency is the author, the root and the initiator of act (agent-causation and event-
causation): Goldman, again.  
11. The agency connects human beings with God, Jesus Christ and Holy Spirit. Inside 
Jesus Christ lie the qualities of God and humans: He is the absolute connector (Kenosis: 
incarnation): Karl Barth. 
12. The agency are churches, missionaries, religions and the world: contemporary 
missiologists. 
 
In what follows, all twelve types will be looked at. The first three will be dealt with in the 
chapter on Hegel, the fourth and the fifth will be discussed under Feuerbach, the sixth and 
the seventh under Marx, and the eighth to the tenth in relation to contemporary agency 
theories; the eleventh will bring us back to Karl Barth in Chapter 5. The twelfth will be 
investigated agents in mission by evangelical scholars and ecumenicals. 
This thesis will present the historical frame, definition and content of agency theology. In 
doing so, it will discuss the possible benefits of agency theology. As pointed out earlier, 
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first, agency theology offers a new paradigm to overcome the problems and limitations 
of the existing mission theology. Secondly, agency theology points to various aspects of 
agencies of God, which connect God, humanity and the world. As a theology of 
acceptance, it does neither exclude nor undermine other stances. Thus, agency theology 
has significant implications for the ecumenical movement, encouraging people to 
understand, take part in dialogue with and support all those who undertake the 
responsibilities of agency. It has potential to become a dynamic theology like public 

















                                                 
19 See, in particular, Sebastian C. H. Kim, “Freedom or Respect?: Public Theology and the 
Debate over the Danish Cartoons”, in: International Journal of Public Theology 1.( Koninklijke Brill NV, 








The ultimate enquiry of philosophy is about human being. Given the complexity and 
diversity of humanity, and our still limited knowledge, it is difficult to establish any clear 
definition of what human being is. Jerome M. Segal believes that ‘human beings are 
inherently fragmented into two modes of being - facticity and transcendence’.20 As a 
result of such transcendental factors, knowledge on human being needs a premise and a 
condition. In fact, all theories of knowledge have either presuppositions or conditions, as 
explained in detail by Keith Lehrer.21 Yet, how can we prove a priori arguments, given 
their intrinsic presuppositions and conditions? On the other hand, not every statement is 
based on presuppositions, regardless of claims to be truthful and academic. Interestingly, 
according to some analytic philosophers, the subject of humanity is dissociated from the 
academic domain. Connecting the ‘death of God’ with the ‘dissolution of humanity’, 
Margaret S. Archer argues that the dissolution has been brought about by ‘social 
imperialism and linguistic terrorism’, 22  which she criticizes as key factors of 
                                                 
20 Jerome M Segal, Agency and Alienation: A Theory of Human Presence (U.S.A.: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1991), viii-ix. 
21 Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p.9, 12, 13. 20. He maintains that 
“The first condition of knowledge is that of truth. The second condition of knowledge is belief. The third 
condition affirms the need for justification, and thus requires explication of the manner in which our claims 
to knowledge are justified. The fourth condition is justification without falsity.” He replaced the word 
‘belief’ with ‘acceptance’ as the second condition of knowledge in his extended book, Theory of Knowledge 
in 1990.  
22  Margaret S. Archer, Being Human: The Problem of Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp.22-34. Archer explains that “the postmodernist denies human subjects any form 
of external mastery over society’s development and form” (Ibid., 24), and “humanity was increasingly 
turned into an entity constituted by language - movement from subject to subjectification and subjugation” 
(Ibid., 25).        
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postmodernism. In other words, the metaphysical and holistic human being disappeared 
from the philosophical domain, and the human being came to be seen as a material which 
is and can be moulded by social power, structure and ideology. Philosophers have either 
opposed or supported this postmodern trend, with supporters demanding that opponents 
elucidate the reason for their opposition in rational and academic ways. Against the trend 
seen in Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard’s dissolution of humanity and Althusser’s 
ideological interpretation of humanity, Archer argues that ‘postmodernism cannot 
dispense with the human being’;23 she believes that the interplay between humanity and 
practical reality, for which the analytic philosophers offer no solution, should be 
examined. Roger Trigg, in his own criticism of the dissolution of humanity by linguistic 
terrorism, argues that ‘when everything is linguistically constructed, language itself will 
collapse’. 24  Analytic philosophers and postmodern scholars, such as Wittgenstein, 
Foucault, Derrida, Levi-Strauss, Althusser and Lucan, demolish the anthropocentric 
subject-concept of the Enlightenment because they believe that ‘all forms of humanism 
are considered to be “ideological” since they distortedly take our wholly superficial 
subjectivity seriously’.25  
 
In the face of analytic philosophers’ attack on the notion of metaphysics and religious or 
ethical concepts under the cloak of scientific verification, Archer and Bratman present 
the agency theory as a way to solve the transcendent and philosophical puzzles of human 
being. Undoubtedly, there have been efforts in the psychological and philosophical 
domains. Whilst psychologists have studied the self and analysed human beings as objects 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 50. 
24 Roger Trigg, Rationality and Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 159. 
25 Margaret S. Archer, Being Human: The Problem of Agency, 28. 
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of social economics, philosophers have tried to analyse human being. Nevertheless, it 
seems that with the emergence of agency theory, there was a resurgence in the holistic 
research on human being. In the philosophical domain, the theory of agency seems to be 
an important toolbox for clear disclosure without giving up the important factors of 
human being.  
 
 
In order to rebuild an agency theory and apply it to the theological sphere, I will focus, 
above all, on investigating the relationship between the notions of agency and 
‘alienation’, since if we are to capture the philosophical meaning of agency, we cannot 
ignore the philosophical notion of alienation. This is because the notion of alienation can 
elucidate not only the relationship between the subject and its object, but also how 
dialectic is related to actuality and agency. Then, I will examine human nature and agency 
theory. In doing so, I will suggest that agency theory could be a solution to mediate the 
extremes26 in philosophical domains. 
 
One of the most difficult problems in the philosophical sphere is that philosophers attempt 
to verify scientifically and logically issues of the metaphysical world. If such 
philosophers remove metaphysical issues from the domain of a science, we will lose much 
of our spiritual heritage, which exists in the process of history or culture even if it cannot 
be verified. It seems that Hegel never abandons issues of the metaphysical world, just as 
he never ignores the actuality of the physical world.     
                                                 
26 Here, I use this term as a paradoxical thesis, by which I mean paired concepts such as ‘God 
and Man’, ‘relativism and absolutism’, ‘past and present’, ‘infinite and finite’, ‘transcendent being and 
being-facticity’. The two entities form a paradoxical contradiction but also need each other logically, 
because if we relinquish one extreme in order to emphasize the other extreme, we would not construe both 
of them. 
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Before embarking on a definition in terms of the relationship between agency and 
alienation in Hegel’s thought, the two notions of alienation and agency will be 
investigated individually. 
 
The term agency has been used in various ways, from theoretical reflexions to practical 
domains. In particular, it seems to me that the term is a key tool for construing the concept 
of mediation between a subject and its object. In addition, if we intend objectively to 
know or analyse a self-activity or the process of an activity between a subject and its 
object, where mediation is part of this activity, there we are prompted to the concept of 
agency. Interestingly, some scholars consider this concept of agency as deeply associated 
with the concept of alienation, as reflexion and mediation presuppose a form of 
distancing.27 In particular we find this reflecting on the notion of alienation in Hegel’s 
Entäuβerung, Feuerbach’s Gegenständlichkeit and Marx’s Entfremdung. Through a 
comparison of how these scholars understood the notion of alienation, I will suggest how 
the concept of agency made its way into the philosophical and theological domains. 
 






                                                 
27 See, in particular, Allen Speight, Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); Jerome M. Segal, Agency and Alienation: A Theory of Human 
Presence (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1991); Evan Tiffany, “Alienation and Internal 
Reason for Action”, Social Theory and Practice, Vol.29, No.3 (July 2003), 387-418, and Carol Rovane, 
“Alienation and the Alleged Separateness of Persons”, The Monist, Vol.87. No.4, (Illinois, 2004), 554-572.   
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Entäuβerung is one of the central concepts of Hegel’s philosophy, particularly in his 
books, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) and Rechtsphilosophie (1822). Hegel uses 
this term to disclose how humans’ Geist and Bewußtsein work in the real world. In his 
view, Entäuβerung is the crucial key to explain humans’ core activity. Accordingly, I will 
investigate how Hegel employs this term. Among the English translations, John Findlay 
and A. V. Miller render Entäuβerung as ‘externalization’,28 whereas, for example, Georg 
Lukás translates it as ‘alienation’. The latter English term, however, is reserved by 
Findlay and Miller (at least most of the time) to translate Hegel’s Entfremdung.29 How 
difficult the translation of Hegel’s language and concepts is, can be learned from a round-
table debate on the translation of the terms Entäuβerung and Entfremdung.30 In the year 
1910, J. B. Baillie translated Entäuβerung as ‘relinquishment’31 and Entfremdung as 
‘estrangement’.32 More recently, Kenley R. Dove rendered Entäuβerung as ‘alienation’ 
and only occasionally as ‘externalization’. 33  The variations are not solely signs of 
different language usages, but reveal fundamentally different philosophical viewpoints. 
It seems that the translation ‘alienation’ for Entäuβerung is the more comprehensive, as 
it includes externalization. We will return to this matter in detail in the next chapter.  
 
                                                 
28  Howard P. Kainz, “Round-Table Discussion on Problems of Translating Hegel”, in: The 
Legacy of Hegel: Proceedings of The Marquette Hegel Symposium 1970, ed. J.J. O' Malley, K.W. Algozin, 
H.P. Kainz, and L.C. Rice (The Hague: Martinus NiJHoff, 1973), 256. 
29 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 294, 
295; ‘Entäuβerung’ translated by alienation ibid., 295. 435. 
30 Howard P. Kainz, “Round-Table Discussion on Problems of Translating Hegel”, 256. 
31 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind II, J. B. Baillie (London: Swan Sonnenschein & 
Co., 1910), 487ff, 800ff. 
32 Ibid., 488-489. Compare original version, 347-348. 
33  G. W. F. Hegel, “G. W. F. Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit Chapter 8, Absolute 
Knowing”, trans. Kenley R. Dove, in The Philosophical Forum Vol. XXXII. No. 4, Winter, Douglas 
Lackey (Wiley-Blackwell, 2001), 407. 
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To the above mentioned terms Entäuβerung and Entfremdung we have to add a third, no 
less complex, namely Gegenständlichkeit. In Hegel’s dialectic, Gegenständlichkeit 
indicates how the subject or the spirit extends its object or the actual world. Hegel made 
use of these terms, especially in his examination of practice, world and culture. Hence 
they have a particular relation to our question of agency.  
 
2.2.2 Development of the concept of Entäuβerung 
 
 
Hegel did not coin the term Entäuβerung, but he uses it frequently34 to elucidate absolute 
spirit, absolute knowledge and the relationship between subject and object. Although we 
cannot establish the exact origin of the term, the concept represented by Entäuβerung is 
widely used in the following historical texts:  
 
First, the concept of Entäuβerung can be found in the Old Testament. According to Erich 
Fromm, prophets of the Old Testament used the notion of alienation as a negative 
judgement of idol worship.35 More concretely, he suggests that idolaters bow, pray and 
sacrifice in front of the idol which they have made themselves. In this way, idolaters 
project all their own power onto the idols, which is then reflected by their alienated 
forms.36 
                                                 
34 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, System der Wissenschaft: Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie 
des Geistes, Johannes Hoffmeister (Bamberg und Würzburg: bey Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 1807; Verlag 
von Felix Meiner, 1952), 32, 347ff, 371,378,379,413ff, 538, 541, 549ff.   
35 In the Old Testament, Prophets often warn idol worshippers (Hosea 14:3, Jeremiah 10:10, 
Isaiah 44:12-19, Psalms 115). If we accept his view, the alienation concept can be traced back to before 
B.C.8C.   
36 Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD, 1956), 123; similarly 
Paul Tillich, Der Mensch im Christendum und Marxismus (Düsseldorf, 1953), 14 and K. Löwith, Von Hegel 
zu Nietzsche (Hamburg: Felix Member Verlag, 1981), 378. 
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Second, alienation can be found as a concept in the Stoics Cicero and Seneca. In this, 
often legal, environment, the term indicates selling commodities and also a loss or transfer 
of properties and rights.37  The same idea has been used in the Gnostic tradition to 
describe the divine’s power kenosis into a substantially unrelated and different or alien 
world. ‘Light [is] seen as entering the alien world on this side, going through it, and 
leaving it.’38 Gnostics also use the term ‘alienation’ as the salvific liberation of the divine 
spirit or light from its estranged dwelling in this cosmos.39  
 
Third, among the middle- and neo-platonic Gnostics, the concept of alienation re-appears 
in Plotinus’ works (205-270). It has been suggested that it can be traced back to Plotinus’ 
emanation theory, which has been translated into Latin using the term alienatio. 
According to this emanation theory, an indefinable entity or first principle came down to 
form finite beings, with the undivided One reaching out and descending from the heavens 
into the last resort of the created world. Hence, Plotinus assumes a fundamental 
connection that is not suspended by alienation. Plotinus also regards alienation as a state 
of the culmination’s contemplation that the finite being is exalted from its own world to 
a much higher one, hence describing the neo-platonic return from this bodily world into 
the spiritual realm of the intellect. The Latin term alienatio corresponds to the Greek 
ἔκστασις.40 Accordingly, Plotinus ‘always characterized alienation as a state of elevation 
(elevatio)’ not as ‘a distortion of the human realm’.41 
                                                 
37 Peter Christian Ludz, A Forgotten Intellectual Tradition of the Alienation Concept, R. F. Geyer 
& D. Schweitzer (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 22. 
38 Ibid., 23. 
39 See ibid., 24. 





These early concepts of alienation encompass a common denominator, a certain transfer 
from the subject to the object, a concept of an emergence of a subject that concretizes 
itself into an object or objects, or a move from singularity to plurality, but also, as we 
have seen in Plotinus, from bodily, cosmic plurality back to the singularity of subject and 
being. 
    
These various uses of alienation were later adopted in the broader neo-platonic Christian 
(and one could also add non-Christian) tradition, for example by St Augustine (354-430), 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and Meister Eckhart (1260-1327). Similar to Plotinus, St 
Augustine and Meister Eckhart regard alienation as a state of kenosis of the divine into 
the world, and a removal from this world into the divine realm.42 Alienation, therefore, 
is one of the foundational transcendental agents in the medieval period, and serves as a 
criterion for a mystical understanding that does not dissolve or negate a discursive 
reasoning.43 Thomas Aquinas inherited the concept of alienation from a historically and 
culturally key connection between Plotinus and Augustine, to which we also have to add 
Plato’s theologia and Aristotle’s logic and metaphysics. Meister Eckhart, with his 
creative powers, developed Aquinas’ suggestions further. 44  Apparently, for Meister 
Eckhart, alienation is the precondition for reaching true life, and is the method whereby 
                                                 
42 See Markus Vinzent, The Art of Detachment (Eckhart: Text and Studies) Vol.1 (Leuven: 
Peeters, 2011), 6-52.  
43 Peter Christian Ludz, A Forgotten Intellectual Tradition of the Alienation Concept, R. F. Geyer 
and D. Schweitzer (London, 1981), 25. 
44 Ibid. Ludz explains more concretely that Thomas Aquinas uses the alienation concept not only 
as “a preparatory stage for the real, the experience of God” but also as a connection with ecstasy: “‘Extasis 
enim quondam alienationem impotara videtur’ (‘Summa Theologica,’ I/II, q. 28 a. 3 ab.1). In the ‘Summa 
Theologica’ he essentially deals with alienation as ‘alienatio a sensibus’ (II/II, q. 173 a. 3 c). ‘Alienatio a 
sensibus’ can mean, for example, that the ‘spirit’ of the prophet is illuminated by the light.”     
 24 
God ‘gives himself and enters in with all that he is’.45 In this respect, at least for Eckhart, 
alienation would show the process of flux through which God reveals his properties to 
human beings and, conversely, how the soul in this world is re-discovering and recovering 
what she became in the very beginning, an alienation from God Himself, a real being 
which, despite all alienations experienced in her exposure to body and world, she has 
never lost. 
 
Scholars have shown that what is called German Idealism has been influenced by the 
medieval tradition of alienation. When God alienates Himself to reveal His nature for 
Himself, a concept of theological kenodoxia (Philippians 2:3) inspired by Luther and 
developed mainly by Fichte and Schelling, and which Hegel sometimes employs in his 
concept of Entäuβerung, with further influences from J. J. Rousseau, it becomes clear 
that God, as in Plotinus, Augustine, Thomas and Eckhart, has a relationship with the 
world and His creatures through God’s Entäuβerung of Himself.  
 
Hegel observes concisely the dialectic with which Jean Jacques Rousseau tends to fill the 
gap between la volonté générale (the general volition) and la volonté particulière (the 
particular will), while he also criticizes Rousseau’s key notion of natural philosophy46 
using the concept of Entäuβerung. Although Hegel based his notion of Entäuβerung on 
Rousseau’s work, which gives him an anthropological and social broadening of the 
metaphysical medieval detachment, in both his Philosophy of Right and the 
                                                 
45 Meister Eckhart, “The Talks of Instruction”, in Meister Eckhart - Selected Writings, Oliver 
Davies (London: Penguin Books, 1994), 41; Josef Quint, “Mystik und Sprache: Ihr Verhältnis zueinander 
insbesondere in der spekulativen Mystik Meister Eckharts“, Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für 
Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, Paul Kluckhohn, Hugo Kuhn und Erich Rothacker, 27. 
Jahrgang, Band XXXVII (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1953), 61. 
46  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, T.M.Knox (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), 125.  
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Phänomenologie des Geistes he goes far beyond a purely intellectual concept of 
alienation. 
  
On the question of how far Hegel’s notion of Entäuβerung is connected with the concepts 
of contemporary philosophers such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm 
Joseph Schelling, Hegel makes clear his position in Differenz des Fichteschen und 
Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie (1801). In this work, Hegel criticizes their 
Identitätsphilosophie on one hand, while on the other hand he establishes his 
philosophical system through the Entäuβerung under their influence.47 Hegel criticizes 
both the Identitätsphilosophie of Fichte, which is based on a subjective Subject-Object, 
and that of Schelling, which is based on an objective Subject-Object. He argues that they 
cannot re-establish the identity between a subject and its object because ‘the principle of 
identity does not become principle of the system; as soon as the formation of the system 
begins, identity is abandoned’.48 Here, why must Hegel introduce the system, when he 
is explicating identity between the subject and its object? It is because, according to 
Hegel, identity cannot be expressed by the application of a mathematical maxim, but only 
by the creation of the system (durch die Darstellung des Systems) in respect of the 
relationship between the subject and its object. In this respect, Hegel distinguishes his 
philosophical system from Fichte’s and Schelling’s Identitätsphilosophie by combining 
the two into his own concept, whereby the subjective Subject-Object needs the objective 
Subject-Object, and conversely the objective Subject-Object needs the subjective 
                                                 
47 Schelling often complained that Hegel and his followers “ate my bread”, meaning that 
Hegel’s thought and his followers’ philosophical systems were affected by Schelling’s philosophical 
system. (Robert C. Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G.W.F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983], 106.)   
48 G.W.F. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, H.S. 
Harris and Walter Cerf (New York: State University of New York Press, 1977), 155. 
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Subject-Object. To verify this, we should check whether the whole system is working in 
the course of movement between the subject and its object. The reason is that Hegel 
considers the truth as the result which is realized in the form of a system.49 Hegel presents 
the norm of judgment in terms of the truth as a system which is actually developed in a 
completed process between the subject and its object.50 However, according to Rosen, 
the problem in Hegel’s system is ‘that the system does not attain validity at its point of 
completion’,51 because the system itself cannot be regarded as the complete something 
or the Absolute, but only as a logical connecting between the whole and parts of the 
concept. In spite of this, Hegel insists that the science of the Absolute or the Idea must 
form a system, and throughout his works he never abandons the idea of a system which 
is a principle of a particular and the universal of philosophy.52  
2.3 Hegel and the Meaning of Entäuβerung 
 
 
Hegel is one of the towering figures of 19th century philosophy, and undoubtedly 
influenced later philosophical thinking, especially with his core idea of alienation. His 
scholarly systems are enormous and to capture the precise meaning of such a crucial term 
is far from easy. How did the notion of Entäuβerung develop in his works? 
  
                                                 
49 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbook, 
1967), 85., P. d. G., 24  
50 Robert C. Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: A study of G.W.F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 109. 
51 Michael Rosen, Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 23-24. 
52 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Science (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1975), 19. 
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Georg Lukács (1885-1971), who, of course, has a particular Hungarian Marxist reading 
of Hegel, maintains that the term Entäuβerung represents a key notion in Hegel’s 
philosophy, in particular in the Phänomenologie des Geistes.53 According to Lukács, 
Hegel often uses Entäuβerung, Entfremdung and Gegenständlichkeit as terms to embody 
the activity of consciousness of the spirit. 
 
In the Phänomenologie des Geistes the notion of Entäuβerung re-occurs time and time 
again.54 Among the different cases, the meaning of the term can be seen to be divided 
into three aspects: dialectic movement, mediation between the subject and its object and 
Dingheit or Gegenständlichkeit. What we observe in these three aspects is a crucial clue 
to establish agency theory in association with the notion of Entäuβerung. For Hegel, 
Entäuβerung can explain the movement of dialectic. In his philosophy, dialectic is a key 
philosophical methodology which recognizes the transcendent world, a genuinely human 
existence and the actuality of things in history. In other words, while we observe the 
process and the result whereby the world of spirit reveals the real world via Entäuβerung, 
we can use dialectic as a key tool to dissolve the gap between the world of spirit and the 
actual world. Hence, the principle of Entäuβerung’s movement would be dialectic, which 
dissolves or connects with the gap between actuality and reason via labour.   
 
                                                 
53 Georg  Lukács, Georg Lukács Werke, Band 8, Der junge Hegel: Ü ber die Beziehungen von 
Dialektik und Ö konomie (Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1967), 393-394, 656. 
54  Hegel uses the term Entäuβerung’ about 53 times in his book, Die Phänomenologie des 
Geistes, (1807). See, 250, 347, 348(3), 349, 351, 360, 361, 362(2), 366, 381(2), 470(2), 472, 483, 484, 501, 
506, 522, 523(2), 524, 525(2), 526, 528, 534, 538, 540, 541, 545, 548, 549(4), 551, 554(2), 561(2) 562, 
563(4), 564(2). 
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According to Hegel, what he calls dialectic is the moving principle of notion which 
produces and melts the particularizations of the universal.55 He explains dialectic more 
exactly by indicating positive content as well as negative operation, maintaining that it is 
this positive content and outcome of the determination which makes it ‘a development 
and an immanent progress’.56  Here, we can see not only the function, but also the 
possibility of dialectic. For Hegel, dialectic can construe the moving principle of thought 
and actuality. Moreover, by exposing the process of consciousness with a logical system, 
dialectic holds the possibility to elucidate the spirit of the times in the world.      
 
Furthermore, Hegel argues that ‘this dialectic is not an activity of subjective thinking 
applied to some matter externally, but it is rather the matter's very soul putting forth its 
branches and fruit organically’.57 Apparently, Hegel recognizes that the dialectic would 
explain logically the system of the world and the Entäuβerung of the spirit. 
   
However, the use of dialectic in Hegel remains controversial, criticized on the grounds 
that it ignores the Western philosophical tradition, which distinguishes dialectic and logic. 
More specifically, some scholars disapprove of the fact that Hegel denominates his 
dialectic as the science of dialectical-logic. In other words, there is sharp criticism where 
Hegel uses dialectic as logical regulation. For example, Kierkegaard criticizes that 
                                                 
55 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), 34. In German, “Das bewegende Prinzip des Begriffes, als die Besonderungen des 
Allgemeinen nicht nur auflösend, sondern auch hervorbringend”  (G. W. F. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke in 
Verbindung mit der Deutschen Forschungsgesmeinschaft, Klaus Grotsch und Elisabeth Weisser-Lohmann, 
vol. Band 14,1, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts(1821) [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009], 47.) 
56  Ibid. In German, “Die höhere Dialektik des Begriffe ist, die Bestimmung nicht blos als 
Schranke und Gegentheil, sondern aus ihr den positiven Inhalt und Resultat hervorzubringen und 
aufzufassen, als wodurch sie allein Entwicklung und immanentes Forschreiten ist.” (Ibid.)  
57  Ibid., 34-35. In German, “Diese Dialektik ist dann nicht äußeres Thun eines subjectiven 
Denkens, sondern die eigene Seele des Inhalts, die organisch ihre Zweige und Früchte hervortreibt.” (Ibid.)  
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Hegel’s logic is ‘an experiment in thought’, which is practiced for mere entertainment.58 
In addition, Theodor W. Adorno argues that Hegel’s dialectic is wrong, on the grounds 
that reason can be reduced precisely to the actuality of things.59 
  
If reason cannot capture or be reduced to the essence of things, and if there is no ring of 
connection between things and rational thought, how do we explain these relationships? 
Hegel’s dialectic suggests a new possibility for metaphysics and abstract regulations 
without abandoning a factor of science. Presumably, analytic thinking has a limitation in 
construing transcendent domains, so naturally dialectic is needed. Analysis of an object 
can show how the subject transfers from a natural thing to the form of rational thought. 
Accordingly, if we capture the holistic actuality of an object, our rational thought needs 
to reunify with an abstract definition, which comes from the analytic results of an object. 
To accomplish this reunification properly, we need to elucidate rational definitions in 
terms of the inner ground of its unification. However, it seems that this elucidation is 
outside the area of rationality. Thus, the cognition that is caused by analytic thought does 
not reach the actuality of an object, but only its externality. In Phänomenologie des 
Geistes, Hegel often mentions that mathematical objects cannot reach actual things, 
because the objects of mathematics do not exactly correspond with the actuality of 
things.60 In other words, analytic thought cannot reach an object itself and its actuality, 
                                                 
58  Søren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierkegaard, Alexander Dru (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1959), 90-91. 
59 Theodor W. Adorno, Drei Studien zu Hegel  (Frankfurt am Mein: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969), 
8 and Theodor W. Adorno, Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Rolf Tiedermann, Fünfte Auflage, 
vol. Band 6, Negative Dialektik Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (Frankfurt am Mein: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996), 
148. See Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, 
and the Frankfurt Institute (England: The Harvester Press, 1977), 63. 
 
60 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, System der Wissenschaft: Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie 
des Geistes, Johannes Hoffmeister (Bamberg und Würzburg: bey Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 1807; Verlag 
von Felix Meiner, 1952), 37. 
 30 
but only its phenomena and shadow. In this sense, dialectical thought starts when analytic 
thought cannot go beyond an object itself, or arrives at the area of limitation in 
understanding the externality of an object. Thus, abstract regulations such as the 
substance of history and the entity of nature cannot be caught or verified by reason 
without dialectic. 
  
In order to understand how dialectic forms the basis for an agency theory, we need to add 
the notion of Entäuβerung and in particular to see how Hegel resolves the actuality of 
Entäuβerung through the labour of mediation or the mediation of labour. 
 
Because dialectic and Entäuβerung are both moving principle of concept, they share a 
logical connection. The relationship between them is such that they are able to collaborate 
directly or logically with each other to expose the relationship between the subject and 
the essence of things or its object. For Hegel, dialectic makes it possible to transform from 
a form of thought to a thing itself through the Entäuβerung of the spirit. More precisely, 
it becomes clear that dialectic is a principle of movement or activity of the entire being 
rather than of the ratio alone. The movement, as Aristotle notes, could be understood as 
the process of logic, which means its effect of movement that comes from its cause, but 
it does not exist in the non-physical sense. Hume criticizes that the existing principle of 
‘cause and effect’ has a limitation in explaining all movements on the ground of the 
priority’s principle, which depends on which events occur first, second and last.61 In 
particular, while Hume observes the phenomenon of billiards, in which a ball comes to 
                                                 
61  David Hume, Enquiries: Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the 
Principles of Morals (1777), ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Second edition (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1927), 
28-29.  
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the first, the second, or the last in space-time, he recognizes that the existing principle of 
‘cause and effect’ needs to complete something in order to explain all movements. More 
specifically, it is necessary to supplement the existing principle of ‘cause and effect’ with 
the dialectic or the principle of priority in order to understand more correctly the 
movements of the subject’s Entäuβerung, because different results can occur depending 
on which action acts first or second, in both the physical and the noetic realms. 
 
Dialectic, therefore, is not only the subject that reveals quantitative, mathematical or 
logical aspects of its Entäuβerung in the appearance of things; it also connotes its 
Entäuβerung’s qualitative aspects in the world of spirit. When the subject reflects or 
activates itself into things, its object will emerge in different results or unexpected figures, 
because some movements do not take place in accordance with ‘cause and effect’ but 
would be affected by the contingency of complex movements or the change of actual 
situations. How can these phenomena be sufficiently explained? The dialectic would open 
a possibility of accessing whole areas of the world just at this point; more concretely, 
these movements of its Entäuβerung would extend into the realms of education, ethics, 
civil societies and states. Hegel suggests that dialectic would take a key role in disclosing 
concretely the actuality of the world through the relationship between the subject’s 
Entäuβerung and Bildung. 
 
Finally, dialectic encompasses both negation and affirmation of movement, in which 
emerge the substance of things and abstract thought through their Entäuβerung. In other 
words, in dialectic logic the use of negation of negation guides to affirmation, while the 
use of affirmation of affirmation could reach towards a transcendent level, beyond the 
limitation of reason. The notion of negative dialectic was picked up by Walter Benjamin 
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and further developed by Adorno,62  even if Adorno had a specific interpretation of 
Hegel’s dialectic. They consider Hegel’s dialectic as negative dialectic. In particular, 
Adorno insists that Hegel’s dialectic is dialectic not of Identität, but of Nichtidentität, 
because he believes that it is toward not an identical unity but a non-identical unity 
between being and thought, or between the subject and the object.63 According to Buck-
Morss, ‘Adorno internalized Benjamin’s philosophy in an act of Aufhebung, in all three 
senses (preserving, negating, going beyond) in this Hegelian term’.64 Hegel’s dialectic 
cannot remain within the world of the subject, but is oriented toward its other, and 
encompasses ‘a larger process toward systematic completion’, 65  especially in the 
Phänomenologie des Geistes. It seems that Adorno’s argument captures the core of 
Hegel’s dialectic, because Hegel observes precisely the relationship between the master 
and the slave in his dialectic, ‘Lordship and Bondage’. When we look at that relationship 
on the basis of Phänomenologie des Geistes,66 the slave produces and labours not for 
himself but according to the master’s will and purpose, while the master has strong self-
consciousness as he chooses death if there is not any room for freedom. However, the 
master himself cannot become a free being as long as he does not allow the slave to be a 
free being, because the master’s consciousness is limited by the slave’s service and 
labour. The appearance of unlimited freedom is false; the master cannot know real 
                                                 
62 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, 
and the Frankfurt Institute (England: The Harvester Press, 1977), xii-xiii. 
63  Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, Rolf Tiedermann, Fünfte Auflage, Band 6, 
Negative Dialektik, Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (Frankfurt am Mein: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996), 148-149. He 
insists that Hegel’s dialectical logic is destructive. See the German text, “Ihre Logik ist eine des Zerfalls: 
der zugerüsteten und vergegenständlichten Gestalt der Begriffe, die zunächst das erkennende Subjekt 
unmittelbar sich gegenüber hat. Deren Identität mit dem Subjekt ist die Unwahrheit. Mit ihr schiebt sich 
die subjektive Präformation des Phänomens vor das Nichtidentische daran, vors individuum 
ineffabile.“ (Ibid., 148.)           
64 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 170. 
65 Ibid., 63. 
66 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, System der Wissenschaft: Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie 
des Geistes, Johannes Hoffmeister (Bamberg und Würzburg: bey Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 1807; Verlag 
von Felix Meiner, 1952), 141-150. 
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freedom, but understands himself as free through the fact that he is not slave. Because the 
master does not admit the slave’s freedom, not only does he dedicate himself to enjoying 
the product of the slave’s labour and service; he also commits all his own labour to the 
slave. For this reason, the stronger the right of the master over the slave, the more the 
master becomes subordinate to the slave. In other words, the labour of the slave is 
demanded both by the thing, the commodity that is created from the materials via that 
labour, and by the master; both restart their new roles with the changed condition through 
the slave’s labour. When the bondsman produces commodities through labour, he finds 
an embodied internalization of himself in its product. In other words, the slave reflects 
his inner being from products, and this elevated inner being projects into his products. 
This process repeats again and again, so he acquires an obvious self-consciousness. Thus 
the labour is essentially spiritual, and the products, although products of Entäuβerung, 
are in reality products of Verinnerlichung or spiritualization, with the spirit of freedom 
being embedded in the slave’s product and the master’s orders becoming slavish. This 
means that the labour is a small creation of God. In other words, as the theistic idea 
alienates in nature, human beings disclose their inner being to the actual world through 
their labour. In the first step, a bondman has a simple relationship with his master through 
the thing; gradually he grasps the spirituality in the thing and this simple material 
relationship transfers to a spiritual relationship with the master. Accordingly, Hegel 
maintains that: ‘Through this recovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that 
it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he 
acquires a mind of his own.’67 When we look at the relationship between the slave and 
the master in historical actuality, there is a real possibility that the slave produces or keeps 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 149: “Es wird also durch dies Wiederfinden seiner durch sich selbst eigner Sinn, gerade 
in der Arbeit, wohin es nur fremder Sinn zu sein scheint.” 
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continuously the same status of slave, while the master maintains his own circumstance 
unchangeably as a master. However, Hegel believes that the slave is getting more freedom 
in terms of natural things through his labour, while the master is no longer a free man 
because he cannot sustain his life without the slave’s service. Ultimately, the slave 
becomes a master of all natural things via his labour, but the master transfers his free will 
to the state of bondage and will be a slave in terms of natural things. This phenomenon 
of spirit’s Entäuβerung emerges into the lives of both master and slave through the 
dialectic movement in the whole system of history.  
In this example of master and slave, what we should notice is that the relationship between 
dialectic and Entäuβerung points to the actuality of the world and the importance of 
mediating stages, such as labour, history, culture and education within societies, states or 
nations. 
                         
In conclusion, through the investigation of the relationship between dialectic and 
Entäuβerung as a movement not only of spirit, we can adumbrate the philosophical world 
and the actual world as a system of history. Hegel never ignored the fact that dialectic is 
a principle of the movement of Entäuβerung, but he progressively extended the idea that 
the tool of dialectic could clarify Entäuβerung’s movement of spirit in a universal sense. 
In addition, the dialectic would be dissolved if it did not bridge the gap between historical 
actuality and the abstract world through labour of self-consciousness.      
 




As we observed above, for Hegel’s dialectic actuality is a core notion in elucidating the 
relationship between thought and an object, as dialectic indicates that the subject orients 
its object to (the) other(s) and (the) other(s) to the subject beyond any pure logic. Such 
bridging he conceptualizes using the term ‘actuality’. 
 
In Philosophy of Right, Hegel states that ‘What is rational is actual and what is actual is 
rational.’68 This idea encompasses how, in an encounter of rational thought and object, 
they interact with each other. Hegel emphasizes that thoughts are deeply associated with 
Dasein; the thoughts and Dasein seek unity, but are unable to achieve it because they are 
in a dialectical process.69 As seen Adorno’s negative dialectic, thought and actuality 
cannot identify each other, but the proper self-sublation can bring about a development 
and progress of philosophy in dialectical process. Hegel provides the insight that in the 
process of history or spirit reality and reason do not have to be the same, as in a 
mathematical formula. Here, the question is how to translate the term wirklich, whether 
by ‘real’, or by ‘actual’. For some interpreters, the difference between ‘actual’ and ‘real’ 
is a sharp one, 70  and the translation of wirklich as ‘real’ has even been called 
                                                 
68 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford 
University  Press, 1976), 10: “Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig”, 
(Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Gesammelte Werke in Verbindung mit der Deutschen 
Forschungsgemeinschaft, Klaus Grotsch und Elisabeth Weisser-Lohmann, vol. Band 14,1, Grundlinien der 
Philosophie des Rechts (1821) [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009], 14); cf. S.W. Dyde translates this 
sentence as “What is rational is real; And what is real is rational.” (Georg Wilhelm Fridrich Hegel, Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right, S.W. Dyde [London, George Bell and Sons, 1896], xxvii.) However, it seems to me 
that Knox’s translation is more acceptable and more valid.   
69 See the explanation of Louis Dupré, “The identity of thought and reality, by which the real 
reveals itself in thought and thought realizes itself in reality, is not static: it is a dialectical process which is 
never completed.” (Louis Dupré, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism [New York: Harcourt, Brace 
& World, Inc., 1966], 42.) 
70 See T. M. Knox in: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, T. M. Knox 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), vi. Hegel maintains that “if reflection, feeling, or whatever form 
subjective consciousness may take, looks upon the present as something vacuous and looks beyond it with 
the eyes of superior wisdom, it finds itself in a vacuum, and because it is actual only in the present, it is 
itself mere vacuity.” (Ibid., 10).   
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scandalous.71 In Philosophy of Right, Hegel insists that ‘rationality enters upon external 
existence simultaneously with its actualization’.72 It is clear that by Wirklichkeit Hegel 
means not reality but actuality, because the notion of actuality is quite different from the 
concept of reality. For instance, in explaining ‘actuality’ Hegel refers to Aristotle’s 
metaphysics, in which ‘existence in act is the full realization of the form in the sensible 
object’.73 Why does Hegel so explicitly refer to Aristotle in this context? The reason is 
that Hegel regards himself ‘as occupying in his own polemic against Kant’. 74 
Accordingly, Hegel’s position is closer to Aristotle than to Plato, because he considers 
that ‘there is no “intelligible” world of the beyond to oppose to the “sensible” world, 
because the sensible world is the thought itself, or “transformed into thought”’. 75 
However, Hegel does not regard actuality as reality like Aristotle does. In Hegel’s 
perspective, thought transforms thoroughly all things into abstract notion, and does not 
form materia prima into actual reality. In Hegel, thoughts form reality, Wirklichkeit, in 
all its concrete forms.76 Clearly, Hegel does not regard Wirklichkeit simply as reality, but 
considers rather that in the encounter between thoughts and things they interact with each 
other through the process of a dialectic movement. 
 
                                                 
71  Béatrice Longuenesse, Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics, Nicole J. Simek (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 110. 
72 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 10.: In German, “Denn das 
Vernünftige, (was synonym ist mit der Idee,) indem es in seiner Wirklichkeit zugleich in die äußere 
Existenz tritt.” (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Gesammelte Werke in Verbindung mit der Deutschen 
Forschungsgemeinschaft, Klaus Grotsch und Elisabeth Weisser-Lohmann, vol. Band 14,1, Grundlinien der 
Philosophie des Rechts (1821) [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009], 14).    
73 Béatrice Longuenesse, Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics, 112.  




If Hegel distinguishes actuality from reality, what then does he mean by actuality?  In 
the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel states that ‘the content of philosophy is actuality’.77 In 
other words, philosophy encompasses actuality of the world and things. This is because 
philosophy has to be produced and to produce its content in the territory of the spirit, as 
well as to elucidate the content in the outward and inward domains of consciousness.78 
Thus, the content of philosophy is deeply connected with humans’ logical thought, and 
the actuality which expresses Hegel’s logic and diverse philosophical spectrums. In other 
words, for Hegel actuality is deeply connected with human thought because only then is 
it possible for the rational, logical thought or reflection to capture nature, substance and 
a system of knowledge.  
 
Secondly, Hegel looks the function of actuality as a unity between essence and existence. 
He argues that: ‘Actuality is the unity of essence and Existence; in it, formless essence 
and unstable Appearance, or mere subsistence devoid of all determination and unstable 
manifoldness, have their truth.’79 In fact, the tasks of philosophy include to elucidate 
logically the relationship between essence and its manifestation, and to construe the 
connecting point between being itself and rational activity. Hegel’s actuality can be 
defined as the essence which reveals ‘its innermost being through external manifestation’ 
                                                 
77 Karen Ng, “Hegel's Logic of Actuality”, The Review of Metaphysics (New York), 63, 1 (2009), 
144. 
78 G.W.F. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel: The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1873), 
William Wallace (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 9. 
79 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic (1831), A. V. Miller (London: 
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and as the noumenon which discloses ‘its nature in the phenomenal’.80 Here, Hegel 
regards the actual as the essence or the noumenon because actuality unifies essence and 
its manifestation, or synthesizes logically the inner and outer world of consciousness. 
Thus, it is not correct ‘to conceive the inner as the actual, and the outer as merely the 
phenomenal, the fleeting, the unreal’.81 Actuality is the immediateness, the form of the 
spirit and unity of the outer and the inner. 
  
Thirdly, Hegel sees actuality as the movement of a dialectical process. That is, he regards 
the actuality not as a fixed concept but as the dialectic of possibility. As we can see in his 
The Jena System II, 1804-5, Hegel understands actuality as a dialectical structure: thesis, 
anti-thesis and synthesis.82 Dialectical movement transfers from a possibility of thing to 
a concreteness of thought. This process encompasses the movement of reflection. Thus, 
the movement of reflection causing the manifold to be unified is actuality. As a result, the 
appearance no longer needs to be opposed to essence as a territory of being-in-itself. This 
is because the movement of essence and forms that reflection produces by thought 
determines the appearance.83 Dialectic has a meaning when the essence of things is 
caught logically by thought and when the thought is redisplayed into the system of science 
by the process of dialectic. For this reason, dialectic is not a method but rather an intrinsic 
structure, a development of the subject-matter itself in the process of Entäuβerung.84 
Above all, dialectic movement is deeply connected with actuality, which is presented to 
                                                 
80 John Grier Hibben, Hegel's Logic: An Essay in Interpretation (1902) (Canada: Batoche Books 
Limited, 2000), 97. 
81 Ibid. 
82 G.W.F. Hegel, The Jena System, 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysics, John W. Burbidge and 
George di Giovanni (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University, 1986), 41-45. 
83  Béatrice Longuenesse, Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics, Nicole J. Simek (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 111. 
84 See Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 82-83. 
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us from the inner potentiality or possibility to the outer externality through the activity of 
thought which, in fact, is not notional, but, on the contrary, concrete and actual. Viewed 
in this light, the dialectic movement is a form of transition from a pure factual potential 
to a conceptualized actuality or embodiedness. 85  Only through actuality can we 
understand an external face of what previously has been hidden as unrecognized 
potentiality, so that we meet the dialectical process in its inner move from potentiality to 
an external appearance of actuality.86 This process gives us the power of cognition, 
which captures actual reality without the process itself being an agent, actuality within 
which actualization is the agent. 
   
In conclusion, Hegel uses actuality as the content of philosophy, the unity of essence and 
existence in a dialectical process. In this case, the key question is whether, and if so how, 
it is possible to connect ‘actuality’ and ‘the content of philosophy’, if actuality is already 
the content of philosophy. Another main issue is how it is possible to regard ‘actuality’ 
as ‘the unity of essence and existence’ if actuality seems more in line with existence rather 
than with essence. The final core issue is whether it is possible to consider ‘actuality’ as 
‘the dialectical process’ if actuality is the dynamic realization of the dialectical process. 
The following subchapter will show that Hegel resolves these questions by understanding 
‘actuality’ as a radical externalization of it, or, in his own words, as embodied activity or 
labour. 
2.5 Entäußerung and Labour 
 
                                                 
85 John Grier Hibben, Hegel's Logic, 98. 
86 Ibid., 99. 
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As we have seen in the previous section, tasks remain with regard to the ‘in between’, to 
the relation between dialectic and actuality, between actuality and the content of 
philosophy, between actuality and the unity of essence and existence, and between 
actuality and dialectical process. Following Hegel, I suggest that labour is the power of 
the connection as well as the key to the movement of Entäuβerung.  
In the first place, Hegel presents the notion of Entäuβerung in order to explain his 
dialectics. He insists that ‘seine Substanz ist also seine Entäuβerung selbst, und die 
Entäuβerung ist die Substanz, oder die zu einer Welt sich ordnenden und sich dadurch 
erhaltenden geistigen Mächte’.87  From this we can see that if its substance is also 
alienation itself and if its alienation is its substance, actual beings must exist through their 
alienation.  
 
Then, how can the self-consciousness transfer from an abstract idea to concrete shapes of 
things through alienation? Interestingly, Hegel suggests labour (die Arbeit) as the answer 
to this question. In fact, labour is a form of activity that shapes actual human beings and 
society. Hegel regards labour as a step or a process of subject-object dialectics. In other 
words, Hegel sees labour as one of the mediators between a subject and its object. 
Through labour human beings would both transform nature to humanistic nature, and 
regularly unify between nature and humanistic nature. In this unification, a subject 
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recognizes that he unifies with his object through the self-alienation or the objectification 
which he expresses in his object through labour.  
 
In Hegel’s philosophy, labour can give form and shape to the subject’s idea of a thing; it 
is the link between subject and object. According to Hegel, somebody becomes conscious 
of what he truly is through labour.88 Furthermore, he insists that ‘die Arbeit hat auch die 
umgekehrte Bedeutung’, and ‘gegen die erste der ‘Entäuβerung’ und der fremden 
Ehre’.89 By elucidating this association between alienation and labour, Hegel attempts 
to reveal the process of dialectics and the actuality of the thing in the world. 
 
Lukács was one of the interpreters to pick Hegel up on his notion of Entäuβerung as 
labour (die Arbeit), which is associated with social and economic activity, and has a 
complicated connection with the relationship between the subject and its object. 90 
Heinrich Popitz also interpreted the notions of Entäuβerung and Aneignung through the 
angle of Arbeit.91 Both these philosophers emphasize Hegel’s notion of Entäuβerung as 
an embodied actuality, mediated by Arbeit to the actual world. Accordingly, the notion 
of Entäuβerung and Arbeit as expression of dialectical process exposes the actual world. 
Henry Silton Harris argues that: ‘It is this ‘made thinghood’ of self-consciousness itself 
that is the deepest significance of the repetition of the dialectic of Perception; and this is 
the most fundamental import of Hegel’s concept of Arbeit.’92 All three interpreters of 
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Hegel emphasize the concreteness and bodylines of the dialectical process which is not 
only leading to, but which by its own nature and content is radical self-negation of, 
conceptuality, by being exposed through labour. This leads to the discussion in the next 
section and links back to our outset, namely the need for the agent of such bodylines, a 
dialectical process which cannot occur in the void. 
 
2.6 Hegel’s Notion of Entäuβerung and Agency  
 
2.6.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous section, we observed the possibility of connecting metaphysical thought 
to actuality, the transcendent substance to the actual world, through dialectic and 
Entäuβerung as an academic science. However, something more is needed in order to 
resolve the gulf between the existing ‘I’ and the becoming ‘I’. Dialectic and Entäuβerung 
need ‘the mediation of a third term that comprises both thesis and anti-thesis’.93 Here, 
the key point is to find out what this third term is, and how it can resolve the impossibility 
of synthesis. Certainly, neither Fichte’s ‘I am I’, nor Schelling’s ‘absolute self’, can be 
the third term, because dialectical synthesis must not be a tautological unity between 
thesis and anti-thesis. Moreover, the term itself must not be vague.  
 
We also need to consider the ‘I’ and who the real ‘I’ should be. One of many reasons is 
that self-consciousness reveals the second ‘I’ or the third ‘I’ or the multiple ‘I’ in the 
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course of world history. However, the ‘I’ in ‘I am a human being’ is not reducible simply 
to the second or the third or the multiple ‘I’, because the actual ‘I’ intertwines with the 
external world, its surrounding situations and cultures. To offer a definition 
approximately congruent with the holistic ‘I’, we would suggest some major 
characteristics which reveal the objective or actual ‘I’, but this is not exactly the real ‘I’. 
If we believe that the actual ‘I’ reveals the real ‘I’, we need to analyse and to synthesise 
the process of the existing ‘I’ and the becoming ‘I’. For Hegel, it is obvious that this 
subjective ‘I’ reveals the objective ‘I’ through its Entäuβerung in the objectifying process. 
Here, the question is how to secure a representative of the real ‘I’. 
Hegel introduced the term Wirkende, which can be translated as agent, but is better 
understood as agency. However, the latter term should not be taken as abstract, but as a 
notion that is as concrete as agent, albeit one that encompasses not just a singularity of 
one agent or a multitude of agents, but means any agent taken in the broadest sense. Such 
agency is a third term that provides an answer to the first question, and by being 
representative of the multiple ‘I’ also answers the second question. This notion of agency 
can be used not only to connote both the movement of dialectic and the process of self-
consciousness’ Entäuβerung, but also to resolve the gulf between the two extremes. In 
addition, it is more reasonable to present the agency than the second or third or multiple 
‘I’ in order to define the real or the holistic ‘I’, because the notion of agency more widely 
encompasses the existing ‘I’, the becoming ‘I’ and ‘pure beings’ than does the multiple 
‘I’.    
Thus, I will investigate agency as the third term and as a representative of the holistic ‘I’. 
In particular, as we have seen in the previous section, I will observe the meaning of 
dialectic, actuality, mediation and externalization in association with agency and 
Entäuβerung. More specifically, I will elucidate the content of agency: 1) the agency as 
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a performer, executant (Wirkende); 2) the agency as a mediator, and 3) the agency as an 
externalizer. 
 
2.6.2 Entäuβerung and agency as a performer 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, the spirit produces many kinds of concepts 
through the process of its Entäuβerung in association with movements or the subject’s 
intentions and actions. Thus, in the process of its Entäuβerung, we can see dialectic, 
actuality, mediation, labour, externality and agency as the principle of movement. Here, 
I intend to consider the agency as performer or executioner that not only makes the 
contents of the existing ‘I’ embody the actual ‘I’, but also makes the actual ‘I’ affect the 
existing ‘I’ through the process of the subject’s Entäuβerung. In that case, the real ‘I’ is 
made by the process of dialectical interaction between the existing ‘I’ and the actual ‘I’. 
All of these ‘I’s indicate the becoming ‘I’. In fact, in The Jena System, 1804-5: Logic and 
Metaphysic, Hegel mentions that actuality (Wirklichkeit) is produced by the agency 
(Wirkende).94 
 
Below is a series of three diagrams illustrating agency’s Entäuβerung of Self-
consciousness as a performer. 
Figure 1 
  
The agency’s EntÄusserung of self-consciousness as a performer 
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As Figure 1 indicates, the holistic ‘I’ is not a static state but is a movable process of 
dialectical Entäuβerung of agencies; it is not a single person but a mutual relationship 
between persons and many kinds of the ‘I’. If so, they (he or she) do (does) not exist for 
themselves (for himself or for herself) except God and transcendent entities. Rather, we 
know many kinds of information and knowledge or multiple ‘I’s through emerging 
agencies in the concrete circumstances.  
 
What does the agency as performer mean, here, for Hegel’s philosophy, particularly in 
association with his Entäuβerung? Specifically, what does the agency perform in the 
philosophical domain? As I mentioned in the previous section, actuality is regarded as 
‘the content of philosophy’, ‘the unity between essence and existence’ and ‘the movement 
of a dialectical process’. This actuality is emerged or made concrete by agency. In that 










First of all, the agency as performer transforms from the possibility of things to the 
actuality of things. According to Hegel, self-consciousness reveals actuality of things 
through labour or Entäuβerung of spirit, which gives and takes in interaction with many 
kinds of external substances. In other words, the agency is a doer of conflicting 
relationship between being-for-self and being-for-other. Accordingly, there is an urgent 
need for the self-sufficient agency in the conflicting structure. In particular, immediate 
knowledge accompanies self-sufficient knowledge, such as ‘sense-certainty, perception 
and understanding’. 95  And even if knowledge were self-sufficient, without those 
embodied mediations it would not be what it is. Knowledge, therefore, can never be 
entirely self-sufficient, unless self-sufficiency is understood as a dynamic process of self-
production. All claims to knowledge, therefore, even to self-sufficient knowledge, ‘are 
best understood as historically situated forms of social practice in which agents seek to 
affirm for themselves that the structures of their own thought and practice really match 
up with the way things are, or have to be’.96 Any agent – and knowledge is essentially 
and even more existentially, as we have learned, agent – reflects environments, forms of 
life and social practice as well as a whole range of thoughts, desires and universal self. 
For that reason, we need to use many kinds of agent to disclose hidden consciousness or 
emerged consciousness, individual agent, conscious agent, rational agent, independent 
agent, human agent, modern agent, Faustian agent, practical agent, virtuous agent, 
inauthentic agent, free agent, organic agent, willing agent, particular agent and self-
determining agent. In using these terms, we distinguish Hegel’s terms, that is: ‘An agent 
who understands himself as part of an “ethical life”, of Sittlichkeit, will also come to 
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understand himself as a “universal self”; his personal point of view on himself and the 
world will come to be fully congruent with his impersonal point of view on the same 
things.’97 However, how have agents been constructed, and what kind of relationship is 
the one between agents and Entäuβerung? 
  
When we investigate agency in its various forms, for example in different forms of 
literature, such as ‘tragedy, comedy and the romantic novel’, which feature in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit,98 we discover the role of agency as performer more clearly in 
its ‘retrospectivity and theatricality of action and of the possibility for an action's 
forgiveness’.99 In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel’s notion of agency has three 
aspects. First, action might be defined from a voluntarist viewpoint, ‘on which the 
construal of responsibility ordinarily considers separately two items: an agent's prior 
intention (or “will”) and the deed that causally resulted or was put into play, as it were, 
by the agent’.100 Second, action might be explained from a corrigibilist perspective, 
which implies three important factors: retrospectivity, socially mediated character or 
theatricality of the context, and the construal of a practical identity with forgiveness. With 
respect to this, thought or self-consciousness develops dialectically into various forms of 
life because thought or consciousness is reflection, and this reflection ‘always marks a 
return of a subject into itself’.101 Third, an action might be disclosed from a causalist 
point of view.102 The causal account of agency would be much broader, closely relating 
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the individual to the action; thus an action might be expressive of an agent. The dialectic 
of expressivity, then, might be understood as oscillation ‘between impersonal and 
personal sides of agency’, and agents, in relation to other agents, must be situated in the 
background of certain actions.103 Agency is a doer to actualize from the possibility to 
actuality, of things or of the forms of thoughts, because actuality is ‘a self-grounded 
reality’,104 best exemplified by Hegel in literature.   
 
In conclusion, agency as performer means that all agents embody actuality in the road of 
history. In other words, any actuality of history and culture does not exist without the 
intervention of agents. If we investigate the appearance of different kinds of 
consciousness, spirit and idea in culture, civilization and society, we will recognize the 
actuality of things and history, emerged through the performance of agency. In other 
words, the actuality is shown clearly by what agents are there at that time. Presumably, 
all agents reveal their entities not just anatomically but also holistically, which 
encompasses the subject and its object through the Entäuβerung of spirit and 
consciousness within a concrete world of actions.  
2.6.3 Entäuβerung and agency as a mediator   
 
What the subject itself presents through Entäuβerung of his (or her) spirit or mind is 
another subject or its object. The problem of how the subject is connected to its object 
has become a key issue among German Idealists since Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. This 
                                                 
103 Ibid. 
104 Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 138. 
 49 
problem is whether we accept dualism or look for a connecting point or mediation 
between the subject and another subject, as well as discovering the mediation that has 
simultaneously features of both the subject and the object, because then we can see the 
actual connection between the two extremes. Agency becomes a possibility of the 
rejection of dualism, as duality ‘makes it impossible to think the unity of the Self and so 
to determine the form of a personal experience’.105 For Hegel, the agency can be a 
mediator between the subject and its object. In fact, Hegel considers the relationship 
between the subject and the object as externality within logic. More specifically, Hegel’s 
science of logic can be divided into two main parts: 1. Objective Logic: the doctrine of 
Being and essence 2. Subjective Logic: the doctrine of notion.106 Thus, I will investigate 
agency as a mediator between the subject and its predicate, between the subject and its 
object. I will suggest that Hegel sees the notion of Entäuβerung as a tool of mediation 
between the subject and its object. This path of mediation, Entäuβerung, connotes crucial 
factors of both subject and object.  
 
Following John Macmurray, we can present four propositions to construe these 
relationships, as follow: 
 
1. The Self is agent and exists only as agent.  
2. The Self is subject but cannot exist as subject. It can be subject only 
  because it is agent.  
3. The Self is subject in and for the Self as agent.  
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4. The Self can be agent only by being also subject.107  
 
The first proposition implies that ‘the Self is no longer a substance, but an organism’.108 
This definition is the existential property of the self. More specifically, Macmurray does 
not see the logical form of thought as mathematical or analytic, but as a dialectical or 
synthetic structure, 109  as in Hegel’s view. The second proposition explains how 
knowledge relates to action. It implies that ‘there cannot be a pure subject, since this is 
the pure negation of agency, and a self which does not act cannot exist’.110 The third 
proposition means that any knowledge cannot develop without a prior knowledge. The 
fourth proposition indicates that ‘there cannot be action without knowledge. Yet action is 
logically prior to knowledge, for there can be no knowledge without an actual activity 
which supports it; but there can be actual activity without knowledge.’111 Here, what 
Macmurray reveals through his propositions is how the subject relates and connects to 
agency, because the subject cannot exist without its action, predicate and object. In the 
case of Hegel, the above statements are based on the viewpoint of subjective logic, which 
is a pure self-development. Malcolm Clark sees this self-development as ‘the free, 
independent and self-determining subjective’. 112  From this subjective viewpoint, 
according to Hegel, the subject is regarded as the in-itself and predicate; however, also as 
determinate being. If subject were without predicate, it would be a thing that is empty 
without any quality and would show only the Appearance: the thing-in-itself, lacking any 
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actual entities. In other words, Hegel insists that the subject is expressed by the predicate 
in notion because ‘the individual and the particular are contingent determinations in the 
subject; it is their absolute possibility’.113 In this combination of the subject, the predicate 
and the notion, the question arises as to what the copula is. According to Hegel, ‘the 
copula indicates that the predicate belongs to the being of the subject and is not merely 
externally combined with it’.114 He goes on to explain that ‘if the is of the copula were 
already posited as the above determinate and pregnant unity of subject and predicate, as 
their Notion, it would already be the syllogism.’115 This copula as a mediation has a 
similar character to agency in respect of the connexion between the subject and the 
predicate, between the subject and its object. Here, Pinkard maintains that the agent as 
the subject is aware of himself from the standpoint of objective logic on the world.116   
Another consideration is that in the objective world, for Hegel, being and essence are 
elucidated from the standpoint of objective logic. The objective logic that shows the 
actual figure of being and essence has a deep relationship with agency, due to the fact that 
agency is mediator of how being has become being and where essence originated from. 
According to Hegel, objective logic has replaced the role of metaphysics, which in terms 
of thought alone was supposed have been a scientific construction of the world.117 In 
other words, objective logic is the true critique of former metaphysics,118 because ‘every 
transition from one concept to the next is driven by the effort to elucidate further, not only 
the content of the concept (what is thereby thought), but the nature of its relation to 
“being” (in Part 1, Book 1 of the Science of Logic, Being), to something “actual” (in Part 
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1, Book 2, the Doctrine of Essence)’.119 Accordingly, Hegel’s logic is developed from 
Being to Essence, from things to relations. These transitions can show that ‘there is 
nothing other than appearance, nothing beyond appearance’.120 Hence, logic is to be 
understood as acquiring its concrete meaning only from the perspective of human agency 
and in the context of human action,121 or conversely, the ‘agent’s relation to the sensuous 
objects of the world is therefore primarily practical and not primarily theoretical’.122 
2.6.4 Entäuβerung and agency as an externalizer 
 
In The Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel uses Entäuβerung to disclose the spirit. This 
Entäuβerung of self-consciousness embodies the externality or externalization of the 
spirit. Rodney Livingstone, in his translation of Georg Lukács’ The Young Hegel, renders 
Hegel’s term, Entäuβerung as ‘externalization’. In this translation, the term is close to 
‘externality’. In fact, Hegel observes the actual world which is made from Entäuβerung 
of spirit or self-consciousness, and then insists that ‘the Spirit of self-alienation has its 
existence in the world of culture’.123 Hegel considers the content of philosophy as an 
elucidation of how the actual world and the current culture or civil society are embodied. 
  
More precisely, the Entäuβerung of spirit embodies the externality of the world. This 
externalization is made possible by an externalizer. For Hegel, the externalizer is 
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objective spirit and subjective spirit. In a wide meaning, this externalizer is agency, which 
encompasses his subjective spirit and objective spirit, because the agency can make us 
cognize thinghood or thingness through its appearance by externalization. According to 
Jean Hyppolite, this thingness that is disclosed by alienation of self-consciousness has 
three dimensions: a thing in general (sensuous certainty), the thing with relation 
(perception) and an interior of the thing (essence, the force of understanding).124 The self 
recollects this thingness or thinghood in the process of these successive alienations of 
self-consciousness. Here, Hyppolite observes the circular action whereby ‘being has been 
resolved into self’125 and then ‘self has posed itself being’.126Accordingly, the alienation 
of self shows that ‘self itself poses thingness’ and this alienation ‘unveils the truth of the 
thing to be the self’.127  
 
Lukács also regards Entäuβerung as thinghood (Dingheit) or objectivity 
(Gegenständlichkeit), so he insists that ‘there is a broad philosophical extension of the 
concept “externalization” which then comes to be synonymous with “thinghood” or 
objectivity. This is the form in which the history of objectivity is portrayed: objectivity 
as a dialectical movement in the journey of the identical subject-object on its way back 
to itself via “externalization”.’128  
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To sum up, Hegel’s views about the subject-object relationship become a foundation of 
his science of logic. Hegel’s thought clearly has a system of knowledge with objective 
logic and subjective logic. Thus, Pinkard insists that: ‘In this way, the agent understands 
himself as the truly independent member of the relation between “subject” and 
“object”.’129 Through externalization of the subject, the individual accomplishes his (or 
her) existence and purpose. Accordingly, Hegel insists that this Entäuβerung of spirit ‘is 
at once the means, or the transition, both of the [mere] thought-form of substance into 
actuality, and, conversely, of the specific individuality into essentiality’130 (Trans. A.V. 
Miller, 298). This mediation between a subject and its object through die Arbeit often 
emerges in capitalistic form. According to Lukács, the capitalistic form of Entäuβerung 
is what Karl Marx, in Das Kapital, was to call fetishism. 131  This matter will be 
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The ideas of Karl Marx, which elucidate a gap between human nature and the actual 
world, have had an enormous influence on philosophy, social systems and politics from 
the mid-19th century to modern times. His own thought was influenced by many earlier 
and contemporary philosophers, in particular by Hegel and Feuerbach.  
 
The previous chapter presented Hegel’s notion of Entäuβerung in association with the 
agency theory. In this chapter, I will begin by exploring Feuerbach’s notion of 
Gegenständlichkeit, and then look at how Marx explores his own concept of alienation. 
It is through Feuerbach’s criticism of Hegel that Marx overcomes Hegel’s Idealism. 
Feuerbach’s terms, Gegenständlichkeit and Vergegenständlichkeit, can open the way for 
the researching of agency in more depth. Another reason is that Marx presents agency as 
creating the actual world, living culture and the essence of religion. Thus, the thought of 








3.2.1 Introduction  
 
 
Feuerbach is prominent among the scholars who have investigated nature, religion and 
human being. In particular, his notions of Gegenständlichkeit and projection are deeply 
related with agency theory, so I am going to discuss his agency theory. Here, Feuerbach 
exposes how the essence of human being can be exemplified in historical actuality or 
religion. In particular, he uses the terms Gegenständlichkeit and Vergegenständlichkeit, 
which represent the notion of nature, religion and history as a tool of logic. In addition, 
these terms are basic concepts of the movement which construes the extension of 
knowledge and the relationship between the subject and its object. As noted above, this 
idea of Feuerbach affected Marx’s notion of alienation. Therefore, in this chapter, I will 
investigate Feuerbach’s concept of Gegenständlichkeit, which is used to observe the 
relationship between religion and human beings as a genus. Then, the problem of 
connecting the subject with its object will be examined. Finally, the notion of 
Gegenständlichkeit will be explored in association with agency theory. 
3.2.2 Gegenständlichkeit and Ludwig Feuerbach’s essence of 
humanity as a genus 
 
Human being as a genus, or more specifically genus essence, is a key notion in the thought 
of Ludwig Feuerbach. In establishing a new philosophy he argues that human being 
should be the starting point, the sole, universal and primary object, including nature, 
which is a foundation of human being.132 Here (at least in the later Feuerbach), the 
                                                 
132 Ludwig Feuerbach, Sämtliche Werke II, W. Bolin and F. Jodi, Grundsätze der Philosophie 
der Zukunft (1843) (Stuttgart:1959), See, part:1„die neue Philosophie: nur das Menschliche is das Wahre 
 57 
human being does not mean an individual or particular person, but Humanity, a genus 
essence, the universal being that has desire, feeling and a basic conviction (die 
Gesinnung) as a sensible person.133  In other words, a universal character of human 
consciousness is found by a genus character of human beings, originated from feeling, 
which is produced by history. This raises the question of how the essence of human being 
becomes religion, and whether or not there is a logical leap. In addition, this chapter will 
investigate whether Marx’s criticism of Feuerbach’s thesis is justified. 
 
Feuerbach’s famous declaration that ‘the secret of theology is anthropology’134 indicates 
how the essence of man is transformed into all areas. In other words, according to 
Feuerbach, the essence of every concept, and hence also ‘the essence of religion reveals 
and expresses nothing other than the essence of man’.135 The focus of this section is not 
to investigate whether this statement means Feuerbach is an atheist, as Hans W. Frei 
argues in his article, ‘Feuerbach and Theology’.136 Rather, it is to explore how Feuerbach 
makes the essence of man transform the essence of everything, including religion. To do 
so, it is necessary first to explain the meaning of essence. 
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135 Ibid. 
136 Hans W. Frei, "Feuerbach and Theology", Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
(Oxford University Press) Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep., 1967), 250-256. Here, Hans W. Frei looks into two types 
of atheism in the nineteenth century: first, theistic notion or language is meaningless (253); second, “man 
is in principle nothing more than a collocation of atoms, like the rest of the material world” (251). 
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For Feuerbach, the ‘essence’ is key to the criticism of rationalism, the critique of religion 
and a rejection of all metaphysics. By essence, Feuerbach means a censor of philosophy 
and religion. Thus, the essence is not only a particular philosophical text, but one that is 
written in a particular time. According to Marilyn Chapin Massey, the essence is created 
under the circumstance of censorship. Accordingly, Massey argues that Feuerbach’s 
language is a compound of rhetorical and philosophical elements.137 However, it seems 
that Massey’s argument is not sufficiently persuasive, because the notions of essence, 
consciousness and species occur frequently in the language of German Idealism of that 
period, as Massey herself notes.138 Moreover, Feuerbach’s arguments include severe 
criticisms of the contemporary Christianity; he himself stated that: ‘I was seized - I myself 
do not know how - by the spirit of German censors.’139 For Feuerbach, the essence is the 
first principle and the actuality of cosmos, history, and nature. He develops his arguments 
with the essence as the starting point. For instance, the essence of human being as a 
species projects the essence of religion. Feuerbach gives the example of the circulation 
of the blood to explain the relationship between the essence of man and the essence of 
religion: 
 
As the action of the arteries drives the blood into the extremities, and the action of 
the veins brings it back again, as life in general consists in a perpetual systole and 
diastole; so is it in religion. In the religious systole man propels his own nature from 
                                                 
137  Marilyn Chapin Massey, "Censorship and the language of Feuerbach's ‘Essence of 
Christianity’ (1841)", The Journal of Religion (The University of Chicago Press), Vol. 65. No.2 (April. 
1985), 175. 
138 Ibid., 174. 
139  Ludwig Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future (1843), Manfred Vogel 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986), 3. 
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himself, he throws himself outward; in the religious diastole he receives the rejected 
nature into his heart again.140  
  
The idea expressed here is that the human being projects his spiritual life and social 
volition into religion, which is reflected by human beings’ desires. In particular, the 
phrase ‘perpetual systole and diastole’ is important in this context, because it reveals how 
the essence of man interacts with biological necessity with the essence of religion. 
Feuerbach regards the life of religion as a process of circulation, repeating continuously 
from fractions to integers, from the real to the ideated, and from thought to sensuous 
perception unless the body which is constituted a blood vessel has heart trouble or dies. 
In other words, in Feuerbach’s thought there are no dualistic extremes, but a monistic 
process to the exclusion of transcendent spheres. Thus, we can call him a monistic 
dialectician or monistic materialist, because he unites the two extremes, God and human 
beings, with love or the property of humanity.141  
Feuerbach classifies Hegel’s philosophy as ‘a circle of circles’, which is ‘the symbol and 
the coat of arms of speculative philosophy’.142 He wants to revise this philosophy to add 
that the circle should be the symbol and the identity of sensuous perception or sensuous 
                                                 
140 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, George Eliot (Mineola: Dover Publications, 
INC., 2008), 26. In German, “Wie die arterielle Tätigkeit das Blut bis in die äußersten Extremitäten treibt, 
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142  Ludwig Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future (1843), Manfred Vogel 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986), 65. (Ludwig Feuerbach, Kleine Philosophische 
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philosophy.143 This is why Feuerbach reveals the secret idea or transcendent entities as 
the actuality of history, culture and religion. Accordingly, Feuerbach discloses a secret of 
religion and a substance of abstract regulation on the basis of the essence of man. For this 
reason, he argues that the course of religious development, as a development of the 
essence, begins with the human being, goes to the centre with the species being, and 
finishes with the human genus.144 In order to prove this, he presents many kinds of 
phenomena which describe in particular the transition of the God of the Jews and the 
incarnated Jesus Christ in Christianity. In the former case, Feuerbach illustrates that when 
man lives in nature, his God is a simple nature-God. When the Israelites lived a nomadic 
life, their God also dwelt among nomadic tribes. Where human beings inhabit houses, 
they also enclose their God in a temple.145 Finally, he declares explicitly that the God of 
the Jews was made by their volition or desire in the actual world. In the latter case, 
according to Feuerbach: ‘The Incarnation is nothing else than the practical, material 
manifestation of human nature of God.’146 He insists that ‘the incarnated God is only 
apparent manifestation of deified man; for the descent of God to man is necessarily 
preceded by the exaltation of man to God. Man was already in God, was already God 
himself, before God became man, i.e., showed himself as man.’147   
 
In both cases, Feuerbach thoroughly rejects transcendent entities or gods if the entities or 
miracles have nothing to do with the essence of human beings. He considers any god that 
                                                 
143 Ibid. 
144  Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 152. Here, Feuerbach insists that “The 
beginning, middle and end of religion is Man.” (In German, “Der Mensch ist der Anfang der Religion, der 
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Christentums, Erster Band, 287]). 
145 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 17. 
146 Ibid., 43. 
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does not correlate with man as meaningless. Thus, he attempts to remove God from 
religion, while emphasizing humanity. Finally, Feuerbach establishes the foundation of 
the philosophy of the future, of the human being, by the human being and for the human 
being with the essence.  
 
Thus, in Feuerbach’s philosophical sphere, we see only human nature, be it religion or 
gods. This fact will lead us further into a consideration of the relationship between the 
actual world and the imitated world, between perceivable nature and the hidden essence. 
The consideration here is whether the essence of man can be identified with the essence 
of religion, and whether the real being can be identified with the ideated notion. Recently, 
Sarah Sentilles, in her article ‘Misreading Feuerbach: Susan Sontag, Photography and the 
Image-World’, has discussed whether photography can be identified with its real world. 
According to Sentilles, ‘like Feuerbach, Sontag argues that human beings have mistaken 
the copy for the thing itself and, as a result, have created a false division between the copy 
and the “real,” devalued both the copy and the thing itself, and overlooked the profound 
ways images affect the world.’148 She explains that: 
   
For Feuerbach, religion is a projection of what belongs to the human species onto 
God; his task is to use religion to return what rightfully belongs to human beings. 
For Sontag, photography is a projection of the reality of the world onto an image; 
her task is to use photography to return our sense of what is real, to force viewers to 
claim the image as theirs, to recognize that what is ‘out there’ is actually what is right 
here.149 
 
                                                 
148 Sarah Sentilles, "Misreading Feuerbach: Susan Sontag, Photography and the Image-World", 
Literature & Theology (Oxford University Press) Vol.24, No. 1 (March 2010), 38. 
149 Ibid., 50. 
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The problem that arises here is whether religion can reduce the essence of human genus 
and whether photography can reduce the real world, as the above indicates should be their 
tasks. From the example of Sontag’s photography, in the case of Feuerbach the statement 
that ‘the secret of religion is anthropology’ may be persuasive rhetoric. However, my 
argument is that the whole realm of religion cannot replace the essence of human beings. 
If Feuerbach regards the essence of the human species as religion, he should verify 
whether transcendent domains of religion actually exist, and whether the human species 
is correctly identified with the divine dimension. If Feuerbach cannot logically or 
scientifically verify this, he ought rather to criticize contemporary religion on the basis of 
the humanist or materialist viewpoint. For this reason, his religious arguments or theses 
were criticized by both theologians such as Karl Barth and Hans W Frei and contemporary 
materialists such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. 
 
However, the methodology and notion that Feuerbach employs from Hegel is worthy of 
further investigation. 
 
3.2.3 Feuerbach’s methodology and alienation 
 
In The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach intends to show that ‘the true sense of Theology 
is Anthropology’.150 In addition, in 1848 Feuerbach noted that: ‘All my writings have 
just one aim, one plan and one object. This is just religion and theology.’151 These 
fundamental concerns are constant throughout Feuerbach’s works. Here, the key question 
                                                 
150  Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841), George Eliot (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, INC., 2008), x. 
151 Ludwig  Feuerbach, Sämtliche Werke 8,  W. Bolin and F. Jodi, 2nd ed., (Stuttgart, 1959), 6.  
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is how Feuerbach can persuasively elucidate such statements. Therefore, I will investigate 
Feuerbach’s methodology associated with dialectic and with his special terms 
‘alienation’, ‘projection’ and ‘objectification’. These three terms of religious 
consciousness, which are placed at the core of the Hegelian dialectic, are central to 
Feuerbach’s methodology. They represent very complex concepts in his work, and are 
interwoven with one another in order to disclose that the secret of theology or the esoteric 
of religion is anthropology. As Van A. Harvey points out, ‘just as the concept of 
projection or objectification is related to the formation of the concept of the species, so is 
the concept of alienation’. 152  It seems reasonable to consider this issue through 
terminological observation on: 1) projection and objectification, 2) alienation, and 3) 
dialectic and reductionism. 
     
1) Projection and Objectification: Feuerbach rarely uses the German term, Projektion, but 
in the English translation by George Eliot, the German terms vergegenständlichen (to 
objectify), and Vergegenständlichkeit (objectification) are frequently rendered as ‘to 
project’ or ‘projection’.153 According to Harvey, projection is a technical term which 
connotes ‘its associations and logical connections with other concepts in a theory’.154 For 
Feuerbach, the term projection encompasses the idea that religion is established not only 
by objectification of the species but also by self-consciousness or self-knowledge of man. 
That is, he uses projection as objectification of the species or self-awareness. More 
concisely, in The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach insists that: ‘Man - this is the 
mystery of religion - projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself an 
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object to this projected image of himself, thus he is converted into a subject; he thinks of 
himself as an object to himself, but as the object of an object, of another being than 
himself.’155 As Feuerbach notes, if projection is regarded as objectification, there is no 
projecting without the object. Furthermore, the process of projection is the same as the 
process of objectification. Through projection, man could develop his essence and his 
nature into religion or theology, which is his object. In addition, in elucidating the 
progressive process of man’s self-awareness or self-consciousness, Feuerbach uses 
projection as alienation. Strictly speaking, projection means that man throws himself into 
things or some substances, which conduces to internalization; but alienation, for Hegel, 
means that man produces his product with things or with subject matters through 
supplying his labour, which conduces to externalization. These two terms, projection and 
alienation, indicate different directions, but Feuerbach uses them both as descriptors of 
man’s essence. If Feuerbach’s use of ‘alienation’ is different from Hegel’s, how then did 
Feuerbach intend to use this notion? 
2) Alienation: First, Feuerbach uses alienation to mean loss of species’ consciousness. He 
maintains that ‘religion is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as 
the antithesis of himself’.156 Undoubtedly, Feuerbach’s notion of alienation is deeply 
connected with Hegel’s, but in his case, unlike that of Hegel, it is not closely related to 
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156 Ibid., 29. (In German, “Die Religion ist die Entzweiung des Menschen mit sich selbst: er setzt 
sich Gott als ein ihm entgegen-gesetztes Wesen gegenüber.“ [Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, 
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civilization or culture (Bildung), which ‘is the alienation of immediate self’,157 but, 
rather, to the loss of species being, which is ‘emergence of the self as an individual within 
the species and the subsequent loss of unity with that species by virtue of the projection 
of the species attributes onto God’.158 In addition, Feuerbach uses alienation to explain 
the gap between essence and existence. 
 
Feuerbach, unlike Hegel, does not regard alienation as the process of actuality that is ‘the 
unity of essence and existence’.159 Rather, he perceives it as a gap between the essence 
of man and his (or her) existence, which ‘occurs when the distinctive human predicates 
are attributed to a deity believed to be a separate, transcendent being’.160 Furthermore, 
Feuerbach also uses alienation as rejection of the I-thou structure. He explains that ‘I am 
an “I” for myself and simultaneously a “thou” for others. This I am, however, only as a 
sensuous being.’161 For Feuerbach, if the ‘I’ has self-knowledge as a moral being or as a 
thinking being, there must be the ‘thou’ in objectification which is the means of 
alienation. Thus, Feuerbach insists that the essence of human being is accommodated 
solely in the community and unity of human being with human being.162 Here, Feuerbach 
constructs a bridge which connects between the ‘I’ and the ‘thou’ or ‘community’ through 
alienation or objectification. Finally, Feuerbach uses alienation as a relinquishment of 
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predicate. He insists that: ‘To exist is to man the first datum; it constitutes the very idea 
of the subject; it is presupposed by the predicates. Hence man relinquishes the predicates, 
but the existence of God is to him a settled, irrefragable, absolutely certain, objective 
truth.’163 In this case, the notion of alienation is a bearer between the subject and the 
predicate. 
  
3) Dialectic and Reductionism: Here, Feuerbach’s dialectic and reduction will be 
explored in association with Hegel’s. As we observed before, Hegel’s dialectic is a key 
tool or methodology which elucidates essence of things, the actual substance of history, 
culture and civil society through objectification, alienation and actuality. According to 
Allen Wood, therefore, Hegel’s dialectic is the lifeblood of his system of philosophical 
logic, but can also be regarded as a highly novel theory of speculative paradoxes: ‘where 
and why philosophical thought runs into them, what they mean, how to deal with 
them’.164 However, for Feuerbach, this function of dialectic is reduced by predicates and 
time. In fact, Feuerbach uses the term ‘dialectic’ far less than Hegel. He simply insists 
that ‘the true dialectic is not a monologue of a solitary thinker with himself; it is a dialogue 
between I and Thou.’165 The transition from ‘I’ to ‘thou’ or from ‘subject’ to ‘object’ is 
exposed by time, space and predicates. Feuerbach clearly states that Hegel’s dialectic is 
not the medium of connecting opposites or contradictories; rather, time is the medium 
that connects them through explicating obscure predicates between God and human 
                                                 
163 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, George Eliot (Mineola: Dover Publications, 
INC., 2008), 15. 
164 Allen W. Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
1-2. 
165  Ludwig Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future (1843), Manfred Vogel 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986), 72. In German, “Die wahre Dialektik ist kein Monolog 
des einsamen Denkers mit sich selbst, sie ist ein Dialog zwichen Ich und Du.” (Feuerbach, Grundsätze der 
Philosophie der Zukunft (1843), in: Kleine Philosophische Schriften (1842-1845) [Germany: Verlag Felix 
Meiner in Leipzig, 1950], 169).  
 67 
beings.166 Here, Feuerbach explains more specifically that ‘only in the realm of sense, 
only in space and time, does there exist a being of really infinite qualities and 
predicates’. 167  Feuerbach tends to keep some distance from abstract regulations or 
metaphysics because these are notions that cannot exactly expose the actual world, so he 
takes actual beings and things within space, time and predicates. He uses the term 
‘predicates’ frequently, to expose the contents of the subject within logical regulations. 
That is, if the subject is the predicate, the subject should be defined by predicate. Hence, 
‘the necessity of the subject lies only in the necessity of the predicates’.168 In other 
words, he explains: ‘What the subject is lies only in the predicates: the predicate is the 
truth of the subject – the subject only the personified, existing predicate, the predicate 
conceived existing. Subject and predicate are distinguished only as existence and 
essence.’169 If this statement is true, there is an unchangeable presupposition that all 
predicates must reduce faultlessly their subject. Feuerbach uses reduction, analogy and 
logical regulation in order to elucidate the relationship between the subject and its 
predicates. In this case, naturally, the necessity of dialectic is weakened. In fact, 
Feuerbach’s methodology, as Marx W. Wartofsky notes, is reduction or rendering from 
the imaginary or supernatural form of religious consciousness to natural terms. 170 
Wartofsky notes two aspects of Feuerbach’s methodology: first, what emerges about 
‘man’ in religious consciousness, and second, ‘how it is revealed, in specific forms of 
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religious thought, and in the ‘false’ reflection on this thought (i.e., theology)’.171 In such 
a methodology, where reduction is revealed through the relationship between the subject 
and its predicates, is there any room for dialectic to act? According to Wartofsky, 
although Feuerbach does not make frequent use of the term ‘dialectic’, his ideas or 
arguments are developed dialectically in his works. However, Wartofsky insists that in 
his interpretation of the Phenomenology of Hegel, the subject of Feuerbach’s dialectic is 
‘not the idea, but rather man as a species being’.172 In other words, Wartofsky believes 
that the summit of Feuerbach’s dialectical phenomenology is the human being’s self-
recognition as a species being. 173  Stephen P. Thornton agrees with Wartofsky’s 
argument in this respect, and maintains that while Feuerbach made brilliant use of 
Hegelian dialectic as a general framework for expressing his own thought on religion and 
philosophy, he also became progressively more disenchanted with it.174 
 
To sum up, this section has presented the methodology employed by Feuerbach to express 
his thought. The starting point of the Feuerbachian dialectic is ‘the existing individual, 
the concrete and particular organism’. 175  Although this dialectic is considerably 
weakened when compared to Hegel’s, it nevertheless elucidates clearly the essence of 
man and the essence of religion. Through it, Feuerbach creates his thesis that the essence 
of man is religion, and the essence of religion is anthropology. That thesis is elucidated 
by concepts such as projection, alienation, objectification and reduction, and dialectics. 
As indicated above, Feuerbach’s thought is based on Hegel’s logic and the 
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phenomenology of spirit, and he develops his idea from this starting point. Accordingly, 
Feuerbach uses both dialectic and the alienation of consciousness as employed by Hegel, 
particularly in order to elucidate the essence of man. Religion is the alienated form of 
man’s recognition of his own nature. Theology, on the other hand, is the theoretical 
alienation of man’s nature, as not yet his own.176 Feuerbach’s self-appointed task is to 
translate the alienated form of man’s recognition of his own nature into unalienated, 
human terms. However, this also requires that he repudiate, on theoretical grounds, 
theology's alienation of man's nature as not his own, by a critique of the ‘contradictions’ 
in theology. Although he transferred from Hegel’s absolute knowledge to the essence of 
man, we cannot ignore that he also intends to construe how the world of human spirit 
connects with its object world or the revealed phenomena of nature and religion. 
According to Thomas E. Watenberg: ‘One of the problems here may be a certain self-
satisfaction in Feuerbach's thought. In his attempt to demonstrate that religion and 
philosophy are forms of human self-alienation, Feuerbach fails to fully answer one very 
significant question, namely, why such a self-alienation is necessary.’177 
  
Here, the key point is an agent that connects the two extremes. It is crucial for Feuerbach 
to find a concrete contact point between the ‘I’ and ‘thou’, between the essence of man 
and religion. The central issue of this task should be to investigate ‘agency’, which is both 
an externalizer and an internalizer, because for Feuerbach, like Hegel, the agency is a core 
theme of his philosophy to elucidate the relationship between the subject and the object, 
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between the internal and external world of man. Therefore, the next section presents the 
central issue of ‘the agency’. 
3.2.4 Gegenständlichkeit and agency 
 
This section will investigate the notion of agency with specific reference to Feuerbach. 
Throughout his works Feuerbach looks into the essence of human being in order to 
elucidate the essence of Christianity and the essence of religion. Thus, we see that 
Feuerbach’s agency between human beings and God or religion, between human beings 
and nature, is crucial to explaining the real essence. I will begin by investigating 
Feuerbach’s definition of agency and whether his agency can be connected by the 
predicates. Then, I will look at the research on how this notion of agency can develop into 
religion and nature.   
 
First of all, I conduct an inquiry into the possibility of agency in Feuerbach’s philosophy. 
Feuerbach states that ‘man transforms his thoughts and even his emotions into thoughts 
and emotions of God, his essence and his viewpoint into the essence and viewpoint of 
God’. 178  This argument indicates that the relationship between the subject and its 
predicate or its object is reversed, and Feuerbach criticizes that the true subject disappears 
in the area of religion or speculative theology. In other words, Feuerbach maintains that 
humanity as a species is not the predicate of religion or gods, but is the true subject of 
actual world, nature and religion. He aims to reconstruct or restore this relationship, and 
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then position the essence of human being in the original place occupied by religions or 
gods everywhere throughout the world. Undoubtedly, for Feuerbach, the absolute subject 
is man; he is the starting point of society and actual history, so the actual world is formed 
by man. Here, Wartofsky notes two issues, first, ‘what is revealed, in religious 
consciousness, about its immediate subject matter, man’ and ‘second, how it is revealed, 
in the specific forms of religious thought, and in the “false” reflection on this thought (i.e. 
theology)’.179 These questions are associated with agency, which is revealed by the 
essence of man. More specifically, for Feuerbach, the agency is originated from the 
essence of human beings. Man projects his essence into religion, theology or gods, so if 
we want to acquire our true essence, we should look into the phenomena of religion. In 
other words, agency stands as a mediator or bearer between the essence of man (the 
subject) and religion, theology or gods (its objects). Feuerbach regards this agency as a 
man who executes his volition or his essence, while Hegel considers agency as the self, 
which is composed of spirit, consciousness and idea with actuality. For Feuerbach, 
agency is something embodied by the essence of man, which is a more obscure or more 
inclusive essence than Hegel’s. Although Feuerbach criticizes Hegel’s abstract notion or 
metaphysic and presents the essence of man as an actuality, his alternative proposal too 
is controversial. It must be asked what the essence of man means exactly, and whether it 
is possible to reduce religion or gods and theology into the essence of human beings, even 
though Feuerbach explains both the essence of man and the essence of religion minutely 
in his work ‘Lectures on the Essence on Religion’. Feuerbach insists that theology 
reorganizes the essence of man into the system or dogma of Christian religion. Hence he 
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sees theology and gods as an agency of the essence of man, embodied into Christianity 
and world religions. 
 
To conclude, first, the agency of the essence, for Feuerbach, is embodied in religion, gods 
and theology, which are occupied by the essence of man through his alienation, projection 
and objectification. Thus, the task of philosophers is to disclose the essence of religion 
candidly and accurately to reduce from the phenomena of religion, gods, and theology to 
the essence of man.  
   
Secondly, if religion, gods and theology are agency of man, how does Feuerbach verify 
this? As seen in the section above, Feuerbach uses projection, alienation and dialectic for 
this reduction, projecting the essence of man into society, religion and the will of God. 
Accordingly, the projection of essence guides the agency where to go or to move. Here, 
we can see the form of the essence through projection, and then we can analyse the form 
of religion by agency. This is the process of development whereby the essence transforms 
into religion and the will of God. Agency reveals to the essence where it is to move 
through the process of essence’s transformation. A further consideration is that if the 
essence of man becomes religion and actuality of society by alienation, we can see the 
origin or source of agency. Thus, agency cannot exist in any form without the essence of 
man, which is the starting point. In addition, Feuerbach uses dialectic as reduction of the 
essence, and this shows how actual history and actual religion are embodied through 
agency, albeit an alienating agency. As discussed in the previous section, the true dialectic, 
for Feuerbach, ‘is not a monologue’, but ‘is a dialogue between I and thou’.180 We will 
                                                 
180  Ludwig Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future (1843), Manfred Vogel 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986), 72. In German, “ist kein Monolog” … “ist ein Dialog 
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examine through the following quotation how to connect between ‘I’ and ‘another I’ or 
‘thou’:   
 
The notion of the object is originally nothing other than the notion of another ‘I’; 
thus, man in his childhood comprehends all things as freely active and arbitrary 
beings; therefore, the notion of the object is generally mediated by the notion of 
the ‘thou’, of the objectified ‘I’. An object, that is, another ‘I’, is given – to speak 
Fichtean language – not to the ‘I’, but to the ‘not-I’ in me; for only where I am 
transformed from an ‘I’ into a ‘thou’, where I am passive, does the conception of 
an activity existing apart from me, that is, objectivity, arise. But only through the 
senses is an ‘I’ a ‘not-I’.181                 
 
This statement indicates that dialectic, for Feuerbach, is a tool to connect between ‘I’ and 
‘thou’ or another ‘I’, qualifying the ‘I’, however, as passive. Hence, if the ‘I’ were self-
empowered, self-acting, and not passive, it could be itself without objectivity, it would 
fully remain subject. Accordingly, agency is seen critically, an alienating cause with the 
effect of transforming the ‘I’ to another ‘I’ or ‘thou’ or ‘the object’ through dialectic. 
Hence, Feuerbach analyses and synthesizes religious phenomena, which comprise the 
object outside of ‘I’ by using dialectic, and then insists that this dialectic embodies the 
activity of this particular agency. 
                                                 
zwischen Ich und Du.” (Feuerbach, Kleine Philosophische Schriften (1842-1845), Der Philosophischen 
Bibliothek Band 227, Max Gustav Lange [Germany: Verlag Felix Meiner in Leipzig, 1950], 169). 
181 Ibid., 51. In German, “Der Begriff des Objektes ist ursprünglich gar nichts anderes als der 
Begriff eines anderen Ich – so faßt der Mensch in der Kindheit alle Dinge als freitätige, willkürliche Wesen 
auf – daher ist der Begriff des Objektes überhaupt vermittelt durch den Begriff des Du, des 
gegenständlichen Ich. Nicht dem Ich, sondern dem Nicht –Ich in mir, um in der Sprache Fichtes zu reden, 
ist ein Objekte, d.i. anderes Ich gegeben; denn nur da, wo ich aus einem Ich in ein Du umgewandelt werde, 
wo ich leide, entsteht die Vorstellung einer außer mir seienden Aktivität, d.i. Objektivität. Aber nur durch 
den Sinn ist Ich nicht Ich.”  (Feuerbach, Kleine Philosophische Schriften (1842-1845), 144).            
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In investigating the notion of Gegenständlichkeit I have suggested that agency, for 
Feuerbach, is religion, theology and gods, which are occupied by the essence of man. His 
thought was affected by Hegel’s notion of Entäußerung. In particular, for Feuerbach, the 
essence of man is displayed through man’s objects, specifically religion, theology and 
gods, and the contents of these objects are systemized, alienated and projected by the 
essence of man. Feuerbach often criticizes the notion of abstract, but his arguments do 
not escape the same problem. Even though he insists that the essence of man discloses 
the abstract of religion and theology, the notion of humans’ essence is itself abstract and 
vague. If we remove the abstract notion from all science, is it possible to disclose the fact 
of history and the truth of religion? In fact, the abstract notion can enable us to think or 
embody the object logically, and to think realistically of the world beyond ‘I’. 
 
Nevertheless, while Feuerbach analyses the object outside of ‘I’ (what he calls, ‘thou’,  
‘religion’ and the essence of man) his surprising discovery is how to connect between the 
subject and the object, between the abstract and the actuality and between ‘I’ and ‘thou’. 
He attempts to explain how the subject connects to the world outside of the subject by 
presenting the notion of agency in critical terms. It is clear that Feuerbach’s notion of 
Gegenständlichkeit is a footboard for Marx’s notion of alienation. Therefore, the next 










Marx’s thought has been hugely influential on subsequent philosophy, political structures 
and economic systems. However, his ideas appear to be diverse and inconsistent. One 
reason for this is that his thought developed through the various stages of his life. Another 
is that there exist hermeneutic differences among Marxist scholars. According to T. L 
Oizermann, in general, scholars are divided into two groups in their understanding of 
Marx.182 Some argue that his thought remained consistent throughout his whole body of 
work, while others insist that there is a big gap between the young Marx and the older 
Marx. 
In my view, Marx did develop and change his ideas over his lifetime, particularly in the 
notions of alienation and agency. For example, his notion of alienation took on different 
forms, such as objectification, thinghood and fetishism. Accordingly, the main purpose 
of this section is to investigate the notion of agency based on the 4 main books: 
Ö konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844 (Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844), Die deutsche Ideologie (1846) (German Ideology), Grundrisse der 
Kritik der politischen Ö konomie (1857-1858) (Karl Marx’s Outline of the Critique of 
Political Economy, 1857), and Das Kapital (1867) (Capital: a Critical Analysis of 
Capitalist Production).  
 
                                                 
182 T. I. Oizerman, The Making of the Marxist Philosophy, Yuri Sdobnikov (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1981), 265-281. 
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3.3.2 Alienation and agency in Öknomisch-philosophische 
Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844  
 
The notion of Entfremdung is a major theme for Marx. He considers Hegel’s and 
Feuerbach’s concepts of alienation as the principles of their philosophy, and observes it 
critically in two works: with regard to Hegel in Ö konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte 
aus dem Jahr 1844, and to Feuerbach in Die deutsche Ideologie.  
 
With reference to Ö konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844, this 
section will begin by investigating how Marx criticizes or amends Hegel’s notion of 
alienation; then, it will ask what relationship emerges between private property and 
alienation, and finally, it will examine how this alienation connects with agency.  
Marx’s notion of alienation was thoroughly related to that of Hegel, and even came most 
directly from him.183 Nevertheless, Marx criticizes Hegel’s dialectic on the ground that 
it is deeply associated with the notion of alienation. In general, Marx accepts Feuerbach’s 
critique on Hegel’s dialectic, which starts from the alienation of substance, namely 
religion and theology, and then sets actuality, sensuous things and the particularity of 
beings while the infinite is sublated, before returning to the abstract, the infinite and 
religion while sublating actuality of being and nature.184 Marx observes this process of 
dialectics which circulates in thought forms. Accordingly, Marx criticizes Hegel’s 
alienation, which is nothing but abstract and philosophical thought when Hegel 
comprehends wealth and the power of the state as an alienated essence from human 
                                                 
183 David McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx, Second Edition (London: The Macmillan Press 
Ltd, 1980), 117. 
184 Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844", Karl Marx Frederick Engels 
Collected Works, Martin Milligan and Dirk J. Struik, vol. 3, Marx and Engels: 1843-1844 (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), 329. 
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essence.185 However, Marx appreciates the greatness of Hegel’s dialectic, which grasps 
‘the moving and producing principle’ with the negation of the negation.186 In other words, 
according to Marx, ‘Hegel conceives that the self-creation of man as a process, conceives 
objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; 
that he thus grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective man - true because 
real man – as the outcome of man’s own labour.’187 In addition, Marx regards the root 
of alienation as a contradiction in economic structure, whereas Hegel insists that 
contradiction expresses the dialectic of pure thought. Later, in Das Kapital, Marx also 
criticizes that Hegel’s dialectic stands upside down, and his actuality is nothing but 
external phenomena of thought forms.188   
While criticizing Hegel’s dialectic on the ground that it is limited within the boundary of 
abstract terminology and does not progress into reality, Marx nevertheless accepts it as 
providing the way to understand political and economic realities and the true picture of 
history through labour of self-consciousness. 
 
Marx also criticizes Hegel’s notion of labour, which is deeply associated with his 
Entäußerung. According to Marx, Hegel regards the subject of labour as the spirit and 
sees that the essence of man identifies with self-consciousness, so his notion of labour is 
nothing more than the alienation of self-consciousness.189 Accordingly, Hegel’s labour 
                                                 
185 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844”, in: Early Writings: Introduced 
by Lucio Colletti, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), 
384. 
186 Ibid., 385-386.   
187 Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844", Karl Marx Frederick Engels 
Collected Works, 332-333.  
188 Karl Marx, Marx Engels Werke, Band. 25, Das Kapital I (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968), 27. 
189 Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844," 333-334. 
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is achieved through the contradiction of subject-object and the subjugation or sublation 
of alienation within the world of thought or abstract. 
  
Furthermore, Marx criticizes Hegel’s notion of mediation as the Entäußerung that 
mediates between spirit and nature. This is because, in using this term, Hegel regards the 
notion of mediation as connection between essence and actuality, spirit and actual things. 
Thus, Marx insists that, for Hegel, thinghood originated from the Entäußerung of spirit 
is nothing but imaginary actual thinghood. 
Through these criticisms, Marx ensures that dialectic and Entäußerung can be used to 
elucidate the contradiction of actual history and can be applied to reveal the distortion of 
actual human situations. 
In investigating the relationship between private property and alienated labour, Marx aims 
to reveal the substance of political economy. He understands that: ‘Political economy 
conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labour by not considering the direct 
relationship between the worker (labour) and production.’190 Thus, Marx observes what 
alien labour embodies, and presents four aspects of such alien labour, as shown below in 







                                                 




















First, the relation of worker to product is the same as ‘the relation to the sensuous external 
world, to the object of nature’. 191  The reason is that the labourer cannot produce 
something without the object of nature or sensuous external world.192 As examined in 
Figure 2-1, Marx exposes the substance of an alien labour in the relationship between 
workers and their products, getting at the heart of the product which is produced by the 
worker and alienates the worker from the product of his labour. Second, in analysing the 
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relationship between the worker and the activity of production within the labour process, 
Marx argues that the worker is alienated from his labour activity because that activity ‘is 
turned against him, independent of him and not belonging to him’.193 As we can see in 
Figure 2-2, Marx points to the activity of production as the ground of alienated labour 
within the process of production. He deduces the character of alienated labour from the 
fact that ‘if estrangement is manifest in the result of production, this means that 
production itself must be alienating, the activity of alienation, the alienation of 
activity’.194 Third, Marx investigates man as the species being, which is revealed through 
the alienated labour. Here, how does Marx’s notion of species being differ from that of 
Feuerbach? Unlike Feuerbach, Marx regards the life of species being as the productive 
life, which means ‘life activity; and free, conscious activity’. 195  However, as 
demonstrated in Figure 2-3, Marx insists that the species being should realize the 
productive life by labour, but cannot realize his or her free, conscious life by alienated 
labour. Thus, alienated labour estranges the worker, who should be most natural when he 
works as a species being. From these considerations Marx draws the conclusion that: ‘An 
immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labour, 
from his life activity, from his species-being is the estrangement of man from man.’196 
Through this analysis and research, Marx finds that the root of alienation, which comes 
from the alienated labour, is private property. Thus, Figure 2-4 indicates that alienated 
labour creates private property which can divide various classes, causing alienation of 
                                                 
193 Ibid. 
194 C. J. Arthur, Dialectics of Labour: Marx and his Relation to Hegel (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1986), 8. 
195 Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844", 276. According to Richard 
Schmitt, “the term, ‘species being’ itself is no longer used” in Das Kapital, “but the conception of human 
freedom expressed by that term remains and still plays an important part.” (Richard Schmitt, Introduction 
to Marx and Engels: A Critical Reconstruction [Boulder: Westview Press, 1987], 156). 
196 Ibid., 277. 
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man from man. As he explains: ‘Private property thus results by analysis from the concept 
of alienated labour, i.e., of alienated man, of estranged labour, of estranged life, of 
estranged man.’197 This private property is then converted into universal value and a tool 
for exchange, ‘money’. In the analysis of general issues in the foundation of political 
economy, i.e. labour, the products of labour, exchange, redundant value, capital and 
money, Marx presents ‘communism’ as a solution to the problems of social class, 
alienated labour and species being.198  
 
In investigating Marx’s analysis of alienated labour, private property, money and capital, 
we need to ask exactly what he considers agency to be. In order to answer the question, 
we must examine Marx’s ideas about the starting point of the reality, and what elements 
of agency connect with each other. In Ö konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem 
Jahr 1844, Marx’s starting points are the human being as subject and the materials of 
labour which confront the human being. He analyses the political and economic structure 
of capitalism in terms of the relationship with products produced by labour, private 
property, capital, commercial products and money.199 When the process of production is 
analysed based on the human and labourer (the subject) as starting point, the agency is 
the self-activity of labourers. That is, the self-activity is the agency which fulfils the desire 
and lives of labourers. Marx insists that: ‘The direct relationship of labour to its products 
is the relationship of the worker to the objects of his production.’200  However, he 
discovers that the self-activity of the labourer does not bring self-actualization or 
fulfilment, but results in self-loss, which ends in unhappiness. In exploring the 
                                                 
197 Ibid. 
198 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844”, in: Early Writings, 348-349. 
199 Ibid., 349. 
200 Ibid., 326. 
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components of alienated labour Marx presents the following explanations, a close 
examination of which can provide us with the specific frames and contents of agency.  
  
Firstly, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e. does not belong to his 
essential being; that he therefore does not confirm himself in his work, but denies 
himself, feels miserable and not happy, does not develop free mental and physical 
energy, but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind. Hence the worker feels himself 
only when he is not working; when he is working he does not feel himself. He is 
at home when he is not working, and not at home when he is working. His labour 
is therefore not voluntary but forced, it is forced labour. It is therefore not the 
satisfaction of a need but a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself. Its alien 
character is clearly demonstrated by the fact that as soon as no physical or other 
compulsion exists it is shunned like the plague. External labour, labour in which 
man alienates himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Finally, the 
external character of labour for the worker is demonstrated by the fact that it 
belongs not to him but to another, and that in it he belongs not to himself but to 
another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, the 
human brain and the human heart detaches itself from the individual and reappears 
as the alien activity of a god or of a devil, so the activity of the worker is not his 
own spontaneous activity. It belongs to another, it is a loss of his self.201  
 
Jerome M. Segal regards agency as self-activity, and specifies Marx’s alienated labour 
into the elements of phenomenological aspect, behavioural dispositions, motivation, 
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relation to his identity, effects, and external relation. The phenomenological aspect of 
self-activity means that the labourers are not content; they are unhappy and feel 
themselves only outside their work; in their work the workers feel outside themselves.202 
Behavioural disposition refers to the fact that where there is no compulsion, the labourer 
will not choose to do the work.203 Motivation of self-activity (agency) is replaced by the 
coercive element of the work and the fact that it does not in itself satisfy a need, but is 
necessary to satisfy other needs.204 Or in other words, the subject as agency and agency 
as subject has become under threat. Alienation does not introduce the need for an 
alienating agency, as in Feuerbach, but agency itself is alienated in Marx. The element of 
relation to identity concerns the fact that the labour is not part of the worker’s essential 
being, and that in doing the work, the labourer denies his true self.205 Effects of self-
activity is related to the workers’ inability to develop their physical and mental energy, 
to the mortification of their bodies and the ruin of their minds.206 Finally, the external 
relation of self-activity is that it belongs not to the workers, but to someone else. In it they 
belong, not to themselves, but to another.207 As presented above, Segal provides a clear 
picture of agency by explaining how labourers live their lives and how they relate to the 
social context through their labour. In his understanding, through the six structural webs 
just described, ‘self” and ‘activity’ are linked and mediated by agency which has now 
become a forced agency or an alienated agency of force. It seems reasonable to suppose 
that the alienated worker is no longer his own self, his own agent of activity and that he 
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experiences alienation in the performance of work.208 Hence, the alienated labourer in 
capitalism is no longer a proper agent, and agency no longer that of self-activity.  
 
Next, it is necessary to explain money, which is one of the stable agents for alienated 
people in capitalism, and takes the most influential role in capitalistic society. Marx 
reveals the characteristics of currency through quotations from Goethe’s Faust and 
Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens. 209 He explains that the greater power money has, the 
more power I have. The characteristics of money are my characteristics and my power. 
Thus who I am and what I can do are not dependent on my personality:210 I am ugly but 
I can buy beautiful women. I am crippled but money can give me 24 legs like Faust’s six 
stallions. Money is the supreme virtue; it can make an evil person an honourable one. The 
analysis shows that money (the object) has become the agency of human (the subject) but 
it overpowers the subject. Marx emphasises how money can bring great power in 
capitalistic society. Accordingly, he insists that ‘money, insomuch as it possesses the 
property of being able to buy everything and appropriate all objects for man, is the object 
most worth possessing. The universality of this property is the basis of money’s 
omnipotence; hence it is regarded as an omnipotent being.’211 His argument shows that 
the bond between money (as agency) and people (the subject) is extremely powerful. In 
‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscript of 1844’, he discusses what determines the 
greatness of human being (the subject). Through the alienated labourer, privatization 
becomes the instrument for universal value (e.g. currency) and forms capital. Agency, 
therefore, is not only removed from the subject, or rather strips the subject of its subject-
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self and replaces him, rendering him an object, the new agency subject is also a de-
individualized subject. It is an institution, a medium, and as such a universal or global 
phenomenon. This powerful medium, the agent of capital, determines the greatness of the 
capitalist and gives the status of emperor to the person who is no longer what it is, but 
what it looks like, based not on the person’s self, but on money. In particular, as we can 
see in Figure 2, Marx interprets alienated labour in four aspects: alienation between the 
worker and the product; alienation from the relation of labour to the act within the labour 
process; alienation as species being, and alienation between man and man. Thus he 
indicates the alienation of many dimensions of work. In other words, the agencies of 
workers are labour, products, process of production, means of production, private 
property, capital and commodity. Thus capitalism is unable to fulfil the essence of human 
being through labour and causes alienation and isolation for human beings. Marx points 
out that: ‘If money is the bond which ties me to human life and society to me, which links 
me to nature and to man, is money not the bond of all bonds? Can it not bind and loose 
all bonds? Is it therefore not the universal means of separation? It is the true agent of 
separation and the true cementing agent, it is the chemical power of society.’212 These 
comments introduce some issues upon which he focuses more specifically in Die deutsche 
Ideologie, Grundrisse zur Kritik der politischen Ӧkonomie, and Das Kapital. 
 
3.3.3 Alienation and agency in Die deutsche Ideologie 
(1845-46) 
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In this book, Marx criticizes the German Ideology, represented at that time by Feuerbach, 
B. Bauer (1809-1882) and Max Stirner (1806-1856) in particular. 213  Here, Marx 
elaborates on the notion of history that can become a foundation of alienation. Anthony 
Giddens insists that, in Die deutsche Ideologie, ‘alienation must be studied as an historical 
phenomenon’.214  Marx argues that the history of nature and the history of man are 
limited by each other unless the human being is extinguished. He insists that the history 
of nature is nature science, which is not problematic for us, but the history of man is a 
problem awaiting solution, because most ideologies originate from mistaken 
interpretations of, or abstractions about, history.215 Here, the question is whether Marx 
considers the history of man as the foundation of alienation. If so, this raises the question 
of how he uses the notion of agency. 
  
In answer to the first question, i.e., whether Marx considers the history of man as the 
foundation of alienation, Marx argues that history should be interpreted by the concrete 
circumstance that surrounds human life. He insists that the grasp of history should be 
accomplished by ‘ascending from earth to heaven’ not by ‘descending from heaven to 
                                                 
213 Allen W. Wood explains Marx’s three senses of Ideology: 1. historical idealism - “the world 
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earth’.216 Accordingly, Marx starts from concrete actuality and historical man, arguing 
that ‘we must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and therefore, all 
of history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able 
to “make history”’.217 Here, Helmut Fleischer insists that ‘history cannot be logically 
deduced from premises about the human “essence”’.218 The reason is that Marx regards 
the first historical act as the production of the means and the production of the material 
life itself, and insists that ‘the satisfaction of the first need leads to new need’, which is 
created by the first historical act,219 and then men ‘recreate their own life, begin to make 
other man, to propagate their kind’.220 This process of history shows how human beings 
have a relation with production in order to survive and to create their history. More 
concretely: ‘The production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life in 
production, now appears as a twofold [13] relation: on the one hand as a natural, on the 
other as a social relation - social in the sense that it denotes the co-operation of several 
individuals, no matter under what condition, in what manner and to what end.’221 Marx 
sees that the products and the means of production take a threatening attitude to the 
worker in the process of history, so he argues that the force of production determines 
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aggregately the condition of society. Accordingly, he insists that ‘the history of humanity 
must always be studied and treated’ by the relationship between the history of industry 
and the history of exchange. More particularly, the products and the means of production 
that serve humans’ needs, in turn take advantage of men, using and consuming the worker. 
Marx sees that this phenomenon is concretely embodied by the division of labour, so he 
analyses the division of labour as a private property,222 which can reduce the human 
being to just a labour tool or a labour machine. Through this analysis, Marx reveals that 
the division of labour produces not only the contradiction between the individual interest 
and the common interest of all individuals,223 but also the force of private property. This 
is because all ‘individuals seek only their particular interest, which for them does not 
coincide with their common interest’.224 In other words, since a cleavage is continuously 
produced by the division of labour between the particular and the common interest, the 
worker’s activity of production is not voluntary but becomes as alien power opposed to 
his own need, ‘which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him’.225 What we can 
recognize from this explanation is that private property and alienation come from the 
division of labour. Accordingly, the workers are dissatisfied and lose their sense of self-
realization the more they labour in their place of work. When Marx sees private property 
as the root of alienation, he tries to look for the point of solution on this matter in the 
process of history. Ultimately, he insists that private property should be abolished, and 
simultaneously the alienation of workers should be sublated by communism or the 
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communistic society, so ‘Marx and Engels no longer call their doctrine “real humanism” 
but communism, communist and also practical materialism’.226  
For Marx, the object of communism is defined in three ways: ‘1) to safeguard the interests 
of the proletariat as against those of the bourgeoisie; 2) to do this through the abolition of 
private property and its replacement by community of goods; 3) to recognise no means 
of carrying out these objects other than a democratic revolution by force’.227 Therefore, 
Marx regards history as the process of alienation. In order to solve the problem, he 
presents the importance of the proletariat’s role and responsibility as the subject of history 
in abolishing private property. 
 
With regard to the second question, i.e., how Marx uses the notion of agency, Marx 
regards human beings as the agents of making history through workers’ labour and their 
production activity. Helmut Fleischer insists that ‘just as practical subjectivity is the 
agency of self-legislation for what is to prevail, so is the potential of demand and the 
ability to put it through as it exists at any one time its own executive agent’.228 However, 
the problem remains as to whether Marx considers agents as the living man or woman 
and practical subjectivity (even if alienated and replaced by an agent like money), or as a 
tremendous mechanical law of history in the respect of ‘making history’. According to 
Perry Anderson, when human beings ‘make history’, there are three different kinds of 
agency in their activity. The first is the most typical form of activity, where an individual 
pursues his private life through a decision and act such as marriage, cultivation of a plot 
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and maintenance of a home.229 The second kind of agency, like the first, performs within 
a general structural framework of existing social relations, including ‘public’ goals, such 
as ‘political struggles, military conflicts, diplomatic transactions, commercial 
explorations’.230 The third kind is the ‘unprecedented form of agency’ and the collective 
agency that first appeared in the American and French Revolutions, but ‘they still remain 
at a great distance from the manifestation of a full popular agency’231 because those 
revolutions could not bring new ideal social conditions, but have acquired full expression 
‘with the emergence of the workers’ movement and revolutionary Marxism’.232 For 
Marx, the transformers of history are people ‘making history’, and the proletariat that has 
a practical willingness in collective projects of social transformation. People who are 
‘making history’ and proletarians are acting as a full popular agency. Marx and Engels 
argue that the whole of history cannot be made by abstract force or the absolute idea, but 
only by an actual agency of a full popular agency and proletarian revolution which will 
abolish the contradictions of history, made by an unjust political-economy. In other words, 
in Die deutsche Ideologie, Marx gives us a convincing insight about the forward-looking 
proletariat, in which, ‘scientific communism alone indicated the real way for the social 
emancipation of the working class, a way the proletarians were spontaneously impelled 
to take by the development of the antagonistic contradiction of capitalism’.233 For Marx, 
the agency of history is the global social transformer and proletariat that is creating new 
social conditions, ‘to understand the process of past and present, to produce a 
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premeditated future’.234 In this book, Marx uses the term ‘historical materialism’ for the 
first time. In the historical process, he believes that the alienated labourers and distorted 
economic structures can be reformed into new ones by the work of these agencies. 
 
3.3.4 Alienation and agency in Grundrisse zur Kritik der 
politischen Ökonomie (1857-58) 
 
In this book, Marx provides new illumination on the theme of alienation observed in 
Ӧkonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844 and Die deutsche Ideologie. 
Here, he re-establishes the notions of ‘alienation’, ‘objectification’, ‘universal individual’, 
‘dialectic method’ and ‘commodities’. Scholars such as David McLellan, Iring Fetscher, 
Carol C. Gould and Predrag Vraicki argue that in this work, which remained unpublished 
until 1941, Marx’s thought is more clear and consistent. For instance, McLellan insists 
that in the Grundrisse, Marx demonstrates the notion of alienation that takes root firmly 
in the process of history.235 Vraicki also argues that this Grundrisse has a key role in 
connecting Marx’s early stage ideas with those from his later stage.  
 
In this section, Marx’s concepts of alienation and objectification are discussed, followed 
by examination of the relationship between alienation and agency in association with 
dialectic and objectification. 
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According to Marx, the first meaning of objectification as production reveals that its 
subject is the man or the woman and its object is nature.236 In other words, an actual man 
objectifies himself in his products through concrete labour. The relationship between the 
subject and its object emerges frequently in the process of objectification, because labour 
is an activity of objectification. Generally speaking, in fact, Marx has taken the model of 
objectification from Hegel, and ‘follows Hegel in construing objectification as a process 
of self-realization of a subject through its transforming objects’.237 However, for Hegel, 
the notion of objectification is already included or implicit in the subject, and is ‘the 
dialectical elaboration of what is already present’, whereas for Marx, objectification as 
labour is creative activity and purposeful activity.238 Accordingly, for Hegel, ‘every 
objectification of subject is an alienation, since the other is nothing but the subject itself 
in its objectified form, and the other initially appears to the subject not as its own other 
but as an external object’.239  For Marx, in contrast, ‘objectification is the intrinsic 
character of every productive activity and is alienated only when the relation between the 
subject and the object becomes an external one. That is, objectification is not alienated 
when the object produced by the subject’s activity is related to the subject as its own.’240 
This difference between Hegel and Marx shows that Marx recognizes the problem of 
circulation from the subject to the object and from the object to the subject under the 
political-economic system of capitalism. Thus, Marx often argues that the key features of 
capitalism are the form of alienation, and this alienation has to be abolished by 
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overcoming separation or dichotomy between living labour (workers) and dead labour 
(capital) or objectified labour. 241 Accordingly, Marx more specifically investigates 
capital-profit and labour-wages and the cost of lend-ground-lent in order to sort out the 
problem of circulation between the subject and its object because, as McLellan indicates, 
these three figures of capitalism would be ‘the trinity formula which comprises all the 
secrets of the social production process’.242 To sum up, Marx regards the alienation of 
the subject as a contradiction of capitalism which comes from the process of 
objectification, so he tries to deal with the contradiction by catching and tracing or 
analysing the substance of the alienated labour. 
 
Now, the remaining task is to analyse how Marx uses agency and alienation in association 
with his dialectic method in Grundrisse zur Kritik der politischen Ӧkonomie. Marx’s 
dialectic method is the direct opposite of Hegel’s. According to Marx, for Hegel, the real 
world is just the external form of the idea under the name of the idea, but for him, ‘the 
ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by human mind and translated into 
forms of thought’. 243  We know that Marx uses the dialectic method as a tool of 
elucidation of the actual, material and external world. However, according to Hegel, the 
actual world is nothing other than the phenomenal world of the spirit, emerged from 
alienation of self-consciousness. In fact, for Marx, the notion of alienation shows ‘not 
only the attitude of the person towards his activity, but also his attitude towards the object 
which represents the product of activity’. 244  In this product of activity, action and 
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creation of the labourer are formed by the causality as agency. According to Carol C 
Gould, ‘this is based on Marx’s account of what he calls the simple production process, 
as well as on his remarks concerning the nature of activity.’245 As shown above, ‘labour 
for Marx is process of objectification in which an agent forms objects that embody his or 
her intentions or purposes and in doing so also forms him or herself’.246 While Gould 
observes the agent in this process of objectification, he insists that in the Grundrisse Marx 
considers the agent as a social individual or social individuals. 247  Accordingly, he 
interprets Marx’s social ontology as the role of agent under the illumination of 
individuality and community. That is, while agents as social individuals create new 
objects in order to realize their purposes or intentions, they transform and create 
themselves through labour in the process. In addition, agents act to develop their new 
capacities and work to recognize these new abilities in themselves.248 Hence, Gould 
maintains that ‘labour as a process constituting the world is at the same time a process of 
self-constitution’249 by social agents.  
 
More specifically, Gould explains agents as the fundamental nature of causality. He 
suggests three kinds of agency, which he believes are very important to understand 
Marx’s social ontology. To explain in detail, first, Marx regards labour as cause-and-
effect in four senses: ‘final, efficient, formal, and material’.250 The purposes of agents 
are embodied by the objects which the labourer produces. Accordingly, these purposes 
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are their final causes as transformative activity and as efficient cause, because ‘what 
brings about changes in things – is inseparably bound up with its purposiveness or with 
final causality’. 251  Second, Gould insists that Marx regards labour as ‘the active 
connection or mediation between final and efficient cause, between a purpose and the 
action that realizes it’.252 This connection or mediation is a synthetic activity of labour 
which gives unification to ‘these dimensions of purpose, agency, form and objective 
conditions’.253 Third, Gould analyses that what Marx calls labour is rightly regarded as 
causal, which one may properly call only human agency,254 because ‘the relation of 
agents to circumstance is not symmetrical or reciprocal, but rather asymmetrical. Thus 
causal efficacy lies only with agents’.255  
 
In summary, in the Grundrisse Marx uses agency as causality of labour, as synthetic 
connection or mediation of labour and as causal efficacy, especially in the association 
with objectification (alienation). Marx regards objectification as ‘a process of self-
creation of the subject, in which an agent realizes and changes him or herself through 
changing the world… namely, in order to realize his or her purpose, the agent is efficiently 
or productively causal by a formative activity that shapes conditions’.256 
 
3.3.5 Alienation and agency in Das Kapital (1867) 
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According to Marx, political-economy is scientific thought about the system of economy 
that exists in most countries. Marx argues that the anatomy of society should be found in 
political-economy. 257  However, it is difficult to analyse society and to reveal the 
concealed structure of production because the capitalistic structure and the process of 
production collaborate complicatedly with its inner connection; hence this task needs 
considerable analytical examination.258 Another reason is that economy is not static, and 
political-economy does not analyse fixed things, but rather the dynamic relationship of 
living people, ultimately the relationship between the classes. This relation is always 
connected with living and personalized things which emerge to manipulate human 
beings.259 Therefore, here, I will investigate aspects of alienation as explained in Das 
Kapital. Next, I will consider alienation and fetishism, followed by Marx’s ideas about 
agency and alienation. 
 
Marx uses the term Entfremdung 11 times in Das Kapital.260 Generally speaking, the 
notion of Entfremdung comprises four aspects. First, Marx uses it to describe the 
relationship between workers and means of production or labour. In explaining the grave 
situation of struggle between labourer and machine, he shows the brutality of the 
production structure and of means of labour which kill labourers cruelly. According to 
Marx, the force of the machine is everlasting, because the machine’s hold on the domain 
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of new production is total and endless.261 Of course, the form of capitalistic production 
always becomes independent from labourers and bestows alienated form upon them. 
Eventually, the alienated situation is developed into confrontation between workers and 
the machine. Labourers put up strong resistance against the machine or the means of 
labour because the means of labour kills labourers.262 In this process of capitalistic 
production, the means of production is the means of exploitation, because the means of 
production, which is occupied by the unchangeable capital, represents the money of the 
capitalist and adheres closely to the capitalist. Then, in the process of actual production, 
the labourers are treated simply as a value of use, as a means and source of labour that 
can produce many products.263 In this process of actual labour, labourers use the means 
of production that belongs to the capitalist, and transform it into the form of valuable 
products. However, the means of production takes advantage of the labourer in the sense 
that private property increases.264 In the capitalistic society, the means of production 
emerges as the existence of capital against living labour. Furthermore, it is shown that 
accumulated labour or dead labour controls the living labour. Thus, Marx clarifies that 
the living labour is completely controlled by the machine, the means of production that is 
produced by his or her labour in the light of Entfremdung.  
 
Second, Marx focuses on the relationship between workers and the capitalist because he 
recognizes Entfremdung through this relationship. According to Marx, the process of 
production transforms wealth into capital and the means of pleasure, while the labour of 
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workers objectifies endlessly into others’ products, and the process of production 
continuously changes the products of workers into goods or capital. On the other hand, 
this process itself is consumed by the capitalist.265  Here, we should notice that the 
capitalist’s Entfremdung is emerged by personalized capital, and the labourer’s 
Entfremdung is emerged by personalized labour. 266  As Marx indicates, while the 
capitalist who is rooted by the process of the Entfremdung is satisfied in his or her 
products or the means of production, from the start of the labour activity, the labourer 
who is sacrificed by the process of Entfremdung stands against the products or the means 
of production.267  
 
Third, in association with surplus value and alienation, Marx shows how the process of 
capitalistic production exploits the worker. He recognizes that all methods to elevate the 
productive capacity of labour within the capitalistic structure accompany the labourer’s 
devotion with the sacrifice of an individual worker. In other words, all means to grow the 
productive capacity of labourers degrade the means to control workers and transform the 
means to exploit, so workers becomes deformed as partial human beings and the dignity 
of workers is degraded; they are considered something attached to the machine. In 
addition, labourers come to reify the contents of work, or the worker’s spiritual ability is 
alienated in the process of objectification.268 In Marx’s view, all alienation, including 
workers’ spiritual alienation, emerges from the capitalistic structure. Thus, in the level of 
manufacture the worker himself or herself exists only as the property of the machine, 
because the labour of workers is degenerated into an automated equipment in the work 
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place. This means that workers are restricted to the machine or working hours without 
freedom, because they are exploited by the capitalist class, who execute the accumulation 
of wealth with such methods. Moreover, the labourers are not only alienated by the 
accumulation of wealth, but they themselves begin to develop as the means of 
accumulation. Accordingly, whether they earn more or less money, the lives of workers 
deteriorate as the accumulation of capital increases.269  
 
Fourth, Marx embodies the relationship between the worker and capital using the notion 
of alienation. He notes that bourgeois economists compliment the achievement of dead 
labour because past labour always disguises capital: the passive voice of A.B.C. … 
labourer disguises the active voice of X non-labourer. Furthermore, Marx insists that past 
labour becomes increasingly significant in the process of living labour. This is because 
the past labour, which embodies the form of capital, controls living labour and makes 
workers alienated.270 According to Marx, capital is like Dracula, able to live by sucking 
out the work of living labour: the more capital controls the living labour, the more capital 
can live on as dead labour.271 Marx insists that while the slaves of Rome were bound 
with shackles, wage-labourers are bound by their owners’ invisible rope.272 He shows 
how dead labour, namely, capital, brutally controls or exploits the living labour, and 
describes how the dead labour makes the living labour thoroughly alienated. 
 
Next, let us investigate alienation and the phenomenon of fetishism in capitalistic society. 
Marx observes the relationship between commodity and money in the first part of Das 
                                                 
269 Ibid., 675. 
270 Ibid., 635.  
271 Ibid., 247. 
272 Ibid., 599. 
 100 
Kapital. Needless to say, commodities and money are key factors in capitalistic society. 
Marx discloses the fetishism of commodities through the observation of commodity and 
money. That is, the fetishism of commodities shows that the commodity encompasses the 
social character of labour, but that fetishism demonstrates a totally different image from 
its original one between people and people.273 In other words, commodity may seem a 
trivial factor, but analysis of the secret of commodity in the economic structure of 
capitalism shows it to be curious indeed. This is indicated more clearly in the following 
passage:  
 
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social 
character of men’s labour appears to them as a social relation, existing not 
between themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the reason 
why the products of labour become commodities, social things whose qualities 
are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. In the same way 
the light from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of our 
optic nerve, but as the objective form of something outside the eye itself. But, in 
the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one thing 
to another, from external object to the eye.274 
 
The figure of commodity is not just the product of labour itself; rather, it reveals the social 
character of workers’ labour, which means the value of exchange or social relationship 
between the ability of workers and capitalistic markets. In the process of exchange, the 
fetishism of commodities emerges in the capitalistic structure of economy. Marx regards 
the fetishism of commodities as an inverted phenomenon between human being and 
commodities. In other words, the products or commodities which are made by the workers 
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control their creators and also regulate their destiny. According to Rubin, the reason why 
Marx turns from the theory of alienation to the theory of commodity fetishism is that he 
had to make a way from the negation of the real world in the name of an ideal to the 
establishment of actual history and further development of concrete society, ‘from 
Utopian to Scientific socialism’,275 because utopian socialism does not recognize limits 
upon its science, but holds the delusion that it has the knowledge needed to organize a 
utopian world, whereas scientific socialism makes people understand the proletarian 
movement within existing society.276 However, it is difficult to find direct evidence in 
Das Kapital for Rubin’s argument that Marx transforms the notion of alienation to the 
thought of commodity fetishism. Contrary to Rubin, Rosental insists that Marx draws a 
new notion about commodity fetishism, different from the notion of alienation presented 
in Das Kapital, albeit that the two notions are deeply related to each other.277 The 
difference between them, according to Rosental, is that commodity fetishism makes the 
workers transfer from the social relationship to the material relationship under a particular 
condition, while alienation expresses the confrontation between the capitalist and the 
worker, and reveals the separation of the labourer or producer from the working condition 
or the product of labour.278  
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In spite of this difference, Richard Schmitt insists that in Marx’s thought this commodity 
fetishism results from alienation,279 because the worker’s alienation from the product of 
their labour expresses the circumstance of individual labourers,280 where commodities 
control their creators.  
 
To clarify, commodity fetishism consists in humans’ thinking and acting, while the notion 
of alienation encompasses ‘not only the attitude of the person towards his activity, but 
also his attitude towards the object which represents the product of the activity’.281 Marx 
uses both concepts in Das Kapital. They are united with each other in the political-
economic system but they perform different functions of agency. 
  
In conclusion, Rubin insists that Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism did not have an 
important position in the Marxist economic system282 when he established his theory of 
value. However, this theory itself, in association with the notion of alienation, is a basic 
foundation of the whole Marxist economic system. In fact, Marx’s research is not limited 
to elucidating the notion of alienation, but is expanded to expose the social character of 
alienation, which encompasses the distorted social relation between the workers and 
commodity fetishism. In addition, throughout his work, he demonstrates how the notion 
of alienation changes or develops. It is clear that Marx uses commodity fetishism to 
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elucidate the phenomena of alienation, and in Das Kapital he sometimes replaces 
alienation with commodity fetishism. 
 
Finally, I will investigate how Marx uses the notions of agency and alienation in Das 
Kapital. In his study of the economistic system, Marx’s notion of alienation has been 
changed to employ other key terms. In particular, in Das Kapital Marx brings into sharp 
relief the idea of commodity fetishism, because this fetishism more clearly explains the 
alienation of workers and the distorted relation of production or the capitalist exploitation 
within the structure of capitalism. What made it possible for this to happen? What kind 
of agencies emerge in his last work? There are many kinds of agencies in capitalism, but 
here, particularly, I suggest three key types: capital, machine and workers. 
   
First, for Marx, capital is a deputy or agent of capitalists or capitalism. Marx regards the 
commodity as the elementary form of the bourgeois society that is the starting point of 
capital’s development, so he construes commodities as products of capital. 283  As 
mentioned in the previous section, for Marx, capital as accumulated labour and dead 
labour is a hidden hand which controls the visible economic world and living labourers. 
More directly, Marx states that capital is dead labour or vampire-like labour, which sucks 
out the work of living workers. The more work it sucks, the longer it lives.284 His 
comments demonstrate how violent the power of capital is in capitalistic society and how 
it exploits and impoverishes the lives of labourers. Because the central position of capital 
is occupied by capitalism, capital as an agency acts to build the capitalistic structure and 
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capitalism. In Das Kapital I, Marx observes how money or commodity transforms into 
capital. In analysing the commodity, he arrives at the universally equivalent form of 
commodity, ‘money’. This transformation from a particular commodity to the universal 
equivalent form can be accomplished by the action of society and by ‘the agency of the 
social process’.285 In other words, capital as an agency of capitalists can turn the natural 
form of commodity into the socially recognized equivalent form. 286  Terrell Carver 
explains Marx’s agency of the social process and shows how capital takes the key role in 
capitalism. According to Carver, ‘Capital presents a fully developed inter-relationship of 
money and commodities as capital, and analyses this in a formal and abstract way, 
attributing it to “societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails”.’287 He 
goes on to insist that ‘Gold as coin has a “price form”, and the universal equivalent has 
become money.’288 Thus we can see that it is impossible to build a capitalistic system, 
its structure and its contents, without capital as an agent in capitalism. When Marx 
analyses that the capital transforms from the form of commodity to value and use-value, 
he reaches the conclusion that: ‘The difficulty lies not in comprehending that money is a 
commodity, but in discovering how, why and by what means a commodity becomes 
money.’ 289  In order to solve this difficulty, Marx looks at the circulation from 
commodity to money or from money to commodity, and insists that ‘the circulation of 
commodities is the starting point of capital’.290 As seen in footnote 289, the circulation 
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of commodities as money between C-M-C and M-C-M can convert to the circulation of 
money as capital. The circulation of capital is ‘an end in itself, for the valorization of 
value takes place only within this constantly renewed movement. The movement of 
capital is therefore limitless.’291 Here, Marx argues that the owners of money, who are 
conscious bearers of this movement, become capitalists in a capitalistic society.292 
 
In short, capital plays a crucial role as an agent of capitalism, in constructing capitalism 
and in making its contents. It is clear that, for Marx, capital as an agency embodies the 
idea of capitalism and takes on dynamic force. When we analyse the agency as capital, 
we can see the actual capitalism, its structure and its direction. As shown above, if agency 
takes a key role in establishing the identities of the subject, the phenomena and realities 
in the modern capitalistic society are the outcomes of agencies’ activities.  
 
Second, Marx considers machinery as crucial tools to intensify capitalism. Machinery 
takes a main role in the development of capitalism and the success of the industrial 
revolution in England. Thus, Marx insists that: ‘Machinery also revolutionizes, and quite 
fundamentally, the agency through which the capital-relation is formally mediated, i.e. 
the contract between the worker and the capitalist.’293 For Marx, the machine is an agent 
of capitalists to increase their private property and wealth as well, as it is an agent of 
workers to reduce labourers’ burden. After much consideration about machinery, 
however, Marx sees not only this positive aspect, but also the negative functions of 
                                                 
commodities into money and the re-conversion of money into commodities: selling in order to buy” (Ibid., 
247). And “the money is in the end converted into a commodity which serves as a use-value; it has therefore 
been spent once and for all” (Ibid., 249). 
291 Ibid., 253. 
292 Ibid., 254. 
293 Ibid., 519. 
 106 
machinery as an agent. He argues that while the machine functions to make many 
products and reduces workers’ efforts or sacrifice, the function as agent of capitalists 
reversely exploits and even destroys workers’ lives in the actual world. Marx explains the 
negative effects of machine production in terms of the worker as follows: First, male 
workers who are skilled in their profession are driven out of the workplace, and women 
and children are employed at a much lower wage.294 Secondly, although one would 
expect that the working day of an average worker would be reduced as machines are 
introduced, in fact, because production levels are stepped up relatively more than the 
efficiency of machines in reducing the time of production, the working day increases in 
length.295 In addition, due to the capitalists’ desire to maximize profits, they want to use 
the machine continuously and beyond its limits, so the intensity of labour increases.296 
In analysing these phenomena, Marx notes that ‘the machines strike down the 
labourer’.297 He gives the example of the demolition and burning of machines in various 
parts of Britain, a protest against the use of machines against labourers. The machine had 
broken apart families and adversely affected the workers. 298  These phenomena 
demonstrate an extreme example of how agency, instead of actualizing the identity of the 
subject, can actually destroy the life of the subject. 
  
To sum up, for Marx, machinery as an agency in the capitalistic production process 
manifests many negative aspects in free society and among free human beings. Marx 
points out that: ‘Family slavery resurfaces in Capital, though in an economically 
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295 Ibid., 526-533. 
296 Ibid., 533-542. 
297 Ibid., 559. 
298 Ibid., 554. 
 107 
determined context, not in one determined by “nature” and the beginnings of culture’.299 
According to Marx’s analysis, the machine is the key factor to change workers’ economic 
lives and cultural atmosphere, and plays a significant role as a faithful servant of the 
capitalist. Thus, the machine as agency between the labourer and the capitalist performs 
negatively to expose the actuality of capital-relation in large-scale industry. 
 
Finally, Marx regards the worker as human agency to embody the capitalistic structure. 
As Marx investigates more deeply into the worker’s situation in the process of production, 
he insists that, in the beginning, the labourer as a free agent sells his own labour-power, 
and then the worker as a slave-dealer sells his spouse and children to ensure the survival 
of his family in a society that is run by large-scale industry.300 Marx regards a worker as 
a free agent and states that a human being should not be a passive slave, but the creative 
subject in history. However, there is contradiction between a free agent and a passive 
slave in historical or economic circumstance. Hence, Marx states that ‘men are made by 
circumstances’ on the one hand, and on the other hand ‘men change their 
circumstances’.301 This is a controversial issue when interpreting Marx’s perspective on 
the subject in history. However, as Andrew Collier notes, in any case, ‘it is as if 
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humankind is the agent in history, and it alienates itself, that is, the alienating is its action. 
Yet it is very much the action of some people against others, and of the structures which 
allow some people to oppress others.’302 In the process of alienating action, Marx sees 
the worker as the subject and the object in the capitalistic economic structure. If the 
labourer is subject, he or she can be autonomous agent. If the labourer is individual as 
object, the person can be socially determined or constructed agent. When an individual is 
analysed using economic categories, he/she appears as the bearer who represents a 
particular social class and its interest.303 Those bearers are the agencies in the capitalistic 
world. According to Marx, those labourers are passive agencies because they adjust to 
the social and economic structures of capitalism and conform to the demand of the society. 
Interestingly, he does not take the structures itself to become agencies of capitalism, 
although he comes close to a structuralist view. On the other hand, there are labourers 
who are willing to reform the society into communism, with the zeal of the proletariat. 
They are defined as autonomous agency. John Roemer believes that the autonomous 
agencies are established among the working class, and argues that these agencies are very 
similar to those Marx presented in the relationship of the owners of the products and 
markets.304 Yet despite this, the concept of ‘the individuals who are formed by society’, 
is vague. In addition, agencies take only a passive role in the evolution of the modes of 
production, which results in private property. Also, the proletariat, the autonomous 
agency that aims for communism, has a limited role in the emergence and development 
of capitalism. Therefore, as Carver argues, ‘while Marx’s account shows the utility-
maximiser presupposed by rational-choice theory to be a social construction, some further 
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concept of agency still lurks within his conception of the individual’.305 Due to the vague 
concept of the individual (i.e. subject and object), it is problematic to definitely conclude 
that the human agency is the creative subject in history. Thus, for Marx, the important 
issues are how to solve the gap between ‘the determination of individual or social 
determination’ and ‘creativity of individuals’; and how to build autonomous agency to 
overcome the determinism. Carver argues that agency is distinguished by characteristics 
such as creativeness and connection between subject and object. Thus he considers that 
the concept of agency ‘does not present humans as necessarily conforming to some 
biological or psychological form of inherent “rationality”’.306 He argues that the human 
being is species-being and the root of human agency is critical and creative reasoning.307 
The creative human agency makes a bridge between ‘the way that the mode of production 
of material life conditions the general social, political and intellectual life process’, and 
‘the claim that proletarians and communists could exercise the sort of agency that the 
overthrow of capitalism would require’.308 However, it is ‘not least through the sheer 
necessity it imposes on us to be agents of the utility-maximising type’.309 The way 
encompasses the contradictions between use-value and value and presents an inherent 
conceptual structure to solve the dilemma of capitalism in the production of commodities. 
The claim is that human agencies with creative and critical thinking should increase 
through inductive arguments and deductive analysis of the dilemma of capitalism 
presented by Marx; those agencies predict the breakdown of capitalism and attempt to 
transform and renovate the system.310 Recognizing the positive roles of human agency 
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in Marx’s Das Kapital, Carver presents creative human agency as demonstrating a 
significant clue to how labourers, the proletariat, confront key agencies of capitalism (e.g. 
capitalist, product and machine, money), and how the human agency establishes scientific 





So far, Marx’s analysis on the status of labourers has been examined based on four 
publications (from the early work to his final book). This section has examined how 
violent capitalism drives labourers into inhuman circumstances. Also, it has explained 
how capitalism alienates the lives of labourers and its impact on the concept of ‘agency’. 
The idea of alienation presented in Ö konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem 
Jahr 1844 is the key theme explored in the early work of Marx. He states that alienation 
is the outcome of private property and division of labour, and identifies that ‘self-activity’ 
cannot be the agency of labourers, due to alienated labour. Currency (money) becomes a 
constant and universal agency for alienated people. However, money overpowers the 
subject and reverses the order of the subject and the object. In Die deutsche Ideologie, 
Marx presents how private property, one pattern of alienation, has been transformed into 
capital and has formed capitalistic society; and how capitalism has become ideology and 
settled in world history. This section has reviewed his argument that people are the subject 
or initiator in creating history but are also sometimes created or influenced by the 
structures of history and ideology. Marx considers that agencies are those who actively 
create communism in history, such as the proletariat. In Ö konomisch-philosophische 
Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844 and Die deutsche Ideologie, Marx criticizes both Hegel’s 
concept of Entäuβerung and Feuerbach’s notion of Gegenständlichkeit, on the grounds 
that neither philosopher was able to apply the concept of alienation to the real context of 
human history. Thus, Marx describes the characteristics of agency in Grundrisse zur 
Kritik der politischen Ӧkonomie as follows: causality of labour when the subject 
objectifies itself; a synthetic connection or mediation of labour; and a causal efficacy. In 
Das Kapital, Marx examines the key agencies of capitalism such as capital and the 
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machine. He identifies the dilemmas of capitalism and the proletariat and concludes that 
the proletariat, which attempts to solve the problems by achieving communism, are the 
human agency with critical thinking and creative ability. His analysis presents specific 
agencies that manipulated the capitalist society in those days. He does not limit his 
argument within theoretical rhetoric, but demonstrates practical methodology and 



























In the previous chapters, I have construed the notions of alienation and agency that 
emerged from Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. The concept of agency allows scholars to 
open the door between actuality and possibility, between the abstract and actual things, 
and between recognition and beings. In addition, agency theory has been embraced by 
sociological inquiry and metaphysical scholars, because analytical philosophy requires 
the application of scientific methodology and verification to unscientific statements such 
as metaphysical thoughts, moral categories and theological notions. In the previous 
chapter, I reviewed how Marx analyses politics, economics and capitalism using the term 
‘agency’ in order to expand his theory. Interestingly, agency and its role are often 
considered and applied in areas of modern economics such as business and finance.311 
  
This chapter will investigate how human nature and human action can be reconstructed 
and explained scientifically. B. F. Skinner has argued that if we perform scientific 
examination and investigation about the organic structure of bodily actions correctly, the 
internal elements of humans, such as human nature, can be properly understood.312 In 
other words, in explaining humanity he refuses to separate human nature and behaviour 
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dualistically. Rather he connects the two by presenting several psychological agents, such 
as inner agents, the inner man and the layman. However, there remain many controversial 
issues regarding agents or agency theory. Therefore, I will begin by investigating how 
agency theory can construe vague human nature in a scientific manner without a logical 
leap, and then look at how agency can explain action scientifically. Finally, I will suggest 
agency as the doer of action and the embodiment of self-activity. 
 
4.2 Human Nature313 and Agency 
 
Human nature is one of the most important themes in the field of philosophy, because it 
is crucial to the examination of human being. Consequently, human nature has been the 
centre of much discussion and dispute, in various fields of study. Philosophy, morality, 
culture, sociology, and politics have all used human nature as a main ground for justifying 
and developing their issues. According to Keith Horton, there has been a trend in recent 
research to consider human nature as setting limits on moral endeavour.314 In some areas 
of modern science, developments such as the potential for gene manipulation, sex change 
surgery, and the creation of human-animal embryos315 require understanding of another 
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dimension on human nature. Under this circumstance, many different opinions have 
emerged on the definition of human nature and on its usage and development. Because 
paying attention to all of these definitions could lead this thesis in an unexpected 
direction, in the following sections the writer will focus on four of them in turn.  
  
 
4.2.1 Human nature as the description of man 
 
First of all, some consider human nature to describe the human being; without human 
nature, the human being does not exist. As mentioned in footnote 312, Aristotle 
understood ‘nature’ as the primary immanent element or the primary matter: the starting 
point from which something can develop. Therefore, human nature is the starting point 
from which the human can develop. Human soul, mind, self, instinct, desire, will, 
consciousness or unconsciousness, faith, hope, love, reason and feeling are all properties 
of human nature that can be used to explain what humanity is. In his Summa Theologiae 
Aquinas applied theological analysis to human nature, insisting that ‘Human nature 
demands distinct theological treatment precisely by virtue of the soul, not of its bodily 
character, except so far as soul bespeaks embodiment.’316 He began by examining the 
essence of soul, then advanced toward its power of acting or abilities. Finally, in 
examining the activity of the soul he attempted to explain what human nature is, in order 
to clarify what ‘human’ is. The soul that is internalized in human nature has metaphysical 
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nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad animam.” 
 116 
content which cannot be verified scientifically, but can explain and describe what human 
is. 
 
The argument that humanity can be explained by the detailed description of soul, mind 
and self, or the intention, desire, thought and will that are internalized in human life is a 
persuasive one. However, the question of whether the element of human nature can be 
scientifically explained and analysed raises a number of issues. This is because discussion 
of human nature requires an assumption that it really exists and can be verified using 
certain scientific tools. It is no easy task to define scientifically what soul, mind and self 
are, still less to analyse and anatomize them. The assumption that transcendence beyond 
facticity is internalized in human nature has resulted in controversy. Complexity and 
extremes are always key issues in explaining human nature. 
 
Therefore, rather than applying scientific explanation and analytical philosophical 
perspectives, Aquinas’s approach, which explains human nature rationally, logically and 
philosophically based on biblical explanations about Creation and the nature of man, is 
thought to be more realistic. Feuerbach’s approach, which perceives religions as 
humanity, may be persuasive because he thought that theologically hidden human nature 
should be identified in order to understand human nature holistically. Another, more 
scientific and objective, approach to the investigation of human nature stresses the 
necessity of describing the important elements of that nature realistically, even though it 
may be individualistic and subjective. All of these approaches attempt to understand 
human nature by explaining its properties, interpreting and describing the phenomena.  
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It is dangerous to be cynical about efforts to synthesize, analyse and interpret human 
nature using all possible methods, and we will not progress if we limit ourselves within 
subjective and intuitive arguments. Moreover, the question regarding the complexity of 
human nature needs further investigation in order to overcome the limitations and solve 
the problems in an academic manner. 
4.2.2 Human nature as actuality and transcendence of being 
 
The complexity referred to earlier results from the two opposite aspects of human nature: 
transcendence and actuality. Jerome M. Segal regards human being as two modes 
inherently fragmented by the facticity and transcendence of human beings. 317  The 
duality in human nature can be either separated or vaguely mixed. According to John 
Locke, simple ideas can be transformed by combination into complex ideas, or notions318 
“because such ideas are made up of many particular substances considered together, as 
united into one idea …”,319 Among the properties of human nature are mixed modes such 
as clear and vague, perceivable and unperceivable and movable and immovable. 
Depending on which perspective is taken, the understanding of human nature can be 
different. In his three books Understanding, Passions and Morals, Hume explained 
human nature in terms of three areas.320 He argued that if human nature itself is to be 
established academically, it must be based on certainty.321 Therefore, Hume insisted that 
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philosophers investigating the ultimate principles of soul should not consider theirs to be 
an academic work about true human nature. 322  Rather, such pursuits are based on 
assumption and speculation rather than universal principles and certainty. Furthermore, 
‘any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, 
ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical’.323 Although Hume tried to 
explain academically the complexity of human nature, it is certain that most philosophers 
regard it as something unverifiable. Although the transcendence and morality in human 
nature can be examined with certainty, the subject is beyond the boundaries of scientific 
judgement and verification. Therefore, the following section will investigate key themes 
such as whether human nature can be analysed and explained scientifically. 
 
4.2.3 Human nature and its flexibility 
 
As noted above, Aristotle defined human nature as potential or primary matter that is 
unchangeable. However, this thesis will gather a wider range of views, in order to expand 
the discussion. Aspects such as instinct, reason, will, volition, and intention can all be 
included in human nature. These things can be changed. According to W. E. Hocking, 
‘human nature is undoubtedly the most plastic part of the living world, the most adaptable, 
the most educable’.324 Indeed, in many discussions on human nature it is a common 
denominator that human nature can be changed. As already noted, today the biggest factor 
that can make this change possible seems to be the fast pace of technological 
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development. Indeed, in his article ‘Human Nature: How normative might it be?’ Kurt 
Bayertz claims that human nature could become technologically contingent. 325  He 
argues: ‘In a word, the “nature of the human being” is identical with his body, i.e., with 
the outer figure and the inner functions of the biological species homo sapiens.’326 His 
view is more comprehensive than W. E. Hocking’s definition of the nature of human 
being as instinct and self,327 because we cannot simply examine human nature in our 
innermost being. He presents a persuasive argument, citing three reasons:  
 
This interpretation seems adequate for several reasons: a) it corresponds to our 
intuition, since we associate a physical being with the concept ‘human’. .. b) The 
human body is part of nature in its entirety: historically it is the product of 
evolution, is subject to the laws of nature and is bound to external nature as regards 
the fulfilment of its needs. c) And finally, in the present context, it is about the 
ethical evaluation and limitation of biotechnological actions: these directly target 
the human body (even where they -indirectly - target the mind).328 
 
It is, however, hard to say that his opinion properly defines human nature. If his claim is 
reasonable, human nature can be academically analysed with accurate observations, 
recordings, and experiments on the human body. As long as this kind of view is accepted 
as sound, we can get a narrow understanding on human nature classified as natural reason, 
will, the self, and mind. In fact, it is difficult to prove this view of human nature 
academically, and for that reason it is excluded from some academic domains. Hence, it 
is very important to find a way to explain this in a more intellectual manner, with the 
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understanding that human nature is a whole being composed of inner world and external 
body. Accordingly, it is now essential to clarify the properties of hidden human nature 
accurately, intelligently and logically. If we abandon efforts to study the properties of 
human nature academically, the result will be vagueness of definition and continued 
misunderstanding. Furthermore, it is impossible to mention the science of man without 
scientific examination of human nature. Therefore, the agency argued by Hocking and 
the opinions of modern scholars will be examined in order to reconstruct the nature of 
human being.  
 
4.2.4 Agency as the remaking of human nature 
 
The key task in this section is to investigate whether it is possible to answer 
philosophically the question about the complex and mixed nature of human being. 
Wittgenstein, who set the foundation of analytical philosophy, stated that ‘what we cannot 
speak about, we must pass over in silence’329, and remained silent about human nature. 
In fact, however, Wittgenstein demonstrated that human being can be expressed and 
formed by language.330 He noted how close is the link between language and life, since 
‘to imagine a language means to imagine a life-form’.331 However, he made no specific 
mention of human nature per se, which is impossible to solve.  
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Under this situation, agency theory brought the significance of human being into the 
academic field. In his book Human Nature and its Remaking W. E. Hocking uses the term 
agency or agent with regard to the understanding of human being. He insists that the 
fundamental and universal thing in terms of conscience ‘is the principal inner agency for 
the remaking of human nature; hence it must stand as a critic over against everything that 
is to be remade, and so over against all instincts’.332 As used by Hocking, agency seems 
to be merely an appropriate term for the remaking of human being, because he neither 
theorized the term more widely, nor expanded the advantage of the theory. Nevertheless, 
the fact that Hocking used agency as an important tool to identify the properties of human 
nature (something unfixed and unpredictable) indicates that human nature can potentially 
develop into the foundation of moral philosophies. Keith Horton also expressed that 
human nature affects moral standards and has a function to build moral theory. Such 
considerations concerning human nature are ‘internal to moral thinking itself about the 
apparently unlimited demands that may be placed on agents by certain moral theories’.333 
As noted by W. E. Hocking, if we regard self, conscience and instinct as the properties of 
human nature, agency could be one of the most effective toolboxes for the explanation 
and reconstruction of these. For example, let us examine agency and ‘self’. First of all, 
from the ontological perspective, we need to see whether ‘self’ really exists. According 
to Hume, some philosophers accept ‘self’ as existing in our imagination. In fact, we can 
never catch ‘ourselves’ at any time without our own perception.334 This is because we 
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cannot prove where the self exists in the body. Robert Nozick explains Hume’s argument 
in detail. He argues that ‘self’ entails three problems from an ontological perspective. 
First, the self cannot be found in any part of our body.335 Second, it is difficult to imagine 
the self without also imagining it as entangled in something.336 Finally, it is difficult to 
envisage the self without identifying it with some particular material form.337 Thus, 
Nozick does not find ‘the view of the self as a property sufficiently illuminating, 
clarifying’338 in this instance. Yet while Nozick considers those opinions about ‘self’ as 
insubstantial, he does not give up the investigation. This is because the self is a crucial 
subject of meta-philosophical considerations. According to Michael V. Wedin, Nozick 
suggests that reflexive self-synthesis is ‘among the most salient features of full selfhood 
and that the notion of the self best explaining the feature is the notion of something that 
constitutes itself in the very act of reflexively referring to itself’.339 Wedin states that 
Nozick’s point is very similar to the explanation of mind, one of the properties of human 
nature.340 Nozick explains how ‘The self synthesizes itself not only transversely, among 
the things existing only at that time, but also longitudinally so as to include past entities, 
including past selves which were synthesized.’341 From an epistemological perspective, 
one finding from Nozick is the fact that the agent of ‘self’ enables ‘self” to synthesize 
itself.  
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Taking a different stance from that of Nozick, Jay F. Rosenberg pays attention to the 
‘perception’ of Hume’s arguments. He points out that ‘self’ does not exist as an object of 
experience but as subject. In other words, according to Rosenberg, ‘the self which is in 
question here is that self which is the subject of all its experiences but the object of none 
of them’.342 The fact that Rosenberg perceives the ‘self’ as thinking subject shows that 
he knows himself through ‘inner sense’, when he thinks of himself as ‘thinking’.343 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the footnote above, Rosenberg’s Cartesian approach shows 
that ‘self’ exists ontologically as complex inner states. Let us examine the different 
opinions about agent with regard to ‘self’, no matter whether it exists ontologically or 
epistemologically. In examining how ‘self as agent’ relates to ‘self as subject’, John 
MacMurray argues that the former is the negation of the latter.344 As noted in the chapter 
on Hegel with regard to the relationship between self and agent, ‘it must be impossible to 
represent the same Self as at one and the same time both Agent and Subject. For when it 
is Agent it will not be Subject; and if this were actually the case, then the Self could never 
know that it was Agent, nor could it ever act with knowledge.’ Self and Agent cannot 
appear at the same time as logical process. Such an idea may conflict with Hegel’s 
dialectic characteristics of actuality, which argue that agency can have both subjectivity 
and objectivity. This demonstrates how contrasting are the positions of Hegel and those 
of other scholars, such as Kierkegaard, who criticized Hegel’s dialectic approach. 
                                                 
342 Jay F. Rosenberg, The Thinking Self (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 13.  
343 Ibid., 220. Rosenberg explains Descartes’s statement, “I am a thing which thinks, a res 
cogitans”: “Res cogitans, then, is not a species of the genus res, distinct from res extensa and only 
problematically in ‘interaction’ or ‘communion’ with it. I am but one entity - res extensa et cogitans. 
Descartes notwithstanding, the thinking self is a ‘corporeal substance’. Yet, although I am but one entity, I 
can ‘know myself’ in two quite different ways. I am indeed res extensa et cogitans But when I speak of 
myself as ‘extended’, I ‘know myself’ through a shared and X-objective epistemic, and I describe myself 
as a propertied matter-of-factual object.” (Ibid., 219-220). 
344 John MacMurray, The Self as Agent: Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University 
of Glasgow in 1953, 96. 
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However, as Hegel expressed in Philosophies of the Law, an argument that agency enters 
into the object with subjectivity and establishes ‘actuality’ (stable and concrete condition) 
through dialectic method, is an explanation completely different from the approach with 
mathematical formulas. Therefore, the agent of ‘self as subject’ is the actor who 
objectifies into concrete objects with subjectivity. In other words, agency, which is 
involved in the overall process of ‘self’ and delivers the characteristics of subject to object, 
can be an important tool to connect the subject and object and solve the mysteries of 
human being. 
 
To summarize, agency is an important tool to explain the countless properties of human 
nature. This section has reviewed how the agent reorganizes self and resolves the human 
existence, while examining the different opinions on self, one of the properties within 
human nature. The following section will investigate human behaviour and agency while 
considering how human action can be explained philosophically. 
4.3 Action and Agency 
 
 
It is a difficult philosophical task to demonstrate how the various properties in human 
nature construct the life style of the human and are expressed in human behaviours. 
Modern behaviour psychologists have presented psychological and behaviour analysis 
through extensive examination and investigation of the relationship between the 
properties of human nature and behaviours. Their work has now established an academic 
area. However, the purpose of this section is to investigate whether it is possible to 
reconstruct our behaviour philosophically and scientifically. In particular, the specific 
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roles of agency will be investigated in terms of how it provides a connection with the 
overall process of behaviours. 
 
4.3.1 Properties of human being - action and agent 
 
Philosophical investigation about motion and action has been a continuing endeavour 
through the centuries. Explaining human motion in philosophical terms is a particularly 
important task in this area. According to René Descartes, motion is ‘the action by which 
a body travels from one place to another’,345 or in more detailed terms ‘the transfer of 
one piece of matter, or one body, from the vicinity of the other bodies which are in 
immediate contact with it, and which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicinity of other 
bodies’.346 In the light of these definitions, Descartes examines and explains how the 
motion appears in complex form, insisting above all that: ‘God is the primary cause of 
motion; and he always preserves the same quantity of motion in the universe.’ 347 
However, since too broad a hypothesis will be impossible to prove specifically, we must 
focus solely on explaining and solving the problem. Therefore, the task of demonstrating 
scientifically the origin of movement and action may be considered secondary. As pointed 
out by B.F. Skinner, human behaviour is a difficult subject matter, which cannot be 
understood easily. This is because human behaviour appears as one process and contains 
                                                 
345 René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy (1644) in: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
Vol. I, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 233.   
346 Ibid. 
347 Ibid., 240.  
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extremely complex content which cannot be easily observed.348 However, he does regard 
behaviour as a subject matter that can be observed and explained scientifically.349   
 
To explain human motion correctly, we need to find the identity of movement and action. 
In order to do so, we must examine what properties are contained in the action and how 
these properties are demonstrated in the action. Let us take the following example. In the 
Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014, Yuna Kim, South Korean Figure Skater, performed a 3-
minute short program and a 7-minute free program. During the performance, she 
demonstrated a high level of artistic performance with balance and power, including 
technically proficient jumps and spins and footwork. The spectators responded with 
warmth and enthusiasm. In analysing the properties of actions in this example, let us 
assume that the results are the following: 
 
1) Rational role: In order to transfer the whole performance into artistic motions, 
she integrated music with her movement and carefully planned her performance. 
2) When she was young, she watched other skaters who performed with artistic 
beauty. She had dream, desire and free will that enabled her to become an 
outstanding figure skater. 
3) Nationalism or Patriotic sentiment: She had intention to show the world about 
her country through her performance. 
4) Mentality: In addition to gain high marks by keeping regulation and command, 
she did her best to satisfy herself with her own performance.  
                                                 
348 B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, 15.  
349 Ibid., 14. 
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5) Morality: she maintained sportswomanship and entered the competition with 
confidence.  
6) Perseverance: In order not to make mistakes in advanced techniques, she 
engaged in extensive practice according to the program.  
7) Inspiration: Her performance inspired the spectators and received great applause.  
 
How can we analyse the movement and actions of the subject, Yuna Kim, in her 10-
minute performance? How can we explain scientifically and academically the fact that 
the properties of action described above are connected in time and space and have resulted 
in her current performance and actions? In order to express the subject clearly, the 
properties in the action of the subject need to be extended to the external world of the 
subject and outwardly demonstrated. Agency undertakes this role. For this reason, Judith 
Jarvis Thomson regards agency as a verb, to ‘do’ and ‘perform’ something in order to 
disclose the will of the subject.350 In other words, agency shows the properties of the 
actions of Yuna Kim’s performance as follow: intention, organizing, planning - rational 
roles; volition, desire, belief, dream, satisfaction, love - emotional factors; regulation, 
command – lawful indications; duty, promise, responsibility - moral requests; mentality, 
free will, personality etc. We can draw a conclusion here. The performance of Yuna Kim 
is undertaken according to the rational guidelines of the subject and her motions include 
regulations and moral requirements. Her performance artistically elaborates those 
elements including emotional factors. The emotional elements of the subject can express 
every moment of her actions. Her emotional expression can connect and transfer to the 
emotion of other people. However, sometimes that emotional expression is demonstrated 
                                                 
350 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Acts and Other Events (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 
24-39.  
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in response to rational guidelines and moral regulation. Thus, the agent which connects 
the subject and the action of the subject is the description of the subject and subject 
matters that are scientifically observable and reconstruct the subject. As shown in the 
example of Yuna Kim, such a relationship of subject matter can be explained logically by 
the notion of agent. Carol Rovane insists that agents ‘can engage in the agency-regarding 
relation’,351 which is ‘an omnibus one and hides many possible interpretations’.352 Yuna 
Kim’s 10-minute performance includes both easily perceivable actions and actions that 
cannot be observable. This is because some properties of actions are mysterious. 
According to Irving Thalberg, these mysterious elements include desires, intention and 
brain, and such complex emotional actions are difficult behaviours to study. 353  A 
question may be raised as to whether those body responses to emotional elements can be 
regarded as actions. Describing human behaviours, Richard Taylor states that some 
bodily motions are not actions.354 For example, breathing and stopping breathing cannot 
be regarded as behaviours. However, if such body motions are separated from the 
category of ‘action’, we may ignore the energy of life which triggers behaviour and 
actions. In fact, even the flow of blood through the veins or of air in the respiratory system, 
and the connections between muscles or between veins show motions and behaviours 
through organic association.355 The purpose of this section is not to investigate whether 
body exercise can be analysed through the notion of agent (that accompanies the motion) 
from a medical or biological perspective. However, it is certain that agent can show the 
                                                 
351 Carol Rovane, The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 72.   
352 Ibid., 74. 
353 Irving Thalberg, Perception, Emotion and Action: A Component Approach (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1977), 37. 53-62.   
354 Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 106.  
355 See, Irving Thalberg, Perception, Emotion and Action, 66-83. 
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relationships of the properties of human actions. S. C. Coval and P. G. Campbell classify 
properties of action into three broad categories: supports of singular reference and 
predication, informational contents, and causation.356 They present four theories using 
agent in order to analyse those properties, as follows:  
 
The objects of the competing causal theories all qualify as possible supports of 
singular reference: the object which consists only of the causal intentional state of 
the agent (Cause Theory); the object which consists of the event directly caused 
by the intentional state of agent (Single Effect Theory); the object which is the 
chain of events initiated by the intentional state of the agent (Chain Effect 
Theory); and the object which is the chain of events which begins with the causal 
intentional state of the agent and ends with the goal event (Relational Theory).357 
 
The common factors in the four theories are ‘the intentional states of agent’. Intention is 
one of the most controversial issues for establishing behaviour theory, and it should be 
borne in mind that in explaining intention academically there are many possibilities to 
discuss, because it includes inner motivation. Bratman is one of many scholars to regard 
intention as a core factor of behaviour. In his latest book, Structure of Agency, he explains 
behaviour through intention and planning theory, and also extends his agency theory.358 
He embodies intention within planning agents because he believes that ‘intentions are 
elements of a planning system, one that has fundamental roles in the coordination and 
                                                 
356 S.C. Coval and P. G. Campbell, Agency in Action: The Practical Rational Agency Machine 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1992), 5-6. 
357 Ibid., 5. 
358 Michael E. Bratman, Structures of Agency, 239. He explains: “According to the planning 
theory, we understand intentions, and intention-like attitudes, largely in terms of their roles in cross-
temporal and social coordination. According to the intention-based theory, then a kind of valuing that is at 
the heart of self-governance consists in policies (that is, general intentions) of giving weight or other forms 
of significance to certain considerations in practical reasoning and action.” 
 130 
control of action’.359 Intention, one of the triggers for behaviours, makes plans according 
to its nature and is an important factor for the human, the subject, to determine his or her 
behaviours. 
  
Of course, when humans have wrong beliefs in their intentions, they demonstrate complex 
behaviour. In that case a problem may arise as to how non-confident intentions and false 
beliefs are recognized in behaviour and whether the planning agent can control its 
behaviour. Bratman holds that instrumental rationality is a necessary criterion for the 
analysis of complex behaviours, and that this can be achieved through the reflection of 
practical reasoning.360 Accordingly, he states that ‘any reasonably complete theory of 
human action will need, in some way, to advert to this trio of features - to our 
reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our conception of our agency as temporally 
extended’. 361  Here, temporally extended agency includes non-human agents, which 
cause many actions. Thus, he maintains that ‘we are planning agents; our agency extends 
over time; sometimes at least, we govern our actions’.362 
 
These kinds of works seem to contribute greatly to explain and interpret behaviour 
logically, but the theories are unable to explain behaviours without any intention. The 
next section will investigate how the notion of agent can explain the behaviours that are 
demonstrated by the analysis of their properties.  
 
                                                 
359 Michael E. Bratman, “Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality”, in: Reasons for Action, 
ed. David Sobel and Steven Wall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 17.  
360 Ibid., 31-36. 
361 Michael E. Bratman, Structures of Agency, 21. 
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4.3.2 Causation of human action and agents 
 
We can analyse logical structures within the behaviour of agents that connect subject and 
object. In general, motions and behaviours are triggered by something, which can be the 
cause and effect of the behaviour. In the example above, there are many reasons why the 
subject, Yuna Kim, could demonstrate a high level of technique and performance without 
making mistakes, and elaborate every motion to an artistic level. Let us consider how this 
can be explained causally or logically in terms of agent.  
 
First of all, the properties of behaviour should be related to a causal statement in order for 
the behaviour (demonstrated by physiological process) to be understood and explained as 
causal relationship. Sydney Shoemaker insists that ‘the generality of causal propositions 
stems from the generality of properties’.363  In establishing the relationship between 
causality and properties, he argues that ‘the identity of property is completely determined 
by its potential for contributing to the causal powers of the things that have it’.364 Based 
on these statements, we need to ask whether there is any problem in explaining behaviour 
with causal relationship. According to Michael Morris, if we want to explain behaviour 
scientifically as causal relationship, two conditions need to be satisfied: the ‘Independent 
existence requirement’ (IE) and the ‘Non-a priori requirement’ (NAP). 365  Morris 
considers an explanation in the form of ‘p because q’, and here he establishes two 
conditions, inspired by Hume: NAP- ‘It is not possible to know a priori that p on the basis 
of knowing that q, or vice versa; IE- the replacements for p and q are true in virtue of 
                                                 
363 Sydney Shoemaker, “Causality and Properties”, in: Properties, ed. D. H. Mellor and Alex 
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364 Ibid. 253. 
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facts about states or events e and c’.366 The two conditions are needed because we can 
analyse behaviour correctly only when certainty is firmly based. The agent of behaviour 
expressed here is not vague, so it is possible to make objective judgement. For example, 
the subject, Yuna Kim’s performance such as jumps, spins and six triples, was analysed 
and marked in terms of objective marking schemes. The outward behaviour can be 
analysed and explained. However, certain behaviours are based on faith, the identity of 
which it is problematic to discover. This is because this believing has two factors, which 
‘are Immanent causes with respect to reactions generally, but Transcendent with respect 
to almost every interesting sub-category of reactions’.367 Morris calls this the Diverse 
Independent view (DI-view), and presents its main characteristics as follow. First, if the 
DI-view is right, different mental states require different treatment.368 Second, ‘If we 
adopt the DI-view, we will need to be cautious in talking about the spatio-temporal 
location of believings.’369 Third, the DI-view denies that beliefs are essentially internal 
in any more metaphysical sense, as opposed to being overt.370 Fourth, ‘there is a room 
for a position intermediate between instrumentalism and realism’.371 Fifth, ‘the DI-view 
is compatible with some form of physicalism, but it denies at least one thesis which is 
plausibly seen as a central motivation for most physicalists’.372 ‘Finally, we should make 
something of a reassessment of behaviourism.’373 According to Morris, if the DI-view 
satisfies the six explanations, the causality of behaviour can be clearly identified. His 
argument assumes that the statement is correct, and in this article he does not explain how 
                                                 
366 Ibid., 13-14. 
367 Ibid., 30. 
368 Ibid., 31. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Ibid., 32. 
371 Ibid. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Ibid., 33. 
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the behaviours appear with causality. However, scholars such as Richard Taylor, 
Roderick M. Chisholm and Alvin I. Goldman point out that agent and event are closely 
related to each other in the analysis of factors of behaviours. Taylor argues that ‘the word 
“cause” in such contexts has not the ordinary meaning of a certain relationship between 
events, but has rather the older meaning of efficacy or power of an agent to produce 
certain results’. 374  Taylor recognizes that the concept of agent which triggers the 
behaviour is essential in order to analyse correctly the structure of each event. 
Accordingly, he regards an agent as ‘something that originates things, produces them, or 
brings them about’.375 Similarly, Chisholm regards the agent as cause and notes that 
‘sometimes a distinction is made between “event causation” and “agent causation” and it 
has been suggested that there is an unbridgeable gap between the two’.376 He does not 
ignore the fact that agent causation can be defined in the observation and analysis of 
events appearing in our behaviour. Thus, he insists that ‘if we take the standard concept 
of “event causation” – the concept of one event contributing causally to another – along 
with the concept of undertaking, or endeavouring, then we can say what it is for an agent 
to contribute causally to the occurrence of an event or state of affairs’.377  Finally, 
Goldman too considers the agent as an entity which triggers certain action and behaviour. 
Hence, in his view, materials such as stones and pieces of wood that cannot trigger 
behaviour cannot be agents. Rather, an agent is any individual or human who is the subject 
of the behaviour, because these beings are the originators or starting points of their own 
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375 Ibid. 
376  Roderick M. Chisholm, “The Agent as Cause,” in: Action Theory: Proceedings of the 
Winnipeg Conference, Manitoba, Canada, 9-11 May 1975, ed. Myles Brand and Douglas Walton 
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activities.378  Goldman admits that ‘there are occasions on which agents cause acts 
without any state or event of the agent being an event-cause of these acts’.379 However, 
he notes that it is difficult to know how there are such occasions. Goldman points out both 
the validity and the invalidity of Taylor’s opinion that ‘acts are not uncaused; they are 
caused by agents’,380 stating that while this might be correct the real problem is how ‘to 
distinguish absence of causation from causation by agents’. Thus, Goldman insist that 
‘the notion of agent-causation unconnected with event-causation is bound to be a 
mysterious and obscure notion’.381 However, Taylor’s ‘notion of agent-causation, of the 
conditions under which an agent causes an act’, is not problematic.382 In the analysis of 
behaviour, there are countless factors that trigger certain behaviours.383 Some behaviours 
have mixed properties, with complex reasons. Goldman explains agent-causation, event-
causation and agents by suggesting that faith, wants and desires can cause intentional 
actions. Taking agent into consideration in the behavioural analysis, he argues that: ‘As 
long as the act is caused by the wants and beliefs of the agent, then he is the author, the 
source, the originator of the act.’384 
 
If then, agent is the author, source, and trigger of behaviour, let us examine what kind of 
identity is formed by humans through their behaviours. 
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4.3.3 Identity385 and agency 
 
Agency is a tool that clearly demonstrates the identity of human being. If this statement 
is true, human nature and behaviour need to be synthetically analysed. It is impossible to 
discover the true identity of human beings by behaviour or nature alone. Rather, human 
nature and behaviour need to be understood as having an organism relationship. Both 
agency (which shows human nature) and agent (as the author, the source and the 
originator of behaviours) must be essentially synthesized. Here, the relationship between 
identity, agents and their roles will be reviewed based on mental action and self-activity 
out of the important connections that link human nature and behaviours. This is because, 
among the key factors of human identity, mental action and self-activity are thought to 
play the most important roles. 
4.3.3.1 Mental action, identity and agency 
 
Mental action is crucial in establishing identity of the actor and demonstrating the reasons 
for behaviour. As Matthew Soteriou insists, ‘mental action can contribute to our 
understanding of a range of different issues and themes’.386  Whereas some mental 
actions are easily observed, analysed and understood, others consist of complex 
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properties that are hard to understand. Therefore, the agency which shows these mental 
actions is explained in two parts. Pamela Hieronymi establishes two kinds of agency, of 
which ‘the first does not display the most familiar and prominent feature of agency, while 
the second might involve an exercise of agency over of the first’.387 As argued by 
Hieronymi, observing both agency (which contains the reason for behaviour) and the 
process of behaviour (which is performed by agency), intention and belief within human 
mentality can be identified scientifically. Thus, she establishes the premise whereby 
‘certain attitudes (most uncontroversially, belief and intention) embody their subject’s 
answer to some question or set of questions’.388 In order to prove the premise, agency 
performs, showing intention and belief in distinct ways. The first of these Hieronymi calls 
‘exercising evaluative control over the attitude’, and the second, ‘exercising managerial 
or manipulative control’. 389  Hieronymi’s point has dualistic characteristics in the 
analysis of behaviour. As examined by E. J. Lowe, interactive dualism exists between 
physical causal closure and mental causal factors. 390  Lowe argues that interactive 
dualism cannot be proved by science, so mental action has to be solved by a priori 
metaphysical argumentation. 391  Similarly, Bernard Williams describes dualistic 
problems that arise in mind and body: First, ‘there are general issues concerning the 
relations between a subject’s mental states and his observable behaviour’. Second, ‘there 
are questions concerning the relations between a subject’s mental states and certain 
internal states of his organism’.392 As we have observed, mental action is one of many 
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spheres that are difficult to explain academically, because the subject matter of mentality 
belongs to the properties of human nature. However, according to Jennifer Hornsby, 
mental action is the ‘one facet of the phenomenon of mentality’ that expresses the action 
of ‘the phenomenon of agency’.393 If complex mental action appears as physical action 
through various agencies, it is possible to explain mental action logically by agent-
causation and agent analysis. According to Hornsby’s argument, agency theory is an 
important tool to overcome the limits of dualism. This emerges clearly in the work of 
John MacMurray, as cited in the review of Hegel’s concept of agency in Chapter 2. 
Therefore, we need to pay attention to Hieronymi’s academic effort to identify mental 
actions by agency. She has shown ‘how certain complex exercises of agency over our 
minds’, including what she calls ‘reflective control, might be modelled in terms of these 
somewhat simple forms of agency’.394  
 
A key issue in the connection between mental action and physical behaviour is that of 
identity. As mentioned in Williams’ first problem statement, identity theory may appear 
between the subject’s mental states and behaviour.395 The issues of personal agency and 
personal identity will be raised in the analysis of the process of how mental states are 
externalized into behaviour. Williams considers that personal identity causes problems 
for two reasons. The first is the argument that self-consciousness is the consciousness of 
human beings about self-identity in a special sense.396 Williams sees a big difference 
between ‘I think’ and ‘I think regarding which I think something’. When he attempts to 
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prove this, he uses the formula: ‘imagining myself doing, being, etc., such and such’.397 
The second reason is that questions about personal identity cannot be clearly answered 
because it is the decision made by the identity of a certain physical body.398 According 
to Williams, ‘Identity of body is at least not a sufficient condition of personal identity, 
and other considerations, of personal characteristics and, above all, memory, must be 
invoked.’399 Therefore, when we explain how mental states and physical states appear in 
our behaviour without confusion, we are eventually able to define each personal identity. 
 
However, Lowe insists that ‘the identity conditions of mental states would appear to be 
thoroughly unlike those of physical states – as unlike them as the identity conditions of 
physical objects are unlike those of natural numbers’.400 Consequently, Lowe considers 
the statement that mental states and physical states are the same to be unintelligible.  
What we find in the statement that mental states and physical states are different is the 
idea that there can be difference between something partially revealed and something 
potentially hidden. Sometimes we can infer the whole thing by some parts, but this cannot 
be justified as the true picture. While fully acknowledging this, David Lewis argued that 
identity cannot be understood by some parts in mental states, but must be perceived as a 
composition of parts and whole.401 He considered mereology (which interprets things in 
the relationship between parts and whole) to be ontologically innocent, 402  and 
mereological relations, ‘the many-one relation of composition, the one-one relations of 
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part to whole and overlap’, as remarkably ‘analogous to ordinary identity’.403 While 
regarding identity as a composition of part and whole, Lewis thought of it as a one-one 
or one-many relation, because the nature of identity has survival, connectedness and 
continuity.404 Thus, Lewis notes that ‘what matters in questions of personal identity is 
mental continuity or connectedness, and that might be one-many, many-one’.405 Peter 
van Inwagen criticized Lewis’s extreme model realism on the ground that it is originated 
from strong analogy: ‘Similarly, those who reject Mereology will regard the strong 
analogy between composition and identity that is a consequence of Mereology as a defect 
in Mereology, since (they will say) composition lacks many of the features that a 
statement of the analogy attributes to it.’406 
  
In order to avoid this critique, Lewis would have had to solve the problem of how mental 
states in mental action connect both part and whole using agent, and form personal 
identity as one composition. In other words, he did not overcome the limit of metaphysics 
because he ignored the role of agent and its function in identity and depended on strong 
analogy.  
 
4.3.3.2 Self-activity, identity and agency 
 
Personal identity is related to human behaviour and self-activity. Moreover, a key concern 
of philosophy is to investigate and reflect personal identity and human action. In his 
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examination of identity in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke states that 
when we perceive and sense an event, self is essential;407 it is what enables us to see, 
hear, smell, taste and sense. Locke considers self as a conscious thinking thing that is 
‘sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is 
concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends’.408 Self and identity are closely 
related. More specifically, Locke explains how self as thinking thing forms identity 
(which differentiates the self from others) through behaviour and thought over the period 
of past and present.  
 
For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes 
every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other 
thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a 
rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any 
past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person, it is the same self 
now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects 
on it, that action was done.409 
 
Harold W. Noonan, who researched the relationship between personal identity and self-
consciousness, pointed out that Locke’s statement is problematic because it is based on 
an assumption that ‘person’ conveys a criterion of identity that serves only for a self-
conscious creature.410 In other words, ‘Locke’s assumption that “person” is an ultimate 
                                                 
407 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: (1690), Collated and Annotated 
by Alexander Campbell Praser (Oxford: At The Clarendon Press, 1894), 449. 
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sortal term’ cannot be justified.411 In fact, for Locke, identity is sometimes united with 
the same self and criteria of personal identity, while he also states that through the same 
consciousness, it can be separated to another man’s self. For Locke, such fission and 
fusion of persons are decisive for the formation of personal identity because ‘any part of 
our bodies, vitally united to that which is conscious in us, makes a part of ourselves: but 
upon separation from the vital union by which that consciousness is communicated, that 
which a moment since was part of ourselves, is now no more so than a part of another 
man’s self is a part of me’.412 Brian Garrett explains the criteria of personal identity in 
sortal terms, and attempts to clarify identity using physical and psychological criteria.413 
Identity requires clear answers to complex and vague questions. Taking as an example 
‘the puzzle of the ship of Theseus’, Robert Nozick has presented the Closest Continuer 
Theory: 
 
The planks of a ship are removed one by one over intervals of time, and as each 
plank is removed it is replaced by a new plank. The removal of one plank and its 
replacement by another does not make the ship a different ship than before; it is 
the same ship with one plank different. Over time, each and every plank might be 
removed and replaced, but if this occurs gradually, the ship still will be the same 
ship. …. It turns out that the planks removed had not been destroyed but were 
stored carefully; now they are brought together again into their original shiplike 
configuration. Two ships float on the waters, side by side. Which one, wondered 
the Greeks, is the original? 414   
                                                 
411 Ibid., 170-171. 
412 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), 466. 
413 Brian Garrett, Personal Identity and Self-consciousness (London: Routledge, 1998), 41. 
414 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanation, 33. 
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In this example, Nozick presents the evidence of identity which explains the self. In the 
case of the ship, there are two very important relevant properties: ‘spatio-temporal 
continuity with continuity of parts’ and ‘being composed of the very same parts’.415 In 
this complex case, responses about which ship is the closest form to the original entity 
are important not as metaphysical truth but ‘as a component of a psychological 
explanation’.416 Therefore Nozick emphasizes that the Closest Continuer Theory is an 
essential condition to demonstrate identity. 417  Like Nozick, David Wiggins also 
considers that continuity is important in constructing identity. However, with regard to 
personal identity he emphasizes continuity within the spatio-temporal area, because it is: 
‘(i) a perfectly clear criterion of personal identity, (ii) a criterion which might very easily 
clash with the memory-criterion, and (iii) a criterion which is generally or always to be 
preferred to the memory criterion’.418 In Wiggins’ view, the memory criterion of identity 
does not differ from the bodily criterion of identity in spatio-temporal continuity. 
However, Thomas Nagel and Thomas Reid question in what way the memory criterion 
and bodily criterion can be the same, and how their identity-criterion can be spatio-
temporal.419 Wiggins answers these questions by insisting that:  
 
… we cannot specify the right concept without mention of the behaviour, 
characteristic functioning, and capacities of a person, including the capacity to 
remember some sufficient amount of his past. It is this characteristic functioning 
                                                 
415 Ibid. 
416 Ibid., 34. 
417 Ibid. 
418 David Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971), 
43.  
419 Ibid., 45. 
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which gives the relevant kind of spatio-temporal continuity for the kinds of parcel 
of matter we individuate when we individuate persons.420 
 
The Spatio-temporal Continuity Theory suggested by Wiggins to establish identity 
appears to be similar to Lewis’s argument that mental properties can explain identity only 
when they have survival, continuity and connectedness. However, in his book Sameness 
and Substance Renewed, published 30 years later, Wiggins hardly used the concept of 
spatio-temporal continuity for understanding identity. Rather, he intensively researched 
and developed the absoluteness of sameness, a theory of individuation and sortal 
concepts.421 
 
Other scholars seek to understand identity from an ontological perspective. Focusing on 
‘what it is’, they endeavour to find proofs through either metaphysical analysis or 
mathematical and scientific experiments. Also, identity formation needs to be examined 
in terms of how the group (unit) and individual have relationships and can be categorized 
in the process. For instance, Frege has demonstrated mathematical explanations of 
identity. He notes that ‘Locke and Hesse seem to use unit and one to mean the same’.422 
Eli Hirsch also explains the concept of identity ontologically and metaphysically. The 
scholar argues that ‘these criteria of identity have typically been regarded as essentially 
comprising two kinds of elements: an element of continuity, and an element of sortal-
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coverage’.423 Such understanding and investigation of identity and human action has 
provided intellectual benefits in various ways. With regard to self-activity such as mental 
action, the focus has been on what made this analysis possible and how personal identity 
was formed. The answers to these questions can be achieved only when the agent in 
mental action and self-activity is properly understood. In his consideration of personal 
identity, Locke understands person, self and agents as actors who specify personal 
identity. Thus, he takes ‘person’ as the name for the self, and states that wherever a man 
finds what he calls himself, so too another may say that there is the same person. It is a 
forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent 
agents, capable of a law, and happiness, and misery.’424 Although he did not form a 
specific theory or present an in-depth study, he does point out the important role of agent 
in the development of personal identity, which is formed through the self or a person’s 
action.  
 
Harry G. Frankfurt, among the leading researchers of human behaviour, analysed the 
problems in human behaviours and stressed the importance of the agent, because ‘There 
are numerous agents besides ourselves who may be active as well as passive with respect 
to the movement of their bodies.’425 Therefore, Frankfurt insisted that ‘we must be 
careful that the ways in which we construe agency and define its nature do not conceal a 
parochial bias, which causes us to neglect the extent to which the concept of human action 
is no more than a special case of another concept whose range is much wider’.426 In his 
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explanation of autonomy, which is one of the properties of human action, Frankfurt 
showed that terminologies such as self (auto) and principle or law (nomy) are united with 
each other.427 He argued that the notion of autonomy is deeply related with that of self-
government, and that individuals are autonomous to the extent that they govern 
themselves;428 that is, an autonomous agent is governed by himself or herself alone.429 
J. David Velleman raised a problem in Frankfurt’s idea that self is a single entity which 
consists of personal identity as well as autonomy,430 pointing out that self is a term 
widely used in many philosophical contexts to express ‘the coincidence of object and 
subject, either of a verb or of the activity that it represents’.431  Defending his own 
position, Frankfurt claimed that Velleman had misunderstood his definition of self, taking 
the statement that the self has boundaries to mean that the self is a singular entity. 
Frankfurt explained that he did not describe the self as an entity with ontological 
implications.432 The conclusion from the controversy is that self and person have the 
same role as agent to demonstrate personal human identity. 
 
In his careful examination of self,433 Jerome M. Segal argues that self-activity (which 
demonstrates human identity) is an agency. Segal regards the self as the integration of 
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personality that ‘persons engage in throughout their lives’. 434  Unlike other agency 
scholars, Segal examines how human behaviour explains human being in the specific 
context of life. His argument is persuasive because he explains agency by combining self 
and activity. There are several reasons why Segal understands agency as self-activity. 
First, ‘the agency is a web of relations that constitute the presence of the self in the 
activity’.435 The second reason is that Segal wants to avoid ‘any need for occult senses 
of agency’, but does not want ‘to exclude as cases of agency much that is interesting in 
human activity’.436 Finally, Segal intends to elucidate the identity of human beings in 
capitalistic society, so he clarifies the relation of self-activity and alienation or alienness 
of labourers in the perspective of Karl Marx. As examined in the chapter on Marx, labour 
is the tool for self-actualization of labourers and self-activity is the agent for the labour. 
Segal maintains that alienness is the distorted form of self-activity which actualizes the 
identity of the labourer. He expresses the alienation experienced by labourers as follows: 
1. ‘I feel as if I am not the agent of my actions.’ 2. ‘I feel as if my actions are not really 
mine.’ 3. ‘I feel as if I never really do anything.’ 4. ‘I feel as if everything just happens to 
me.’ 5. ‘I feel as if everything I do is done by something else.’437 These statements show 
that the self understands agency as an alienated presence which goes beyond its boundary. 
Therefore Segal expresses his agency theory in the statement: ‘X is the agent of some 
activity A if and only if A is an activity of X and X is not alienated from A.’438 He argues 
that when alienation is considered in the relationship between the self and activity, agency 
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form. (Jerome M Segal, Agency and Alienation: A Theory of Human Presence [U.S.A.: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1991], 58). 
434 Jerome M Segal, Agency and Alienation: A Theory of Human Presence, 60. 
435 Ibid., 117. Segal explains more concretely: “In making agency a matter of self, agency is as 
variable as the self is, and the sense of agency as variable as the sense of self.” (Ibid., p.119).  
436 Ibid., 118. 
437 Ibid., 134. 
438 Ibid., 140. 
 147 
is opposite to the notion of alienation. 439  As examined by Marx, the alienation of 
labourers destroys their self-identities and denies their behaviour as something that does 
not belong to them. That is why alienation and agency as analysed by Segal can be 
opposite to each other. The alienation of labour destroys the true identity of labourers, but 
agency as self-activity establishes their identities. In a structural relationship between the 
self and an activity, identity is established by agents. In other words, true identity of 
labourers is formed by agency, which ‘can be viewed as a complex structural union 
between actions and the self’.440 Segal expresses the complex structural combination as 
something like the web of structural relations. In his view, ‘Agency is not a single simple 
relationship. It is not a matter of exercise of some irreducible power of agent causality, 
nor is it a matter of the general existence of a single causal thread that connects volition 
or desire with physical movement.’441  
 
In short, Segal regards agency as a complex and systematic union, connecting self with 
action, and the web of structural relationship. Agency that shows the true identity of the 
man through human behaviour goes beyond alienation and presents the possibility that 
enables the human to become the subject of life and the subject of history. In addition, 
the way to understand properties that are very difficult to grasp in human nature is by 
reference to the agency. As Segal and Hornsby have noted, a person is an agent of his 
actions when and only when his self and his mentality are present in them. In other words, 
agency is a performer that carries behaviours, which happen by the properties of human 
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nature such as wants, will, consciousness, beliefs, instinctive needs, volition, desire and 
emotions, to the diverse context of life.  
 
 
4.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
Studies regarding the human (as a whole being) and connections between subject and 
object are important, despite criticisms from researchers. While analytic philosophers’ 
criticisms of fields of study that are academically unverifiable have affected scholarship 
regarding human nature and human action, in philosophy, ethics and psychology, it seems 
that agency presents a way of overcoming the weakness inherent in the view of human 
being as disjointed parts rather than a holistic whole. We can rethink the dissolution of 
human being as the subject through agency theory, although Michel Foucault ends his 
book, The Order of Things by insisting that ‘then one can certainly wager that man would 
be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea’.442 Those criticisms have 
expanded and developed agency theory as the reconstruction of human nature, allowing 
philosophical investigation on agency theory to progress. Humanity or human being, as 
Archer notes, is seen as the linchpin of agency in general,443 because this is one of the 
most important tool-boxes to explain the properties of human nature: the self, mentality 
and person, which are the core of human being.  
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This chapter began by critically reviewing scholars’ opinions about human nature, and 
suggested how agency theory can prove its properties. Next, the chapter demonstrated 
that agency theory, a key focus of human behaviour research, can explain self- activity, 
personal and mental action, and is an important tool for understanding personal identity. 
It is often thought that external properties such as social status, wealth and occupation are 
the best indicators of someone’s identity. However, more fundamental factors are the 
mental actions and self-activities that have led to current conditions. Through these agents, 
personal identity is formed and expresses the standards of behaviours. 
 
To conclude, agency theory has been an important subject for those philosophers who 
study human nature and action. It has also been the centre of much controversy, as 
detailed in Agency and Action, published in 2004.444 Nevertheless, agency theory is 
noteworthy not only because it gives a clue that could fill the gap between a doer and 
actions, and help to connect between transcendent reality and the finite world, but also 
because it says that an individual has his or her own agency representing himself or 
herself. In addition to this, agency theory can be an important tool to construe human 
nature, actions and self academically, placing human being as the subject in the world 
and within society. The theory can play a decisive role to construct and restore the whole 
of human being, which had hitherto been demolished by analytic philosophers. We can 
find a crucial key for future systematic theological investigation of agency in Segal’s 
statement that: ‘Agency has to be conceived as a kind of webbing, as a connectedness 
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between self and activity that has no particular specification. It might be thought of as 























                                                 








Within the academic sphere there have been various attempts to find a method or solution 
that can encompass two extremes.446 As we have seen in the previous chapters, many 
philosophers have presented valid theories in order to solve the problems of two extremes 
from the point of view of philosophy. In their dependence on reason and scientific 
methods these attempts share a common approach, and all have had limitations in the 
effort to find a bridge between God and human beings. Indeed, as we find in Kant’s 
thought, reason will not capture entities beyond the world of aesthetics and senses unless 
it is based on something that is inborn in reason itself; nor can it trustworthily bridge and 
pass judgement upon anything that is beyond the world of appearance. The connection 
between God as inborn in reason and humans in this world is, therefore, beyond 
reasonable judgment; there is no secure bridge between God and man, between infinite 
entities and finite beings. So, what is left for the world of theology? 
 
In the following the problem of the potentially impossible bridge between the two 
extremes is investigated within the post-Kantian theological sphere with special reference 
to Karl Barth. As we know, not only Barth, but many theologians have persistently tried 
to solve the problem in various theological areas, and of course their viewpoints have 
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changed considerably. For instance, the Catholic theologian Karl Rahner extends and 
expands his theological point on the basis of Thomas Aquinas’ natural theology in order 
to suggest the contact points between man and God. John Hick, a Protestant scholar, also 
considers that transcendent beings and mysterious events are mediated by symbols and 
metaphors to human beings. Amongst other scholars, Raimundo Panikka, Paul Tillich, 
Paul Knitter and Robert King have expounded various positions in this area. Although it 
would be fruitful to research their arguments and theories in order to see how they develop 
these contact points between God and man and whether and in what form they develop 
agency theories, one of the most powerful topics from the time of early Christianity, I 
would like to focus on the most paradoxical theologian, who by the very nature of his 
theology both addressed and somehow developed an agency theory in principle, only to 
deny the very possibility of its existence. That is why we will focus on Karl Barth, one of 
the most influential theologians in history, who wanted to solve this problem of two 
extremes without appealing to or depending on reason, focusing on revelation of the 
divine alone. Furthermore, Barth’s theological argument will be re-illuminated in relation 
to agency theory. 
 
5.2 Karl Barth’s Theology and Agency 
5.2.1 Barth’s diagnosis on the two extremes 
5.2.1.1 Starting point: living man 
 
It is important as a starting point to discover the linchpin between the two extremes, 
between God and man, between transcendent being and being-facticity, between 
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absolutism and relativism, between subjectivity and objectivity. As we indicated in the 
previous chapters, reason occupies an absolute position in the philosophical inquiry of 
two extreme concepts. The reason why there is a problem of two extremes is based on the 
complexity of reason itself, because, as Tillich says, ‘the polarity of the static and dynamic 
elements of reason produces a conflict between absolutism and relativism of reason’.447    
 
On the other hand, it is worthwhile noting that Karl Barth places the starting point for 
diagnosing the two extremes with something or somebody. In fact, the viewpoints of 
scholars can appear differently depending on which of their many books are consulted. 
Some theologians maintain that Barth could start from revelation, the Word of God and 
God’s grace to arrive at the connecting point between human beings and God. This would 
not be wrong if they depended on Barth’s Church Dogmatics to solve the two extremes 
and to seek through dialectic the Word of God.448 However, it would be problematic if 
they based their ideas on Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, one of his most 
philosophical books, in which he suggests a starting point of diagnosis of the two 
extremes, because Barth suggests the living man as the connecting point between two 
opposites such as past and present, absolutism and relativism. 
In fact, there is logically no problem of two opposites in God Himself, regardless of 
verification of whether God exists. If we wish to find the place where the problem of the 
two extremes occurs, we could give attention to the phenomena of human beings. Barth 
evidently knows this, so he makes clear the theological matter in the history of 
Christianity. Specifically, he insists that the problem of theology in Christian history is 
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the subject-matter of theology.449 In the centre of this subject-matter he places living 
man, who has the key to the problem of both extremes.      
 
However, this subject-matter needs to be clarified in order to demonstrate its 
distinctiveness from the social sciences and from the relatively recently established 
branches of theology. Two questions are crucial in historical interpretation and analysis. 
First, what is the main event which forms a period? Second, who is the creative subject 
of history? The centralization of man shows that the construction and reconstruction of 
the subject-matter which composes history are very important. What, then, does the 
historical material say? According to Barth, it says that its subject-matter is living man 
because, as he indicates, history is made up of living men whose work is handed over 
upon their death. If we can know what kind of meaning is made by living man in a 
particular period, then we can understand the main events of that time. Then, we will be 
in a position to move on to answer the second question. Barth explains the Church and 
theology as follows: 
 
The Church does not stand in a vacuum. ... As regards theology, also, we cannot 
be in the Church without taking as much responsibility for the theology of the 
past as for the theology of our present. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Luther, 
Schleiermacher and all the rest are not dead, but living. They still speak and 
demand a hearing as living voices, as surely as we know that they and we belong 
together in the Church. ...Our responsibility is not only to God, to ourselves, to 
the men of today, to other living theologians, but to them. There is no past in the 
Church, so there is no past theology, ‘in him they all live’.450 
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Here, we see Barth’s amazing insight. According to him, we can reconfirm that 
theological matter in history is subject-matter. He also regards living man as subject-
matter. This living man ceaselessly connects the past and the present, speaks with a live 
voice passing over a number of regions and generations, and creates development and 
change in every period. Hence, we can understand how human beings can know 
transcendent being, and at the centre of his theology there is a connecting point between 
that being and the human. The living man is commonly known as the things in history 
that exert influence upon current times through language and thought. That makes 
historical interaction a possibility, and encourages a reflection of the times through books 
and other works.  
 
It is necessary to differentiate this from Feuerbach, who also made humans stand in the 
centre of religion and historiography. By doing so, Feuerbach tried to make human beings 
substitute for divine things. He stood upon the major premise that human beings are at 
the beginning of religion, in its stages of development, and even in the last phase of 
religion.451 If human beings are the beginning, the development, and the end, we can 
reach the conclusion that God is created by human beings and that God should exist for 
human beings. Hence, a study of religion should not only start with, but should also finish 
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with the concept of human beings, and human beings would be the core of it. The fact we 
cannot overlook is that if a transcendent entity is replaced by a human one, theology is 
changed into anthropology. In other words, Feuerbach’s idea demolishes the place of 
theology or would be considered as humanistic theology.  
 
Accordingly, there are considerable differences between the essence of a genus that 
indicates essence of religion, and living man who is the subject-matter of history. 
  
Here, living man who is the subject-matter of history and the bridge over the gap between 
the past and the present is a very interesting and worthwhile concept to re-establish one 
of Barth’s theological methods. In addition, the reason why Barth places the word ‘living’ 
in front of ‘man’ is considerably important to reconstruct his thoughts. 
 
First of all, Barth creates five columns to analyse and to re-illuminate the spirit of the 
times. 
It should have five columns: the first for entering the most important dates of 
world history in general; the second for the most noteworthy events in the history 
of culture, art and literature; the third for church history in general; the fourth for 
the dates of birth and death of the most prominent theologians of the period; and 
the fifth for the years in which their most important books were published.452 
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Living man is deeply rooted in the centre of these five columns. Through the process of 
seeing, observing and establishing in these columns the subject-matter of history, such as 
living men like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lessing, Kant, Herder, Novalis, Hegel and 
Schleiermacher in the eighteenth century, and Wegscheider, De Wette, Marheineke, 
Baur, Tholuck, Menken, Feuerbach, Strauss, Schweizer, Dorner, Müller, Rothe, 
Hofmann, Beck, Vilmar, Kohlbrügge, Blumhardt and Ritschl in the nineteenth century, 
Barth would reveal the whole picture of Protestant theology in the nineteenth century to 
multi-generations who have the eyes to be able to see them. In other words, Barth, as a 
bearer of their theological thought from the past to the present, reconstructs and re-
illuminates Protestant theology in the nineteenth century for subsequent generations. The 
reason why Barth discusses the living men who are the subject-matter of history is that 
those people are regarded as the connecting bridge between the past, present and future 
generations. However, Barth often construes this living man as existing man, thinking 
man and acting man who is absorbed in the actuality of his existence.453 So he maintains 
‘that only the doer of the Word is real hearer, for it is the Word of the living God addressed 
to the living man absorbed in work and action of his life’.454 Barth’s insight shows that 
the meaning of living man can apply in various circumstances.  
 
In summary, the living man as a starting point gives us considerable insights into how 
Barth re-established Protestant theology in the nineteenth century. First, the two extremes 
are not in God Himself, but in the category of human beings. Secondly, the appearance 
                                                 
453 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. I /2, The Doctrine of the Word of God, 792. 
454 Ibid. In German, “Nur der Täter des Wortes ist sein wirklicher Hörer, und das darum, weil es 
das Wort des wirklichen Gottes an den wirklichen, d.h. an den im Wirken, in der Tat seines Lebens 
begriffenen Menschen ist.” (Karl Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik I/2 Die Lehre vom Wort Gottes [Zollikon-
Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1945], 886).  
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of both extremes is not only to escape human beings’ limitation, but also to establish 
absolute power of reason. Finally, as both these extremes are based on the living man, we 
should recognize the limitation of men as connecting points between God and human 
beings. 
5.2.1.2 Conflicts of the two extremes 
 
There has been no perfect solution to the conflict of two extremes that would close the 
gap between God and human beings in the political, cultural and theological spheres. 
Generally speaking, in many areas this gap broadened more in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries than in medieval times, when the Church and God held absolute 
power, surpassing human authority and reason. In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries there was a transposition from Theo-centric to Man-centric theology, so that 
man took over the throne of absolute power and the conflict of two extremes emerged. 
  
Barth recognizes this and investigates absolute man as an aspect of the living man who 
emerged in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. For him, the concept of 
absolutism is key 455  to elucidating the spirit of the age of the eighteenth century, 
indicating ‘a system of life based upon the belief in the omnipotence of human 
powers’. 456  He divides the concept into two parts, political absolutism and 
Enlightenment, in order to disclose absolute man, who was hidden in various areas of 
                                                 
455 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background & History, 37. 
456 Ibid., 36. In German, “«Absolutismus» kann offenbar allgemein bedeuten: ein Lebenssystem, 
das gegründet ist auf die gläubige Voraussetzung der Allmacht des menschlichen Vermögens. (Karl Barth, 
Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert, 19).  
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science and culture and who emerged into politics, science, music, and styles of 
architecture during that period.457 He concludes that: 
 
Man, who discovers his own power and ability, the potentially dormant in his 
humanity, that is, his human being as such, and looks upon it as the final, the real 
and absolute, I mean something ‘detached’, self-justifying, with its own authority 
and power, which he can therefore set in motion in all directions and without any 
restraint - this man is absolute man.458 
 
In this passage he makes clear that human beings have become a yardstick for judgment. 
This man does not have to depend on revelation, the Bible and the authority of the Church 
in order to meet transcendent beings or God. This represents an escape from limitations 
of human abilities that can neither obtain the knowledge of God nor know God without 
revelation and God’s grace. According to Barth, during the eighteenth century there was 
established an ideal of science of history and of natural science, and the pursuit of 
knowledge without presupposition was a standard of judgment in various fields.459 
Furthermore, it was a maxim of those days that absolute man would do everything and be 
all-conquering. In other words, the term ‘absolute’ was undergoing a process of transition 
from God to human beings. This appears to be the spirit of the age, and it affects a 
formation of theology, especially liberal theology, in the eighteenth century. 
                                                 
457 Ibid., 33-79. 
458  Ibid., 36. In German, “Der Mensch, der seine eigene Kraft, sein Können, die in seiner 
Humanität, d. h. in seinem Menschsein als solchem schlummernde Potentialität entdeckt, der sie als Letztes, 
Eigentliches,Absolutes, will sagen : als ein Gelöstes, in sich selbst Berechtigtes und Bevollmächtigtes und 
Mächtiges versteht, der sie darum hemmungslos nach allen Seiten in Gang setzt, dieser Mensch ist der 
absolutistische Mensch.” (Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert, 19). 
459 Ibid., .40. In German, “In deisem Jahrhundert hat sich die Idee von der voraussetzungslosen 
Geschichts- und Naturwissenschaft und von deren eben in dieser Voraussetzungslosigkeit begründeten 




Where reason and capability of human beings substitute for the place of revelation and 
divine power, there is a humanizing of the problem of theology. According to Barth, this 
humanization emerges first of all in politics, 460  where the Church and Christianity 
become identified with the state.461  Secondly, humanization of theology leads to a 
particular morality and bourgeois theology, which in his view represent a deterioration of 
Christianity, which takes on a pietistic or a rationalistic colouring.462  
 
Another consideration is that the humanization of theology created a philosophical and 
scientific transformation of Christianity, which extended its influence and increased 
participation.463 
Finally, this humanization causes the deepening of inner pietism and individualism, 
whereby the mystery of the down-to-earth forms of pietism becomes domesticated, rather 
than the true Christian mystery.464 Barth points out that ‘it is no argument against the 
individualistic character of the undercurrent that the Christian and non-Christian 
Enlightenment dissociated themselves on occasion in very strong words from mysticism, 
enthusiasm and theosophy as against expressions of the irrationality that they so hated’.465  
                                                 
460 Ibid., 85. In German, “…an dem die Humanisierung des theologischen Problems in sozusagen 
greifbarer, nämlich in politischer Form an den Tag getreten ist.” (Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie 
im 19. Jahrhundert, 65). 
461 Ibid., 90. In German, “Die Kirche und das Christentum sind, was auch sonst von ihnen zu 
sagen sein mag, im Staate und empfangen jedenfalls ihre äußere Gestalt und Bewegung ganz und gar vom 
Staate her, nicht aus ihrem eigenen Wesen und Gesetz.” (Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. 
Jahrhundert, 70). 
462 Ibid., 100. 
463 Ibid., 112. 
464 Ibid., 122. 
465  Ibid. In German, “Und erst recht beweist es gar nichts gegen den individualistischen 
Charakter jenes Unterstroms, daß die christliche und nicht-christliche Aufklärung sich in teilweise sehr 
starker Wendung gegen Mystik, Enthusiasmus und Theosophie als gegen Äußerungen der ihr so verhaßten 
Unvernunft abgegrenzt hat.” (Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert, 101). 
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This tendency of humanization of theology opened the possibility that God could be 
illuminated, divided and even removed through human reasoning. Yet to Barth, it is a 
mistake to overlook the limits of science, because concepts of human being and absolute 
power cause frequent conflicts and highlight discrepancies in terminology. Barth knows 
that the reason both extremes exist in many areas of human life is because of the 
vulnerable and contradictory nature of human reason and capability.   
 
Paul Tillich rightly captures this, pointing out that both absolutism and relativism can be 
seen in reason. He claims that: ‘Essentially, reason unites a static and a dynamic element. 
The static element preserves reason from losing its identity within the life-process. The 
dynamic element is the power of reason to actualize itself rationally in process of life.’466 
There is a conflict between absolutism and relativism, caused by the polarity of the static 
and dynamic elements under the conditions of existence. In Tillich’s view, this leads to a 
‘quest for the concrete absolute’,467 which he considers as the perfectly concrete as well 
as the perfectly absolute, i.e., the paradoxically united logical form. How then is this 
possible? Tillich posits that the conflict between absolutism and relativism has never been 
resolved by criticism, neither in the past nor the present,468 since the concrete absolute 
is required to overcome this problem. For this reason Tillich requests the advent of 
revelation, which is Jesus Christ as the Ultimate Reality. According to Tillich, this 
Ultimate Reality becomes known to us through symbol and analogy because the sentence, 
                                                 
466 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology 1: Reason and Revelation, Being and God (London: SCM 
Press Ltd, 1978), 86.            
467 Ibid., 83. 
468 Ibid., 89. 
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‘The being of God is being-itself’469 is both a symbolic statement and at the same time 
not symbolic.470 The reason why it does not indicate anything beyond being-itself is that 
it is not symbolic. Yet because it is not able to say anything about God without 
symbolizing, it is symbolic. In fact, in Tillich’s theology, the symbol is a crucial factor to 
reach the reality of God. He explains the symbol as follows: 
 
Religious symbols are double-edged. They are directed toward the infinite which 
they symbolize and toward the finite through which they symbolize it. They force 
the infinite down to finitude and the finite up to infinity. They open the divine for 
the human and the human for the divine.471 
 
Here, as we can see, a symbol does not always indicate something beyond itself, but also 
opens the Ultimate Reality which cannot be captured within our capability. Tillich needs 
symbols to deal with the problem of the gap between God, the Ultimate Reality and 
human beings. He also, like Barth, considers revelation as the key solution for the 
dilemma between ‘absolutism’ and ‘relativism’. However, unlike Tillich, Barth does not 
change revelation and the Word of God into the Ultimate Reality; nor does he depend on 
symbols for solving the problem of the two extremes.  
 
5.2.1.3 Karl Barth’s diagnosis and agency theory 
 
As we have seen, Barth defined the absolute man who is the origin of the problem of the 
two extremes and thus indicated the humanization of theology and liberal theology in the 
                                                 
469 Ibid., 235. 
470 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 10. 
471 Tillich, Systematic Theology I, 240. 
 163 
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. By doing so, he was able to look for a clue to the 
problem in human beings, but he would not and could not find the key to the connection 
between the two extremes. Instead, he focused his attention on the revelation and grace 
of God. Undoubtedly, Barth believed that although living man as subject-matter is the 
starting point of the connection between the two extremes, the living man cannot be the 
subject to reconcile or overcome those extremes. He recognized that because of the limit 
of human ability or reason the contradiction between two completely different qualities 
cannot be solved. 
   
Barth’s recommendation to resolve the extremes led to the emergence of agency theory, 
which gives us considerable insights. In terms of agency, Barth’s teaching has been 
quoted by a number of scholars, and the idea that his thought is close to the concept of 
agency has been both criticized and supported. First of all, King investigates an agency 
model that would give us the meaning of God. He mentions the opinions of both Barth 
and Farrer, and summarizes their position as one in which God can be conceived only as 
agent, known only through His action.472 Although this viewpoint is widely held, it has 
become controversial both within and outside theological circles. According to King, 
critics of theology argue that application of an agency model to God is equivocal.473 In 
other words, when theologians use God as agent, the concept of agency is not clear and 
can be interpreted in various ways. However, as already alluded to in the previous 
chapters, the terminology of agency gives us a possibility to bridge two extremes, such 
as subject and object, God and human beings, absolutism and relativism. 
  
                                                 
472 Robert H. King, The Meaning of God (London: SCM Press, 1974), 42. 
473 Ibid. 
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In fact, Barth established a vast structure of systemic theology which involves the triune 
God, revelation, incarnation, election and reconciliation between God and sinful man. 
Through the large system of theology extracted from the scriptures, Barth explores the 
procedure of divine omnipotence and its relation to creaturely agency.474 McDowell 
recognizes this and focuses particularly on ‘Barth on Nothingness’,475 i.e., ‘While the 
intrusion of das Nichtige is ontologically unfounded, it can be referred to only in the 
bizarre acts of agents’,476 which makes it ‘an extremely foolish and irrational act’.477 Of 
course, it is not only the negative aspects of agents that are innately sinful in nature, but 
also the anthropocentric positions. 
   
In terms of human agency, some moral theologians, in particular James Gustafson and 
Stanley Hauerwas, argue that Barth’s thought is too narrow to expand or maximize the 
concept of human abilities. This is because human moral agency acts with a ‘passive 
conformity of human activity to God's activity’.478 However, Werpehowski comments 
that this view stems from too narrow a reading of Barth’s works. 479  Whether this 
criticism is valid or not, the concept of human agency is widely employed as the 
mediating role between God and human beings. 
                                                 
474 John C. McDowell, “Much Ado about Nothing: Karl Barth's Being Unable to Do Nothing 
about Nothingness”, International Journal of Systematic Theology (Oxford) Vol. 4, No. 3 (November 
2002), 328. 
475 Barth argues that “the existence, presence and operation of nothingness are also objectively 
the break in the relationship between Creator and creature”. These “are not only the frontier which belongs 
to the nature of this relationship on both sides and which is grounded in the goodness of the Creator and 
that of the Creature” (Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, G.W. Bromiley & T.F. Torrance, Vol. III/3, The 
Doctrine Of Creation [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1961], 294).    
476 John C. McDowell, “Much Ado about Nothing: Karl Barth's Being Unable to Do Nothing 
about Nothingness”, 331. 
477 Ibid. 
478 William Werpehowski, “Command and History in the Ethics of Karl Barth”, Journal of 




On the other hand, Barth’s thought also encompasses an emergence of divine agency as 
the connection of the two extremes. Therefore, according to Colle, consideration ‘of the 
union between divine essence and human nature must account for how the consciousness 
of God in the mediating role of Jesus and in the Holy Spirit differ’.480 In this indication, 
the triune God as agent would participate in each other or in human beings, viz. the 
covenant-partner of God in the world. Colle’s explanation of divine agency and causality 
is directly implicated in this differentiated consciousness of Christ and the Spirit.481  
 
Here, we can find a key feature of Barth’s theology with regard to the aspect of divine 
agency. Generally speaking, there are four positions in relation to the doctrine of agency 
which are associated with the triune God, i.e., Christological doctrine of agency, God-
centric doctrine of agency, Pneumatic doctrine of agency and Spirit Christological 
doctrine of agency. Theologians of the Christological doctrine of agency would include 
Paul Tillich, T. F. Torence, 482  Dorothe Sölle 483  and David Ford. The God-centric 
doctrine of agency would be represented by John Hick, Karl Rahner, Paul Knitter and 
Robert King.484 The third group, theologians of the Pneumatic doctrine of agency, would 
be Ralph Del Colle,485 John Thompson486and Peter Ward.487 Finally, theologians of the 
                                                 
480  Ralph Del Colle, “Scheiermacher and Spirit Christology: Unexplored Horizons of the 
Christian Faith”, International Journal of Systematic Theology (Oxford) Vol. 1, No.3 (November 1999). 
481 Ibid. 
482 Thomas F Torrence, The Mediation of Christ (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992). 
483 Dorothe Sölle, Christ the Representative: An Essay in Theology after the 'Death of God', 
David Lewis (London: SCM Press, 1967). 
484 Robert H. King, The Meaning of God (London: SCM Press, 1974). 
485  Ralph Del Colle, “Schleiermacher and Spirit Christology: Unexplored Horizons of the 
Christian Faith”, International Journal of Systematic Theology (Oxford) Vol. 1, No.3 (November 1999). 
486  John Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology of Karl Barth, Princeton Theological 
Monograph Series 23, Dikran Y. Hadidian (Pennsylvania: Pickwick Publications, 1991). 
487  Pete Ward, Participation And Mediation: A Practical Theology For The Liquid Church 
(London: SCM Press, 2008). 
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Spirit Christological doctrine of agency include G.W.H Lampe,488 Oliver D. Crisp, Paul 
Newman,489 Roger Haight,490 James Mackey,491 Michael Lodahl,492 Barry Strong and 
James D.G. Dunn. 
 
Barth was to develop and apply all four aspects of the doctrine of agency in the theological 
sphere in order to attain justification for theology as an academic subject. Barth’s 
cognition of God will be investigated in the next section. 
 
Another consideration is the importance of culture as a connecting point between God 
and human beings. In particular, Barth mentions the musician, Wolfgang Amadeus 
Mozart, whose works open the eyes of his audience to be able to see transcendent entity; 
ultimately, through listening to works such as The Magic Flute and Don Giovanni, people 
could meet the divine entity or God.493 Gouwens describes Barth’s vision of Mozart’s 
music in terms of ‘the turning from shadow to light’.494 In fact, Barth notes the free 
expression which is not only at the heart of Mozart’s music but would in his opinion also 
be the core of God’s attribution. Therefore, he distinguishes Mozart from contemporary 
musicians such as Bach, Handel and Haydn, who were ‘children of their century’,495 
because he regards their music as reflecting ideology or dogma of their time, labelling it 
                                                 
488 Geoffrey W. H. Lampe, God as Spirit: The Bampton Lectures, 1976 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1977). 
489 Paul Newman, A Spirit Christology: Recovering the Biblical Paradigm of Christian Faith 
(USA: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987) 
490 Roger Haight, “The Case for Spirit Christology”, Theological Studies Vol. 53 (1992). 
491 James Mackey, The Christian Experience of God as Trinity (London: SCM Press, 1983). 
492 Michel Lodahl, Shekhinah/Spirit: Divine Presence in Jewish and Christian Religion (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1992). 
493 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 63.73. 
494 David J. Gouwens, “Mozart among the Theologians”, Modern Theology (Oxford) Vol. 16, 
Issue 4 (Oct. 2000), 467. 
495 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 73. 
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‘the music of absolutism’.496 It is very interesting that he differentiates between Mozart 
and contemporary musicians on the basis of full musical freedom. What draws Barth to 
Mozart is Mozart’s exceptional capacity to see almost perfectly and to praise the glory of 
God’s creation.497 It is clear from this that Barth considers culture, including music, as a 
medium or agency between the transcendent entity of God and human beings. Palma also 
notes that Barth’s theology of culture reveals freedom as the core qualifier of culture.498 
For Barth, free culture is a parable or analogy of the kingdom of God. However, Palma 
argues that even though Barth apparently regards human work and culture as agency of 
bearing God’s will, God’s chosen means and agents, he does not place sufficient value 
upon them.499 Of course, Barth does not state that culture itself has the capacity to reach 
the entity of God’s freedom, but through analogical interpretation of Barth’s theology of 
culture, culture would be the connecting point between transcendent entity and finite 
beings. 
  
Now, the question remains as to how culture would encompass or mediate the two 
extremes. Here, it is worth noting Niebuhr’s comment that in Barth’s theology of culture 
there is no road from man to God, but there is a road from God to man.500 He regards the 
central doctrine of Barth’s theology as God’s act, whereby ‘God has taken, is taking and 
                                                 
496 Ibid., 72. 
497 See, in particular, Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. III, Part 3 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1978), 298-299. For further details of Barth’s comment on Mozart’s music, see Karl Barth, Wolfgang 
Amadeus Mozart (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1986).  
498 Robert J. Palma, Karl Barth's Theology of Culture: The Freedom of Culture for the Praise of 
God (Pennsylvania: Pickwick Publications, 1983), 31-33. For the view that “the freedom of God is a major 
theme in the theology of Karl Barth” see George S. Hendry’s article “The Freedom of God in the Theology 
of Karl Barth”, Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 31, No.3 (1978) 229.      
499 Robert J. Palma, Karl Barth's Theology of Culture, 32. 
500 H. Richard Niebuhr, Theology, History, and Culture, edited by William Stacy Johnson (New 
Heaven: Yale University Press, 1996), 120. 
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will take this road’.501 He argues that for Barth, Christian action is neither parallel nor 
counterpart-action to God’s action; rather, it is ‘response to the divine activity which 
precedes, accompanies, and awaits human action in history’. 502  This viewpoint is 
acceptable in part, if we look at analogy on the basis of Barth’s Church Dogmatics, but it 
needs to be modified from a standpoint of free culture. In this way, free culture would 
become a pathway or agency connecting God and human beings. 
 
Let us look at the problem from a different aspect of culture associated with the agency 
of God’s creation, one that is able to support natural theology composed of the key 
features of rationality and nature. Here, the concept of nature needs to be specified, 
because its definition can vary between scholars. It is important that a criterion of 
elucidation should be established in order to interpret nature properly. In this respect, 
McGrath’s explanation is helpful, because he says that culture would determine both the 
materials and the phenomenon of nature. In addition, not only is rationality itself formed 
by cultural factors, but it is also embedded in tradition as well as in nature.503 Eventually, 
according to McGrath, ‘such a natural theology would thus be shaped by the 
contingencies of history and culture, rather than resting on the alleged universality of 
“necessary truths of reason”’.504 Whether nature and reason can become a mediation or 
encounter between God and human beings is a very controversial issue when interpreting 
Barth’s thought. This will be the subject of the section 5.2.3 below.      
 
                                                 
501 Ibid., 121. 
502 Ibid. 
503 Alister E. McGrath, The Open Secret: A New Vision for Natural Theology (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2008), 167. 
504 Ibid., 168. 
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To sum up, Barth’s thought with regard to solving the problem of the two extremes is 
close to agency theory, with its tripartite division into human agency, divine agency and 
cultural agency. Human agency is associated with living man, who is not only subject-
matter in Christian history but also connects the past and the present and bridges past and 
present generations. Divine agency is related to bridging the triune God to each other. In 
addition, God’s agent could overcome the qualitative gap between human beings and 
God. Finally, the concept of free culture includes human beings’ relatedness, religion, art 





5.2.2 Barth’s epistemology regarding God and agency 
 
 
In this section the aim is to investigate a little further into Barth’s epistemology when 
considering the association of agency theory. Generally speaking, some scholars argue 
that Barth regards the solution to the two extremes to be revelation, grace and divine 
reconciliation, whereas others maintain that Barth also recognizes creatures, through 
which God’s will and glory can be revealed. These two positions often conflict with each 
other in the interpretation of Barth’s theology. However, this conflict is reasonable, 
because there may be various views on the hermeneutical aspects of Barth’s theology. 
  
Here, let us concentrate our attention on three aspects of Barth’s epistemology regarding 
God: ‘The Self-attestation of God as the ground of cognition’, ‘Revelation and God’s 
Word’ as the subject-matter of cognition, and ‘Faith as the possibility of cognition’. 
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5.2.2.1 Self-attestation of God and grace  
 
Barth’s view is that God is known from the relationship between God and human beings, 
instigated by God, and that these two entities have qualitative differences. Humans cannot 
connect with God. In fact, to overcome or to reduce the gap between humans and God, 
many theologians have continually adjusted various aspects of their theories. It appears 
that, according to Barth, there is only one principle for reaching an understanding of the 
level of Godhead, which he expresses in his epistemology as ‘God is known only by 
God’.505 In other words, God is known only by divine agency, which is Himself. From 
this principle, we can analogize a foundation of epistemology regarding God which 
comes from God’s agency alone: even a Christological agency is still a God-centric 
agency, and the same is true for a Pneumatic agency or a Spirit Christological agency. 
There is no lack of attacks against this statement from both rationalists and the 
Continental Group,506  because it implies that the object of cognition is beyond the 
boundary of human thinking. In general, the object is very important in epistemology, 
because cognition without an object induces false knowledge. Thus, Descartes’ cognition, 
                                                 
505 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, Vol. II/1, The Doctrine of 
God (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), 179. In German, “Gott wird nur durch Gott erkannt.” (Karl Barth, 
Die Kirchliche Dogmatik, Vol. II/1, Die Lehre Von Gott (Zollikon: Verlag der Evangelischen 
Buchhandlung, 1940), 200. 
 
506 Schilling divided the Continental Protestant theologians of the 1960s into three main groups 
as follows: 
 “1.Theologians of the Word of God, whose perspective is predominantly Barthian”, i.e., Karl 
Barth, Ernst Wolff (Lutheran), Otto Weber (Reformed), Herrmann Diem, Helmut Gollwitzer, Karl 
Gerhard Steck, Walter Kreck, Wilhelm Niesel, H.H. Wolff, Heinrich Otto, Josef L. Hromadka, Jean 
Bosc, Roger Mehl, Jacques Ellul, Jean-Louis Leuba and N.H. Söe, etc. 
“2.Theologians who are influenced decisively or conspicuously by existentialist modes of 
thinking”, i.e., Rudolf Bultmann, Friedrich Gogarten, Gerhard Ebeling, Ernst Fuchs, Knud E. Lögstrup, 
Emil Brunner, etc. 
“3.Theologians who find either in the Lutheran confessions or Luther himself definitive 
guidance in interpreting the faith of the Scriptures”, i.e., Peter Brunner, Edmund Schlink, Wilfried 
Joest, Walter Künneth, Ernst Kinder, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Gerhard Gloege, Theobald Süss, Regin 
Prenter,  Gustaf Wingren and Nils A. Dahl, etc. 
The above citation is from S. Paul Schilling Contemporary Continental Theologians (London: 
SCM Press, 1966), 9-10.                  
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cogito ergo sum, reflects that certainty of the object is a core of thought and a point of 
departure when practising philosophy.  
 
Barth’s statement that ‘God is known only by God Himself’ is a controversial one for his 
antagonists. The objections can be roughly divided into three standpoints. First, Bartley, 
a rationalistic theologian, regards Barth as being as rational as possible, while maintaining 
an ultimate and irrational commitment to the above statement; i.e. he considers Barth to 
be providing a rational excuse for an irrational commitment,507 and he objects to an 
ultimate commitment not because he thinks the commitment itself is illegitimate or 
irrational, but because it is not subject to criticism and revision.508  In other words, 
Bartley argues that any commitment that is an absolute principle should allow criticism 
and revision. 
 
Secondly, some theologians of the Continental Group criticize Barth’s theology because 
it weakens dialectical theology in respect of overcoming the gap between a transcendent 
entity and finite human beings. In other words, they focus on the dialectical method, in 
order to solve the problem of the qualitative difference between the infinite entity and the 
finite entity. The question of whether Barth relinquishes the dialectics from his scholastic 
study will be investigated in the next section. 
   
                                                 
507  W.W. Bartley, The Retreat to Commitment (London: Open Court Publishing Company, 
1984), 38, 72. Bartley regarded Barth as a neo-orthodox theologian. Subsequently, this term has been used 
in the English speaking world to describe Barth.   
508 Ibid., 254-256. 
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Finally, Barth’s critics argue that his axiom, ‘God is known only by God’ should present 
a clear answer to his opponents. In other words, his argument needs to prove what the 
divine agency is and how human beings cognize it. 
  
Barth has carefully considered what the entities of human beings are, and whether the 
realm of reason is able to go beyond this boundary. In his commentary on the ‘Epistle to 
the Romans’, he presents more concretely the possibility of recognition of God. 
Recognition is possible when God reveals Himself to human beings and also when Man 
can recognize the relationship between God and human beings on a dialectical level. In 
this way, he examines how we can deal with the problem that produces a dualistic polarity 
and parallelism in the two extremes. In his commentary, Barth construes ‘the Old Man’ 
who lives without God as well as ‘the New Man’ who stands before God. The first is the 
existing man who lives in this world without regarding God and the latter is the man who 
lives in the new world. More importantly, he explains the nature of the New Man who is 
created by God’s grace as follows:  
 
Upon the threshold of my existence there appears, demanding admittance – the 
New Man of the new world, the New Man in Christ Jesus, justified and redeemed, 
alive and good, endowed with attributes which are not mine, have not been mine, 
and never will be mine. This New Man is no visible figure in history, no 
metaphysical phantom of my imagination; he is no other, second person, with 
whom I may be compared; he claims to be me myself, my existential, 
unobservable, Ego.509  
                                                 
509 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (1922), trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns, Sixth edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), 229. In German, “Diese Beziehung bedeutet, dass ein 
gerechtfertigter und erlöster, ein guter und lebendiger Mensch, der neue Mensch der neuen Welt in Jesus 
Christus Einlass fordernd an der Pforte meines Daseins erschienen ist – wobei alle jene Attribute das 
besagen, was ich nie war, nicht bin und nie sein werde!-, und das mit dem begründeten Anspruch, keine 
historische Größe, kein Metaphysisches Gespenst, kein Anderer, Zweiter neben mir zu sein, sondern – ich 
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Above, we have already clarified the concepts of the New Man and the new world on a 
theological level. However, from this citation, the remaining question is how these 
concepts can be justified. First, what Barth understands as the concept of the New Man is 
neither the second person of real ‘I’, nor a metaphysical shade of his imagination.510  
Here, if Barth regarded the New Man as the second person and the objectified being of 
real ‘I’ metaphysically, the New Man would be reduced to real ‘I’ without any logical 
leap. From this context, what we know is that the New Man cannot be analysed within 
reasonable boundaries, is not one with whom the ‘I’ may be compared. Secondly, if this 
New Man can be analysed cognitively, there needs to be something new which is beyond 
human reason. Barth maintains that this is the grace of God. In other words, the grace of 
God can reveal God to this New Man on a theological level, because grace is the power 
of the Resurrection to transform the Old Man into the New Man, from the status which is 
conditioned by visible or invisible sin to the new status which is justified by the act of 
God.511 Furthermore, he defines grace as ‘the power of the Resurrection’, which is ‘the 
knowledge that men are known of God, the consciousness that their existence is begotten 
of God, that it moves and rests in Him, and that it is beyond all concrete things, beyond 
the being and course of this world’.512 Another consideration is whether grace is one of 
the attributes of God or one of the natures of God. Scholars apply the terms ‘attribute’ 
                                                 
selbst, mein unanschauliches existentielles Ich, ich, der ich in Gott bin, und darum keinen Augenblick auf 
mich warten zu können.” (Karl Barth, Gesamtausgabe: Im Auftrag Der Karl Barth-Stiftung, Cornelis van 
der Kooi und Katja Tolstaja, Zweite Fassung, Vol, II, Der Roemerbrief [1922] [Zurich: Theologischer 
Verlag, 2010], 316). 
510 Ibid. 
511 Ibid., 190-191. 
512 Ibid., 207. In German, “Sie ist das Erkennen des Erkanntseins des Menschen durch Gott. Sie 
ist das Bewusstsein des Menschen von seiner jenseits aller Gegebenheiten, aller Lebensinhalte, aller 
Wesenheit, alles Da-Seins und So-Seins von Gott gezeugten Existenz selbst, sofern sich der Mensch in ihr 
wiederfindet.” ( Karl Barth, Der Roemerbrief [1922], 287).          
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and ‘nature’ in different ways. In his book, The Göttingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the 
Christian Religion, Barth examines these terms more specifically and distinguishes them 
from each other. He notes that nature is cognized in and through attributes. 513  If 
recognition of nature is true, the attributes come from the nature. In this respect, Barth 
regards all the determinations of attributes of God as determination of His nature, and 
regards each as itself identical with the divine nature.514 After all, grace is not only an 
attribute of God, which is revealed by the divine act, but also God’s nature, which is 
revealed by the divine attributes. If this is true, how can we reveal the divine attributes? 
In answering this question Barth presents Deus Dixit to sinful man.515 That is, only God’s 
self-revealing and self-attestation can bring us close to the level of God as preaching of 
His Word. He would consider this as God’s grace, His love and the freedom of God. In 
other words, God is not an abstract object which exists only in scholars’ thought, but He 
reveals, gives access to and speaks Himself to human beings through His grace, through 
His freedom, with His love. The key point is that the grace of God comes from His nature, 
                                                 
513  Karl Barth, The Göttingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion, Edited by 
Hannelotte Reiffen, Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 
1991), 378. 
514 Ibid., 380. 
515 Barth, The Göttingen Dogmatics, 45-68. Here, Barth explains Deus Dixit as six levels: 
1. It is an address (Ibid., 58). 
2. “Revelation means disclosure” (Ibid). 
3. “The Deus Dixit means a here and now” (Ibid., 59). 
4. “The concealed and unique address that we call God’s revelation is qualified history”  
(Ibid., 60). 
5. “God is always the subject, and God the subject, in this concealed and singular address 
which is not in continuity with other events” (Ibid., 61). 
6. The process of God’s self-revealing is a dicere, its content is Word (Ibid., 62).  
In German, 1. Das ist “eine Anrede” (Karl Barth, Gesamtausgabe: Im Auftrag Der Karl Barth-
Stiftung, Hannelotte Reiffer, Vol. II, Erster Band, (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1985, 69).  
2. “Offenbarung heißt Enthüllung” (Ibid.).  
3. “Das Deus Dixit bezeichnet ein Hic et Nunc” (Ibid. 70).  
4. “Die verborgene, singuläre Anrede, die wir als Gottes Offenbarung bezeichnen, ist qualifizierte 
Geschichte” (Ibid., 72).  
5. “In dieser verborgenen.singulären, mit keinem anderen Geschehen in Kontinuität stehenden   
Anrede ist und bleibt Gott Subjekt und Gott Subjekt” (Ibid., 73-74). 
6. “Der Vorgang des Sich-Offenbarens Gottes ist ein dicere, sein Inhalt ist Wort” (Ibid., 74). 
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because, as Barth notes: ‘God is gracious and continuous gracious even where there is no 
grace.’516 
 
To summarize, the self-attestation of God as the ground of cognition comes from His 
essential attributes, such as grace, love and freedom, hence His own nature as being the 
God of revelation.    
 
5.2.2.2 Revelation and the Word of God  
 
The key issue is how Barth can recognize revelation and God’s Word as subject-matters 
of cognition. In the first place, we have to inquire how to solve the paradox that it is 
possible to recognize God, who is beyond the boundary of our human cognition. Barth 
ponders this problem and maintains that ‘the possibility of the knowledge of God springs 
from God, in that He is Himself the truth and He gives Himself to man in His Word by 
the Spirit to be known as the truth’.517 This immediately makes clear that for Barth there 
is no human cognition of God, unless the possibility of cognition is moved from man to 
God, a cognition that we call revelation. In other words, although human beings bear the 
imago Dei (the image of God) in reason, which is a gift from God, sinful man himself 
cannot arrive at the world of God. If Barth’s argument is right, there remains a second 
question: how can we know the nature of God, if human beings cannot recognize God’s 
entity for themselves? As mentioned above, the incapability of man needs God’s 
                                                 
516 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, Vol. II-2, The Doctrine 
Of God (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1978), 92. 
517 Ibid., 63. 
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intervention to reduce the gap or break down the barriers between sinful man and God, 
because otherwise there is no possibility of encountering God. 
 
Barth often maintains that God reveals Himself to His people. Here, a fundamental 
problem arises and provokes a dialectical issue, that according to Barth’s argument no 
contact point between God and human beings remains or can be found. Thus, some 
scholars criticize that in his Church Dogmatics Barth neglects the use of human reason 
or his capability in response to God’s revelation and absoluteness, and he reduces the use 
of dialectic. A prominent historian of World Christianity, Werner Ustorf, shows that 
Barth was not invited by the Continental Group, which met twice at Basle, Switzerland 
in 1930 and 1932, in order to adumbrate on a faith relevant to modern knowledge.518 
Pointing to a letter from Visser’t Hooft to Oldham, Ustorf shows that the reason why 
Barth did not receive an invitation is that in his theology there is no room for dialectic in 
any specific sense.519 However, we might question whether those scholars who criticized 
Barth’s theology were justified, because Barth developed his theology dialectically in the 
historical situation of his ministry. Barth recognizes that although ‘the revelation of which 
theology speaks is not dialectical’,520 dialectic is a key factor in arguing and explaining 
the revelation of God’s Word. For instance, while he regards Christian preaching as a 
human task, he wants to look at the dialectical relation between God’s Word and Christian 
preaching.521 This indicates that the limitations of human ability demand the emergence 
                                                 
518 Werner Ustorf, Sailing on the Next Tide: Missions, Missiology, and the Third Reich, Vol. 125 
(Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang, 2000), 104. 
519 Ibid., 105. Visser’t Hooft maintains that there is not only one-sidedness in Barth’s theology, 
but also no connecting point between God and the actual situation of the world.         
520 Karl Barth, “Church and Theology” (1925) in Theology and Church, Translated by Louise 
Pettibone Smith (London: SCM Press, 1962), 299. 
521 Karl Barth, The Göttingen Dogmatics, Vol. 1. 272. 
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of dialectic in order to find a contact point with God. More concretely, he suggests the 
importance of dialectic in theology as follows: 
                           
Theology is not only ectypal (ἔκτυπος) and the theology of wayfarers (νιατοrum); 
it is also, according to the further analysis of our elders, theology after the fall 
(theologia post lapsum). And that means that it is conditioned in its basic 
assumptions by human misery. And such conditioning involves the impossibility 
(. . .) of rejecting with a gesture of irritation the dialectical character of 
theology.522     
 
Barth strongly emphasizes and depends on a dialectical method that overcomes the 
incapability of human beings to connect with the revelation of God. On this basis, we 
would maintain that Visser’t Hooft’s interpretation of Barth’s theology was not correct. 
Probably, he had some other reasons for refusing to invite Barth to the Continental Group 
meeting. 
   
In conclusion, Barth believes that human beings cannot reach a knowledge of God 
through reasoning or recognizing without God’s own intervention. Only when the 
gracious God gives us the Word and revelation that cognizes the attributes of God’s 
nature, are humans enabled to recognize God’s revelation and Word with the method of 
dialectics, which, however, uses reason, but reason that has first been informed by God’s 
grace. 
 
                                                 
522 Barth, Theology and Church, 299. In German, “Ist sie doch nicht nur theologia ἔκτυπος bloß 
und theologia viatorum, sondern nach der weiteren Erläuterung unserer Alten auch, theologia post lapsum, 
d. h. aber in ihren Grundvoraussetzungen mitbedingt durch «des Menschen Elend». Das bedeutet nun aber,  
daß es nicht angeht, trotz aller Lebhaftigkeit, mit der Peterson das unternimmt, den dialektischen Charakter 
der Theologie...” (Karl Barth, Gesamtausgabe: Im Auftrag Der Karl Barth-Stiftung, Holger Finze, Vol. III, 
Vorträge und Kleinere Arbeiten 1922-1925 [Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1990], 669). 
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5.2.2.3 Faith as rendering the possibility of cognition  
 
This section will investigate on a theological level faith as the necessary condition for any 
possibility of human cognition of God. 
  
Generally speaking, if it is impossible to cognize God through reason itself, what 
possibility is there with which the knowledge of philosophy can be compared? Barth 
investigates the human-centric theology which seems to have been, in the eighteenth 
century, always right, scientific and a yardstick of judgment.523 He criticizes the trends 
that places scientific knowledge in a higher position than the knowledge of faith. As 
mentioned above, because reason itself not only cannot go beyond human boundaries, but 
also does not reach at knowing God, Barth employs God’s grace, love, and freedom as 
well as God’s Word and revelation in order to overcome the limitation of human cognition 
with regard to God. In this situation, Barth complements an analogy of faith with 
dialectics in order to explain the possibility of cognition of God. The question remains as 
to why faith is thought to be important in bridging God’s attributes on the side of humans, 
and why reason is not chosen to connect between the nature of God and human beings. 
Barth clearly does not want us to depend on rational acceptance, rational manifestation 
or rational excuse, but appeals instead to acknowledgment, recognition and confession of 
faith.524 These acts of faith indicate a form of knowledge which desires its object as its 
origin. Faith encompasses the attributes of reason, or even precedes reason. Barth uses 
                                                 
523 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 90. 
524 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Geoffrey William Bromiley & Thomas F. Torrance., Vol. 
IV/1, The Doctrine of Reconciliation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956), 758.  
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reason deliberately in developing his Church Dogmatics from a positive aspect and 
perspective, because he believes that ‘Christian faith is the illumination of the reason in 
which men become free to live in the truth of Jesus Christ and thereby to become sure 
also of the meaning of their own existence and of the ground and goal of all that 
happens’.525 In his PhD thesis, ‘The Use of Reason in Karl Barth’, Wilson argues that 
Barth never acknowledges a conflict between reason and faith.526  This argument is 
reasonable because Barth never uses faith as a contrary concept of reason; however, even 
so, reason cannot usurp the unique position of faith. In his thesis, Wilson maintains that 
Barth expands a dialectic conception of reason, and that he does not have to reconcile 
faith and reason, because he never admits that these are incompatible with each other.527 
In other words, he recognizes that there are two different levels not only in both 
knowledge of faith and knowledge of reason, but also in the roles of faith and reason to 
reach the level of God’s existence. 
       
Although Wilson is correct in pointing out that Barth does not play faith against reason, 
Barth clearly sees an epistemological order of the two. He employs and reconstructs St 
Anselm’s thought, where he finds several stages of reason, and he considers Anselm’s 
theology as a model whereby theology could become a science. Anselm pursues not only 
rational knowledge under the insight of faith, but also faithful knowledge under the 
illumination of reason. G. R. Evans understands correctly the two different levels of 
knowledge. He argues that Anselm’s theological thinking is based on ‘the recourse to 
reason within a context of faith’,528 and enters deeply into the question of the relation 
                                                 
525 Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, G. T. Thomson (London: SCM Press, 1968), 22. 
526 Gerry Wilson, “The Use of Reason in Karl Barth”, (PhD diss., University of Ottawa, 2001). 
527 Ibid., 1-2. 
528 G. R. Evans, Anselm and a New Generation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 95. 
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between faith and reason.529 In his book, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, Barth 
investigates whether these two levels of knowledge are in harmony and interaction with 
each other,530 so that Anselm constructs theology as a science, but a science of faith.  
 
According to Anselm, the theological scheme is made up of five factors: the necessity for 
theology, the possibility of theology, the condition of theology, the manner of theology 
and the aim of theology.531 Barth ponders this theological structure and attempts to make 
a blueprint for theology. First, Barth wants to construe Anselm’s theological approach in 
order to construct a bridge that would connect the two extremes. Second, as we mentioned 
before, Barth knows that dialectic is not sufficient to reach the knowledge of God. 
Accordingly, he needs a new tool or approach, which is the analogy of faith he discovers 
in Anselm’s works. Of course, it is a controversial issue whether Barth develops his 
dialectic method continuously throughout his works. It seems, however, that although he 
shifted emphasis from a dialectical thinking to that of the analogy of faith, the dialectical 
approach still underlies all of Barth’s works, even after he had published the study on 
Anselm in 1931. In particular, Bruce L. McCormack, in his book, Karl Barth’s Critically 
Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 1909-1936, enumerates532 
the many theologians who have interpreted variously Barth’s theological development. 
                                                 
529 Ibid., 96. Evans maintains that “The reason functions as God has designed it to do and faith 
ensures that it does not go astray.” 
530 Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, Jonn Mcintyre & Ian T. Ramsey (London: 
SCM Press, 1960), 151, 158, 168. 
531 Ibid., 15-72. 
532 Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development, 1909-1936 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1-28.  
McCormack had investigated the opinions of many theologians regarding Barth’s theological 
development from 1922 to 1938, including: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Hans Frei, T. F. Torrance, Steven G. 
Smith, Stephen H. Webb, Eberhard Jüngel, Erik Peterson, Ingrid Spieckermann, Michael Beintker, Horst 
Georg Pöhlmann, George Hunsinger, Richard Roberts, Ferdinand Kattenbusch, Friedrich-Wilhelm 
Marquardt, Helmut Gollwitzer, Ulrich Dannemann, Peter Winzeler, Trutz Rendtorff, K. G. Steck, Dieter 
Schellong, Wilfried Groll, Christof Gestrich, Dietrich Korsch, John Macken. 
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He maintains that von Balthasar’s formula, ‘a turn from dialectic to analogy’, which 
evoked a considerable response in Barth’s Denkbewegung,533 is not the only way to read 
Barth. McCormack sees four principal problems with von Balthasar’s formula: First, the 
term ‘dialectic’ is not clear and definite.534 Second, the analogy of faith is an inherently 
dialectical notion.535 Third, ‘dialectical method’ is not on the same plane as ‘analogy of 
faith’: while the former is a conceptual tool, the latter ‘refers to the result of a divine act 
over which human beings have no control’.536 By using these concepts as if they were 
on the same plane, von Balthasar’s formula is guilty of a category error.537 The final 
problem is that the formula cannot escape from dialectic or analogy, so we cannot 
penetrate deeply into Barth’s theological development.538 After examining the problem 
of von Balthasar, McCormack suggests an alternative plan. He explains the importance 
of what he calls ‘Karl Barth’s critically realistic dialectical theology’ in construing 
epistemologies of theology as follows:   
 
It should be noted that the choice of the phase ‘critically realistic’ was not made 
out of a desire to establish a comparison between Barth’s theology and those 
contemporary schools of philosophical reflection which have also found in the 
phrase something apt for describing their own epistemologies. No such 
comparison was intended, for it is doubtful that it can be made for two reasons.  
 
First, as the phrase has been used here, it describes a strictly theological 
epistemology. ‘Critical realism’ here has the significance of a witness to the 
mystery of the divine action in revelation. …  
                                                 
533 Ibid., 2. 
534 Ibid., 16. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Ibid., 19. 
537 Ibid., 18. 
538 Ibid., 19. 
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Second, as has been argued throughout the book, to the extent that Barth 
concerned himself with philosophical epistemology at all, he was an idealist (and 
more specifically, a Kantian). All of his efforts in theology may be considered, 
from one point of view, as an attempt to overcome Kant by means of Kant; not 
retreating behind him and seeking to go around him.539  
 
As McCormack explains in the above passage, critical realism becomes the immediate 
background with regard to Kant’s thought. In other words, Barth would confirm Kant’s 
position of a limitation of reason and he would divide knowledge into two levels: the 
knowledge of reason and the knowledge of faith. From what we have said before, the 
knowledge of faith, informed by God’s grace, becomes the transcendental ground for the 
knowledge of reason: faith is the necessary condition for any potential knowledge of God. 
Paul La Montagne, in his PhD thesis, ‘Barth and Rationality: Critical Realism in 
Theology’, supports McCormack and explains that critical realism has two main features: 
‘First, knowledge is understood to be mediated. … Second, and almost as a consequence 
of the first, there must be some sort of critical theory about the limits of reason or of 
knowledge which is used to make judgments about knowledge and knowing process.’540 
How do humans get to the level of transcendent knowledge? To Kant this was of no 
concern, as he categorically excluded knowledge of the divine from pure reason. For 
Barth, however, rational knowledge comes on the basis of faithful knowledge. For this 
reason, Barth concentrates on Anselm’s ‘Fides quaerens intellectum’, because God is not 
only ‘that thing than which nothing greater can be thought’541 (Et quidem credimus te 
                                                 
539 Ibid., 464-465. 
540 D. Paul La Montagne, “Barth and Rationality: Critical Realism in Theology”, (Doctor of 
Philosophy thesis, Princeton Theological Seminary, 2001), 14. 
541  St Anselm, The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm with the Proslogion, Sister 
Benedicta Ward (London: Penguin Books, 1973), 244.  
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esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit), but also ‘something greater than it is possible 
to think about’542 (sed es quiddam maius quam cogitari possit). In construing Anselm’s 
Proslogion 2, Barth considers the Name of God as the aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari 
possit and the quo maius cogitari nequit, which would be the presupposition of the proof 
of God’s existence.543  Furthermore, he argues that the ‘Existence of God which is 
accepted in faith is now to be recognized and proved on the presupposition of the Name 
of God likewise accepted in faith and is to be understood as necessary for thought’.544 
McCormack supports Barth’s argument that Anselm uses the aliquid quo nihil maius 
cogitari possit and the quo maius cogitari nequit ‘as a key by which to explicate the 
meaning of God’s existence. And that is what “proof” finally means, as Barth understands 
it: it means explicatio.’545 Thus, the analogy of faith is the dialectical precondition to 
capture God who is beyond reason in Anselm’s Proslogion 2, 15. 
  
More specifically, God needs Himself as the sole agency to expose His nature and 
attributes to His creatures. Without this, nobody can reach the point of contact between 
God and human beings, let alone the level of God’s knowledge. In this case, divine agency 
would act, as Austin Farrer put it, ‘omnipotently on, in, or through creaturely agencies 
without either forcing them or competing with them’.546 On the other hand, a human 
agency could only postulate analogy of faith and dialectics to reach the level of God’s 
knowledge. Faith is the intersection of two axes: a horizontal axis at the level of human 
                                                 
542 Ibid., 257. 
543 Karl Barth, Anselm : Fides Quaerens Intellectum, Jonn Mcintyre & Ian T. Ramsey (London: 
SCM Press, 1960), 73-77. 
544 Ibid., 78. 
545 Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development, 1909-1936, 432-434.     
546 Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation: An Essay in Philosophical Theology: Containing The 
Deems Lectures 1964 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988), 62. 
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agency, and a vertical axis on the level of God’s agency, with the latter coming first. 
Farrer provides a good illustration of how the two different arguments go together, with 
two agencies on different levels ‘taking effect in the same finite action, the finite agency 
which lives in it, and the infinite agency which founds it. On any theistic hypothesis, such 
founding action is a mode of God’s active existence.’547 Barth regards the act of faith as 
the basic Christian act; it is ‘a cognitive event, the simple taking cognisance of the 
preceding being and work of Jesus Christ’.548 
  
In conclusion, it is clear that Barth’s epistemology is divided into three parts. First, the 
self-attestation of God is the ground of cognition. Barth suggests that ‘God is known only 
by God’.549 In other words, God is known solely by divine agency and divine activity. 
Second, ‘revelation and God’s Word’ comprise the subject-matter of cognition with 
regard to God. Through this subject-matter, human beings can cognize the attributes or 
nature of God with the method of dialectics, using reason. Third, faith is the possibility 
of cognition regarding God. Faith is the agency between God and humans through 
dialectic method, analogy of faith, analogy of relation and God’s creation.   
 
5.2.3 Natural theology and agency 
 
                                                 
547 Ibid., 159. 
548 Karl Barth, CD IV/1, 758. 
549 Karl Barth, CD II/1, 179. 
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In the previous chapter, we observed Barth’s theological position of the possibility of a 
cognition of God with regard to an agency theory. Natural theology,550 which will be 
investigated in this section, is one of the most disputed areas in the reconstruction of 
Barth’s theology. In particular, the controversy between Barth and Emil Brunner 
regarding natural theology affected the theological direction of Protestantism after the 
year 1934. In addition, the development of Barth’s theology with regard to natural 
theology presents us with myriad agencies.     
Therefore, in what follows we will try to identify the core issue of the debate between 
Barth and Brunner regarding natural theology, and whether or not Barth retains the 
consistency of his argument on natural theology in his Church Dogmatics. In addition, 
we present a comparison between natural theology and agency theory. 
 
5.2.3.1 Barth’s argument with E. Brunner on natural theology  
 
In general, natural theology could broadly be considered as a theological approach which 
intends to give us a new possibility of cognition of God on the human side; that is, it 
assumes the capability of human reason to reach the level of knowledge of God. Most 
natural theologians believe that the imago Dei (the image of God) has not totally been 
destroyed by sin but that part remains, so that the attributes of God can be recognized by 
reason. The debate between Barth and Brunner focuses specifically on the choice of 
whether theology should or should not be a natural one. 
   
                                                 
550 According to, Moltmann, “the expression theologia naturalis is taken from Stoic Philosophy” 
(Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation, The Gifford Lecture, trans., 
Margaret Kohl [London: SCM Press, 1985], 57).  
 186 
Under the title, ‘Nature and Grace’, Brunner outlines what he considers to be Barth’s false 
conclusions. He condenses them into six main problems, which we will explore while 
also taking consideration of Barth’s responses. 
  
We should bear in mind that both Barth and Brunner were greatly dissatisfied with 
existing approaches to natural theology. Alister E. McGrath indicates that like Barth, 
Brunner explicitly does not accept a self-sufficient rational system without an intervening 
revelation between God and human beings to reach the level of God’s knowledge.551 Yet 
despite this common ground, in 1934 the dispute between Barth and Brunner was sharp 
and rigorous. 
 
In the first place, Brunner maintains that the imago Dei has to be regarded in two ways, 
one formal and one material. 552  He rejects the term ‘remnant’, which would be a 
questionable concept in construing the imago Dei as well as suggesting a quantitative 
approach that would bring to the fore the relative concept of sin. In addition, he explains 
that the imago, in the formal sense, retains the imago Dei irrespective of the sinfulness of 
human beings,553 whereas in the material sense the imago is totally lost, because human 
beings are sinners, and nobody is not at least tarnished by sin.554  
 
It seems that his attempt to divide the imago Dei into two is persuasive and reasonable, 
because this division would open the possibility for a mediation between God and human 
                                                 
551  Alister E. McGrath, The Open Secret: A New Vision For Natural Theology (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 159. 
552 Emil Brunner & Karl Barth, Natural Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" By Professor 
Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply "No!" By Dr. Karl Barth, Peter Fraenkel (London: Geoffrey Bles: The 
Centenary Press, 1946), 23. 
553 Ibid., 24. 
554 Ibid. 
 187 
beings. But it is precisely this possible crossover, or link between the divine and the 
human, that Barth cannot accept. To Barth, Brunner’s argument is completely 
inconsistent, since it states on the one hand that human beings have ‘the capacity for 
revelation’ because of their ‘likeness to God’, while at the same time it asserts that man 
cannot do anything for his salvation by himself.555 Brunner’s strength of bridge-building 
seems to Barth the lethal handicap in discriminating between God’s grace and humans’ 
role for salvation. Philip Edgcumbe Hughes also evaluates that Brunner’s distinction, 
matter and form, is inescapably divisive and questionable because ‘if the “matter” is lost, 
there is no content for the “form”’.556 
   
Barth, furthermore, declares that Brunner’s argument does not indicate clearly the 
distinction between the formal and material imago.557  In response to this criticism, 
Brunner tried to re-construe the imago Dei. In his book, Man in Revolt, he employs the 
concept of the formal and material imago from the Platonist-Aristotelian-Stoics, in 
particular the Aristotelian view. 558  Accordingly, Brunner cannot find an answer to 
Barth’s question directly from Holy Scripture.559 However, because Brunner cannot give 
up the point of contact between God and human being formulated through the imago Dei, 
he restates the formal imago Dei in man which has remained a certain ‘relic’ through 
                                                 
555 Ibid., 79. 
556  Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, The True Image: The Origin and Destiny of Man in Christ 
(Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1989), 69. 
557 Emil Brunner & Karl Barth, Natural Theology, 87. 
558 Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology, Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth 
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God’s gift, despite the image having been totally destroyed by sin.560 In order to make a 
reliable argument, Brunner investigates many theologians, in particular, Irenaeus, 561 
Augustine, Calvin and Luther. Finally, he states that his ‘concept of the formal imago is 
formed on the analogy of this concept of formal freedom’.562 
                   
Secondly, Brunner regards the creation of the world as the revelation and self-disclosure 
of God. Therefore, he reproaches Barth for being a blind advocate of the Bible, because 
he does not accept the revelation that is hidden inside creatures of God.563 For his part, 
Barth criticizes Brunner’s God and his revelation as being not of Christianity but of a 
transcendental illusion or product of philosophy.564 It seems that Brunner finds the object 
of revelation in the created world, while Barth does not, highlighting instead that there is 
a qualitative difference between humans’ reason and the revelation of God in regard to 
the history of God’s salvation. Nevertheless, in his Church Dogmatics Barth develops 
progressively his perspective on the creation of the world.             
 
Thirdly, Brunner considers that preserving grace would encompass all creatures and all 
human acts, even though men have sinned against God.565 Barth generally accepts his 
view with regards to preserving grace, but not another special grace which precedes the 
grace of Jesus Christ.566  
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Fourthly, Brunner maintains that although all ordinances of creation can be perfectly 
understood in faith, all these things can be retained for the believer by divine ordinance 
of nature.567 For this reason, natural theology would be needed for the phenomena of 
natural life.568 However, Barth wonders what yardstick we have for measuring these 
sociological ‘ordinances of creation’.569 
 
Another consideration is that Brunner presents the formal imago Dei as the point of 
contact between human beings and God because we can hear the Word of God, even 
though our material imago completely disappears because of sin. Accordingly, he 
maintains that the formal imago cannot be destroyed by sin. He explains that this 
receptivity to the formal imago is not associated with whether or not we can accept the 
Word of God, but means that God can address human beings as a purely formal 
possibility. 570  However, Barth poses a problem as to the relevance of the formal 
possibility and of the ability to make decisions as a ‘capacity’ that exists in man anterior 
to divine revelation.571 
    
Finally, Brunner takes a vague position in terms of the formal imago. For instance, he 
argues that the material imago was totally destroyed when the first Adam died by sin. 
That does not mean that the formal imago would never be affected by this event.572 
Rather, he maintains that ‘it is not possible to repair what no longer exists. But it is 
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572 In the same book, Brunner interprets Gal. ii. 20. as evidence that “the formal personality 
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possible to repair a thing in such a way that one has to say: this has become quite new.’573 
In other words, although the formal imago has been affected by sin, the imago still 
remains and then repairs new beings by faith. However, Barth interprets this argument as 
stating that the death of Adam cannot destroy the formal imago, but only the material 
imago. Although Brunner tries to prove the formal imago as a point of contact or a 
capacity for revelation, and he re-interprets Gal 2:20 or I Cor. 2:10f, his reading of Gal. 
2:20 suggests that the formal imago has a lasting personality that is able to meet God’s 
personality. The problem with this interpretation is that it shows not continuity, but 
discontinuity between the ‘existing I’ and the ‘new I’ in verse 20. Furthermore, Brunner’s 
statement that ‘it is not possible to repair what no longer exists’ is problematic, because 
he poses the power of God on the same level as that of human beings. For this reason, 
Barth confesses that Brunner’s statement makes him ‘flabbergasted’.574       
 
To summarize, in the debate Barth seriously attacks Brunner’s core of natural theology. 
He denies the juxtaposition of natural theology and revelation theology in order to avoid 
any assumption of a point of contact between human beings and God. 
  
Natural theology is a crucial theme for Barth, because he tries to overcome two extremes 
through faith alone. However, he recognizes that natural theology concentrates more on 
human reason than on the revelation of God and God’s grace in order to seek the contact 
point between God and human beings. Therefore, as Thomas F. Torrance indicates, for 
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Barth it is not enough to establish just independent natural theology without the theology 
of revelation.575  
5.2.3.2 Barth’s viewpoint on natural theology in his Church Dogmatics  
 
As we observed above, Barth strongly rejected natural theology in the 1934 controversy, 
which was able to affect the decline of revelation theology because rationalists often place 
reason more highly than revelation. In this section, I investigate whether Barth’s position 
remained consistent with regard to natural theology during the period between 1932 and 
1967, as revealed in his Church Dogmatics (I-IV).  
In general, Barth maintains that natural theology cannot give us a point of contact between 
human beings and God. However, there are slight differences and developments in his 
position on natural theology during the period. 
  
In the first place, in Church Dogmatics I and II/1, Barth’s position on natural theology is 
thoroughly negative, because he insists firmly on the revelation of God alone. The ground 
of knowledge of God does not spring from analogia entis, but from God’s self-attestation 
or analogia fidei. Barth marks out the foundation of ‘the knowability of the word of God’ 
as follows: ‘no finitum is capax infiniti, no peccator is capax verbi divini’. 576 
Accordingly, he denies Brunner’s argument that the formal imago of man would be a 
point of contact between God and human beings because Barth believes that the real point 
of contact between God and human beings is formed solely by God Himself through the 
                                                 
575 Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1990), 147.   
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reconciliatory work of Jesus Christ.577 Just as a rainbow does not need land in order to 
stand on the ground, truth does not need humans’ support to make truth stand out. 
Therefore, Barth objects to analogia entis, which acknowledges the point of contact 
between God and human beings without the revelation of God.578 However, Pannenberg 
interprets Barth’s view differently with regard to analogia entis. He maintains that 
Barth’s critique is not based on the ontological aspect of the analogy, but that he uses the 
analogy in its epistemological aspect. According to Pannenberg, Barth had taught 
analogia entis between the Creator and the creatures on the basis of creation until the year 
1930. However, human beings cannot recognize by themselves the analogy between 
Creator and creature. Barth requires revelation of God in order to mediate between 
Creator and His creatures.579 Although Pannenberg might be right in his interpretation, 
the problem remains that Barth may not have objected to analogia entis in its ontological 
aspect, because his objection equates God with idols sprung from this capacity. Barth 
insists that ‘it is a construct which obviously derives from attempts to unite Yahweh with 
Baal, the triune God of Holy Scripture with the concept of being of Aristotelian and stoic 
philosophy’. 580  Thus Barth obviously objected to both the ontological and 
epistemological aspects of analogia entis, and in his CD1 and CD2-1 suggested instead 
analogia fidei as both his ontological and epistemological principle. 
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Secondly, in CD2-2 and CD3, Barth’s use of the term analogia fidei, developed against 
natural theology, changes considerably. In these volumes, Barth often uses the term 
analogia relationis instead of the analogia entis or analogia fides. Balthasar and Brunner 
suggested that Barth’s epistemology during this period expanded significantly, and that 
in CD3 Barth had possibly accepted some concepts with regard to natural theology which 
he had earlier rejected.581 They interpreted the term analogia relationis in the light of 
analogia entis. However, this reading was based on a misunderstanding, caused by 
Barth’s comment on Gen 1: 26-31. According to Barth, ‘the analogia relationis as the 
meaning of divine likeness cannot be equated with an analogia entis’.582 He regards the 
imago Dei of human beings not as an image that is intrinsically possessed, but as a 
relationship between male and female, between God and human beings. In other words, 
the imago Dei of human beings in an ontological aspect is still regarded as destroyed 
totally, whereas it is regarded as being retained in the aspect of analogia relationis. At 
this point, it seems that Brunner and Balthasar misread Barth’s comment on the imago 
Dei. Apparently, Barth insists that ‘all creation aims at the confrontation of God and man 
and the inconvertible I-Thou relationship between Creator and creature . . . which is the 
true and sole motive of the cosmic process’.583 His understanding of analogia relationis 
does not highlight any correspondence or similarity between divine being and man on the 
basis of the imago Dei, but contrasts them, the ideal and its destroyed state, a relation that 
is to be described as a confrontation.   
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To clarify our debate, we need to distinguish Barth’s use of analogia relationis from 
Brunner’s formal imago. There are three distinctions between Barth’s view of the imago 
Dei and that of Brunner. First, Barth seeks to deduce the image of God from the human 
nature of Jesus Christ. The human nature of Jesus Christ is not directly identified with the 
imago Dei but indirectly corresponds to it. In contrast, Brunner seeks the imago Dei from 
the formal imago of human beings. Second, Barth believes that the divine being cannot 
be compared with human beings on the basis of ontology but only within a logic of 
relationship, because the qualitative difference between God and human beings cannot be 
overcome with respect to their natures and their attributes. Finally, Barth considers that 
the divine prototype creates His archetype and His agency on the basis of an analogia 
relationis within the created world. He insists that ‘the relationship between the 
summoning I in God’s being and the summoned divine Thou is reflected both in the 
relationship of God to the man whom He has created, and also in the relationship between 
the I and the Thou, between male and female in human existence itself.’584  
As we observed above, analogia relationis is not ontologically given through the creation 
of God, but newly occurs through the grace of God. We have to verify that in Barth’s 
CD3, the analogia relationis becomes important for the mediation between the divine 
being and His creatures. Above all, Barth focuses on God’s existence in relationships and 
fellowship, 585  and then he insists that analogia relationis encompasses the 
correspondence and similarity of the Creator-creature. According to Barth, the two 
relationships are established not by human beings but by the Creator, because the nature 
or attributes of the Creator reveals His unlimited freedom and His eternal love, whereas 
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the imago Dei of human beings cannot make any point of contact between Creator and 
creature without God’s intervention, because that imago Dei has been completely 
destroyed. 
  
Thus, in CD3 Barth develops the two relationships into a possibility of God’s knowability 
through analogia relationis. Certainly, Barth insists that the correspondence and 
similarity of the Creator-creature relationship is established by the Creator on the basis of 
an analogia relationis.586 However, he still rejects the point of contact in an ontological 
aspect, and therefore maintains that there is no similarity and correspondence between 
the Creator-creature relationship in analogia entis and analogia fidei based on an 
ontological concept. 
 
Thirdly, we will investigate Barth’s perspective on natural theology in CD4/3. In general, 
in CD4/1 and CD4/2 Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation is concentrated on the work of 
Jesus Christ, while in CD4/3 he focuses on the bearers of reconciliation, which would be 
people of God or the created world. In fact, the development of Barth’s theological 
thought makes room for gradual encompassing of some issues of natural theology. Barth 
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has confessed that Jesus Christ is the sole word, light and the truth of the world. However, 
he admits that there are important human words, lights and truths in association with the 
event of reconciliation outside the circle of Holy Scripture and the Church.587   
 
If there are lights, words and truths that would notice or reveal Christ’s reconciliation 
outside the boundary of Holy Scripture and the Church, we have to investigate whether 
Barth would accept a natural theology in order to understand the reconciliation between 
God and the world and creatures. Barth poses a question as to why the world should not 
have its diverse prophets and apostles, because he cannot ignore that there are worthwhile 
words, shining lights and great or little revelation in the created world.588 Of course, it is 
not true that these valuable words, lights and truths serve as a bridge between the Creator 
and the creature, between the divine being and the being of man, although they do 
reconcile human beings with the transcendental being to some extent.589 For this reason, 
Barth makes clear that such things ‘must be in the closest material and substantial 
conformity and agreement with the one Word of God Himself and therefore with that of 
His one Prophet Jesus Christ’. 590 Accordingly, he argues the need for criteria to 
distinguish between them and other words which ‘do not derive from the light which 
lightens the darkness but from the darkness itself, so that they can only be regarded as 
untrue words’.591 
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Thus, we can see that Barth’s position on natural theology is considerably softened and 
adapted in CD4/3-1 when compared with CD1, CD2/1 and CD3. However, Barth still 
insists that ‘God is known by God Himself’, and ‘Jesus is a yardstick for all judgment’.                         
 
Finally, we investigate Barth’s epistemology regarding the known God and the unknown 
God in CD4/4 (1967). In this volume, Barth ponders over the universal knowledge of God 
outside the circle of the Church, and it is clear that here he accepts many elements of 
natural theology. In particular, he argues that God is known objectively by Himself in the 
created world and through the history of the world.592  According to Barth, all that 
Christianity can do is to run after God’s work, in order to spread widely the Word of God 
in our world.593 
  
Barth argues that God announces Himself to the created world in three ways. First, God 
reveals Himself through the works of believers and members of the Church.594 However, 
he recognizes that God would be restricted, distorted and dimmed by the limited 
knowledge of the Church.595 Second, God announces Himself objectively to the created 
world through His attributes, because the created world praises its Creator ceaselessly. 
He explains that every blade of grass and every snowflake reveal the glory of their 
Creator596 because ‘God’s own glory as Creator is accompanied by his glorification by 
his creature’.597 Third, God gives us Himself through Jesus Christ. Accordingly, Barth 
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insists that the created world encompasses the grace of Jesus Christ because Jesus Christ 
is the ground and purpose of the creation of the Creator.598 Yet although God reveals 
Himself objectively to his created world, and although He does not remove the objective 
knowledge in order to watch His wisdom, endurance and peace, the announcement of 
God is suppressed by the great darkness that encompasses the blindness of man, the 
deficiency of subjective cognition and the indifference of human beings with regard to 
the Creator, because ‘the world is at fault for existing in the ambivalence of objective 
knowledge and subjective ignorance’.599    
 
We have observed the development of Barth’s theological thought in association with 
natural theology in his Church Dogmatics I-IV. In 1934 Barth strongly rejected natural 
theology, but in CD3/1, CD3/2 and CD4/4 he accepted certain elements of it, in particular 
the doctrine of creation. 
  
Barth never loses sight of his Christological yardstick, but he allows us to see the 
possibility of natural theology under certain conditions. In other words, his perspective 
on natural theology develops gradually without the abandonment or weakening of his 
own revelation theology. 
 
5.2.3.3 The re-illumination of Barth’s natural theology through agency  
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Barth’s insight on natural theology expanded considerably throughout the course of his 
life, as we observed above. Now we will focus on the role of agency theory in re-
illuminating Barth’s theological thought. In particular, we will investigate specific aspects 
of natural theology, such as the problems of the imago Dei, the point of contact, and the 
relationship between the Creator and creatures.   
 
The imago Dei is one of most controversial issues in the search for a point of contact 
between God and human beings. First, Barth argues that the imago Dei cannot be a point 
of contact between the Creator and human beings in the ontological aspect, but that it is 
able to establish the true identity of human beings in comparison with their Creator.600 
Barth regards the man as the imago Dei which ‘is not created to be’ God’s image, but 
which ‘is created in correspondence with’ His image.601 Second, Daniel L. Migliore 
suggests that Barth’s idea of the imago Dei is connected with the concept of ‘the co-
existence of man and woman’.602 In other words, Barth does not seek the point of contact 
under the destroyed image of God, but seeks a possibility of the relationship or the co-
existence between the Creator and human beings, between male and female in their 
particular sexual identity.603 The reason why he focuses not on an analogia entis but on 
an analogia relationis of the imago Dei is because human beings have no possibility to 
cognize the transcendent God directly for themselves or through their current images 
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without the revelation of God and God’s grace. This means that we can rightly understand 
the world, human beings and their real existence only through the relationship with the 
First Cause, the Creator and Providence. When we use the term ‘agency’, the relationship 
between the subject and the object, between the Creator and creatures, is already 
connoted. Among relation concepts, the term ‘agency’ places more weight on a doer or a 
representative or áποϛτολος than on a master or the self-existing or the Creator.  Thus, 
in this case agency theory is a crucial tool to explain how Barth deals with the intention 
and contradiction between two extremes, God and human beings.  
                           
Secondly, Barth argues that there are many points of contact between the Creator and His 
creatures in the world, but he cannot admit that the point of contact is made by reason and 
human beings’ capability. He never gives up the necessity of the revelation of God and 
Jesus Christ in order to cognize the knowledge of God. As we investigated in the previous 
chapter, there are various levels of agency in Barth’s thought: i.e. divine agency, human 
agency, nature agency and culture agency. God uses all of these to reveal His Will, His 
Love and His Providence to all creatures, according to Barth. More importantly, each 
agency should rightly understand its limitation and its place, and should avoid the 
temptation to reach towards the place of God. For instance, the Son of God, Jesus Christ, 
as the agent of God does not take his Father’s place. When Jesus prays at Gethsemane, 
he says ‘O my father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless not as I 
will, but as thou wilt.’ 
  
Let us investigate in more detail the three levels of agencies. First, Jesus Christ as the 
agent of God mediates between God the Father and His creatures. According to John 
Thompson, the divine agent in Barth’s theological thought comprises both Jesus Christ 
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and the Holy Spirit. Thompson maintains that ‘the Son is with the Father, the agent of 
creation just as the Father and the Holy Spirit cannot be dissociated from the Son in the 
work of reconciliation’;604 while the Holy Spirit is ‘the source and power of our hope 
impelling us forward as the first-fruits and foretaste of eternal salvation’.605 Thompson 
notes that in Barth’s view, Jesus Christ’s role of reconciliation is central to ‘the revealing 
activity of God in the Son’.606 Thus, both the Son and the Holy Spirit as the agent of God 
reveal the Father’s attributes to the creatures, so this level of agency is reducible and is 
the same as the Father. Second, Barth considers the Christian community as God’s agent.  
This community should exist for others, just as Jesus Christ exists not for Himself but for 
the world,607 and it should consider ‘Jesus Christ as the basis of its existence’.608 He 
argues that the community ‘cannot be its own meaning and telos, nor can it rest content 
with its own being as such’.609 In addition, the community should find its task, i.e., the 
mission, ministry and witness of the Church, because the community rises, destroys, 
flourishes and falls with its relation or with its correspondence. Therefore, the Church as 
the agent of God should confess continuously before God her omissions, her sins and her 
indifference to the world; hence this level of agency is irreducible and is not as same as 
her Master. Third, God would use all nations outside the Christian community as His 
agents, ‘either to execute His judgments, or, as in the case of Cyrus, as the instruments of 
His faithfulness and goodness’.610  Because these agents are taken from outside the 
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Church, this level of agency is untouchable, unknown and undecided without the 
intervention of the divine Providence.     
Finally, Barth argues that the creatures reveal the Creator’s glory in creation. If we look 
at the attributes of creatures as the basis of cognition regarding the knowledge of God, 
many points of difficulty remain. However, if we consider the creatures as myriad 
agencies, it is naturally accepted that ‘God’s own glory as Creator is accompanied by his 
glorification by his creatures’.611 In other words, many agencies would reveal objective 
knowledge of their Master or the Creator in the world, as proven by the fact that the triune 
God is known throughout world history, in the non-Christian as well as the Christian 
world.612 However, according to Barth, although God does not revoke this objective 
knowledge from the creatures,613 this knowledge cannot reveal completely the Creator 
and the unknown God as a fact. Accordingly, we can only trust, according to ‘an 
approximately corresponding subjective knowledge of God that is proper to the world 
and mankind’.614 Hence knowledge of God in the world would be achieved objectively 
for God, but subjectively for man.615 Finally, Barth postulates Jesus Christ as a yardstick 
to distinguish the true agent of God from myriad agencies of God. 
  
In conclusion, we have investigated Barth’s theological thought on natural theology under 
the light of agency theory. Different levels of agency reveal God’s will, love and purpose. 
As Thompson summarizes, it is therefore appropriate that the Holy Spirit, ‘who is the 
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union of the divine life, who is union of God and humanity in Jesus Christ, who is the 
agent of our reconciliation, should be the agent of the divine coming into our life’.616 
 
5.3 Issues of Contemporary Natural Theology and Agency 
 
The issues of contemporary natural theology can be investigated in association with 
agency theory. Nowadays, the place of natural theology is extended to the real world of 
nature beyond the fundamental question of whether the ground of epistemology regarding 
God is reason of human beings or the revelation of God. In particular, the pollution of the 
natural world and the destruction of an ecological system would demand ecological 
theology. Another perspective investigates whether nature would become a point of 
contact with God. McGrath argues that if Barth were living in current circumstances, he 
would accept contemporary natural theology.617 When Barth considered the situation of 
the German Christians, in particular, the Nazi revolution in 1933, he had to reject the 
natural theology that supported Nazi policy of anti-Semitism in his perspective of the 
revealed theology.618 Of course, this does not mean that all problems would be resolved 
if Barth were to accept completely the current position of natural theology. Accordingly, 
in this section, the critiques of some scholars regarding Barth’s natural theology will be 
considered in more depth. The section will be divided into three parts: terminology of 
natural theology and theology of nature, the points of contact, and Polkinghorne’s natural 
theology and agency. 
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5.3.1 Terminology of natural theology and theology of nature  
 
When we look for the point of contact between God and His creatures, natural theology 
can play a crucial role. As mentioned previously with regard to Barth’s debate with 
Brunner, the traditional perspectives of natural theology are derived from two stems: 
Aquinas’ rational thought and Augustine’s divine grace. The differences between these 
perspectives have often triggered disputes between the two camps. Nowadays, however, 
with the pollution and devastation of our environment, the problem of nature is becoming 
a key issue. Scholars in various areas of the sciences argue that the significance of nature 
must be considered and its destruction prevented through global action. In the theological 
domain too, nature is a frequently re-emerging issue. However, the terms ‘natural 
theology’ and ‘theology of nature’ are often used interchangeably and without distinction. 
Therefore, it is necessary to differentiate clearly between them. The distinction is 
explained by Hermann Dembowski’s article, ‘Natürliche Theologie und Theologie der 
Natur’. First, he argues that natural theology should accomplish its task, which is the 
understanding of the reality of God, through the reality of the world. Here, he posits two 
presuppositions: On the one hand, God reveals Himself in His work, which is the reality 
of the world. On the other hand, human beings have the ability of insight coming from 
God, which penetrates the reality of the world.619 Secondly, Dembowski maintains that 
theology of nature starts from the revelation of God, which is based on the Bible.620 In 
other words, he argues that theology of nature does not inquire about the reality of God 
from the reality of the world, but investigates the cognition and acts of human beings 
                                                 
619 Hermann Dembowski, “Natürlische Theologie und Theologie der Natur”, in Ökologische 
Theologie: Perspektiven zur Orientierung, Günter Altner (Stuttgart: Kreuz Verlag, 1989), 32-33. 
620 Ibid., 32, 45. 
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from the revelation of God.621 Accordingly, he insists that the aim of theology of nature 
is to recognize nature rightly and to preserve the value of nature.  
 
After distinguishing the terms clearly, Dembowski argues that natural theology would not 
only be incompatible with the natural science that is the core of the Enlightenment, but 
would also be problematic in relation to the revealed theology that is based on the Bible. 
In addition, natural theology would not provide a ground for ecological theology, which 
could help to solve the crises of environmental destruction. However, he argues that 
theology of nature would be compatible with natural science and revealed theology, and 
would support the building of a ground for ecological theology. It seems that his 
theological position stands in the same line as Barth’s thought. The difference between 
them is in their different theological foci; i.e., Barth focuses on revealed theology while 
Dembowski focuses on ecological theology. In fact, ecological theology should have a 
theological foundation, whether that is natural theology or a theology of nature. It would 
be problematic to emboss or strengthen ecological theology on the basis of natural 
theology, which is rooted in reason and natural philosophy. For instance, the power of 
science and reason have devastated the natural environment in the name of development. 
We can see this phenomenon in many countries, in particular, in China and in the Amazon 
of Brazil. Thus, it seems to me that Dembowski presents a theology of nature which 
should be rooted by revealed theology on the basis of an evangelical position. Similar to 
Dembowski’s view, Sallie McFague insists that natural theology stands in contrast to a 
theology of nature,622 and that theology of nature ‘will express divine goodness and 
                                                 
621 Ibid., 57. 
622 Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1993), 65.   
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power, as well as our place in the scheme of things in terms of the view of reality coming 
to us from contemporary science, a view we have characterized in terms of the organic 
model’.623 That is, McFague regards the universe or nature as the body of God, which 
can be construed by the organic model. 
  
In contrast, Moltmann does not distinguish theology of nature from natural theology, 
because division between two theological approaches is misleading.624 He argues that all 
natural theology starts from the creation of God, manifested in nature, while all ‘theology 
of nature’ illuminates nature within the light of God’s self-revelation.625 In Moltmann’s 
understanding, these theologies are one, because God is one. 626  He notes that the 
separation between revealed theology and natural theology cannot be overcome, so that 
the world is the promise of the kingdom of God, within the light of the Messiah.627 Thus, 
for him, revealed theology is natural theology under the condition of history, while natural 
theology is revealed theology under the condition of the Messiah;628 hence, ‘natural 
theology was the preparation for revealed theology’. 629  According to Moltmannn, 
natural theology is 1) ‘the general presupposition for specifically Christian theology’,630 
2) ‘the consequence and the eschatological goal of historical and Christian theology’,631 
3) ‘Christian theology itself’,632 and 4) ‘a task for Christian theology’.633  
                                                 
623 Ibid., 66. 
624 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation, The Gifford Lecture, 
trans., Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1985), 59. 
625 Ibid., 57. 
626 Ibid.,59. 
627 Ibid., 58. 
628 Ibid., 59-60. 
629 Ibid., 58. 
630 Jürgen Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms of Christian Theology, trans., 
Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 2000), 64. 
631 Ibid., 65.  
632 Ibid. 
633 Ibid., 79. 
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In Pannenberg’s study of the history of natural theology, he suggests that its first 
expression is found in the work of Panaetius, who was a founder of Middle Stoism.634 
Pannenberg differs from Moltmann in stating that for St Augustine, ‘natural theology was 
not a preparatory stage for Christian theology’, but that its purified form was identical 
with the Christian doctrine of God.635  
 
Moltmann is a great admirer of Barth, but he recognizes that Barth’s revelation theology 
is too transcendental, even to the point of irresponsibility, and cannot provide an 
eschatological vision. As Pannenberg has argued, the revelation of God is not perfect 
from its start, but reveals the perfection at the end of history.636 Moltmann appeals to the 
importance of ecological theology, and explains it as one category which binds natural 
theology, a theology of nature and revealed theology. This is persuasive, but if we accept 
Moltmann’s argument we risk the loss of Barth’s evangelical heritage, whereby man 
cannot recognize God through natural theology without the illumination of revealed 
theology. When we engage in theological thinking, each theology, i.e., natural theology, 
theology of nature and revealed theology, can expand our theological understanding. The 
distinction is very significant, because the focus of debate would be changed from God 
and human beings to nature, without concentrating on the question of the ground of 
cognition regarding God, whether revelation or reason. In addition, through this division, 
we can state nature herself the way that she is in herself, freely without the burden of 
                                                 
634 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Vol. I., trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: 
T & T Clark Ltd, 1991), 76. Cf. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa I (Göttingen: 1959) 191-207. 
635 Ibid., 80-81. 
636 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God, trans., Philip Clayton (Grand Rapids: 
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finding whether the point of contact is the revelation of God or reason. Thus, 
Dembowski’s disclosure of the relationship of interaction and distinction between natural 
theology and a theology of nature is useful. If Dembowski’s argument has validity, it 
raises the questions of how we can look for the point of contact between God and 
creatures, and how we can investigate the meaning of materials or the natural world from 
the standpoint of natural philosophy and natural science. 
5.3.2 The point of contact regarding nature 
 
Since the debate between Barth and Brunner, the issue of the point of contact for cognition 
of God has been continuously discussed among scholars. Advances regarding nature and 
the point of contact between God and His creatures have been made both in philosophy 
and through scientific investigation. In this section we will investigate nature, the world 
and God through Alfred North Whitehead’s nature philosophy. 
  
Whitehead, a mathematician and natural philosopher, regards nature not as a lifeless thing 
but as a live process.637 He does not examine the attributes of nature itself but inquires 
into human beings’ cognition and understanding when confronted with nature. In other 
words, he defines nature not only as something external and grasped by our experience, 
but also as causal nature, which is beyond our cognition.638 Through this division, he 
analogizes the terms ‘extension’ and ‘region’, which are basic forms of nature. He 
establishes an extensive connection as a fundamental form of physical world and regions 
                                                 
637 Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1920), 53. 
638 Ibid., 31.    
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and as ‘the things which are connected’.639 Whitehead understands space and time as 
‘simply abstractions from the totality of prehensive unifications’640 of sense-objects. For 
Whitehead, the totality and each prehension share the same reality; nature is conceived 
as ‘a complex of prehensive unifications’ 641  in a continually evolving process of 
expansive development, a process which is itself the reality.642 He explains the organic 
nature as follows: First, ‘the expansion of the universe in respect to actual things is the 
meaning of “process”; the universe in any stage of its expansion is the first meaning of 
organism’.643 Second, ‘each actual entity is itself only describable as an organic process. 
It repeats in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm.’644 He observes how God is 
recognized by philosophical thought on the basis of understanding of nature. In the 
process of history, God is the beginning and the end. According to the Bible, God is ‘the 
Alpha and the Omega, the Beginning and the End’ (Revelation 21: 6a). 645  Here, 
Whitehead does not interpret ‘beginning’ as meaning the first thing in the historical 
past;646 rather, God is the beginning and the end because His nature is dipolar. In this 
case, the problem is how God has a point of contact with His creatures. Whitehead 
suggests that: ‘God’s nature is constituted by his conceptual experience.’ 647  Thus, 
according to Whitehead, the dipolarity of God’s nature, i.e., a primordial nature and a 
                                                 
639 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology - Gifford Lectures 
Delivered in the University of Edinburgh during the Session 1927-28, David Ray Griffin & Donald W. 
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consequent nature, has self-contradictions in relation to the world, as can be seen in the 
following quotation: 
           
It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that the World 
is permanent and God is fluent. 
 
It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one 
and God many. 
 
It is as true to say that, in comparison with the World, God is actual eminently, as 
that, in comparison with God, the World is actual eminently. 
 
It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in 
the World. 
 
It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World transcends 
God. 
 
It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God.648      
 
For Whitehead, the understanding of God and the world is metaphysical. He regards the 
metaphysical principle of God as the saving from collapse, i.e., religious and moral 
elements or intuitions.649 From this perspective, he tries to solve the problem of the two 
extremes of the world through elucidating God’s dipolar nature, and insists that ‘the 
perfection of God’s subjective aim, derived from the completeness of his primordial 
nature, issues into the character of his consequent nature’.650 In other words, God is both 
the principle of embodiment of the world from the perspective of His primordial nature, 
and His judgment on the world in view of His consequent nature, which is ‘composed of 
a multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization’.651 Whitehead’s analogizing 
                                                 
648 Ibid., 348. 
649 Ibid., 343. 
650 Ibid., 345. 
651 Ibid., 345-346, 350. 
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of the metaphysical formation and construction of the world from God’s dipolar nature 
suggests that ‘God is the infinite ground of all mentality, the unity of vision seeking 
physical multiplicity’,652 and ‘the world is the multiplicity of finite actualities seeking a 
perfected unity’.653 Whitehead often uses this balanced notion regarding God and the 
world because God does not exist without the world, just as the world does not exist 
without its Creator. Therefore, God and the world are mutually necessary to each other.654 
It is possible to interpret as pantheism Whitehead’s interpretation of the relationship 
between God and the world as mutual supplementation, because his argument gives us 
the feeling that God is the world, and the world is God. However, in his comparison of 
the worldview of Whitehead and the Russian theologian Nicolas Berdyaev (1874-1948), 
Charles Hartshorne insists that Whitehead’s viewpoint regarding God and the world is 
not pantheism, but panentheism, and cites both etymological and historical reasons for 
this.655 According to David A. Pailin, the term ‘panentheism’ was coined in the early 
19th century by the German thinker K. C. F. Krause,656 ‘to draw attention to the intimate 
and all-inclusive relationship between God and the world’.657 While this point would 
also apply to Berdyaev, his thought differed from that of Whitehead in that he saw the 
creative process as taking place outside of time, in eternity. He insisted that God does not 
depend upon the world, and that the process is accomplished in God.658 
  
                                                 
652 Ibid., 348. 
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(London: Routledge, 1989), 76. Cf. K. C. F. Krause, The Ideal of Humanity and Universal Federation, ed., 
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What then, for Whitehead and Berdyaev, is the point of contact with God? For Whitehead, 
that point of contact is, first, organic nature and the world that is originated from God’s 
primordial nature. Man can recognize the actuality of God through metaphysical 
philosophy about organic nature and the world, because ‘philosophy tends to oscillate 
between the point of view belonging to the infinite and to the finite’.659 Second, the 
contact point with God is in the process of history, because ‘the sense of historic 
importance is the intuition of the universe as everlasting process, unfading in its deistic 
unity of ideals’, and ‘the Deistic influence implants in the historic process new aims at 
other ideals’.660 Finally, this point of contact with God is only in metaphysical thought, 
because he does not conceive of God as an ontological reality, but in modes of thought. 
Otherwise, he would have to verify the existence of God. However, he notes that ‘proofs 
are the tools for the extension of our imperfect self-evidence’.661  
 
For Berdyaev, on the other hand, the point of contact with God is the two-fold nature, the 
divine-humanity of man. In orthodox theological tradition, Jesus Christ alone is God-man, 
and many scholars would attack any suggestion that this two-fold nature might apply to 
all men. However, Berdyaev insists that ‘man is a manifold being; he bears within him 
the image of the world, but he is not only the image of the world, he is also the image of 
God’.662  As is made clear in his book, Solitude and Society, the dominant idea in 
Berdyaev is man or man’s image, and in his view, any consideration of man is also a 
                                                 
659 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1938), 71. 
660 Ibid., 142. 
661 Ibid., 69. 
662 Nicolas Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom, trans., R. M. French (London: Geoffrey Bles: The 
Centenary Press, 1943), 45-46. 
 213 
consideration of God.663 Yet this should not be interpreted as implying a pantheistic 
identity, because: ‘God and man are not external to each other, not outside one another; 
neither are they identified, the one nature does not disappear in the other.’664 Thus, what 
Berdyaev presents in relation to God, man and the world is theo-pantheism rather than 
pantheism. For him, the point of contact between God and man is the divine-human nature 
of man in a Christological and metaphysical perspective.  
5.3.3 Polkinghorne’s natural theology and agency 
 
Nowadays, scientific research on nature and the cosmos means that the significance of 
natural theology is growing. As we observed above, Whitehead did not try to investigate 
nature herself scientifically, but rather he construed nature, God and the world 
metaphysically, via reason. However, Polkinghorne, who is both a scientist and a 
theologian, believes that the world of creatures and the cosmos are carved out by the 
Creator. John Leslie665 and P. C. W. Davies666 also investigate the assumption that the 
Creator’s mind is present in His creatures. Through the results of such research, we can 
analogize the Creator’s attributes from creatures. Polkinghorne terms this the new natural 
theology, which is investigated scientifically in terms of the creation of universes, 
compared with the natural theology of Thomas Aquinas and Emil Brunner. He notes that 
the new natural theology constitutes a new form or point of contact through scientific 
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Centenary Press, 1938), 202. 
664 Nicolas Berdyaev, The Beginning and the End, trans., R. M. French (London: Geoffrey Bles, 
1942), 101. 
665 Leslie looks philosophically into the structures of cosmos and man in the divine mind. (John 
Leslie, Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001], 8).  
666 Davies observes scientifically creatures in the divine mind. (P. C. W. Davies, The Mind of 
God: Science and the Search for Ultimate Meaning [Oxon: Penguin, 1993]). 
 214 
examination.667 Although he indicates the limitation of science, which cannot verify that 
God created the world and the cosmos, he asserts that science can help us to understand 
the Creator Himself, or the cosmos, through explanation of why the world is so 
understandable, intelligible, and subtle.668  For him, natural theology can offer only 
limited insight, since it rests on broad ideas about the world, which are too general to lead 
us to God Himself.669 Therefore, he proposes that the new natural theology should not 
be seen as a rival or alternative to science, but as complementary to it.670 Moreover, 
unlike the old-style natural theology which looked for proofs of God’s existence via 
reason, the new natural theology looks instead to the existence of God to help 
understanding of things in the physical world.671 Polkinghorne recognizes the difference 
between natural theology and a theology of nature, and knows the limitations of science 
and reason; hence he suggests the new natural theology, which is similar to a theology of 
nature but differs slightly from revealed theology. Thus, Polkinghorne modestly revises 
natural theology to the new natural theology which can offer a scientific explanation that 
is ‘intellectually satisfying insight rather than logical proof’, 672  and which is itself 
revised by revealed theology. 
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Let us now look at Polkinghorne’s use of agency in order to elucidate scientifically about 
God and the world under the light of the Creator’s creation. Polkinghorne uses agency to 
explain how God creates and acts in the physical world. He believes that the God of the 
gaps between God and His creatures is a theological mistake,673 so he presents agencies 
to resolve the problem. He notes that ‘our modes of agency, therefore, could be expected 
in this case to be of little analogical significance in the search for an understanding of 
divine action’.674 Even though God creates the world and universes, the divine action 
regarding creation cannot be easily caught by our reason or scientific examination.  
 
Polkinghorne presents two sorts of causality to explain the physical world in association 
with God’s interaction: top-down, and bottom up causality. He explains that bottom-up 
causality is ‘inputs of energy, described by conventional physics in terms of the behaviour 
of the parts because this involves localized interaction with constituent bits’, whereas top-
down causality is ‘a new kind, at least as far as physics is concerned – inputs of pattern 
formation (‘information’ is the technical word used for it), described in terms of the 
overall behaviour of the whole’.675 Scientists, in particular bottom-up thinkers, explain 
causality of the physical world to ‘proceed from the basement of phenomena to the 
superstructure of theory’.676 Accordingly, their method is ‘analogia entis rather than 
analogia fidei’, and they appeal to experience and reason rather than to faith and 
revelation.677 However, top-down thinkers explain causality of the physical world as 
proceeding from God’s will to concrete phenomena of divine agencies. In particular, 
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Polkinghorne notes that, ‘since our own actions are the form of agency best known to us, 
it has been natural to seek to exploit a possible analogy between human and divine 
agency’.678 In other words, the divine agency, for top-down thinkers, is a key factor in 
studying the physical world; it interacts with creatures. i.e., human beings, the physical 
world and universes, indicating God’s activity, which is active input of information from 
above and the process of accomplishing creation. Hence, divine agency is a bearer of 
divine active information within the physical world.679 Here, Polkinghorne indicates 
some problems with this idea of top-down agency. First, it is necessary to bridge the gap 
‘between the ineffable mystery of the claim presented by the idea of primary causality 
and the unacceptable reduction of the Creator to an invisible cause among competing 
creaturely causes’.680  Second, ‘if it is the unpredictabilities of physical process that 
indicate the regions where forms of holistic causality can be operating, then all such 
agency, including divine Providence, will be hidden within these cloudy domains’.681 In 
addition, ideas of divine consistency and of God’s faithfulness will lead us to expect that 
certain predictable aspects of the natural process will remain undisturbed,682 and that 
God will act in comparable ways in comparable circumstances, and yet the human 
condition is infinitely variable.683 Finally, if we accept the idea of the physical universe 
as a constantly evolving process, and if we conceive of God as knowing the world in its 
temporality, this could imply that God cannot know the future. This would not necessarily 
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be contrary to the idea that there can be no imperfection in the divine nature, since the 
future does not yet exist to be known.684 
  
Notwithstanding these difficulties, and even though the divine agency or top-down 
agency cannot be caught easily by scientific tools or human reason, Polkinghorne uses 
many kinds of agencies in order to explain God, the created physical world and the 
Creator’s creation.  
 
5.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
Contemporary natural theology differs from the old natural theology of Anselm, Aquinas, 
Barth and Brunner, which asks whether God can be recognized by reason and created 
creatures. The task of the new natural theology is focused on preserving the nature that is 
created by the Creator rather than on developing it, and hence it can be termed a theology 
of nature. Whitehead elucidates God and the world logically from the perspective of 
process philosophy. In this view God, who is the beginning and the end, has two natures: 
the primordial nature and the consequent nature. For Whitehead, while God is complete 
in the perspective of primordial nature, with regard to the consequent nature God is a 
judge. This elucidation regarding God and the world in this process is not scientific proof, 
but metaphysical examination. For this reason, Whitehead insists that proof is not a 
necessary and sufficient condition in science. According to Dembowski, natural theology 
cannot be compatible with a theology of nature, ecological theology and natural science. 
Polkinghorne too criticizes the old natural theology and Whitehead’s metaphysical 
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theology, and suggests a new natural theology that is a theology of nature. This natural 
theology is not against scientific explanation, but complements and is complemented by 
it. He believes that the physical world is made by the Creator and revealed by divine 
agency. However, there is a limit to construing the physical world by divine agency, just 
as scientific examination is limited in verifying the created world. Nevertheless, he 
suggests human agency and divine agency as the best tools to capture theological God 
and the world. Using these agencies he explains scientifically the possibility of the 
creation of God within the physical world, but he resists ‘the subordination of theology 
to science’.685 His explanation regarding new natural theology, divine agency and human 
agency is a crucial clue to elucidate how God and the physical world and man interact 












                                                 










The agency theory has been closely examined in the previous chapters, in relation to the 
profound philosophies of Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. There, the main concern was how 
the ideal world and the actual world can be scientifically linked to each other by reasoning. 
Moreover, through the agency theories of current scholars, it has been explained how 
sociological issues, ethical controversies, and human nature and desires can be 
scientifically verified without extensive prerequisites and major premises. In addition, the 
theology of Barth has been looked at. He investigated the world of human beings in depth, 
and was convinced that knowledge of faith is as important as knowledge of science. Barth 
argued that when knowledge of faith is established as prerequisite, human beings can 
understand domains of knowledge beyond their limitation. In the light of these inquiries 
and research, the agency theory can be applied to practical circumstances in order to 
connect the differing opinions between these philosophers and the theologian, Barth. 
 
Here the main question is this: What can synthesize the humanistic dimension and 
knowledge of faith as the connector of the extremes: actuality and abstract, transcendence 
and immanence, God and human beings? In other words, the main task is to establish the 
context of philosophical and theological connection within agency theology. In order to 
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solve the problem, Stephen B. Bevans’ work, Models of Contextual Theology: Faith and 
Cultures, provides important insights. In his book, Bevans presents connection as an 
important characteristic of contextual theology. He explains that if we do not want to 
forget past experiences, those experiences must be reflected and re-examined in the 
context of the present.686 More specifically, past events that have been sustained and 
maintained in tradition, and events recorded in the Bible, need to be brought back into the 
middle of ‘personal/communal experience, culture/social location and social change’ and 
their meanings readdressed.687 According to Bevans, theology can become contextual 
theology owing to factors both external and internal. External factors are historical events, 
intellectual currents, cultural shifts and political forces. 688  Internal factors are the 
incarnational nature of Christianity, the Sacramental nature of reality, understanding of 
the nature of divine revelation as being, the Catholicity of the church and Christianity; he 
also argues that trinity should be considered.689 By considering these elements in context 
and taking them as a model of connection, theology can overcome the limitation of 
metaphysical theology.  
 
Then what is theology as dynamic practical context, where text and context are 
continuously connected with each other and synthesize the issues arising from them? 
Bevans presents subjects which can bring the content raised from the contextual theology 
model into specific contexts. He notes that this content can be more elaborated in mission. 
In a later work, Constants in Context: A Theology of Mission for Today, co-written with 
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Roger P. Schroeder, Bevans presents a theology of mission alongside six models of 
contextual theology, namely the translation model, the anthropological model, the praxis 
model, the synthetic model, the transcendental model and the countercultural model.690  
More specifically, agency theology will be applied here in an attempt to answer the 
question of how mission theology can be extended beyond its limitations to solve the 
problems in its current context. I will also briefly outline a definition of agency theology 
to suggest it as a possible alternative that could overcome the limitations of mission 
theology. To achieve these aims, first of all, the paradigm in mission examined by the 
influential David Bosch will be observed and critically reviewed. Secondly, there will be 
presented a historical account of the relationship between Church and mission from the 
perspective of agency. I will conclude this chapter by suggesting the possibility of agency 
theology as an alternative idea to mission theology. 
 
6.2 Agency and David Bosch 
 
The key issue explored in this section is the paradigm shifts in mission. David J. Bosch 
asserts that these paradigm shifts have taken place over the six epochs of Christian history 
as defined by Hans Küng: ‘the apocalyptic paradigm of primitive Christianity; the 
Hellenistic paradigm of the Patristic period; the medieval Roman Catholic paradigm; the 
Protestant (Reformation) paradigm; the modern Enlightenment paradigm; the emerging 
Ecumenical paradigm’.691  
                                                 
690 Ibid. 37, 54, 70, 88, 103, 117. Stephen B. Bevans & Roger P. Schroeder, Constants in Context: 
A Theology of Mission for Today (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2004), 83-92, 110-111, 174-183, 209-221, 221-
228, 264-265.    
691 David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission, American 
Society of Missiology Series, No. 16 (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1991), 181-182. 
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On this basis, Bosch develops his own argument of the Christian history of paradigm 
shifts in mission. In what follows, I will investigate whether his argument is appropriate 
to explain these paradigm shifts. 
 
6.2.1 The issues of paradigm shift and David Bosch 
 
First of all, Bosch carefully employs Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory692 within the 
frame of theology. Although Kuhn had limited his theory to the natural sciences,693 and 
had excluded social science, Bosch nevertheless believes that it provides a beneficial tool 
to understand and explain the division of epochs in terms of theology and mission 
theology. He presents the paradigm shifts in the process of mission history as follows: 
‘the Missionary Paradigm of the Eastern Church; the medieval Roman Catholic 
Missionary Paradigm; the Missionary Paradigm of the Protestant Reformation; mission 
in the Wake of the Enlightenment; the emergence of a Post-modern Paradigm; the 
Emergence of an Ecumenical Missionary Paradigm’.694 
Bosch insists that the paradigm shifts of natural science are considerably different to those 
of theology, on the basis of Küng’s interpretation of Kuhn’s paradigm theory. 695 
Generally speaking, in the natural sciences the new paradigm clearly substitutes the old 
one. For instance, Bosch suggests that the Newtonian scientific revolution meant that the 
cosmos would no longer be understood in terms of Ptolemaean and Copernican 
                                                 
692  Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Third Edition (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago, 1996), 66-76. 
693 David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission, 184. 
694 Ibid., 187-188. 
695 Ibid., 185-186. See also, Hans Küng, Theologie im Aufbruch: Eine ökumenische Grundlegung 
(Munich: Piper Verlag, 1987), 157.  
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categories.696 However, in theology, the old paradigm continues to exist alongside the 
new one.697 Hence, on the basis of Küng’s argument, Bosch insists that ‘the Hellenistic 
paradigm of the Patristic period still lives on in the spirit of the Orthodox churches, the 
medieval Roman Catholic paradigm in contemporary Roman Catholic traditionalism, and 
the Protestant Reformation paradigm in twentieth-century Protestant Confessionalism, 
and the Enlightenment paradigm in liberal theology’. 698  According to Bosch’s 
observation, paradigm shift does not occur suddenly, but progresses gradually as the old 
paradigm overlaps the new one and guides it to a new epoch.699  
Here, the question is whether the application of Kuhn’s paradigm to theology is 
sufficiently justified. According to Kuhn, in natural science there would be a complete 
change of paradigm because an unverified hypothesis can be destroyed by new 
experiment or verification, and an old hypothesis is no longer useful.700 However, in the 
case of social science, there remains a common denominator of life, culture and religious 
belief in each of the six epochs. We therefore need to ask whether it is possible that 
various thoughts and diverse culture can be standardized into one paradigm to represent 
the spirit of a particular time. To categorize the paradigm of an era in that way is to ignore 
the actual social relationship, culture and structure of the phenomenology of the spirit. 
Therefore, the argument that each period displays one uniform paradigm needs to be 
reconsidered, to see whether the contents of the six epochs can be overlapped. In addition, 
Küng and Bosch note that the features of all the paradigms could fall into one period. In 
                                                 
696 David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission, 186. 
697 Ibid. 
698 Ibid. 
699 Ibid., 184. 
700 Ibid. 
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order to overcome this phenomenon, they set some premises whereby the paradigm is 
applied differently for theology than for natural science.  
 
Of course, if a paradigm is allocated and characterized for each period, the thoughts that 
were prevalent in each epoch can be summarized into a simple structure, making it easier 
to understand the complicated ideas existing in a particular generation. However, such 
generalization and standardization could lead the paradigm to seem oppressive, because 
particular situations and minority cultures would be overlooked. Therefore, we must 
overcome this uniformity in order to use the paradigm structure. As an alternative idea, 
Bosch and Küng argue that the paradigm of theology would overlap in each period.701 
The two scholars apply the paradigm differently from the way Kuhn adopted. If we accept 
their arguments, would this resolve the problem? To answer this question, we need to ask 
whether their subdivision of eras is correct. For instance, both Bosch and Küng state that 
the current era is characterized by the emergence of an ecumenical (missionary) 
paradigm. However, there are many different opinions on and interpretations of 
ecumenism in the modern history of mission. Evangelists and Church-centred scholars 
see mission as expansion or growth of the Church and as support for a ‘Church-centred 
ecumenical movement’. Others regard the Church as a mere tool for mission, and consider 
that mission is God’s work; this stance supports the idea of ‘mission ecumenism’. A third 
position maintains a ‘secular ecumenism’ that eliminates the barrier between the Church 
and the world because mission does not occur only under the influence of the Church. 
Finally, the perspective of ‘ecumenism of religious pluralism’ considers religious struggle 
and conflict and holds that the Church should destroy the walls between different religions 
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and unify them as a whole. These different positions have raised strong controversies over 
the subject of ecumenism for the past forty to fifty years. The question is whether these 
different opinions and interpretations must be standardized into one single language of 
‘ecumenical mission’ that can represent the paradigm of the modern time or whether a 
plural world does not ask for differentiate views on mission..  
 
 




Bosch specified ecumenical mission as a new paradigm in modern mission. As pointed 
out above, Bosch’s paradigm based on mission history was easy to understand because it 
clearly categorized the characteristics of each time period. However, his simplification of 
the various contexts of each period meant that minor elements could be missed out. 
Considering the issues raised by mission history, and discussion in the WCC and 
meetings, Bosch presents 13 elements of an ecumenical mission paradigm which is 
currently progressing and will continue to progress.702 In the last chapter of his book 
Transforming Mission, he asks, ‘Whither Mission?’, and concludes that the barriers to 
mission are Western imperialism, mission moratorium and mission as the selfish war.703 
                                                 
702  Ibid., 368-510. 1. ‘Mission as the Church-With-Others’, 2. ‘Mission as Missio Dei’, 3. 
‘Mission as Mediating Salvation’, 4. ‘Mission as the Quest for Justice’, 5. ‘Mission as Evangelism’, 6. 
‘Mission Contextualization’, 7. ‘Mission as Liberation’, 8. ‘Mission as Inculturation’, 9. ‘Mission as 
Common Witness’, 10. ‘Mission as Ministry by the Whole People of God’, 11. ‘Mission as Witness to 
People of Other Living Faiths’, 12. ‘Mission as Theology’, 13. ‘Mission as Action in Hope’. See various 
scholars’ points of view about these 13 articles in Readings in World Mission, ed. Norman Thomas 
(London: SPCK, 1995), 81-321. 
703 David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission, 518-519. 
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In fact, mission moratorium is thought to have been the impetus for Bosch to establish 
the contents of the new paradigm in mission.704 He considers the mission moratorium 
suggested by Gatu at the 1973 Bangkok conference from three positions. The first 
position supports Gatu’s argument. Here, Western mission is regarded as closely related 
to colonialism, a point particularly relevant to African mission. 705  Therefore it is 
necessary that mission moratorium should encourage younger churches to be independent 
from Western missionaries and to have more autonomy.706 The second position holds 
that the idea of moratorium is unrealistic and an unfair judgment on missionaries who 
were never involved in colonialist mission. According to this position, moratorium is an 
anti-Christian perspective which intends to disturb mission. 707  In particular, those 
arguing from an evangelical approach criticize the idea of moratorium as a short-sighted 
perspective that is both unfair and irresponsible with regard to three billion non-
Christians.708 The third position argues that the terminology of moratorium cannot be 
applied to every mission field.  Thus moratorium does not mean the end of all mission, 
                                                 
704 Bosch mentioned mission moratorium several times in the missiological books he edited. See 
D. J. Bosch & T. D. Verryn, Missiology and Science of Religion (B. Th.): MSR 301(Pretoria: University of 
South Africa Press, 1978), 129-153; D. J. Bosch, Science of Mission and Science of Religion: MSR 
101(Basic module of Science of Mission) (Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 1975), 157-161. 
705 D. J. Bosch & T. D. Verryn, Missiology and Science of Religion, 129. See Werner Ustorf, 
‘Missionswissenschaft’, in Ö kumenische Theologie Missionswissenschaft, ed. Georg Strecker, Grundkurs 
Theologie, Band 10,2 (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1994), 127. 
706 Ogbu U. Kalu, ‘Not Just New Relationships but a Renewed Body’, International Review of 
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‘Why Lausanne?’ In Let the Earth Hear His Voice: International Congress on World Evangelization 
Lausanne, Switzerland (Minneapolis: World Wide Publications, 1975), 33. In the opening convocation at 
the Lausanne Conference, Billy Graham insisted that ‘we should reject the idea of a moratorium on sending 
missionaries’. See also Harvey Perkins, Harry Daniel & Asal Simandjuntak, ‘Let My People Go’, in 
Mission Trends No.3: Third World Theologies, eds. Gerald H. Anderson & Thomas F. Stransky (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1976), 192. The CCA (the Christian Conference of Asia) ‘has not adopted the position’ of 
the AACC (the All Africa Conference of Churches) ‘in favor of a moratorium’. 
708 See Donald A. McGavran, ‘The Dimensions of World Evangelization’, in Let the Earth Hear 
His Voice: International Congress on World Evangelization Lausanne, Switzerland (Minneapolis: World 
Wide Publications, 1975), 111. 
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but only of bad mission: ‘Moratorium is intended to advance mission and is not aimed 
against it; what it does not call for is another definition of mission.’709 Bosch notes that: 
‘In moratorium at its deepest the issue is the cry “Listen to us!” It is the yearning for an 
entirely new relationship between older and younger churches.’710  
In fact, moratorium as suggested by the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) is a 
criticism by the African nations against those Western missionaries who compromised 
with colonialism and imperialism. It is an argument about how the means of control have 
shifted from swords and guns to capital, organizations, personnel and resources.  
 
As examined in the Introduction, historically Western mission was progressed alongside 
imperialism and colonialism. Specific evidence can be found in England’s 300 years of 
mission history. Jeff Cox points out that English mission organizations such as CMS, 
SPCK and SPG once possessed slave farms or were linked to the slave trade in the name 
of fund raising for missions. Moreover, missionaries from major mission organizations 
had connections with slave merchants.711 Consequently, mission was seen as overlapping 
with imperialism and perceived as a tool for expanding the system. For the same reason, 
Stephen Neill argues that colonialism and Christian mission are closely related, that 
missionaries are ‘the tools of governments and that missions can be classed as one of the 
instruments of western infiltration and control’.712 Taking one example, Neil refers to 
the writing of Mr K. N. Panikkar, who criticized mission from an Indian perspective: 
‘First the missionaries; then the traders; then the gunboats.’713 As examined by Werner 
                                                 
709 D. J. Bosch & T. D. Verryn, Missiology and Science of Religion, 130. 
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Ustorf, a well-known scholar of African mission, if mission is related to exploitation by 
imperialism, if it intends to destroy aboriginal communities and lives by planting Western 
culture, there may be doubt as to whether it should continue. According to Ustorf, that 
kind of mission is an ideology that is related to capital.714 He points out that following 
the Bangkok Conference of 1972/3, the mission moratorium declared by Gatu became an 
official slogan among third world actors, articulating the view that Western missionaries, 
mission resources and money should not manipulate African Christianity.715 Similarly, 
Carl E. Braaten acknowledges that the identity of mission in the modern world is in crisis. 
In Africa, Asia and Latin America, there is an outpouring of opinion that Western mission 
should be stopped. Sometimes the mission of the Western Church is even seen as an 
enemy distorting the gospel.716 Braaten points out that debates about this colonialist 
mission have caused hatred between the evangelical and ecumenical camps. There is a 
huge gap between the two positions, and neither can accept the other. Consequently, the 
identity of mission has collapsed. 
 
Indeed, after examining the many problems arising due to colonialist mission, it is 
necessary to ask, ‘What is the true meaning of mission and missiology?’717 Ustorf argues 
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that the term ‘mission’ is neither Hebrew nor Greek. Strictly speaking, it is not a biblical 
word.718 Even worse, the same term was used by Hitler to express his Weltanschauung 
and to practice his political scheme.719 According to Ustorf, ‘Hitler’s missiology was 
symbolically efficient.’720 Furthermore, that missiology was ‘the reflected response of a 
missionary of a post-Christian and violent political religion to a situation of great 
tension’.721  
 
Thus mission became stigmatized, it became the major theoretical frame for Hitler to 
practice his scheme, and lost its authenticity. Yet in spite of the problems, mission cannot 
simply be dismissed, due to the value of its key content and the identity of Christianity 
within it. Then, is there any other frame or terminology different from mission that would 
allow us to practice its genuine content and identity? Must we stubbornly continue to use 
the term ‘mission’? Jesus told us to put new wine into new wineskins. Is it time for 
theologians to prepare a new wineskin, a new paradigm that can bring out perfect 
reflection and regeneration of mission? 
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Another factor prompting consideration of these questions is that today, incorrect practice 
in mission becomes known immediately; criticism and bans are activated without delay. 
The situation whereby information on the mission field was shared only after a generation 
had passed by is now long gone. Because of the development of technology and mobile 
networks, nations are interconnected like a spider’s web; the world resembles one huge 
global village. Sebastian Kim and Kirsteen Kim explain various types of globalization, 
namely religious, economic, political, and cultural globalization, 722  ideas originally 
inspired by Roland Robertson. 723  Supporting these ideas, Peter Berger and Samul 
Huntington entitled their own book Many Globalizations.724 Considering contemporary 
world Christianity 725  as one form of globalization, Kim and Kim perceive world 
Christianity as an agent of globalization. They argue that communion, the Bible, 
spirituality and mission are world Christianity and global meeting points. 726  They 
believe that globalization and mission need to have koinonia with evangelical and 
ecumenical Christianity and the Catholic Church, with ecumenism as the starting point. 
By doing so, mission can begin the necessary advance toward global mission. In a similar 
vein, Ogbu U. Kalu explains that ‘globalization may be imaged as an external force or 
change agent that has elicited a variety of local responses and thereby created a dynamic 
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cultural force that has reshaped both Christianity and its mandate to mission’.727 As the 
world is globalized, it is inevitable that local cultures, ethnic groups, life styles and 
mission are influenced by it. Anthony Giddens makes the point that ‘Globalisation is 
restructuring the ways in which we live, and in a very profound manner. … Globalisation 
also influences everyday life as much as it does events happening on a world scale.’728 
This is because globalization appears widely in political, technological, cultural, and 
economic phenomena. 729  According to Giddens, however, ‘It is wrong to think of 
globalisation as just concerning the big systems, like the world financial order. 
Globalisation isn’t only about what is “out there”, remote and far away from the 
individual. It is an “in here” phenomenon too.’730 Moreover, globalization is not a single 
process, but a complex set of processes. In these complex processes, globalization creates 
views that may be pessimistic or optimistic, because there are both winners and losers.731  
 
We should not overlook the fact that colonial types of the past imperial period may 
reappear in the modern globalized world wearing political, economic, or religious masks. 
The term ‘mission’ is known to be associated with colonialism and imperialism. Thus we 
                                                 
727 Ogbu U. Kalu, ‘Globalization and Mission in the Twenty-first Century’, in Mission after 
Christendom: Emergent Themes in Contemporary Mission (Louisville: WJK Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2010), 42. Kalu explains ‘different genres of history of globalization’ as follows: ‘(1) the archaic 
globalization of the fifteenth century, symbolized by the Iberian voyages of discovery; (2) the 
protoglobalization that followed the intensified commercial rivalry and mercantilist theory of the eighteenth 
century; (3) the modern globalization of the nineteenth century, with its imperial instrumentalization of 
power; and (4) the postcolonial globalization after the World Wars’ (Ibid., 25).  
728 Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping our Lives (London: 
Profile Books, 2002), 4. 
729 Ibid. 10.  
730 Ibid. 12. 
731 Ibid., 15. Giddens explains that ‘A pessimistic view of globalisation would consider it largely 
an affair of the industrial North, in which the developing societies of the South play little or no active part. 
It would see it as destroying local cultures, widening world inequalities and worsening the lot of the 
impoverished. Globalisation, some argue, creates a world of winners and losers, a few on the fast track to 
prosperity, the majority condemned to a life of misery and despair.’ He adds, ‘Rather than a global village, 
one might say, this is more like global pillage’(Ibid., 16). 
 232 
have a problem to solve: how can mission overcome the stigma, deliver Christ-centred 
identity into the world and practice genuine gospel in specific contexts? 
 
Given these problems in definition, and the stigma and prejudice that surround the idea 
of mission, it is questionable whether the term ‘mission’ can still properly transfer the 
meaning of ‘shift’ or ‘transformation’. Therefore, I argue that in order to provide a new 
direction for mission, it would be helpful to replace or at least complement mission 
theology with agency theology. 
 
 
6.3 Agency in the Relationship between Mission and Church 
 
In this section, the relationship between the Church and mission is investigated from the 
perspective of agency. First, we explore the question of who is the agency in the Christian 
mission. Secondly, we focus specifically on the problems surrounding the Church-centric 
mission theology and the mission-centric Church. Finally, moving away from the 
relationship between the Church and mission, we investigate the emerging secular 
ecumenical mission theology, which believes in the rigorous application of theology in 
the world. 
 
6.3.1 The ‘agency’ in the Christian mission 
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Who the agency is and who has carried out God’s work in the history of the Christian 
mission are interesting questions. First of all, agency was revealed through the Old 
Testament in the form of Israelites, prophets, ordinary people such as farmers, shepherds, 
merchants, and even ‘all nations outside of Israel’ 732 , In the New Testament, the 
incarnation of the Logos progressed and changed into the secularity of the Word. Theories 
such as incarnation, kenosis and world-orientation appeared as a connection between the 
sacred and the secular. This raises the question of how such theories have been embodied 
in our world, and one possible answer is provided by agency. The concept of agency has 
expanded to embrace the culture and context of Christians’ lives. 
After its early success in performing Christian mission, many scholars regarded the 
Church as God’s agent, the body of Christ as the incarnated tool of the divine Logos. The 
Church as a sacred organ or organization had carried out her mission over a long period, 
and had rapidly expanded throughout the world since the approval of Christianity as the 
religion of the Rome Empire by the Emperors Constantine to Theodosius and Justinian. 
From Cyprian onwards to the medieval period, the Church was considered as the sole 
agency of God, so that there was no other salvation outside the Church. According to J. 
Ratzinger, ‘Kirchen bleiben und doch eine Kirche werden’; being churches, but aiming 
to become one single church,733 he suggests that the Churches in their numbers should 
be centred on one faith. In the name of God's agent, the Church (or the Churches in their 
respective regions) had control over many areas of societies and cultures. Subsequently, 
however, many problems arose. Some people suspected the authenticity of their Church, 
which had taken the initiative in performing mission and carrying out God's will, and they 
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argued that their Church was not the only agent of God. As a result, some people not only 
looked for Jesus Christ outside their Church, but also rejected the Christ who seemed to 
be a construct of the various, not seldom conflicting Churches. If this agency had carried 
out God’s will more fairly and more humbly, the Church would probably have sustained 
her position for a long time. In post-ecclesiastical circumstances, God’s agency can mean 
mission boards, good Samaritans instead of Israelites, and even culture and arts created 
by human beings. 
When we look at the various opinions of scholars on the agency in Christian mission, we 
find many evangelical scholars who consider the Church as the only institution for 
undertaking God’s work. Most of the Catholic scholars, D. McGavran 734  and his 
followers, and even those scholars who are labelled evangelists conform to this viewpoint. 
Evangelical ecumenists such as Johanes Blauw, Stephen Neill, Orlando E. Costas and 
David Bosch have also claimed that the nature of the Church is mission and the Church 
is absolutely vital in mission, whereas J.C. Hoekendijk and J.E. Lesslie Newbigin urged 
that the agency of mission is laities and congregations, and emphasized their 
indispensability in mission. For instance, according to J.C. Hoekendijk, ‘a layman is a 
representative of God’s mission people’, but ‘a clericalized layman is unsuited for the 
apostolate’. 735  Of course, Hocking also emphasized that laymen play a key role in 
mission. Similarly, L. Newbigin noted that ‘the only answer, the only hermeneutic of the 
gospel, is a congregation of men and women who believe it and live by it’, but ‘the Church 
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is not so much the agent of the mission as the locus of the mission’.736 According to Barth, 
we may think of the agency that accomplished God’s work as theologians, culture and 
arts and books. 
Undoubtedly, the extension of the concept of agency in mission opens more fully the 
possibility of showing the right path and task of Christian mission.  
 
6.3.2 Emergence of God’s mission from the conflict with 
Church-centred mission 
 
In the history of mission, the statement ‘mission is Church’ implies that mission is 
regulated by the Church and exists for the Church. This is the opinion of Gisbertus 
Voetius (1589-1676) explanation of the content of mission as ‘‘Church planting or 
planting of churches’,737 mission as an expansion of the Church. Their core aim is to 
draw people who have not been redeemed into the Church, convert them into Christians 
and lead them to redemption.  
Opposing the Uppsala Conference definition of mission as ‘humanization’, Donald 
McGavran argued that it is an incorrect exaggeration to regard mission as everything that 
the Church needs to do and everything that God wants the Church to do.738 In addition, 
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according to McGavran, perceiving evangelism as a way of changing social structures 
can be nonsense, and does not accord with the principles of the Bible. For him, the most 
important and urgent task is mission, and the most important priority for world 
evangelization is preaching the gospel. Through evangelization, churches should be 
planted and grow continuously.739 
Therefore, churches stand firmly as the only agent that practices God’s will. The Church, 
as Christ’s body, judges right and wrong in the world on behalf of God. However, this 
standpoint risks forgetting the status and mission of the Church as agency, and making it 
instead the main part or subject in mission. 
In response to the Church-centric tendency, which holds the position that the Church is 
God’s only agent and determines everything, the notion of God’s mission has emerged. 
This became a core issue at the 1952 Willingen Conference of the International 
Missionary Council (IMC), where Church-centred evangelism came under criticism and 
it was argued that the subject of mission is not the Church, but the Holy Trinity. 
Here, I will begin by investigating whence the concept of God’s Mission originates, and 
the meaning of it. Then, I will study further the theological background that introduced 
the theme of God’s mission at the Willingen Conference.  
 
First of all, how and why is the term, Missio Dei used? In general, it is supposed that the 
terminology originates from Georg F. Vicedom’s book Missio Dei. He stated that the 
                                                 
and the dominant concern of missionary congregation must therefore be to point to the humanity in Christ 
as the goal of mission.”) 
739 Donald A. McGavran, Understanding Church Growth, Third ed. (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), 286-287. Here, McGavran insists that dynamic mission begins from 
well-organized church planting. 
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Church is only a tool of God, and the result of God’s actions of sending His son and 
salvation.740 Furthermore, he explained that the notion of Missio Dei, God’s mission, was 
adopted as the core issue of the 1952 Willingen conference of the IMC in order to clarify 
the concept of mission.741  However, David Bosch insists that the idea of Missio Dei was 
first presented by Karl Barth at the Brandenburg Missionary Conference in 1932, and that 
Karl Hartenstein also used similar terminology. 742  In addition, Bosch indicates that 
Barth’s argument strongly influenced the new declaration of Missio Dei at the Willingen 
Conference.743 
  
Even though Gisbertus Voetius makes the foundation of God’s mission secure, insisting 
that God is the first cause of mission, his thought is still limited within the Church-centric 
tradition. Therefore, Bosch considers Karl Barth as one of the first theologians to initiate 
the new paradigm of God’s mission. However, a similar concept can be found in Karl 
Graul.744 A century before the Willingen Conference, Graul wrote that mission is not ‘the 
apostolic road from Church to Church, but the Triune God moving into the world’.745 In 
fact, the notion of God’s mission is a necessary conclusion that is compatible with the 
                                                 
740 Georg F. Vicedom, Missio Dei: Einführung in eine Theologie der Mission (München: Chr. 
Kaiser Verlag, 1958), 12. In German, “Auch die Kirche ist nur ein Instrument in Gottes Hand. Sie selbst ist 
das Ergebnis der Tätigkeit des sendenden und rettenden Gottes.”  
741 Ibid.  
742 David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission, 389-390. 
Hartenstein insists that “Die Mission ist nicht nur Gehorsam gegen ein Wort des Herrn, sie ist nicht nur 
Verpflichtung zur Sammlung der Gemeinde, sie ist nicht Anteilnahme an der Sendung des Sohnes, der 
Missio Dei, mit dem umfassenden Ziel der Aufrichtung der Christusherrschaft über die ganze erlöste 
Schöpfung.” (Georg Vicedom, Missio Dei, 12). 
743 Ibid., 390.  
744  Karl Graul is one of the founders of the Leipzig, Neuendettelsau and Hermannsburg 
Missionary Societies (cf. J.C. Hoekendijk, Kerk en Volk in de Duitse Zendingswetenschap [n.d. (1948)], 
62-75).   
745 David J. Bosch, Witness to the World: The Christian Mission in Theological Perspective 
(London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1980), 240.  
 238 
Bible: God becomes a missionary for Himself and He is the Incarnation on earth. God 
sends out His agents to fulfil His will in the world. 
 
Secondly, it is necessary to consider why Missio Dei was raised as a significant issue at 
the Willingen Conference. The reason was the conflicts between Church and mission. 
Bosch may be correct when he indicates that ‘for understanding of the shifts in Protestant 
thinking regarding the relationship between Church and mission, the contributions and 
articles of the World Missionary Conferences are of primary importance’. 746  More 
precisely, the main issue of the Edinburgh Conference (1910) was the absence of 
missionary zeal in Western churches. Thus the purpose of the Conference was to motivate 
and equip Western churches for mission. According to Rodger Bassham: ‘Edinburgh saw 
that mission is the task of the whole church.’747 The Tambam, Madras Conference in 
1938 also emphasized the role of churches for mission, setting up the Church as God’s 
agent for mission and stressing the witness-bearing character of the Church.748 Yet while 
Bosch and Bassham estimate the relationship between Church and mission as positive, E. 
Stanley Jones, V. Chakkarai and J.C. Hoekendijk criticize the central position of the 
Church for mission.749 The Whitby Conference in 1947 presented partnership between 
the older churches and the younger churches. The prevailing view, as expressed by 
Feliciano V. Carino, was that: ‘Churches as the bearers of the missionary obligation are 
                                                 
746 David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission, 369. 
747 Rodger C. Bassham, Mission Theology: 1948-1975. Years of Worldwide Creative Tension 
Ecumenical, Evangelical, and Roman Catholic (California: William Carey Library, 1979), 17. Bassham 
indicates that the Edinburgh Conference was a meeting of “the 1200 delegates (all Western with the 
exception of 17 Asian Christian) from 159 missionary societies” (Ibid., 15). 
748 Ibid., 23. 
749 Evert Jansen Schoonhoven, “Tambaram 1938”, International Review of Mission, Vol. LXVII, 
No. 267, July, 1978, 302-303. 
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in a missionary situation wherever they are.’750 According to this view, the Church as 
agent of God takes a strong position in the field of mission.  
These trends of IMC conferences led to the notion of Missio Dei at the Willingen 
Conference of 1952. In other words, God’s mission emerged from the search for a ground 
to overcome the problem of conflict between Church-centred mission and mission 
societies-centred mission. 
According to Vicedom, the core statements of Missio Dei are first, that mission is God’s 
work;751 second, that mission is done by God, so God sends His Son and furthermore the 
Father God and the Son Jesus Christ send the Holy Spirit to the world,752 and third, that 
mission is God’s action and dispatch for salvation by proclaiming gospel of salvation.753 
God’s mission acknowledges that mission is an activity that belongs to God and that He 
initiates mission. The mission activity in which we participate as one body is originated 
from the God of the Holy Trinity. Therefore, use of expressions such as Church’s mission 
or our mission should be minimized. The prime mystery of mission is that God sent His 
Son and the Father and the Son sent the Holy Spirit. That is how mission revives and 
grows. The Willingen Conference represents a great transformation from the mission of 
previous periods. The emergence of a new theological evangelism paradigm, God’s 
mission, is an epoch-making event. However, mission activities originated from this 
transformation are diverse, and so too are the evaluations of those activities. 
 
                                                 
750  Feliciano V. Carino, “Partnership in Obedience”, International Review of Mission, Vol. 
LXVII, No. 267, July, 1978, 326. 
751 Georg F. Vicedom, Missio Dei, 12. 
752 Ibid., 13-14. 
753 Ibid., 15-16. 
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6.3.3 Agents in trends of Missio Dei 
 
This section examines further the theological trends in God’s mission. These can be 
divided into three main groups. The first believes that ‘the nature of the Church is 
mission’, the second considers that ‘Church is mission’ and the third group excludes the 
Church’s role in mission. The first group includes in particular those who hold evangelical 
ecumenical perspectives, such as Johannes Blauw754, Charles Van Engen755, Thomas F. 
Torrance, David J. Bosch, Orlando E. Costas756, Gerald H. Anderson757, and Stephen 
Neill758. Scholars who perceive the Church as mission hold an ecumenical stance, and 
include Lesslie Newbigin, J.C. Hoekendijk and Georg F. Vicedom. They maintain that 
all work of the Church should be regulated and determined by mission. The third group 
includes secular and religious ecumenicalists, who tend to see mission and world as one; 
in this view the Church may be included or excluded as non-essential. Representative 
scholars of this group include Richard Schaull, Ludwig Rütti, and M.M. Thomas. The 
following sections will examine each of these three trends in turn. 
6.3.3.1 Agent in ‘the nature of the Church is mission’ 
 
                                                 
754 Johannes Blauw, The Missionary Nature of the Church: A Survey of the Biblical Theology of 
Mission (London: Lutterworth Press, 1962), 119-126.  
755 Charles Van Engen, “The Impact of Modern Ecclesiology on the Local Church”, in New 
Direction in Mission & Evangelization 2: Theological Foundations, eds., James A Scherer & Stephen B. 
Bevans (Maryknoll: Oribis Book, 1994), 55-63. & Engen, “The relation of Bible and Mission in Mission 
Theology, in The Good News of the Kingdom: Mission Theology for the Third Millennium, eds., Charles 
Van Engen, Dean S. Gilliland & Paul Pierson (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1993), 27-36. 
756 Orlando E. Costas, The Church and Its Mission: A Shattering Critique from the Third World 
(Wheaton: Tyndale House Publishers, 1974), 153-174. 
757  Gerald H. Anderson, “Introduction: The Theology of Mission among Protestants in the 
Twenties Century”, in The Theology of the Christian Mission, ed., Gerald H. Anderson (London: SCM 
Press, 1961), 3-16. 
758 Stephen Neill, A History of Christian Missions, second ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 
380-413. & Neill, The Church and Christian Union: The Bampton Lectures for 1964 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), 14- 70. & Neill, Creative Tension: The Duff Lectures, 1958 (London: Edinburgh 
House Press, 1959), 81-112. 
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There are distinct theological differences between the statements: ‘mission is the nature 
of the Church’ and ‘the nature of the Church is mission’. In other words, mission is 
determined according to the meaning of ‘the nature of the church’.  
 
 
This standpoint is shared by most evangelical ecumenicalists. Of course, scholars with a 
Church-centred viewpoint maintain that mission is the Church. This means that mission 
is regulated by and plays an important function in the Church. Therefore, there exist huge 
analytical differences between the stance of Church-centric scholars and ecumenical 
evangelical scholars. 
 
According to Bosch, the notion of mission-centric Church started with scholars such as 
A.A. van Ruler, Hendric Kramer, J.C. Hoekendijk, and E. Jansen Schoonhoven.759 They 
regard mission as the apostolate that is ‘an essential characteristic of the Church’.760 
Scherer indicates that the representatives of the Whitby Conference ‘felt obliged to renew 
the call and vision of a universal mission as the supernational task of all churches’.761 
Likewise, the reason why the apostolate was considered as a fundamental feature of the 
Church is that mission approaches the world with universalistic characteristics rather than 
particularism. In other words, in the Missio Dei, God’s mission, the Church is sent by 
God as an apostle and the Church is the agency of God. The Church as the people of God 
needs to have the apostolate as agent. However, depending on how this apostolate is 
understood and applied, agency shows completely different features. Emil Brunner 
                                                 
759 David J. Bosch, Witness to the World, 176. 
760 Ibid. 
761 James A. Scherer, Gospel, Church, & Kingdom: Comparative Studies in World Mission 
Theology (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1987), 94. 
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illustrates three reasons why Church (the people of God) needs to understand the 
apostolate. First, the apostolate is endowed with authority. Apostles are ambassadors of 
Jesus, and they are not rulers but servants in the world (Philippians 2: 7, 8).762  
Secondly, Brunner shows that in Paul’s writing about various spiritual gifts, the term 
‘government’ is used to indicate ‘the gift of apostles’. The term refers not to any kind of 
authority in hierarchical structure, but to the apostolate, as the Lord establishes His reign 
by humbling Himself.763  
 
Finally, Brunner explains about the apostles of the first Jerusalem Church, described in 
Acts (Acts 15: 6-21). The apostles did not solve problems using their primary status. 
Rather, they ‘submitted to the sway of truth’. In other words, ‘the privilege of priority 
linked to this place vanishes completely’.764 Church as God’s people and agency should 
understand the apostolate of Church properly, so that it can perform the role of God’s 
mission humbly. Thus Thomas F. Torrence considers that Jesus Christ is an apostle sent 
by God in order to carry out the mission of God’s love in the world. Jesus Christ has 
demonstrated His body, His image and His Word to the world.765 God’s people (the 
Church) are identified with God’s agent. Thus Torrence is convinced that the mission of 
the apostolic Church refers to the personal work of Jesus Christ Himself in the place called 
‘the Church’.766 The Church as agent and God’s people and Christ are united as one body 
                                                 
762 Emil Brunner, The Misunderstanding of the Church, trans. Harold Knight, (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1951), 32. 
763 Ibid., 33. 
764 Ibid. 
765 Thomas F. Torrence, “The Mission of the Church”, Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol.19. 
1966(2), 130.  
766 Ibid., 131. 
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by the power of the Holy Spirit.767 Based on the unity of the apostolate, he argues that 
mission is the nature of the Church.768 Thus, we can analogize that mission occurs in the 
place where the intention of the sender and the one who was sent encounter one another. 
We call this God’s mission. The apostolic agent is considered as mediator who 
demonstrates the nature of the Church. The one who was sent is mediator who unites with 
God and the world. If the agent moves independently of the sender (God), this shows that 
the apostolate is not seen in the nature of the Church and is not the nature of the Church. 
Therefore, Newbigin also insists that ‘a Church which has ceased to be a mission has lost 
the essential character of a Church, so we must also say that a mission which is not truly 
a church is not a true expression of the divine apostolate’.769 
  
This researcher argues that all characteristics of the Church, God’s agent, need to be 
characterized by the apostolic mission and the practice of God’s will, the sender, in the 
world. Edward R. Dayton and David A. Fraser stated that the Church is sent by God in 
order to bring God’s kingdom on earth, and the Church is a co-worker with God.770 This 
means that the Church sent by God is God’s agent and has active and passive will for the 
fulfilment of God’s will on earth. Therefore, as argued by Dayton and Fraser, it is 
necessary to investigate God’s mission in order to explain and determine the nature of the 
Church, God’s agent.771 The mission of the Church is regarded as participation in God’s 
work of grace and redemption on earth. Dayton’s point shows that the mission of Church, 
                                                 
767 Ibid., 134. 
768 Ibid., 141. 
769 Lesslie Newbigin, The Household of God: Lectures on the Nature of the Church (Great 
Britain: SCM Press, 1953), 169. 
770 Edward R. Dayton and David A. Fraser, “Mission and the Church”, in: Perspectives on the 
World Christian Movement, A Reader, ed. Ralph D. Winter and Steven C. Hawthorne (California: William 
Carey Library, 1981), 555.    
771 Ibid., 556. 
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God’s agent, originates from the Creator, the Holy Trinity. God’s agent (Church) plays a 
very significant role in God’s mission.772  
This argument encourages those who undermine Church dogmatics and deny the function 
of mission in the Church to recognize the statement: ‘the nature of the Church is mission’. 
However, the statement ‘mission is the nature of the Church’ conveys a somewhat 
different meaning. As well as oneness between Church and mission, it also means that 
mission should be determined by the nature of the Church. This viewpoint places more 
emphasis on the Church and regards mission as of secondary importance. As a result, the 
Church becomes a single agent, which dominates mission. If the Church dominates 
beyond its boundary, the will of God (delivering and loving the world) will be undermined 
and shame will be brought upon His name. This has happened frequently in the history 
of Christianity. Therefore a new argument, ‘Church is mission’, has appeared in order to 
clarify the status of the Church in mission. The next section presents the alternative 
argument in detail. 
6.3.3.2 Agent in ‘Church is mission’ 
This section focuses on the argument of Newbigin and Hoekendijk, who strongly support 
the statement ‘Church is mission’. In doing so, it addresses the question, ‘what is an 
agent?’  
First of all, the statement ‘Church is mission’ conveys different meanings depending on 
different interpretations. Those who attempt to identify Church with mission match the 
subject and the predicate in the two statements: ‘mission is Church’ and ‘Church is 
                                                 
772 Ibid. 
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mission’. However, from the perspective of God’s mission, this interpretation risks 
identifying the agent with God Himself. Of course there is an exception: In the mission 
of God, the Holy Trinity, He became agent Himself and incarnated as mediator between 
humanity and the world through the word of revelation. 
However, identifying the one who is sent by God with the sender, God, may lead to 
Feuerbach’s conclusion that: The essence of human being is religion and the essence is 
projected to God.773 If the statement ‘Church is mission’ leads to the statement ‘Church 
and mission are one’, it causes a logical error. Advanced interpretation can be found in 
Edmund Clowney, who explained that in the 1960s, because the WCC developed the 
theology of the servant, the Church strongly believed that ‘Church does not have mission’ 
but rather that ‘Church itself is mission’, meaning that the Church exists only for 
mission.774  
 
What is the true meaning of ‘Church exists only in (for) mission?’ The WCC Geneva 
Conference in 1967 stated that ‘the Church exists for the world’. Basham presented a 
more advanced interpretation, whereby the Church is perceived as the function of mission, 
but this does not mean that mission is perceived as the function of the Church. His 
interpretation is viewed as being more acceptable, because if the statement ‘Church is 
mission’ is true, it means that Church is determined by mission. Among the scholars 
holding this viewpoint, Vicedom and Newbigin highlighted the positive use of the Church 
by mission, but Hoekendijk strongly criticized the overall work of the Church as mission. 
                                                 
773 Ludwig Feuerbach, Lectures on the Essence of Religion (1851), Ralph Manheim (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), 19 
774 Edmund P. Clowney, The Church: Contours of Christian Theology (Illinois: Inter Varsity 
Press, 1995), 155.  
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The former two scholars viewed both mission and Church as God’s tools. As God’s 
kingdom is established on earth, Church and mission should be renewed and developed 
continuously. Hoekendijk on the other hand proposed that Church needs to be thoroughly 
evaluated based on mission. This section presents the two arguments in detail.  
In the first place, according to Newbigin, the statement ‘Church is mission’ means that 
Church should not be referred to without mission also being mentioned, or vice versa. 
Newbigin interprets the statement as indicating the close relationship between mission 
and Church. However, if one looks closely at the logic of the statement, it does not 
necessarily imply a close relationship between the two. 
In order to demonstrate an equal and close relationship between Church and mission, the 
statement ‘Church is mission’ would have to be followed by ‘mission is Church’. 
Therefore, Newbigin’s interpretation needs further explanation. First of all, Newbigin 
warns that when the Church institutionalizes and possesses absolute power in the system, 
it loses its own status and becomes proud. Accordingly, Newbigin insists that ‘the Church 
is not and can never expect to be the bearer of God’s cause in the sense that it is the agency 
through which God’s order is established within history. That is the Constantinian 
dream.’775 His viewpoint does not explain the Church with dogmatic form, but describes 
the identity of the Church in reality. He asserts that, as evidenced by the New Testament, 
the Church has been frequently reprimanded and warned from the very beginning.776 
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Consequently, Newbigin shows that the Church is not a perfect and ideal community, but 
is a mission community that is imperfect and needs repentance and renewal. He declares 
that, ‘if the Church is the bearer of the presence of the kingdom through history, it is 
surely not as the community of the righteous in a sinful world’.777  
Next we can ask how the sinful Church can take the role of mission. Newbigin makes it 
clear that mission does not belong to either the Church or human beings, but belongs to 
God:778 ‘Mission is not essentially an action by which the Church puts forth its own 
power and wisdom to conquer the world around it.’779 In addition, Newbigin points out 
that McGavran’s argument contains an error, because he understood mission as the 
expansion of the Church.780 According to Newbigin, the sinful Church as well as sinful 
world needs to be changed by mission. 
  
Now the question is how Church and world can be transformed into something that God 
wants. To answer this, Newbigin explores the concept of mission through the Bible and 
argues that mission belongs to the Holy Trinity God and originates from God.781 This 
means that God changes the world and the Church.  
 
While Newbigin regards the Christian mission as an analogous logical structure, he insists 
that mission is an activity from a fundamental belief embodied in the statement that ‘God 
has revealed himself as Father, Son, and Spirit’.782 Therefore, Newbigin suggests that the 
                                                 
777 Ibid. 
778 Ibid., 72. 
779 Ibid., 66. 
780 Ibid., 153. 
781 Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society (Geneva: WCC Publication, 1991), 118, 
134-135.  
782 Lesslie Newbigin, The Open Secret, 31. 
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Christian mission has three modes: as the proclaiming of the kingdom of the Father; as 
sharing the life of the Son; and as bearing the witness of the Spirit.783 In the relationship 
with the missionary Holy Trinity, Church can discover its own place and be continuously 
re-formed by the God of mission. After the Willingen conference, the notion of God’s 
mission was used too radically, so that it excluded the role of the Church in the mission 
field, and in the most extreme case did not even include Jesus Christ. Newbigin points 
out that this was due to a misunderstanding of the concept of God’s Mission.784 If the 
Church exists for itself and is only concerned about its own expansion, then it actually 
works against the gospel. The real role of the Church is as an agent to help people glimpse 
God’s kingdom.785 The only way that sinful Church shows the righteousness of God in 
history is by carrying out the same tasks that Jesus performed. Through the salvation of 
Jesus Christ, who is the way, the truth and the life, through baptism and communion, and 
through God’s word and sermon, the Church is united and qualified to represent God’s 
righteousness. In other words, the Church is qualified to be agent to show God’s grace.  
 
Newbigin presents the dynamic work of God in mission. In particular he shows the role 
of the Holy Spirit, who changes the world and the Church, and always goes before the 
Church on the journey of mission. The fact that Church starts on the foundation of mission 
means that it is progressed by the activity of Holy Spirit and God’s authority. As 
examined earlier, Newbigin believed that mission can change the Church as well as the 
world.786 Therefore, when Newbigin states that ‘Church is mission’, this statement has 
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to be extended and applied widely. His extended concepts are introduced in his various 
publications. In The Other Side of 1984, Newbigin strongly criticizes culture and points 
out that Church needs to stand firm on the stance of New Testament apocalyptic 
eschatology in order not to fall into the Constantinian trap of making the Constantinian 
alliance with countries. 787  According to Newbigin, mission is God’s action which 
promotes the power of Holy Spirit in order to enable Christ’s work of deliverance to be 
accomplished.788  
 
Newbigin’s argument ‘Church is mission’ is located in the middle of the spectrum 
between fundamental evangelistic ecumenism and secular ecumenism. Therefore, it is not 
welcomed by those who want to rigorously apply the concept of God’s mission to the 
Church. Newbigin’s viewpoint cannot avoid the criticism, because it does not completely 
separate mission from the influence of Church. Therefore, Hoekendijk, who held a more 
critical position than Newbigin with regard to ‘Church is mission’, will be examined in 
order to study his viewpoint of Church and mission and the meaning of God’s agent. 
 
According to Hoekendijk’s concept of ‘Church is mission’, the Church is regulated by 
mission and is the function of mission. This is similar to Douglas Webster’s point that the 
Church is the instrument of mission.789 According to Roger C. Bassham, ‘Hoekendijk 
opened a sharp attack on the “Church-centric” view of mission which he considered had 
prevailed in much missionary thinking.’790 Such arguments required reconsideration of 
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all the work initiated by the Church; in particular, examination of who is the initiator in 
mission raised the important theme of ‘God’s mission’ and made Church step down from 
the main stage of mission. The main reason for this was that ‘Church-centric missionary 
thinking is bound to go astray, because it revolves around an illegitimate center’.791 
Another reason was the misuse of evangelism, which was deeply connected with 
imperialism and cultural colonialism in the 18th and 19th centuries. For example, 
Hoekendijk shows that before Moravian missionaries evangelized, they tried to establish 
a Christian style of civilization. He also quotes Karl Graul, who believed that a nation 
needs to become Christian before individual conversion and evangelization; and drawing 
upon 19th century theologians from Schleiermacher to Troeltsch, he points to mission 
activities based on the idea that converting individuals is impossible except by the 
expansion of western Christian civilization. He concludes that this idea played a 
significant role in combining Christian colonialism and mission,792 and suggests that this 
stemmed from a misunderstanding of biblical concepts about evangelism. Hoekendijk 
points out that, in the Bible, evangelizing pagans is possible only in the era of the 
Messiah.793 He makes it clear that the Messiah is the initiator or subject of evangelism 
and the purpose of evangelism is something that Israel expected of the Messiah, that is, 
the establishment of peace. 794  Therefore he regards evangelism as the Kerygma, 
Koinonia, and Diakonia of shalom. 795  He is convinced that this kind of inclusive 
evangelism is required all over the world. However, he rejects the idea of using 
evangelism for Church propaganda, because the essential character of propaganda is a 
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lack of hope and an absence of humility: ‘The propagandist has to impose himself and 
tries to make exact copies of himself.’796 He also rejects the notion of Gisbertus Voetius 
that the purpose of evangelism is the planting of the Church (plantatio ecclesiae).797 Here, 
the question is whether the rejection of these ideas and methods of evangelism can be 
justified in mission. Tormod Engelsviken poses the problem as follows: ‘Why should this, 
or the concept of shalom itself, be played out against the planting of the church, when the 
church is the “institution” - to use a word with some negative connotation - that should 
have exactly these functions?’798 However, Hoekendijk insists that the notion of Church-
centred mission values the Church too highly, and tends to regard it as God’s secure 
bridgehead or ark in the world.799 As a result, it leads to the misunderstanding that 
mission is something that moves from Church to Church,800 passing on an incorrect 
message to the next generations of mission and making them circle around Church like a 
merry-go-round.801 According to Hoekendijk, Church-centred mission makes the whole 
ground of mission the Church and makes it difficult for missionaries to overcome the 
boundary of the Church. As a result, the world loses its meaning and is regarded as just a 
training ground for Church. God’s kingdom is minimized or underestimated as something 
that can be experienced and imagined only within the boundary of Church. 
 
                                                 
796 Ibid., 21. 
797 Ibid., 22. 
798  Tormod Engelsviken, “Missio Dei: The Understanding and Misunderstanding of a 
Theological Concept in European Churches and Missiology”, in: International Review of Mission, 2003 
Vol. XCII, No. 367, 488. 
799 J.C. Hoekendijk, The Church Inside Out, 22. 
800 Ibid. 
801 Ibid., 38. Hoekendijk explains that: “Church-centric missionary thinking is bound to go astray, 
because it revolves around an illegitimate center.” 
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To overcome Church-centred mission, Hoekendijk raised the importance of the 
apostolate.802 Bosch summarized Hoekendijk’s apostle theology as follows: ‘We shall 
never understand what the apostles taught unless we do what the apostles did, namely, 
mission. Apostolicity without apostolate is not apostolicity but apostasy.’803 Therefore, 
according to Hoekendijk, the apostolate is an activity beyond the boundaries of Church 
for the purpose of mission. That is how the Church becomes true Church. If mission 
activities centre within Church, this indicates that the Church gives up its own identity 
and moves astray from the apostolate.804 Here it is necessary to note that Hoekendijk 
perceived Church and the world only as one function of the apostolate.805 He explained 
that the Church and the world should be regulated and interpreted by the apostolate, 
indicating that the boundaries between the Church and the world had fallen down.806 The 
true ground of Church lies in preaching God’s kingdom to the world. If the Church 
understands this, it does not limit itself in mission but accepts that the Church is mission. 
The statement ‘Church is mission’ is his direct expression of ‘there is no Church without 
mission’. As pointed out by Bosch: ‘Van Ruler’s thesis that “mission was a function of 
the Church” was inverted by Hoekendijk: the Church was a function of mission.’807 
Church is an instrument of evangelism. However, if the Church functions as mediator or 
ark of salvation, it means the apostolate has disappeared from the Church. That is why 
Hoekendijk stated that the organization of evangelism tries to exclude itself from 
something related to the Church.808 This idea originates from his understanding of our 
                                                 
802 Ibid., 41. 
803 David J. Bosch, Witness to the World, 199. 
804 J.C. Hoekendijk, The Church Inside Out, 41. 
805 Ibid., 42 
806 Ibid., 41. 
807 David J. Bosch, Witness to the World, 176-177.  
808 J.C. Hoekendijk, The Church Inside Out, 52. 
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God as not being limited in one place of the world like Baal.809 Nothing can exist beyond 
his boundary. He does not dwell only in the temple.810 Our God is the Lord, the king of 
world history and the head of the Church. Here, Hoekendijk introduces an order of ‘God-
World-Church’, not ‘God-Church-World’,811 in order to explain that Church exists not 
for itself but for other people. That is how Church proves its own justification and 
manifests its own value. In other words, he highlights that just as the Messiah does not 
exist for Himself, Church does not coexist with the world but exists to serve other people 
and the world.812 
 
Hoekendijk’s statement, ‘Church is mission’ raises the important questions of who is the 
subject of mission, who is the agency, how should the agency undertake the mission and 
what is its status in mission compared to the subject? The theological answers to these 
questions are investigated in the relationship between Church and mission, considering 
evangelism which is the demand of mission. Furthermore, the features of God’s mission 
are investigated in terms of the apostolate. Bosch argues in Missio Dei that the subject 
and source of mission is God. Agencies such as Church and human cannot be the author 
of mission or responsible initiator. In other words, Church and missionaries are only the 
tools and functions for mission and particular areas in mission.813 In fact, Hoekendijk 
emphasizes that the most practical agents in the mission that responds to the requests of 
Church (God’s people) and evangelism are laymen and the house churches. The laymen 
are the bearers of God’s mission and the representatives of God’s mission people,814 
                                                 
809 Ibid., 68. 
810 Ibid. 
811 Ibid., 68-69. 
812 Ibid., 70. 
813 David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission, 392. 
814 J.C. Hoekendijk, The Church Inside Out, 83-84. 
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because they are in the best position to carry God’s love which gives His Son to the world 
and shows his faith to the secular people, and the house churches have the best status to 
show God’s love towards the world and reveal God’s love through its committed life. Not 
only is the Church God’s people, but people belong to the world; laymen and the house 
church are the representative agents of God for the world. Hoekendijk points out that 
institutionalized Church has lost its identity and reason for being, because it is 
preoccupied by managing and administering that Church. Therefore, the most ideal 
system is suggested to be one of house churches, as with the early Church.815 In response 
to this point, Hoekendijk’s critics have claimed that he ignores the role of Church as 
agency in mission and excludes the Church in God’s Mission.  
 
6.3.4 The agent beyond the relationship between mission and 
Church 
 
In the previous sections, the two statements, ‘the essence of Church is mission’ and 
‘Church is mission’ have been examined based on world mission conferences and several 
scholars of mission, such as Bosch, Newbigin and Hoekendijk. We were able to find 
church-centred Catholic churches and evangelical circles that view church as God’s only 
agent. In addition, the perspectives of mission-centred ecumenists were reviewed. They 
argue that the nature of church is mission: church is simply a tool for mission, and should 
submit to mission entirely.  
In this section, we go beyond the issue of the relationship between the Church and mission 
to investigate the viewpoints of secular ecumenicals and religious ecumenicals, in order 
                                                 
815 Ibid., 89-90. 
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to identify the agency in God’s mission. Secular and religious ecumenists turn 
controversy over ‘mission or church’ into a discussion of other things (such as world and 
other religions). They believe God’s mission event should take place in the world.816 
However, the world contains violation of human rights, political and economic 
oppression, injustice and structural evil. Therefore, the main task is to achieve God’s 
kingdom through solidarity and joint protest to gain true humanity and liberation. This 
view does not regard other religions as Satan and evil to be demolished. Instead, it 
perceives them as God’s creation and as objects of mercy, and tries to find opportunities 
for conversation.817 Specifying ecumenical stances into secular and religious ecumenical 
approaches, Bosch criticizes their positions. Following Bosch’s categorizations, the 
present writer intends to identify what agent means.  
In doing so, it will be possible to answer conclusively the question that has endured 
throughout the history of mission, namely: ‘Who are the agents in God’s mission?’  
 
6.3.4.1 The agent and secular ecumenicals  
 
                                                 
816 Manfred Linz, Anwalt der Welt: Zur Theologie der Mission (Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 1964), 
177, 214.    
817 See, Amos Yong, “From Demonization to Kin-domization: The Witness of the Spirit and the 
Renewal of Missions in a Pluralistic World”, in Global Renewal, Religious Pluralism, and The Great 
Commission: Towards a Renewal Theology of Mission and Interreligious Encounter, eds. Amos Yong & 
Clifton Clarke (Lexington: Emeth Press, 2011), 157, 162, 170. Yong mentions that “What I find remarkable 
is that whereas much of the history of Christian missions has demonized pagans and barbarians of the world, 
in this text (Acts 28), Paul and his fellow missionaries receive the generosity of their Maltese hosts 
instead.”(Ibid., 162.) Thus, he insists that “This common humanity … means that rather than a 
demonization of the (religious) other, we must move beyond the failed task of Christianization and work 
for the kin-domization of Gospel of Christ, with others, even across  religious lines, to the level that is 
possible.”(Ibid., 170.)  
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Among secular ecumenicals, the world created by God is an important agenda.818 Hence, 
the order ‘God-World-Church’, as proposed by Hoekendijk, has been established, 
emphasizing the notion of the world as a place lived in by people loved by God. Bosch 
mentions Manfred Linz, who, in his article ‘Anwalt der Welt: Zur Theologie der Mission’, 
analysed the sermons of German preachers between 1900 and 1960. According to Bosch, 
Linz criticized those descriptions of the world that treat it only as a geographical entity 
but do not recognize its theological definition and significance.819 Bosch summarizes 
Linz’s arguments as: ‘The world has to be moved from the periphery to the centre. 
Mission should become “Anwalt der Welt” advocate for the world.’820 This statement is 
representative of the wide recognition of the requirement for the new perspective, in 
which the world is understood as context of mission theology.  
 
This emphasis on the world is frequently found in recent thinking in ecumenical circles. 
According to Richard Shaull, the fundamental crisis in mission is caused by the fact that: 
‘Church, by and large, has not kept up with the ongoing influence of Christ in history.’821 
In order to solve the crisis, Shaull considers that the focus of mission needs to be changed 
from the Church to the world, and that it should deliver a significant message for the 
world. 822  The ultimate contribution of God’s people to the world is to devise new 
strategies for salvation, yet our religious institution, the Church, has lost its Messianic 
power to change and reform the world. Therefore, Shaull suggests that ‘our concern as 
                                                 
818 The Uppsala Assembly issued the statement: “The world provides the agenda.” (David J. 
Bosch, Witness to the World, 38). 
819 David J. Bosch, Witness to the World, 36. 
820 Ibid. See, Manfred Linz, Anwalt der Welt: Zur Theologie der Mission (Stuttgart: Kreuz-
Verlag, 1964), 9. 138-140.  
821 M. Richard Shaull, “Toward a Reformulation of Objectives”, in: Protestant Crosscurrents in 
Mission: Ecumenical-Conservative Encounter, ed. Norman A. Horner (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1968), 
98.  
822 Ibid., 83. 
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Christians is to have a secular rather than a Christian religious self-identity’.823 In other 
words, focusing too much on building Christian culture to find our own identity is no 
longer desirable. Instead, it is necessary to enter the secular world and witness Christ’s 
power.824 This world holds countless conflicts, from basic human needs to political 
conflicts, civil war, religious war, ideological and social revolution, and economic 
injustice. Shaull reminds us that God works dynamically for ‘the humanization of life’ in 
the middle of the complicated world.825 He suggests that the younger generation may be 
uninterested in the traditional features of God, such as His Otherness, His Sovereignty 
and complex debates about dogmatics and eschatology. However, they can participate 
with genuine interest in the work of God’s people for ‘humanization’, and will be attracted 
by an apocalyptic perspective.826 For Shaull, the agent that attempts to apply God’s 
mission in the world is surely God’s people. Then, why does Shaull exclude the 
institutionalized Church from being God’s agent? If that institutionalized Church were to 
devote itself to the creation of the ‘new humanity’ with God’s Messianic character, then 
certainly it could be God’s agent. However, Shaull argues that most of our religious 
organizations have lost that power.827 Therefore, he insists that ‘the Church testifies to 
God’s work of renewal by its freedom to die, whenever and wherever that is called for, 
and to kill old institutional forms that no longer meet the needs of the present’.828 While 
not being accepted by the conservative evangelical Church, this argument that the Church 
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needs to go to the world and undertake the Messiah’s mission has strongly inspired the 
ecumenical movement. 
The emphasis on God’s mission to the world based on the ecumenical position can also 
be observed in Ludwig Rütti, who was strongly influenced by Hoekendijk’s ideas. In his 
book Zur Theologie der Mission, Rütti presents dilemmas in mission such as reality and 
requests and the problems of Church-centred mission, and emphasizes the world as the 
context of mission.829 Rütti understands God’s mission as the action of God in the world. 
Therefore, mission is not something private that comes from the inner world of the 
individual, nor is it an event occurring inside Church. Mission is something that takes 
place in the world and in human life.830 Similar to Hoekendijk, Rütti argues that the 
specific content of mission found in the context of specific human life is ‘shalom’.831 
Therefore, Rütti views God’s mission as planting shalom in the midst of specific human 
society, where it is filled with conflicts, hostilities and battles. According to Rütti, shalom 
means presenting ongoing criticism and thus taking part in a social development process 
that would lead to reform of society; this process is something universal, so it needs to be 
spread to every part of life and the world.832  
If God’s mission is incarnated in the midst of the world and God’s shalom is established, 
then we need to ask how shalom in the world is different from shalom in the Church, and 
                                                 
829  Ludwig Rütti, Zur Theologie der Mission: Kritische Analysen und neue Orientierung 
(München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1972). In this book, Rütti explains mission theology as follows: 1. Das 
Dilemma der Weltmission 2. Eschatologie und Mission 3. Welt als Horizont der Sendung 4. Sendung und 
Kirche.  
830 Ibid., 188. In German, “Diser Ort ist weder die private Innerlichkeit des einzelnen noch der 
von der profanen Welt abgegrenzte Raum der Kirche - sei es als Heilsanstalt oder als Gemeinschaft -, 
sondern die konkrete Lebenswelt des Menschen.”  
831 Ibid., 188-189. 
832 Ibid., 189. In German, “Als solcher ist der Prozeß des Schalom universal; er soll sich auf alle 
Lebens-beziehungen und Weltbezüge ausweiten.” 
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what standard separates the Church from the world. Here, Rütti insists that it is 
meaningless to separate Church and the world at an abstract level.833 If God’s word and 
His will are specifically incarnated and secularized in the midst of the world by mission 
of shalom, there is no need to divide the world and the Church. This is one of the 
significant features of ecumenical circles, which define secularization as a vague division 
(overlap) between Church and the world. Bosch disagreed with the extreme tendency of 
this position. In particular he criticized the argument of the central committee of the 
World Students Christian Federation (WSCF), which rejected terms such as ‘Church’, 
‘evangelization’ ‘witness’ and ‘mission’, because these focus on one-sidedness and do 
not consider others’ circumstances. Also, the terms demand people to leave their familiar 
environment and belong to a Christian group. Sometimes, such a position demands 
religious obsession in return for eternal life. Thus it eventually destroys the life of the 
whole being.834 Bosch also strongly criticized a representative at the 1973 Bangkok 
Conference, who stated that all traditional language in the Church is meaningless, noting 
that ‘he became atheist by His grace’.835 This trend makes the Church redundant, and 
puts up barriers. As Bosch argued:  
The centuries old extra ecclesiam nulla salus (no salvation outside the Church) 
has gradually made way for extra ecclesiam multa salus (ample salvation outside 
the Church), and occasionally here and there already tends towards intra 
ecclesiam nulla salus (no salvation inside the Church).836 
                                                 
833 Ibid., 274. Rütti insists that “Die abstrakte Unterscheidung von Kirche und Welt ist letztlich 
nichtsagend.”   
834 David J. Bosch, Witness to the World, 38. 
835 Ibid., 39. 
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The trend of secular ecumenism progresses out of the Church and away from the 
traditional perspective of mission. Of course, ‘closeness of Church’, ‘the domination of 
Church as judge’, and ‘Church’s inability to solve problems in the world’ may all be 
reasons for this perspective. 
For secular ecumenicals, who is the agent? What fulfils God’s will in the world of God’s 
mission and becomes mediator of salvation? At the Bangkok Conference, the term 
‘agency’ was used frequently. Church and mission agencies are sometimes used to 
indicate God’s agency. However, the concept extends widely to cover all issues in the 
world, and salvation in modern times refers to deliverance from particular political, 
economic and social problems.837 Therefore, the notion of God’s agent extends to any 
men, women or organizations working for today’s salvation. Consequently, for secular 
ecumenicals, it is meaningless to separate Church and the world. Anyone who practices 
God’s justice and peace in the world can be agencies working for God’s deliverance.  
 
 
6.3.4.2 The agent and religious ecumenicals  
 
                                                 
837 World Council of Churches, Bangkok Assembly 1973: Minutes and Report of the Assembly 
of the Commission on World Mission and Evangelism of the World Council of Churches December 31, 
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The term ‘religious ecumenicals’ is used by Bosch as frequently as ‘secular 
ecumenicals’.838 Religious ecumenicals try to find common ground between different 
religions. Instead of hostilities and feuds, their main concern is conversation and building 
mutual relationships. To achieve the purpose, they approach other religions and seek for 
universal values. Newbigin, representative of mission scholarship, attempts to approach 
and have conversations with other religions, while maintaining a Christian identity. In his 
view, this is the only way to evangelize people of other religions. First of all, he 
acknowledges that there exists ‘the light’ in other religions.839 Thus, he does not view 
‘the finality of Christ’ from the perspective of exclusion of other religions,840 but as the 
need for Christ’s participation to solve problems in the context of our history. 841 
Identifying three positions toward other religions, namely pluralism, exclusiveness and 
inclusiveness, Newbigin explains why he supports, but also disagrees with, all of them. 
The position which I have outlined is Exclusivist in the sense that it affirms the 
unique truth of the revelation in Jesus Christ, but it is not Exclusivist in the sense 
of denying the possibility of salvation of the non-Christian. It is Inclusivist in the 
sense that it refuses to limit the saving grace of God to the members of the 
Christian Church, but it rejects the Inclusivism which regards the non-Christian 
religions as vehicles of salvation. It is pluralist in the sense of acknowledging the 
gracious work of God in the lives of all human beings, but it rejects a pluralism 
                                                 
838 David J. Bosch, Witness to the World, 38. 
839 Lesslie Newbigin, The Open Secret, 198. 
840 Lesslie Newbigin, The Finality of Christ, 45. 
841 Ibid., 64. 
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which denies the uniqueness and decisiveness of what God has done in Jesus 
Christ.842 
Thomas, another ecumenical mission scholar, stated that a more inclusive attitude and 
more respect are needed to approach other religions. As a past chairman of the WCC, he 
took as his starting point ‘the new humanity in Christ’. 843  However, according to 
Newbigin, ‘the new humanity in Christ’, in Hindu society for example, can be a vague 
and challenging idea that brings about misunderstanding.844 Several years later, Thomas 
elaborated his ideas into four categories: ‘the reality of man as created in the image of 
God’,845 ‘the reality of man as a fallen creature’846 ‘the reality of the Crucified and Risen 
Jesus Christ as the true man and as the source of renewal of human nature and through it 
of all things’,847 and ‘the reality of man and society in the light of the consummation of 
their Absolute future in the Kingdom of God’.848 Here, the first and second categories 
are general statements that can be found in the work of Reformed theologians. However, 
the third category needs further explanation. According to Thomas, the ‘new humanity’ 
begins with the death of Christ on the cross and his resurrection, but Church is not the 
only place where ‘the new humanity’ manifests.849 The Church itself is not ‘the new 
humanity’ and does not have ability to open itself to secular societies and demonstrate 
this ‘new humanity’. Thomas believes that the ‘new humanity’ must manifest in the 
                                                 
842 Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 182-183. 
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struggles of societies where people have secular human fellowship,850 and in those who 
believe in other religions, particularly in Hinduism.851 He explains that someone who 
adheres to another religion can have faith in Christ and commit their life to Him. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that they have decided to isolate themselves from their 
religious communities and belong to Christian society.852 Rather, they will reform the 
structures and values in the societies, cultures and religions to which they currently belong, 
establishing the fellowship of Christ-centred faith in them. Thomas’s idea shows the 
universality of God-in-Christ working beyond Church and Christianity, extending to 
other religions, the people of Asian revolutions and cultures.853 This proposed theology 
eventually leads to a declaration of Christ-centred syncretism. In the fourth category, 
Thomas suggests that the ‘new humanity’ enables us to hope for the kingdom of God: this 
is possible by the power of the Holy Spirit who was sent by the resurrected Jesus Christ. 
In this world of injustice and corrupt political and economic structures, Thomas argues 
that only the spirit of ‘Suffering Servanthood’ enables us to become ‘the new creation 
within Christ’ and move forward with the hope of the kingdom of God and His justice. In 
his view ‘it calls for active dialogue with other faiths to build up a syncretism of 
spiritualties oriented to the Messianism of “the Suffering Servant” symbolised by the 
centrality of the Crucified Jesus and prophetic diakoina of the Church’. 854  This 
conversation with other religions and ideologies enables us to see something different that 
we may not find in Christianity, which represents syncretism of spiritualties.855 Thus, 
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Thomas’s idea of mission aims towards Christ-centred syncretism, which integrates 
everything into the universal Christ, who assists mankind to achieve the ‘new humanity’.  
Alongside Thomas, there are various discussions and debates about religious pluralism 
and the paths toward a theocentric Christology. Writings such as John Hick’s book ‘The 
Myth of God Incarnate’856, ‘The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man’857 by 
Raymond Panikkar and ‘Living Faiths and the Ecumenical Movement’858 by Stanley 
Smartha are useful to understand the issue of conversation between religions. In addition, 
Karl Rahner, a Catholic scholar, argues that there are various ways leading to salvation, 
and that one norm (way) exists in the Catholic Church.  
Who then, for religious ecumenicals, are God’s agents? In that tradition, the attempt to 
have conversation with other religions and to relativize Christianity reflect the assumption 
that God’s agent also exists outside of Christianity. Just as secular ecumenicals view the 
new world outside Church as the place where God works, and present a wider perspective 
that whoever practices God’s justice and love, including non-Christians, are God’s agent, 
so religious ecumenicals argue that God’s agent exists in other religions, outside Church 
and Christianity. According to Bosch, the religious ecumenical perspective has blurred 
the distinction between Christianity and other religions.859 Consequently, as argued by 
Thomas, this perspective can lead to the conclusion that mission does not necessarily 
require Hindus to come into the structure of Christianity. Therefore Bosch asks, if 
evangelism is not conversion of other religions into Christianity, what the direction and 
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purpose of Christian mission should be.860 Charles W. Forman also criticizes the idea 
that ‘Christians should adapt toward the followers of other faiths’.861 In this context, 
Gregory Baum suggests that current theological tradition should be re-evaluated from the 
perspective of religious ecumenism. Baum proposes the direction and purpose of mission 
theology as follows: 
Theologians must examine the possibility that the Church’s missionary message 
exercises its salvational power where people in fact are, in their own cultural 
environment, enabling them to cling more faithfully to the best of their religious 
tradition and live the full personal and social implications of their religion more 
authentically.862 
If this direction of mission is accepted, then according to religious ecumenicals, agents 
can be every kind of organization, people and religion that work for the restoration of the 
‘new humanity’, including other religions. For this tradition, one of the main tasks of 
agents is to ensure that nominal Christians or Buddhists, and false Hindus or Moslems, 




This section has investigated the question of who has been considered God’s agent over 
the history of mission. Agency has been a crucial issue in that history, producing various 
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theories and trends of mission theology. To summarize, in the theories based on the 
relationship between Church and mission, first, there is a viewpoint that Church is the 
only agent that declares and delivers God’s will and carries salvation. This stance is 
commonly agreed among evangelical Church-centred scholars and the Catholic Church. 
The declaration that ‘mission is Church’ implies that mission is only one aspect of the 
functions of the Church, and Church is the subject of mission. However, this idea resulted 
in the phenomenon of Church-centeredness, whereby the Church became oblivious to its 
own status and accepted and indirectly assisted colonial violence and injustice. Criticism 
of this idea reasons that as the Church became institutionalized and powerful, it fell into 
‘the trap of Constantine’ and became a helpless being, so that it could no longer be God’s 
agent. As a reaction against the idea of Church-centred mission, the alternative notion of 
‘God’s mission’ has been strongly argued by ecumenicals, who believe that God calls the 
world as His agent and practices His justice and love in human history. While evangelical 
ecumenicals argue that ‘Church and mission are the same and Church without mission is 
nonsense’, ecumenical scholars argue that the nature of Church is mission. A will to fulfil 
God’s calling for mission led to the establishment of the WCC as an agency of God, and 
to the birth of the ecumenical movement. Subsequently, different ideas and voices have 
been raised in the area of mission theology. Criticisms against Church (e.g. Church is 
incapable of solving the problems in a world that is filled with social sins, injustice and 
political violence), and the question of who is God’s agent to resolve injustice and tragedy 
in the world, have extended the concept of agent beyond the Church.  Finally, the 
statement that ‘Church is mission’ is a public declaration that the Church should take only 
one part of the role in mission, and is not the key agent of God. As secular agencies have 
taken on tasks that had previously been undertaken by the Church, the concept of God’s 
agency has spread widely throughout the world. Furthermore, religious ecumenicals 
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argue that if the Church excludes other religions and performs mission in an aggressive 
way, it will be hard to integrate other religions into universal Christ in the world of 
coexistence. Therefore, holding the more inclusive and integrated perspective of religious 
pluralism, they are convinced that God’s agent can be found in other religions, not just 
Christianity.  
The conclusion so far is as follows: mission is activated based on three frames (church, 
world and other religions) and connects them with God; mission means agency that is 
sent by God as apostle and practices God’s will. Without mission, the three frames 
(church, world and other religions) cannot be agencies that deliver God’s will. Only 
through agency that is ‘mission’ can they be the communities that embrace God’s will. 
Only by mission can church, world and other religions be indirect agencies that deliver 
God’s will. Therefore, the reason modern mission scholars such as Bosch, Newbegin, 
Hoekendijk, Ustorf and John Hick examined how mission was related to the three frames 
and expressed was because, when looked at from a microscopic perspective, various 
agents appeared; however, from a macroscopic perspective, mission is the agency which 
performs God’s will.863 
As explained above, various perspectives of mission theology have appeared, depending 
on the view of who the agent is in the history of mission. Yet while the concept of ‘agent’ 
is an important one, it has not been established as theory in the frame of mission theology. 
                                                 
863 According to Jan A. B. Jongeneel, Gustav Warneck (1892-1903) used the Latin word ‘missio’ 
to mean the agencies of sending (Jan A. B. Jongeneel, Philosophy, Science, and Theology of Mission in the 
19th and 20th Centuries: A Missiological Encyclopedia Part I: The Philosophy and Science of Mission, 92 
[Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 60]). See also, Gustav Warneck, Evangelische Missionslehre: ein 
missionstheoretischer Versuch, Erste Abteilung: Die Begründung der Sendung (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas 
Berthes, 1897), 1-7, & Zweite Abteilung: Die Organe der Sendung, 1-20, in particular, 6-7. Richard Rothe 
(1867-1871) ‘treated mission as an agency which must retreat in favour of the (colonial) state which 
assumes responsibility for the expression of the Christian culture’ (Jan A. B. Jongeneel, Philosophy, Science, 
and Theology of Mission in the 19th and 20th Centuries: A Missiological Encyclopedia Part II: Mission 
Theology, 106 [Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1997], 116). 
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Instead, it is underestimated as one theological trend, or sometimes confused with mission 
societies or agencies. To fill this gap, the following chapter presents the definition, 
content and methodology of agency theology, while organizing the updated research on 
‘agency’. In doing so, it will present the Conclusion to this thesis on whether an agency 














































Can theology make a bridge between God and humanity - world, society and people - 
crossing over subject and object? How might it be possible? What are the criteria to 
determine such a possibility? These questions present the motivation to find out what 
agency is and how agency connects the two extremes. Therefore this chapter outlines the 
meanings, definition, justification and methodology of agency theology, focusing on the 
role of agency in theology. 
To establish or maintain theology as an academic discipline, reasons are required to show 
why theology is necessary and how it can work on rational grounds. Frame, structure and 
content are needed to support the reasons, while methodology is required to advance and 
develop the content. In order to examine whether it is possible to establish agency 
theology as an academic means, the foundations of the theory have been reviewed based 
on representative German idealistic philosophers such as Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. In 
addition, the key content presented by modern agency scholars who attempt to explain 
human identity, nature and behaviours through agency theory has been discussed. The 
work of Barth, whose thought differed from that of the agency theorists, has also been 
explained. Unlike those researchers who have tried to solve problems through human 
reason, Barth considered God’s revelation and His self-attestation as essential to connect 
the transcendent dimension. Modern major natural theologians’ explanations about God, 
nature and human beings have also been presented. The thesis has pointed out that the 
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concept of agency has become the major factor for emerging diverse trends of mission 
theology with regard to the relationship between Church and mission. This chapter will 
reflect upon the concepts that have been presented so far in the study, while also 
considering the possibility of an agency theology. 
  
The chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will present the meaning, definition and 
purpose of agency theology. Second, I will construct and classify the frame and the 
content of agency theology. Finally, I will suggest how agency theology is embodied and 
actualized through its methodology. 
 
7.2 Suggestion: A Possibility of Agency Theology 
 
7.2.1 The sketch of agency theology 
 
 
Through the philosophical investigation and theological examination undertaken up to 
now, we have arrived at the point of asking the fundamental question: ‘What is agency 
theology?’ Therefore, the important task of this section is to develop the agency theory 
in a theological context. To accomplish this task, the concepts of agency suggested by 
Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, agency scholars, Barth, natural theologians and missiologists 
are summarized in seven tables. Only Table 1 (called T1) is presented here; the remaining 




Table 1 Hegel’s Agency ( Called T1) 
+ Who/what/meaning/defin
ition 











-bridges the gap between historical 
actuality and the abstract world 
Dialectic 
The function of actuality 





-synthesizes logically the inner and outer 
world of self-consciousness 
-is a unity between essence and existence 
-unifies essence and its manifestation 








The task of philosophy -elucidates the relationship between 
essence and its manifestation 
-construes the connecting point between 





The activity of thought 
 
Labour 
-is the actuality as dialectical structure: 
thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis 
-connects between inner potentiality or 























-transforms from the possibility of thing to 
the actuality of things 
-reveals actuality of things through labour 
or Entäußerung of spirit 
-is the actor who objectifies into concrete 
objects with subjectivity 
-is in the overall process of ‘self’ and 
delivers the characteristics of subject to 
object, can be an important tool to connect 
the subject and object solve the mysteries 
of human being 
-connects between being-for-self and 
being-for-other. 
-might be understood as a oscillation 
“between impersonal and personal side of 
agency” 





















-connects between the subject and its 
object 










As examined in Section 1.4 of the Introduction, and in Table 7, we can summarize agency 
using key words such as connection, action, self-attestation, and real identity. As 
connector, agency includes mediator (T1, T2), bearer (T2), copula (T1), self as the subject 
(T1), commodity (T3), capital (T3), means of production (T3), machine (T3), causality 
(T4), instinct (T4), conscience (T4), intentions (T4), living man (T5), human agency (T5), 
divine agency (T5), Jesus Christ (T5), the Holy Spirit (T5, T7), nature (T6), culture (T5), 
Christian community (T7), Church (T7), world (T7), and religions (T7). As doer, agency 
has performer (T1), actuality (T1), a doer (T1), labourer (T1, T3), alienator (T2), executer 
(T2), expressivity (T1), self-activity (T3, T4), proletariat (T3), causality of labour (T4), 
objectification (T3), a verb (T4), properties of action (T4), mental action (T4), the act 
(T4), bottom-up causality (T6) and top-down causality (T6). Also, agency has elements 
of real identity such as incarnation (T7), kenosis (T7), self-attestation (T5), evangelism 
as mission (T7), Church’s mission (T7), God’s mission (T7), God’s word (T7), new 
humanity (T7), layman (T7), shalom (T7), the apostolic church (T7) and house church 
(T7).864  
If we want to develop the key words into agency theology, the following three aspects 
should be considered. First, agency theology covers every issue of connection between 
Holy Trinity God (the subject) and His creation (the object). Secondly, agency theology 
presents codes of practice in faith in order to reform the individual as well as community 
and society. Agency theology considers process, methods and evaluation of how the 
subject’s will is transferred into object. Finally, agent such as self-attestation and identity 
should be based on apostolicity to connect between Holy Trinity God (the subject) and 
the object (world, people, politics, economics and cultures). Thus, agency theology can 
                                                 
864 See Appendix, Table 2 (T2) to Table 7(T7). 
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be defined in terms of three dimensions, as a theology of connection, of action, and of the 
apostle. These three areas take as their agenda God the Trinity, the world, and human 
beings. All of these have meaning for existence and can be clarified by agency theology. 
The three definitions of agency theology are examined in detail as follows. 
  
First, agency theology is a theology of connection.865 The term ‘connection’ has a range 
of meanings. It can refer to communication or to fellowship, and may imply reconciliation 
and mediation. In each meaning, there is a presumption of relationship. As seen in Hegel 
(T1), Feuerbach (T2) and Marx (T3), connection means building a bridge in the 
relationship between subject and object; actuality and abstract world; essence and 
existence. The ultimate meaning of connection is to synthesize and unify parts and whole 
(T4). As shown in Hegel’s explanation of actuality (T1), the agency that connects subject 
and object must have both subjectivity and objectivity. This is similar to the fact that Jesus 
Christ must partake of both divinity and humanity in order to connect human and God so 
that He can mediate between the two (T5). 
Accordingly, as a theology of connection, agency theology understands correctly the 
connection between subject and object.  
 
Therefore, the content of agency theology also includes questions such as: How are the 
subject and the object connected? What are the connecting points? What other issues are 
related to the connection? Mereology, the study conducted by agency scholars who 
investigate the relationship between part and whole in order to explain identity, can be 
the major research area for agency theology (T4). The content must include investigation 
                                                 
865 See Section 1.4, twelve main definitions of agency - 2, 8, 11. 
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of how to understand correctly the connection between God the Trinity and the created 
world (T5); what kinds of human agencies exist to connect subject and object between 
God and His creation; and the roles, responsibilities and limitations of agencies. In 
addition, the content must contain specific strategies and programmes of how to care for 
and develop human agencies. 
  
Agency theology takes as its important agenda God the Trinity, the world and human 
beings. It is based upon three presumptions: God is God of connection; the world is the 
place where connection takes place; the human being is the one connected to Divine 
agency. In fact, the key ideas of John Leslie866 and Paul Davies relate to the mind of 
God, as reflected in created things or the physical world (T6). In particular, Davies notes 
that ‘this agency is creative in the sense of being somehow responsible for the laws of 
physics, which govern, among other things, how space-time evolves’.867 McFague also 
regards the created world as God’s body (T6). These studies attempt to find the point of 
contact or connection between God the Creator and His creatures. Similarly, in his 
research regarding whether God intervened in the formation of this world, looking at the 
big bang theory and chaos theory, Polkinghorne attempts to find a connection between 
God and the world and human beings (T6). As he argues, ‘the God of the gaps was 
actually a theological mistake’.868 Rowan William also maintains that ‘theology needs 
                                                 
866  See, John Leslie, Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2001), 43, 107-110, 135, 148-157. 
867 Paul Davies, The Mind of God: Science and the Search for Ultimate Meaning (London: 
Penguin Books, 1992), 185. 
868 John Polkinghorne, Quarks, Chaos, and Christianity: Questions to Science and Religion 
(London: Triangle, 1994), 22. 
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to make connections to search out and display unities or analogies … to try with overall 
outline.’869 
 
Therefore, agency theology is a theology that connects subject and object; the ideal world 
and actuality; the Creator and His creatures; religion and human; human and human; 
human and world, culture and history (T1, T2, T3, T5, T6). To take the human body as 
an example, problems will arise if the veins are not connected properly or are blocked by 
something. Likewise, problems in the world often come from isolation. Disconnection 
such as tyranny and self-righteousness, radical fundamental dogmas and religions may 
frequently cause problems between countries and societies as well as within a nation. As 
a theology of connection, agency theology can provide a breakthrough towards the 
solution. Therefore, the term ‘connection’ in agency theology expands the major issue of 
theology to a higher level, in order to consider how to communicate in international strife 
and political relationships, in the relationship between capitalism and labour, and in the 
ecological relationship between God, nature and humans. 
  
Secondly, agency theology is a theology that establishes self-identity through action.870 
The term ‘action’ involves a presumption that there is a factor to trigger the behaviour 
(T4). As explained in Chapter 4, analysis of human behaviour has demonstrated that its 
causes originate from mental properties such as intention, desire, volition and self. The 
behaviours are made known through human agency. From the perspective of theology, 
action is not a careless movement such as a simple reflex. Rather, action is labour that 
                                                 
869 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology: Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 14. See Dietrich Ritschl, The Logic of Theology: A Brief Account of the 
Relationship Between Basic Concepts in Theology, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1986), 92.  
870 See Section 1.4, twelve main definitions of agency - 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10.  
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intends to deliver something from the potential dimension to the actual world (T4). That 
is why modern agency scholars explain the matter of identity through investigation of 
actions. In addition, action means that someone practices his or her responsibilities and 
transforms something by his or her labours. Therefore, agency theology is not limited to 
abstract theory, but is a theology of labour, action, practice and transformation (T4). It is 
through these activities that the theology demonstrates human beings and their God, and 
the world in which people live. 
 
Accordingly, agency theology as theology of action must clarify what human beings can 
do and what human beings must do. It needs to indicate how humans build relationships 
in the areas of societies, politics, economics and religions, and how they should act. In 
other words, the principles of action, reason, direction and purpose can be content of 
action theology (T4). There may be various reasons for showing a particular action. The 
reasons for religious actions may come from God the Trinity as subject, from His creation, 
the natural environment, or from the human being. The criteria for deciding whether any 
behaviour is right or wrong can be decided based on the Bible. The method, evaluation 
and appropriate ways of actions can be established depending on culture, tradition and 
sociological understanding of the context. 
As mentioned already, the agenda of agency theology are God the Trinity, the world and 
human beings. God the Trinity is the God of action and the world is where actions take 
place. It is through actions that human beings reveal self-identity, the world and God. As 
noted by Wittgenstein, our language is the picture of the world. He implied that our 
language is the action of drawing something from our mind into specific reality. 
Therefore, agency theology is a theology of action, which clearly demonstrates its identity 
through action (T4).  
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Finally, agency theology is a theology of the apostle.871 In other words, it is theology of 
‘being sent’. Hegel regards agency as an externalizer of the subject (T1) which 
encompasses his subjective spirit and an objective spirit. Therefore, apostolicity is the 
major characteristic and key content of agency theology (T7). As examined in 
Hoekendijk’s work, apostolate means ‘being sent’ to the world with mission, based on 
Christ’s words ‘as the Father sent me, so I am sending you’ (John 20:21). He considered 
that the reason why God the Father sent His son was to establish the world of shalom. 
The word ‘sending’ indicates preaching the gospel of shalom, sharing fellowship of 
shalom and giving service of shalom (T7). The term ‘shalom’ means taking as our model 
Christ who came to the world to sacrifice Himself on the cross, and putting His vision 
into practice by our actions.  
Accordingly, considering apostolicity as the main topic, the content of agency theology 
(as theology of the apostle) includes apostolate and God, apostolate and the world, and 
apostolate and human beings (T7). As mentioned earlier, apostolicity means sending to 
the world (T7). Modern mission theologians sometimes consider mission as the theology 
of sending, and missionaries as the people who are sent. ‘Being sent’ means ‘going’. The 
basic feature of ‘being sent’ is to go somewhere beyond boundaries, whether of 
geography, language, ideology, culture or religion. However, ‘being sent’ also includes 
anything related to Christ’s shalom, such as going to the world with gospels of shalom, 
fellowship of shalom and service of shalom (T7). 
 
                                                 
871 See Section 1.4, twelve main definitions of agency – 7, 12.  
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Starting from the presumption that the agenda of agency theology are God the Trinity, 
the world and human beings, it is clear that God is the God who sends. In other words, as 
seen in the Creeds, the Father God sent His son; again both of them sent the Holy Spirit. 
This world is the place of God’s apostolate. Human beings should not be limited in fixed 
dogma, but are apostles who are sent to the world. 
7.2.2 The various types of agency theology and their 
methodology 
 
This section examines what the content and methodology of agency theology should be.  
First of all, the definition and purpose of agency theology have already been described, 
and provide specific content. Therefore, God the Trinity, the world and human beings can 
form the foundations of agency theology. By interpreting these in relationship with each 
other, agency theology can offer a reasonable perspective of theology. 
 
Depending on which perspective is taken with regard to the content, different kinds of 
agency theology may appear. It is nonsense to argue one particular agency in our diverse 
world. This may be the religious self-righteousness seen in fundamentalists. Agency 
theology does not seek for one-sidedness, but opens the possibility that various types of 
agency theologies can be developed from various theological perspectives.  
 
The next section demonstrates how various categories can appear in agency theology.  
Hegel stated that agency produces ‘actuality’. This actuality is a key concept of agency 
theology, and is explained in terms of three elements: ‘the content of philosophy’, ‘the 
unity between essence and existence’ and ‘the movement of a dialectical process’ (T1). 
What then is the possible content? First, it is the idea of Church-centred agency theology: 
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Church is God’s agency and takes a key role in mission, as a Noah’s ark representing 
salvation. In a previous chapter, I stated the premise that agency theology is an alternative 
theology that may substitute for mission theology. According to Bosch, the emerging 
paradigm in mission theology today is ecumenical mission theology. Missio Dei is a key 
issue in ecumenical theology. Therefore, secondly, agency theology might be regarded as 
ecumenical mission theology (T7). Another consideration is that the triune God is the 
subject of mission and God incarnates for mission as an agency for Himself in the world. 
This notion of agency in the perspective of Barthian theology is considerably important 
for evangelical scholars and theologians of Missio Dei. Here, we should note that this 
agency has both subjectivity and objectivity. If agency theology focuses only on the 
subject as suggested by Barth, God should be the agent (T5). God should reveal and prove 
Himself so that human beings understand Him (T5). However, as examined earlier, Hegel 
pointed out that both subjectivity and objectivity need to be included in agency, so that 
we can understand it logically and academically (T1). This means that God as an agent is 
both subject and object in mission. If God were only subject, this would cause many 
problems in our understanding. If God were only object in mission, we would have to 
speculate as to what would be the subject. The fact that Holy Trinity God is both subject 
and object in mission means that God’s characteristics can be fully portrayed in His 
character of agency. God as an agent is a mediator who reveals humanity, nature and the 
creation to us (T5). The concept of mediator is logically consistent when things are inter-
related within the concept of Holy Trinity God (T5). It is the key content representing the 
existing mission theology, and the concept that indicates the major direction of current 
ecumenical mission theology.  
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As discussed earlier, of the several issues in ecumenical mission theology, the question 
of who is agent resulted in strong controversy in various world mission conferences, 
causing division among churches and damage to the ecumenical movement, which seeks 
for unity. In the debate as to who is the key agent of God, the argument that the Church 
is the only agent caused a backlash, because of the power that gave the Church to 
manipulate everything in mission (T7). The new argument holds that God is the subject 
and the mediator in mission; depending on different interpretations, it accepts every 
secular agent, which undermines the key role of Church as the instrument of revealing 
God (T7). Furthermore, this argument extends to religious pluralism, which considers that 
God works in other religions (T7). As a result, it has attracted hostility from fundamental 
Christian organizations, which consider it to be unacceptable, pagan, or even Satanic. 
This phenomenon was apparent at the WCC in Pusan, South Korea in 2013.  
 
Because agency theology encompasses within its theological frame such diverse aspects, 
it enables each individual to recognize his or her own position among these categories 
and allows various mediators to open almost every area and advance toward mutual 
understanding and consideration. Hence, it can be categorized as follows: 
 
1. Church-centred agency theology - the Church is the only way as God’s agency. 
2. Mission-centred agency theology- the mission-doers are God’s agency. 
3. Holy Trinity agency theology - God Himself has become the agency and we know 
God by His revelations. 
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4. Cultural agency theology – interculturation, inculturation, cross-culturation, free 
culture.872 
5. Secular agency theology - emphasizes the world because God reveals Himself as 
Creator among unlimited creation.  
6. Natural theological agency theology - the created world can show God’s divinity 
and God’s love. 
7. Religious pluralism agency theology - God is not limited to within Christianity 
so all religions on earth can be God’s agency. 
 
 
As shown above, each stance in agency theology takes a key role in a certain area and 
does not exclude or undermine other stances. Therefore, agency theology can be 
characterized as a theology of acceptance, encouragement, and support for one another. 
 
On the other hands, agency theology embraces various methodologies. Agency is the 
connection between subject and object. The connection can be explained by 
externalization of mind and the mind can be described by the principles of dialectic 
movement. Therefore, the first major methodology of agency theology is dialectic 
theology (T1). Dialectics include anything related to deductive and inductive logic and 
use both negation and affirmation. In addition, as seen in modern agency theologians, 
agency theology reflects how to connect part and whole. Analogy, commonly employed 
in explaining mereology, is an important methodology in this theology. According to 
Barth, analogia entis is not an appropriate methodology for humans to perceive God. 
Instead, analogia relationis, in which the starting point is that the created image of the 
                                                 
872  See, Werner Ustorf, The Cultural Origins of “Intercultural” Theology, in Intercultural 
Perceptions and Prospects of World Christianity. 150, eds. Richard Friedli / Jan A. B. Jongeneel / Klaus 
Koschorke / Sundermeier /Werner Ustorf (FrankFurt am Main, 2010), 81-104.      
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human being has the image of God, should be applied (T5). Secondly, modern agency 
theologians have presented agency to explain human actions. These agencies would be 
mental action, self and person (T4). Therefore, agency theology can develop its mission 
by using causality, which can explain logically the meaning of existence. In addition, the 
theory of sortal terms, used to explain the identity that appears through action (T4), is a 
tool to demonstrate what identity to have and how to live among God the Trinity, the 
world and human beings. Thirdly, reductionism, which identifies whether subject can be 
transformed into object and object into subject, is an important method in agency theory. 
This is because agency becomes object by embracing the will of subject. It is no longer 
agent if the object is something irrelevant to the subject. Of course it is true that some 
scholars, who argue that there is no such transformation that can make subject and object 
become identical, like a mathematical formula, prefer a dialectic approach to 
reductionism. In that case, agency theology can evaluate and reflect to what extent the 
object is close to the subject. Fourthly, agency theory sometimes delivers the will of 
subject to object by projection. This method was used by Feuerbach in order to discover 
the secret of subject by examining object. In other words, since religion is the projection 
of human nature, understanding religion leads to true knowledge of human nature. 
Projection can be an important tool to explain the logical relationship between subject 
and object (T2). In agency theology, projection helps us to understand logically the 
relationship between the Trinity God, the world and human beings. Furthermore, 
projection of agency theology (as theology of connection, action and apostolate) enables 
us to understand clearly its identity and mission. 
  
The major methodologies described above must be applied appropriately according to 
specific theme and context. Agency theology is a tool for solving and explaining the 
problems in transcendent and finite, ideal and real, hidden and revealed areas. Therefore, 
it is risky to depend on only one particular method to develop agency theology. The 
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various methodologies presented here are all essential elements in the establishment of 
agency theology and advancing it to a higher level.  
 
 
7.2.3 The crucial issues and prospect for agency theology 
 
So far, we have given an outline of agency theology. This raises several questions. First, 
in what way is agency theology distinctive and different, and how can it be an alternative 
to mission theology? Secondly, how does agency offer a new paradigm to overcome the 
problems and limitations of mission theology? Finally, what is the role of the Trinity - 
God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit? Continuous discussion of these questions 
will enable the development of agency theology to a deeper level, and provide the 
evidence to justify it.   
 
On the first question there are diverse opinions, but it is clear that agency theology 
encompasses much of the content of mission theology, and shares similar issues. 
Therefore, as argued in the Introduction, agency theology is suggested as an alternative 
to mission theology. However, there are differences, mainly in language. According to 
Wittgenstein, language is a specific picture of something it wants to express.873 As we 
examined earlier, there have been sharp criticisms against mission, and it is in crisis; it 
carries stigma and is weighed down by doubt. Therefore, if we intend to reflect upon and 
reform the many problems in mission, it may be beneficial to substitute the word ‘agency’ 
for ‘mission’. Doing so will revitalize the declining area of mission. The term ‘agency 
theology’ presents a different picture from the content expressed by the word ‘mission’. 
Moreover, agency theology does not carry any stigma, but has a dynamic and appealing 
public image. Secondly, in addition to referring to the Bible, agency theology can be 
                                                 
873 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Part I: 1945, Part II: 1947-1948), trans. 
G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 4.   
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developed academically and in cooperation with those philosophers or philosophical 
theologians who reflect upon other areas, such as philosophical ideas on actuality, politics 
and economics. Agency theology is not an isolated area. Instead, it opens academic 
discussion and is established as public theology at the centre of academia. Agency 
theology can be an answer to the argument made by analytic philosophers that academia 
without hard evidence or with only potential presumptions is inadequate as scientific 
study, and that those involved in such studies may investigate their issues within their 
own circles, but should resign from the ivory tower. Finally, mission theology focuses on 
issues such as world evangelism, church growth, social justice and inculturation, while 
agency theology focuses on connections or communication that enable those tasks to be 
accomplished. As examined above, the main concerns are how the will of God (the 
subject) can be specified, and how the gaps can be resolved in the contexts in which 
people live - such as religion, society, culture and academia. A main element is specific 
method, process and evaluation of how the will of the subject can be practiced with action 
in life. For instance, a theology of liberation comprises theological codes of practice for 
the oppressed in order to solve vicious circles such as political violence and killing in the 
dictatorships of Latin America.874 Minjung theology regards Jesus (the subject) as the 
Minjung who were oppressed by the Korean dictatorship. It views sorrows and 
oppressions, and has developed theological codes of practice, from the perspective of the 
Minjung.875 Agency theology includes guidelines from various contexts and creates 
comprehensive codes of practice in faith to connect the gaps between God (the subject) 
and human (the object). It also takes appropriate action. Apostolicity is the foundation to 
justify and evaluate the comprehensive code of practice. We have examined how 
apostolicity was argued and developed by several mission scholars (T7). However, 
                                                 
874 See, Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation, trans. 
Sister Caridad Inda & John Eagleson (London: SCM Press, 1974), 13-15.  
875 See, Nam Dong Shu, “Towards a theology of 한(Han)” in Commission on Theological 
Concerns of the Christian Conference of Asia (ed.), Minjung Theology: People as the subjects of History 
(London: Zed Press, 55-69.  
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apostolicity is like the rudder of a boat, determining the direction and justification for 
connection and action in agency theology.  
 
To summarize then, the focus of agency theology differs from that of mission theology 
in the three aspects described above. Importantly, however, agency theology does not 
overlook the important elements of mission theology.   
  
On the second issue, I agree with Bosch, who identified ecumenical mission as a new 
emerging mission paradigm. His suggestions regarding 13 mission subjects of an 
ecumenical mission paradigm can be summarized into the above three elements of agency 
theology. As pointed out by Pannenberg, if someone can see God’s work in the secular 
world, he (or she) can know the will of God in the history of the world.876 Our history 
demonstrates that ‘the combination of radical nationalism and religious ideologies’877 
has resulted in countless innocent victims in many countries, such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Syria, and Iraq. Does God want such killings? Is it the only way 
to guard and preach the truth? In fact, one of the important tasks for ecumenical mission 
would be to find solutions to relieve such extreme conflicts. 
  
In mission theology, there are divisions between evangelical and ecumenical camps. The 
former highlights individual spiritual salvation, while the latter is concerned with social 
salvation focusing on social responsibility. The two stances remain in opposition, each 
arguing its own perspective. Contrastingly, agency theology is closer to the key topic of 
ecumenical mission, a new emerging mission paradigm. This is because connection is the 
main topic; the major concern is with specific actions to deal with injustice and 
                                                 
876 Wolfhart Pannenberg, ‘Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation’, in Revelation as 
History, ed. Wolfhart Pannenberg & trans. David Granskou (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), 
135. 
877 Dino Abazovic, ‘Religious and Political Identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in Religion 
and Identity in Post-conflict Societies, eds., Regina Ammicht Ouinn, Mile Babic, Zoran Grozdanov, Susan 
A. Ross and Marie-Therese Wacker, International Journal of Theology, Concilium, 2015/1 (London: SCM 
Press, 2015), 84.  
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dehumanization. Apostolicity as self-identity is the foundation to decide what is right or 
wrong. As examined earlier, the starting point of agency theology is to accept and respect 
various stances without losing its essential identity. 
 
Finally, there are issues about divine agency which cannot be proved by hard evidence 
but can be found only by knowledge in faith (T5, T6 and T7). In particular, emphasis has 
been placed on the Holy Spirit as agent: the Holy Spirit has been the major influence on 
the birth of global Christianity. There is no controversy over the traditional position that 
regards Jesus Christ as agency sent by the Father God. That is because Jesus has the dual 
nature of God (subject) and human (object); He is able to connect God and people as 
intercessor. There is no logical problem in this (T5). In other words, Jesus is the ideal 
connector or mediator to relate infinite God to human, because He holds the two natures 
within Him. Historically it has been overlooked that the Holy Spirit too is an agent to 
connect the subject with the object (world and people), since the Holy Spirit has the 
natures of the Father God and of His Son. However, the connecting role of the Holy Spirit 
has recently been emphasized in areas such as mission theology, citing the Pentecostal 
event.878 In particular, Pope John Paul II referred to the Holy Spirit as ‘the principal 
agent of mission’,879 quoting Acts 1: 8, Matthew 28: 18-20, Mark 16: 15-18, Luke 24: 
46-49 and John 20: 21-23. Interpreting those verses, he argued that mission does not 
                                                 
878 Kirsteen Kim, The Holy Spirit in the World: A Global Conversation (London: SPCK, 2007), 
172-176. See, Jan A. B. Jongeneel, Ecumenical, Evangelical and Pentecostal/Charismatic Views on 
Mission as a Movement of the Holy Spirit, in Pentecost, Mission and Ecumenism Essays on Intercultural 
Theology, ed. Jan A. B. Jongeneel (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 231-246.    
879 Pope John Paul, ‘Redemptoris Missio: An Encyclical Letter on the Permanent Validity of the 
Church’s Missionary Mandate’, in Redemption Dialogue: Reading Redemptoris Missio and Dialogue and 
Proclamation, ed., William R Burrows (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1993), 3, 16. 
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depend on human power but on the Holy Trinity God.880 In particular, he noted that the 
Holy Spirit not only guides the mission of church but also makes the mission complete.881  
In his book The Church in the Power of the Spirit, Moltmann argues that the messianic 
mission of church covers Christ’s messianic mission and the Holy Spirit’s charismatic 
sending, which is poured into everybody. He states that the goal of messianic mission ‘is 
not the glorification of the church but the glorification of the Father through the Son in 
the Holy Spirit’.882 In his view the Holy Spirit gives authority to Christian communities 
to undertake mission and gives energy to undertake ‘diakonia’.883 The Pentecostal event 
in Acts 2 shows that church was born as the result of the Holy Spirit’s coming. Therefore, 
it is clear that the Holy Spirit plays an essential role as agent in the church’s mission.  
 
Roelf S. Kuitse regards the Holy Spirit as source of mission and as an agent of connection, 
so he maintains that ‘the Spirit is not only brought in in connection with natural or created 
order; the Spirit is also linked to human creativity, to human culture’.884 He believes that 
the Holy Spirit (agent of mission) uses, controls and changes cultures for the purpose of 
evangelism.885  
 
John V. Taylor makes it clear that the Holy Spirit encourages and intervenes in mission. 
He notes that ‘the chief actor in the historic mission of the Christian church is the Holy 
                                                 
880 Ibid., 17. 
881 Ibid., 17-18.  
882  Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Contribution to Messianic 
Ecclesiology, trans., Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1977), 11.    
883 Ibid., 294, 295. 
884  Roelf S. Kuitse, ‘Holy Spirit: Source of Messianic Mission’, in The Transfiguration of 
Mission: Biblical Theological & Historical Foundations, ed., Wilbert R Shenk (Pennsylvania: Herald 
Press, 1993), 122.  
885 Ibid., 123. 
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Spirit’.886 Taylor regards the Holy Spirit as ‘dynamic communicator and Go-Between 
operating upon every element and every process of the material universe, the immanent 
and anonymous presence of God’.887 According to him, the Holy Spirit intervenes, acts 
and labours for mission of church. Taylor’s comments on the Holy Spirit show very 
important insights about agent. 
 
Kirsteen Kim shows the key roles of the Holy Spirit in the specific context of mission. 
She lists examples to explain how several spirits have affected mission in Korea: the 
Minjung theology (Nam Dong Suh); the pentecostal theology (Yong Gi Cho); and the 
religiocultural theology (Ryu Dong Shik).888 She highlights that the role of the Holy 
Spirit as agent is very important in the secular world and religious pluralism. 
To summarize, these arguments have demonstrated that the Holy Spirit is an agent for 
mission who connects, acts and clearly reveals His identity. The emphasis on the Holy 
Spirit as divine agency enables us to reflect on various issues of agency theology in 
today’s global and interconnected world. It also shows the universal power that includes 
diverse societies in one unified concept.  
 
So far, we have examined three common issues regarding agency theology. Continuous 
reflection upon and study regarding these questions will enable agency theology to gain 
dynamic power to undertake its dynamic role. The prospects are good that agency 
theology can be an alternative to mission theology. 
 
 
                                                 
886 John V Taylor, The Go-Between God: The Holy Spirit and the Christian Mission (London: 
SCM Press, 1974), 3. 
887 Ibid., 64. 
888 Kirsteen Kim, The Holy Spirit in the World: A Global Conversation, 103-139. 
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7.3 Summary and Conclusion 
 
So far, I have suggested the possibility of agency theology. In order to specify agency 
theory I have investigated the concept of ‘alienation’ employed by Hegel, Feuerbach and 
Marx. Using their widely-recognized mathematical formulae, they attempted to show 
something beyond scientific principles. Rather, they have provided a significant clue to 
solve the problems of opposites: ideal world and actuality (nature, culture, human beings, 
society and history), infinite and finite, transcendence and sensual world. Through Hegel, 
it was clearly shown how self-consciousness becomes embodied in concrete contexts in 
order to become culture and science. Agency is a performer and the process of 
externalization. It embodies the actuality that is the content of philosophy, connects 
subject and object, and reveals the historical reality we live in as a concrete form of culture. 
Feuerbach considered these Hegelian observations too idealistic to explain religion, 
which represents the nature we live in and different life systems of human beings. 
Through reviewing Feuerbach’s theory of objectification, which states that nature and 
religion project the essence of human being that is outside Hegel’s interest, we have 
explained that he used agency theory as a tool to reveal the hidden secret of religion. In 
Marx’s view, the ideologies of Hegel and Feuerbach are limited in explaining the specific 
reality and circumstances of human beings. This is why Marx focused on the relationship 
between ‘property’ and ‘labour’ as key factors in human society, and explained it through 
the notion of ‘alienation’. He defined the labourer, the proletariat, as creative agency of 
history who embodies self-activity into labour, and insisted that history progresses by the 
individual agency who reforms the world rather than by the elites who are responsible for 
interpreting the world. The opinions of these three eminent scholars provide us, who are 
living in both the idealistic and the specific actual world, with a prominent notion of 
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agency. However, nowadays, scholars who study agency focus only on how our 
consciousness and phenomenon of spirit, intentions and actions, can be scientifically and 
logically elucidated. As a consequence, they give no attention to Hegel, Feuerbach and 
Marx, who are rich sources of knowledge about the notions of agency. Thus, 
disappointingly, they do not investigate or elaborate in great detail upon agency. What 
their efforts do show is that there exist links between human nature or mental properties 
and action, between consciousness and phenomenon of spirit, and these phenomena allow 
us to have information of the outside world, information that is interlinked like a spider-
web. However, their explanation cannot embody the divine and transcendent domain of 
the world in our reasoning.  
 
Of course, as explained by Hegel, the emergence of absolute knowledge and the usage of 
agency for recognizing the Absolute is localized and limited to human beings’ self-
consciousness. Moreover, as Barth indicated, it is knowledge that lies within the 
boundaries of anthropocentricity. Consequently, Barth maintained the existence of 
agency that has the form of direct revelation or of incarnation where Divinity shows 
Himself. These disputes with regard to the transcendent level have continued without 
solution for a considerably long time.  
 
Agency theory, which enables us to see the resolution to the problem of two extremes not 
only in the rational domain, but also with regard to the transcendent, has been applied in 
this thesis specifically to the area of mission. I have shown how, historically, colonialism 
was a notable feature of Western mission. Furthermore, David Bosch’s idea that ‘the new 
paradigm of current Mission is Ecumenical’, has been investigated. Ecumenism is not 
new, but has survived in the history of mission through building up relationships between 
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people of different theological and religious backgrounds. If it is the new paradigm, what 
is the most important thing we attempt to change? We live in an era when mission is in 
decline, a result of self-contradiction where mission abused its power. Therefore, as 
argued by the well-known mission scholar, Werner Ustorf, in his analysis of the African 
mission, the assertion that mission should be continued just because of its traditional 
significance is not persuasive.889 If that is the case, the frame of mission definitely needs 
to be changed, and the stigma associated with mission eradicated. Alternatively, a new 
terminology is needed to expand the main content. The most appropriate theory to fulfil 
this request is the so-called agency theology, which provides the theoretical and practical 
foundation to expand the important area of mission. Certainly, the attempt here has 
limitations, in that it can only be fragmentary. However, in spite of the limitations, I 
believe that this thesis creates a significant contribution in explicating the identity of 
Christianity as a new mission paradigm. Moreover, I have highlighted the importance of 
‘agent’ in the establishment of the actual world and the coherence of society.  
 
The logical structure of this thesis is dialectic. More precisely, Chapters Two to Four 
focus on building the agency theory, which can offer the possibility of connecting the 
transcendent and the immanent, the abstract and actuality, subject and object, in a 
philosophical and rational approach. However, in Chapter Five, I investigated how, for 
Barth, between the realm of God and the realm of humans there lies a border line that 
cannot be breached. That is, human beings cannot cognise God without a self-revelation 
or self-attestation of God. Here, Barth clearly insisted that for humans to cognise God, 
                                                 
889  Werner Ustorf, “Der Kimbanguismus in Zaire-Eine afrikanische Antwort auf westliche 
Missionkonzepte”, in: Kirchen in Afrika: Eine Sendereihe des Deutschlandfunks, hrsg.von Werner Ustorf 
und Wolfram Weise (Erlangen: Verlag der Ev.-Luth. Mission, 1979), 42-50.  
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faith is needed. In other words, I investigated the possibility of acquiring knowledge of 
God though divine agency, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit. Thus, if Chapters Two to 
Four comprise thesis, then Chapter Five is anti-thesis. In Chapter Six, the synthesis of the 
two positions creates mission theology. Therefore, the overall structure of the study is 
dialectic; that is, in order to explain agency and agency theology, it adopts Hegel's 
approach of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. 
 
To extend this research, the next project should establish a more concrete system and 
content of agency theology. It should also apply that system and content specifically to 
mission theology. If that is accomplished, it will be possible to see the dynamic agency 

















Table 2 Feuerbach’s Agency (Called T2) 
 Who/what/meaning/defin
ition 





























A mediator/a bearer/ 
executer 
Religion, theology, Gods. 
-is between the essence of man and 
religion, gods, theology 
-embodies their essences into the 
Christianity and World Religions 
Projection 
A cause and result of 
activity 
A person who projects 
 
A person who objectifies 
his essence 
-is how to transform from “I” or 
“thou” or “the object” 
-is objectification of the species or 
self-awareness  











-is loss of species’ consciousness 
-is gab between essence and existence 
-is relinquishment of predicate/ the 
subject and the predicate 
-is rejection of I-thou structure  








-connects God to human beings 









-is not a monologue of solitary thinker 
with himself 
-is dialogue between I and Thou 








The essence of Man -transforms his thoughts and even his 
emotions into thoughts and emotion of 
God. 
-transforms his essence and even his 



















































The Self Activity of 
laborers 




-fulfils the desire and lives of 
labourers 
-are linked and mediated by agency 
which has now become a forced 

















 Capital/ commodity 
 








-is one of the stable agents for 
alienated people in capitalism 
-plays a crucial role(as an agent of 
capitalism), in construing 
capitalism and in making its 
contents 
-acts to build the capitalistic 
structure and capitalism 
-embodies the idea of capitalism 
and takes on dynamic force 
-is visualized subject. It is an 
institution , a medium, and such as 
a universal or global phenomenon 
-can turn the natural form of 
commodity into socially recognized 
equivalent form 
-is limitless 
-is an end in itself for the 
valorisation of values takes place 

























process of production/ 
means of production 
 
 
-is not only removed from the 
subject, or rather strips the subject 
of its subject-self and replaces him, 
rendering an object, the new 





































-is creating new social conditions, 
to understand the process of past 
and present 
-is creating new social conditions, 
to produce a premediated future 
-embodies the capitalistic structure. 
-is a free agent and states that 
human being should not be a 
passive slave but the creative 
subject in history 
-realizes and changes him or herself 
through changing the world 
-is efficiently or productively 
causal by a formative activity that 
shape conditions 
-create new objects in order to 
realize their proposes or intentions 
-transform and create themselves 
through labour 
-act to develop their new capacities 
and work to recognize these new 
abilities in themselves 
 
 
Fundamental nature of 
causality 
The purpose of agent 
Casualty of labour 
 Synthetic connection or 
mediation of labour 
-are embodied by the objects which 





























-is to increase capitalists private 
properly, wealth 
-is to reduce labourer’s burden  
-is key factor to change worker’s 
economic lives and cultural 
atmosphere  
-is key factor to play a significant 
role as a faithful servant of the 
capitalist 
Between the labourer and the 
capitalist performs negatively to 
expose the actuality of capital-



































































































-could be one of the most effective tool boxes for 
the explanation and reconstruction of human 
nature and moral theories. 
-is to identify the properties of human nature 
 
 
-enables ‘self’ to synthesize itself 
 
-is to do and perform something in order to 
disclose the will of the subject and to show the 
properties of the action 
 
-are as elements of a planning agents and can 
control its action 
 
-triggers the behaviour 
-is as something that originates things and events 
 
-are the originators or starting points of their own 
activities 
 
-is caused by the wants beliefs of the agent, then 
he is the author, the source, the originator of the 
act 
-does not display the most familiar and prominent 
feature of agency 
-might be involve an exercise of agency 
 
-is the ‘one fact of the phenomenon of mentality’ 
that expresses the action of ‘the phenomenon of 
agency’  
-is an important tool to overcome the limits of 
dualism 
 
-will be raised in the analysis of the process of 
how mental states are externalized into behaviour 
 
 








































































































-cannot be understood by some parts in mental 
states, but must be perceived as a composition of 
parts and whole 
 
-needs continuity within spatio-temporal area 
 
 
-are actors who specify personal identity 
 
 
-interprets things in the relationship between parts 
and whole  
-connects part and whole in mental actions 
-the many-one relation of composition, the one-
one relations of part to whole and overlap 
   
-are autonomous agents who governed by 
themselves alone 
 
-is a term widely used in many philosophical 
contexts to express ‘the coincidence of object and 
subject, either of a verb or of the activity that it 
represents’ 
 
-the self as the integration of personality that 
‘person engage in throughout their lives’ 
-actualizes the identity of the labourer 
-is a web of relations that constitute the presence 
of the self in the activity  
-X is the agent of some activity A if and if A is an 




























Table 5 Karl Barth’s Agency (Called T5) 
 Who/ what/ defi- 
nition/ meaninig 

































































-as a subject matter is starting point 
of the connection between the two 
extremes but  the living man cannot 
be the subject to reconcile or 
overcome those extreme 
-is widely employed as the mediating 
role between God and human beings 
-1.Christological doctrine of agency 
-2.God-centric doctrine of agency 
-3. Pneumatic doctrine of agency 
-4. Spirit Christological doctrine of 
agency  
-would be the connecting point 
between transcendent entity and 
finite beings 
-there is no road from man to God, 
but there is a road from God to man 
-would become a pathway or agency 
connecting God and human beings 
-God is known solely by divine 
agency and divine activity 
-comprise the subject-matter of 
cognition  with regard to God 
-is possibility of cognition regarding 
God 
-as the agent of God mediates God 
the Father and His creatures 
-as a yardstick to distinguish the true 
agent of God from myriad agencies 
of God 
- is the source and power of our hope 
impelling us forward as the first-
fruits and foretaste of eternal 
salvation  
-this level of agency is reducible 
-should exist for others 
-rises, destroys, flourishes and fall 
with its correspondences 
-this level of agency is irreducible 
-as His agents, either to execute His 
judgments, or as in the case of Cyrus 
(Isaiah 45:1), as the instruments of 
His faithfulness and goodness 
-this level of agency is untouchable, 
unknown and undecided without the 
invention of the divine Povidence 

















































Table 6 Contemporary natural theologians’ agency (Called T6) 
 Who/what/defi-
nition/meaning 
























































Use of agency  
 
 





-God reveals Himself in His work, 
which is the reality of God 
-Man has the ability of insight coming 
from God, which penetrates the reality 
of the world 
-starts from the revelation of God, 
which is based on Bible  
-will express divine goodness and 
power 
-is not as lifeless thing but a live 
process  
-is conceived as a ‘a complex of 
prehensive unifications  
-a primordial nature and a consequent  
Nature 
-God is the principle of embodiment 
of the world from the perspective of 
His primordial nature, and His 
judgment on the world in view of His 
consequent nature 
-to draw attention to the intimate and 
all-inclusive relationship between God 
and the world 
-man is not only the image of the 
world, man is also the image of God 
-in order to explain how God creates 
and acts in physical world  
 
-is inputs of energy, described by 
conventional physics in terms of the 
behaviour of parts because this 
involves localized interaction with 
constituent bits 
-is a new kind, at least as far as 
physics is concern –inputs of pattern 
formation, described in terms of the 













































Table 7 Agency in Mission Theology (Called T7) 
 Who/what/defi-
nition/meaning 






























































































- as in the case of Cyrus (Old Testament, 
Isaiah 45:1) 
-appeared as a connection between the 
sacred and the secular   
-is the only institution for undertaking God’s 
work and salvation  
-as Christ’s body, judges right and wrong in 
the world on behalf of God  
-the Church is only a tool of God, and the 
result of God’s actions of sending His son 
and salvation  
-the Church as agent, God’s people and 
Christ are united as one body by the power 
of the Holy Spirit  
-is considered as mediator who demonstrates 
the nature of the Church 
-does not belong to either the Church or 
human beings, but belongs to God 
-the sinful Church as well as the sinful world 
needs to be changed by mission 
-the Church is regulated by mission and the 
function of mission  
- is regarded as the Kerygma, Koinonia, and 
Diakonia of Shalom 
-We shall never understand what the apostles 
taught unless we do what apostles did, 
namely, mission. Apostolicity without 
apostolate is not apostolicity but apostasy 
-are bearer of God’s mission and the repre-
senttative of God’s mission people 
-have the best status to show God’s love 
towards the world and reveal God’s love 
through its committed life 
-God works dynamically for ‘the 
humanization of life’ in the middle of the 
complicated world 
-If that institutionalized Church were to 
devote itself to the creation of the new 
humanity with God’s Messianic character, 


















































































God’s word/ His 
will 















-is as the action of God in the world 
 
-is not something private that comes from 
the inner world of the individual, nor is an 
event occurring inside Church 
-is something that takes place in the world 
and in human life 
-is as planting shalom in the midst of 
specific human society, where it is filled 
with conflicts, hostilities and battles    
 
-are incarnated and secularized in the midst 
of the world by mission 
-Anyone who practices God’s justice and 
peace in the world can be agencies working 
for God’s deliverance 
 
-must manifest in the struggles of societies 
where people have secular human 
fellowship, those who believe in other 
religions 
-enables us to hope for the kingdom of God: 
This is possible by the power of the Holy 
Spirit who was sent by the resurrected Jesus 
 
-God’s agent exists in other religions 
-these agents can be every kind of 
organization, people and religions that work 














Abazovic, Dino. 2015. Religious and Political Identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 
Religion and Identity in Post-conflict Societies, eds., Regina Ammicht Ouinn, Mile Babic, 
Zoran Grozdanov, Susan A. Ross and Marie-Therese Wacker, International Journal of 
Theology, Concilium, 2015/1. London: SCM Press. 83-90. 
 
Adorno, Theodor W. 1969. Drei Studien zu Hegel. Frankfurt am Mein: Suhrkamp Verlag.  
________________, 1996. Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Rolf Tiedermann, 
Fünfte Auflage, vol. Band 6, Negative Dialektik Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (Frankfurt am 
Mein: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
 
Anderson, Gerald H. 1961. Introduction: The Theology of Mission among Protestants in 
the Twenties Century. In The Theology of the Christian Mission. Ed. Gerald H. Anderson. 
London: SCM Press. 
 
Anderson, Perry 1980. Arguments within English Marxism. London: Verso. 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1980. Foreword, in Objects and Identity: An Examination of the 
Relative Identity Thesis and Its Consequence, Harold W. Noonan. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers. 
Anselm, St. 1973. The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm with the Prologion. Sister 
Benedicta Ward. London: Penguin Books. 
 303 
 
Aquinas, Thomas. 1912. The "Summa Theologia" of ST. Thomas Aquinas Part I. QQ. 
LXXV.CII.(4). Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates & 
Washbourne LTD. 
 
Archer, Margaret S. 2006. Being Human: The Problem of Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Aristotle. 1966. Aristotle's Metaphysics. No. 1000 in Everyman's Library, John 
Warrington. London: Everyman's Library. 
 
Arthur, C. J. 1986. Dialectics of Labour: Marx and his Relation to Hegel. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
 
Ayer, A.J. 1973. The Central Questions of Philosophy. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
 
Bade, Klaus J. 1982. Imperialismus und Kolonialmission: Kaiserliches Deutschland und 
koloniales Imperium. Ed. Klaus J. Bade. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH. 
 
Barabas, Marina. 1997. Transcending the Human. In Religion without Transcendence? 
D.Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin. 177-232. Houndmills: Macmillan Press. 
 
 304 
Barnes, Barry. 2000. Understanding Agency: Social Theory and Responsible Action. 
London: SAGE Publication. 
 
Barth, Hans. 1976. Truth and Ideology. Frederic Lilge. California: University of California 
Press. 
 
Barth, Karl, 1960. Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum. Jonn Mcintyre & Ian T. Ramsey. 
London: SCM Press. 
_________, 1957. Church Dogmatics. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance. Vol. II/1, The 
Doctrine of God. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
_________, 1956. Church Dogmatics. G.W. Brormiley & T.F. Torrance. Vol. I /2, The 
Doctrine of the Word of God. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
_________, 1975. Church Dogmatics. G. W. Brormiley & T.F. Torrance. Second. Vol. I/1, 
The Doctrine of the Word of God. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
_________, 1961. Church Dogmatics. G. W. Brormiley & T.F. Torrance. Vol. III/3, The 
Doctrine of Creation. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
_________, 1978. Church Dogmatics. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance. Vol. Vol. II-2, The 
Doctrine of God. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
_________, 1956. Church Dogmatics. Geoffrey William Bromiley & Thomas F. Torrance. 
Vol. IV/1, The Docrine of Reconciliation. Edinburgh: T&T Clark. 
_________, 1970. Church Dogmatics. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance. Vol. III/1, The 
Doctrine of God. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
 305 
_________, 1961. Church Dogmatics. Geoffrey William Bromiley & Thomas F. Torrance. 
Vol. IV/3-1, The Doctrine of Reconciliation. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
_________, 1981. Church Dogmatics, Lecture Fragments. Geoffrey W.Bromiley. Vol. IV, 
4, The Christian Life. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
_________, 1962. Church Dogmatics. G.W. Brormiley & T.F. Torrance. Vol. IV, 3, II, The 
Doctrine of Reconciliation. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
_________, 1936. Credo: A Presentation of the chief problems of Dogmatics with 
Reference to the Apostles' Creed. J. Strathearn Mcnab. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
_________, 1947. Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert: Ihre Vorgeschichte 
und Ihre Geschichte. Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag. 
_________, 1968. Dogmatics in Outline. G. T. Thomson. London: SCM Press. 
_________, Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers No. 8. 1966. God, Grace and 
Gospel. James Strathearn McNab. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. 
_________, 1972. Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background & 
History. Brian Cozens & the Staff of SCM Press and John Bowden. London: SCM Press. 
_________, 1950. The Epistle to the Romans. Translated by Edwyn C. Hoskyns. London: 
Oxford University Press. 
_________, 1957. The Word of God and the Word of Man. Douglas Horton. New York: 
Harper & Brothers Publishers. 
_________, lectures at Gottingen, Winter Semester of 1923. 1982. The Theology of 
Schleiermacher. Dietrich Ritschl, trans.Geoffrey W. Bromiley. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
 306 
_________, 1991. The Göttingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion. Edited 
by Hannelotte Reiffen, Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. Vol. 1 vols. Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans. 
_________, theology and Philosophy. 1961. The Humanity of God. Thomas Wieser & 
John Newton Thomas. London: Coliins Clear-Type Press. 
_________, 1962. Theology and Church. Louise Pettibone Smith. London: SCM Press. 
 
Bartley, W.W. 1984. The Retreat to Commitment. London: Open Court Publishing 
Company. 
 
Bassham, Rodger C, 1979. Mission Theology: 1948-1975 Years of Worldwide Creative 
Tension Ecumenical, Evangelical, and Roman Catholic. California: William Carey Library. 
________________, 1978. Seeking a deeper Theological Basis for Mission. International 
Review of Mission. Vol. LXVII, No. 267(July). 329-337. 
 
Baugh, Bruce. 2003. French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Baum, Gregory. 1975. Religion and Alienation: A Theological Reading of Sociology. New 
York: Paulist Press. 
 
Bayertz, Kurt. 2003. Human Nature: How Normative Might It Be? : Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy (Abingdon) Vol.28, No.2  
 307 
Berdyaev, Nicolas. 1943. Slavery and Freedom. trans., R. M. French. London: Geoffrey 
Bles: The Centenary Press. 
_______________, 1938. Solitude and Society, trans., George Reavey. London: Geoffrey 
Bles: The Centenary Press. 
_______________, 1952. The Beginning and the End. trans., R. M. French. London: 
Geoffrey Bles. 
_______________, 1949. The divine and the Human. trans., R. M. French. London: 
Geoffrey Bles. 
 
Berger, Peter L. & Samuel P. Huntington. 2002. Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity 
in the Contemporary World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bevans, Stephen B. 2006. Models of Contextual Theology: Faith and Cultures. Revised 
and Expanded Edition. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 
 
Bevans, Stephen B. and Roger P. Schroeder. 2004. Constants in Context: A Theology of 
Mission for Today. American Society of Missiology Series, No. 30. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 
 
Blauw, Johannes. 1962. The Missionary Nature of the Church: A Survey of the Biblical 
Theology of Mission. London: Lutterworth Press. 
 
Bosch, David J. 1975. Science of Mission and Science of Religion: MSR 101(Basic module 
of Science of Mission). Pretoria: University of South Africa Press. 
 308 
____________, 1991. Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission. 
American Society of Missiology Series, No. 16. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 
____________, 1980. Witness to the World: The Christian Mission in Theological 
Perspective. London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott. 
 
Bosch, David J. & T. D. Verryn, 1978. Missiology and Science of Religion (B. Th.): MSR 301 
(Pretoria: University of South Africa Press. 
 
Bratman, Michael E. 2009. Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality. In Reasons for 
Action, ed., David Sobel and Steven Wall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
________________, 2007. Structures of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Brennan, Michael J. & Trigeorgis, Lenos 2000. Project Flexibility, Agency, and 
Competition: New Developments in the Theory and Application of Real Options. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Brenner, Joseph E. 2008. Logic in Reality. Switzerland: Springer. 
 
Brunner, Emil. 1947. Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology. Olive Wyon. London: 
Lutterworth Press. 
___________, 1951. The Misunderstanding of the Church. Trans. Harold Knight. 
Philadelphia: The Westmister Press. 
 309 
Brunner, Emil & Barth, Karl. 1946. Natural Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" by 
Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the reply "No!" by Dr. Karl Barth. Peter Fraenkel. London: 
Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press. 
 
Buck-Morss, Susan. 1977. The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter 
Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute. England: The Harvester Press. 
 
Butler, Judith. 1999. Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century 
France. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Callincos, Alex. 2004. Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory. 
Historical Materialism Book Series, Paul Blackledge, Sebastain Budgen, Jim Kincaid, 
Stathis Kouvelakis, Marcel Van Linden, China Mieville, Warren Montag, Paul Reynolds 
and Tony Smith. Leiden: Brill. 
 
Calton, Patricia Marie. 2001. Hegel's Metaphysics of God: The ontological proof as the 
development of a Trinitarian divine ontology. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Carino, Feliciano V. 1978. Partnership in Obedience. International Review of Mission. Vol. 
LXVII, No. 267(July). 316-328. 
 
Carver, Terrell. 1998. The Postmodern Marx. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
 310 
Charles, David. 2004. Emotion, cognition and Action, in Agency and Action, Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55, ed. John Hyman and Helen Steward. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Chisholm, Roderick M. 1975. The Agent as Cause, in Action Theory: Proceedings of the 
Winnipeg Conference, Manitoba, Canada, 9-11 May 1975, ed. Myles Brand and Douglas 
Walton. Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 
 
Christensen, Torben & Willam R. Hutchison. 1982. Missionary Ideologies in the 
Imperialist Era: 1880-1920: Papers from the Durham Consultation, 1981. Eds. Torben 
Christensen and William R. Hutchison. Denmark: Aros. 
 
Clark, Malcolm. 1971. Logic and System: A Study of the Transition from "Vorstellung" to 
thought in the Philosophy of Hegel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
 
Clowney, Edmund P. 1995. The Church: Contours of Christian Theology. Illinois: Inter 
Varsity Press. 
 
Colle, Ralph Del. 1999. Scheiermacher and Spirit Christology: Unexplored Horizons of the 
Christian Faith. International Journal of Systematic Theology (Oxford) Vol. 1, No.3 
(November): 286-307. 
 
Collier, Andrew.2004. Marx. Oxford: One-world. 
 311 
Costas, Orlando E. 1995. Christ outside the Gate: Mission beyond Christendom. 
Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 
____________, 1974. The Church and Its Mission: A Shattering Critique from the Third 
World. Wheaton: Tyndale House Publishers. 
 
Coval, S. C. & Campbell, P. G. 1992. Agency in Action: The Practical Rational Agency 
Machine. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. 
 
Cox, Jeff. 2008. The British Missionary Enterprise since 1700. London: Routledge. 
 
Davies, Paul. 1993. The Mind of God: Science and the Search for Ultimate Meaning. 
London: Penguin Books. 
 
Davies, Oliver. 1991. Meister Eckhart: Mystical Theologian. London: SPCK. 
 
Davies, O., Janz, P.D. & Sedmak, C. 2007. Transformation Theology: Church in the World. 
London: T. & T. Clark. 
 
Dayton, Edward R. & Fraser, David A. 1981. Mission and the Church. In Perspectives on 
the World Christian Movement a Reader. Ed. Ralph D. Winter and Steven C. Hawthrone. 
California: William Carey Library. 
 
De Nys, Martin J. 2009. Hegel and Theolgy. London: T. & T. Clark. 
 312 
Dembowski, Hermann. 1989. Natürlische Theologie und Theologie der Natur. In 
Ö kologische Theologie: Perspektiven zur Orientierung , Günter Altner. 30-58. Stuttgart: 
Kreuz Verlag. 
 
Descartes, René. 1999. Principles of Philosophy (1644), in The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, Vol. I, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Dickey, Laurence. 1987. Hegel: Religion, Economics, and the Politics of Spirit 1770-1807. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Dryden, John. 1956. The work of John Dryden. Edited by H. T. Sendenberg. Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 62. 
 
Dupré, Louis. 1966. The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, Inc. 
 
Eckhart, Meister. 1994. The Talks of Instruction. in Meister Eckhart-Selected Writings. 1-
52. London: Penguin Books. 
 
Engelsviken, T. 2003. Missio Dei: The Understanding and Misunderstanding of a 
Theological Concept in European Churches and Missiology. International Review of 
Mission. Vol. XCII. No. 367. 481-497. 
 313 
Engen, Charles Van. 1994. The Impact of Modern Ecclesiology on the Local Church. In 
New Direction in Mission & Evangelization 2: Theological Foundations. Eds. James A 
Scherer & Stephen B. Bevans. Maryknoll: Oribis Book. 
____________, 1993. The relation of Bible and Mission in Mission Theology. In The Good 
News of the Kingdom: Mission Theology for the Third Millennium. Eds. Charles Van Engen, 
Dean S. Gilliland & Paul Pierson. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 
 
Evans, G. R. 1980. Anselm and a New Generation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Farrer, Austin. 1988. Faith and Speculation: An Essay in Philosophical Theology: 
containing the Deems lectures 1964. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
 
Ferrarin, Alfredo. 2001. Hegel and Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Feuerbach, Ludiwig. 1956. Das Wesen des Christentums. Werner Schuffenhauer. Zeiter 
Band. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. 
_______________, 1950. Kleine Philosophische Schriften (1842-1845). Der 
Philosophischen Bibliothek Band 227, Max Gustav Lange. Germany: Verlag Felix Meiner 
in Leipzig. 
_______________, 1967. Lectures on the Essence of religion (1851). Ralph Manheim. 
New York: Harper & Row, Publishers. 
_______________, 1986. Principles of the Philosophy of the Future (1843). Manfred 
Vogel. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 
 314 
_______________, 2008. The Essence of Christianity. George Eliot. Mineola: Dover 
Publications, INC. 
_______________, 1980. Thoughts on Death and Immortality. James A. Massey. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
_______________, 1959. Sämtliche Werke II. W.Bolin and F. Jodi. Grundsätze der 
Phiosophie der Zukunft (1843). Stuttgart. 
________________, 1959. Sämtliche Werke II. W. Bolin and F. Jodi. Thesen zur Reform 
der Philosophie (1842). Stuttgart. 
 
Fleischer, Helmut. 1973. Marxism and History. Eric Mosbacher. London: Alllen Lane The 
Penguin Press 
 
Flett, John G. 2009. Missio Dei: A Trinitarian Envisioning of a Non-Trinitarian Theme. 
Missiology: An International Review (American Society of Missioloogy) XXXVII, No.1 
(January): 5-18. 
 
Flew, A. and Vesey, G. 1987. Agency and Necessity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 




Forman, Charles W. and Gregory Baum, O.S.A., 1974. Is there a Missionary Message? in: 
Mission Trends No.1: Crucial Issues in Mission Today, ed. Gerald H. Anderson and 
Thomas F. Stransky. New York: Paulist Press. 
 
Forrest, Peter. 1996. God without the Supernatural. Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of 
Religion, William P. Alston. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1970. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences 
London: Tavistock Publications. 
 
Foust, Thomas F. 2002. Lesslie Newbigin's Epistemology: A Dual Discourse. In A 
Scandalous Prophet: The Way of Mission after Newbigin, Thomas F. Foust, George R. 
Hunsberger, J. Andrew Kirk, and Werner Ustorf. 153-162. Grand Rapids: William B. 
Publishing Company. 
 
Frankfurt, Harry G. 1999. Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
________________, 2002. Reply to J. David Velleman, in Contours of Agency: Essays on 
Themes from Harry Frankfurt, ed., Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press. 
_______________, 1998. The Importance of What We Care about: Philosophical Essays. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 316 
Frege, G. 1884. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: Eine logisch mathematische 
Untersuchung übeFr den Begriff der Zahl. Breslau: Verlag von Wilhelm Koebner. 
__________, 1950. The Foundations of Arithmetic: A logico-mathematical enquiry into the 
concept of number. Trans. J. L. Austin. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
 
Frei, Hans W. 1967. Feuerbach and Theology. Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion (Oxford University Press) Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep.): 250-256. 
 
Fromm, Erich. 1956. The Sane Society. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD. 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1976. Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies. Trans. 
Christopher Smith. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
 
Galloway, Allan D. 1974. The meaning of Feuerbach: The Hobhouse Memorial Lecture, 
1974. The British Journal of Sociology (Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London 
School of Economics and Political Science) Vol. 25, No.2 (June): 135-149. 
 
Garrett, Brian. 1998. Personal Identity and Self-consciousness. London: Routledge. 
 
Gatu, John G. 1974. ‘Missionary, go Home’ in International Documentation 63 (July 1974) 
 




Giddens, Anthony, 1971. Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An analysis of the 
writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
_______________, 2002. Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping our Lives 
London: Profile Books. 
 
Glasser, Arthur F. & McGavran, Donald A. 1983. Contemporary Theologies of Mission. 
Grand Rapids: Baker Books.  
 
Goldman, Alvin I. 1970. A Theory of Human action. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
_______________, 1986. Epistemology and Cognition. Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
_______________, 1992. Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Science. 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
_______________, 1993. Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science. Colorado: 
Westview Press. 
_______________, 2006. Simulating Mind: The Philosophy, Psychology, and 
Neuroscience of Mindreading, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Goodall, N. 1953. Missions under the Cross: Addresses delivered at the Enlarged Meeting 
of the Committee of the International Missionary Council at Willingen, in Germany, 1952; 
with Statements issued by the Meeting. Ed. Norman Goodall. London: Edinburgh House 
Press.       
 
 318 
Gould, Carol C. 1978. Marx’s Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx’s 
Theory of Social Reality. Massachusetts: The MIT Press.  
 
Gouwens, David J. 2000. Mozart among the Theologians. Modern Theology (Oxford) Vol. 
16, Issue 4 (Oct.): 461-474. 
 
Graham, Billy. 1975. Why Lausanne? In Let the Earth Hear His Voice: International 
Congress on World Evangelization Lausanne, Switzerland. Minneapolis: World Wide 
Publications. 
 
Grant, Colin. 2007. Why should Theology be unnatural? Modern Theology 23. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
 
Gruning, Herb. 1998. Divine -Cosmic Interaction Some Contemporary Alternative. The 
Doctor of Philosophy diss., McGill University. 
 
Gustafson, James M. 2004. An Examinined Faith: The Grace of Self-Doubt. Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press. 
 
Haight, Roger. 1992. The Case for Spirit Christology. Theological Studies Vol 53: 257-287. 
 
Harris, George W. 1999, Agent-centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian 
Internalism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 319 
Harris, H.S. 1977. Hegel's Ladder I: The Pilgrimage of Reason. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company. 
 
Hartshorne, C. 1978. Whitehead's Philosophy: Selected Essays, 1935-1970. Lincoln and 
London: University of Nebraska Press. 
 
Harvey, Van A. 1997. Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion. Cambridge Studies in 
Religion and Critical Thought: I, Wayne Proudfoot, Jeffrey L. Stout, and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hegel, G. W. F. 1969. Hegel's Science of Logic (1831). A. V. Miller. London: George Allen 
& Unwin. 
___________, 1975. Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the 
philosophical Science (1830). Trans. William Wallace. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 
___________, 1896. Hegel's Philosophy of Right. S.W.Dyde. London: George Bell and 
Sons. 
___________, 1976. Hegel's Philosophy of Right. T. M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
___________, 1977. Phenomenology of Spirit. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
___________, 1952. System der Wissenschaft: Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie des 
Geistes. Johannes Hoffmeister. Bamberg und Würzburg: bey Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 
1807; Verlag von Felix Meiner. 
 320 
___________, 1910. The Phenomenology of Mind. J. B. Baillie. London: Swan 
Sonnenschein & Co. 
___________, 2001. G. W. F. Hegel: The phenomenology of Spirit Chapter 8, Absolute 
Knowing. In The Philosophical Forum Vol. XXXII. No. 4, Winter, Douglas Lackey. 407-419. 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
___________, 1967. The Phenomelogy of Mind. J. B. Baillie. New York: Harper 
Torchbook. 
___________, 1950. The Logic of Hegel: The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. 
William Wallace. London: Oxford University Press. 
___________, 1977. The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of 
Philosophy. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf. New York: State University of New York Press. 
___________, 1986. The Jena System, 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysics. John W. Burbidge 
and George di Giovanni. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University. 
Henderson, Mark . 2008. We Have Created Human-Animal Embryos Already, say British 
Team, The Times (U.K.), Wednesday April 2 2008 
 
Hibben, John G. 2000. Hegel's Logic: An Essay in Interpretation (1902). Canada: Batoche 
Books Limited. 
 
Hick, John. 1977. The Myth of God Incarnate, ed. John Hick. London: SCM Press. 
 
Hieronymi, P. 2009. Two Kinds of Agency, in Mental Actions. ed., Lucy O’Brien and 
Matthew Soteriou. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 321 
Hirsch, E. 1982. The Concept of Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hocking, William E. 1918. Human Nature and its Remaking. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
____________________, 1932. Re-thinking Missions: A Laymen’s Inquiry after One 
Hundred Years. U. S. A.: Harper & Brothers Publishers. 
 
Hodges, H. A. 1979. God beyond Knowledge. W. D. Hudson. London: Macmillan Press. 
 
Hoekendijk, J. C. 1950. The Call to Evangelism. International Review of Mission. Vol. 
XXXIX. No. 154. 167-175. 
____________, 1967. The Church inside out. Ed. Hoedemaker and Pierter Tijmes, trans. 
Isaac C. Rottenberg. London: SCM Press. 
 
Hollenweger, Walter J. 2010. Intercultural Theology. In Intercultural Perceptions and 
Prospects of World Christianity. 150. Eds. Richard Friedli/ Jan A. B. Jongeneel/ Klaus 
Koschorke/ Theo Sundermeier/ Werner Ustorf. Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang. 
 
Hornsby, Jennifer 2004. Agency and Actions. in Agency and Action, Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement: 55, ed. John Hyman and Helen Steward. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Horton, Keith. 1999. The Limits of Human Nature, in The Philosophical Quarterly (Oxford) 
Vol. 49. No.197. 452-470. 
 322 
 
Hughes, Philip Edgcumbe. 1989. The True Image: The Origin and Destiny of Man in Christ. 
Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press. 
 
Hume, David. 1975. A Treatise of Human Nature: Being An Attempt to Introduce the 
Experimental Method of Reafoning into Moral Subjects (1739), ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. 
Oxford: At the Clarendon Press 
___________, 1927. Enquiries: Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning 
the Principles of Morals (1777), ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Second edition. Oxford: At the 
Clarendon Press.  
 
Hyman, John and Helen Steward. eds., 2004. Agency and Action, Royal Institute of 
Philosophy supplement 55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hyppolite, Jean. 1974. Genèse et structure structure de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de 
Hegel. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman. Evanstone: Northwestern University Press. 
____________, 1974. Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenmenology of Spirit. Samuel 
Cherniak and John Heckman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Inwood, Michael. 1992. A Hegel Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Inwagen, Peter van. 2003. Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 323 
 
Israel, Joachim. 1979. Alienation: From Marx to Modern Sociology. New Jersey: 
Humanities Press. 
 
Johnson, Keith E. 2003. Divine Transcendence, Religious Pluralism and Barth's Doctrine 
of God. International Journal of Systematic Theology (Oxford) Vol.5, Number 2 (July): 
200-224. 
 
Jongeneel, Jan. A. B. 2010. Missionary Theology and Intercultural Theology. In 
Intercultural Perceptions and Prospects of World Christianity. 150. Eds. Richard Friedli/ 
Jan A. B. Jongeneel/ Klaus Koschorke/ Theo Sundermeier/ Werner Ustorf. Frankfurt am 
Mein: Peter Lang. 
___________, 1992. Ecumenical, Evangelical and Pentecostal/Charismatic View on 
Mission as a Movement of the Holy Spirit. In Pentecost, Mission and Ecumenism Essays 
on Intercultural Theology. Ed. Jan A. B. Jongeneel. Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang. 
___________, 1995. Philosophy, Science, and Theology of Mission in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries: A Missiological Encyclopedia Part I: The Philosophy and Science of Mission, 
92 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
___________, 1997. Philosophy, Science, and Theology of Mission in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries: A Missiological Encyclopedia Part II: Mission Theology, 106. Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang. 
 
 324 
Jorgensen, Jonas Adelin. 2008. Studies in the intercultural History of Christianity. Jesus 
Imandars and Christ Bhaktas: Two Case Studies of Interreligious Hermeneutics and 
Identity in Global Christianity. 146 vols. Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang. 
 
Kainz, Howard P. 1973. Round-Table Discussion on Problems of Translating Hegel. In The 
Legacy of Hegel: Proceedings of the Marquette Hegel Symposium 1970, J.J. O' Malley, K. 
W. Algozin, H. P. Kainz, and L. C. Rice. 253-267. The Hague: Martinus NiJHoff. 
 
Kalu, Ogbu U. 2010. Globalization and Mission in the Twenty-first Century. In Mission 
after Christendom: Emergent Themes in Contemporary Mission. Louisville: WJK 
Westminster John Knox Press. 
___________, 1975. Not Just New Relationships but a Renewed Body. In International 
Review of Mission, Vol. LXIV, No. 254. April. 143-147. 
 
Kamenka, Eugene. 1970. The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
 
Kane, J. Herbert. 1982. A Global View of Christian Missions: From Pentecost to the 
Present. Revised Edition. Grand Rapids: Bake Book House. 
 
Kelly, George Armstrong. 1996. Notes on Hegel's "Lordship and Bondage." In Hegel's 
Dialectic of Desire and Recognition: Text and Commentary, John O'Neill. 253-272. New 
York: State University of New York. 
 325 
 
Kerr, Fergus. 1989. Theology after Wittgenstein. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Kierkegaard, Søren. 1959. The Journals of Kierkegaard. Alexander Dru. New York: Harper 
Torchbooks. 
 
Kim, Kirsteen. 2007. The Holy Spirit in the World: A Global Conversation. London: SPCK. 
Kim, Sebastian C. H. 2007. Freedom or Respect?: Public Theology and the Debate over 
the Danish Cartoons, in International Journal of Public Theology 1. Koninklijke Brill NV, 
Leiden, 249-269. 
______________, 2003. In Search of Identity: Debates on Religious Conversion in India. 
Oxford: Oxford University. 
 
Kim, Sebastian C. H. & Kirsteen Kim. 2008. Christianity as a World Religion. London: 
Continuum.  
______________, 1997. Ecumenical Endeavour and Mission. In Mission Trends Today: 
Historical and Theological Perspectives. Eds. Joseph Mattam & Sebastian Kim. Mumbai: 
St Pauls. 
 
King, Robert H. 1974. The Meaning of God. London: SCM Press. 
 
Knowles, Dudles. 2002. Routledge Philosophy Guide Book to Hegel and Philosophy of 
Right. London: Routledge. 
 326 
 
Kojéve, Alexandre. 1996. Desire and Work in the Master and Slave. In Hegel's Dialectic 
of Desire and Recognition: Text and Commentary, O'Neill, John. 49-64. New York: State 
University of New York Press. 
______________, 1969. Introduction to the reading of Hegel. Ed. Allan Bloom, Trans. 
Jame H. Nichols. New York: Basic Books. 
Krause, K. C. F. 1900. The Ideal of Humanity and Universal Federation, ed., W. Hastie. 
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
 
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1996. The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Third Edition. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago. 
 
Kuitse, Roelf S. 1993. Holy Spirit: Source of Messianic Mission. In The Transfiguration of 
Mission: Biblical Theological & Historical Foundations. Ed., Wilbert R Shenk. 
Pennsylvania: Herald Press. 
 
Küng, Hans. 1987. Theologie im Aufbruch: Eine ökumenische Grundlegung. Munich: 
Piper Verlag. 
 
La Montagne, D. P. 2001. Barth and Rationality: Critical Realism in Theology. Doctor of 
Philosophy diss., Princeton Theological Seminary. 
 
 327 
Lampe, Geoffrey W. H. 1977. God as Spirit: The Bampton Lectures, 1976. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Lehrer, Keith. 1978. Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Leslie, John. 2001. Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Lewis, David. 1990. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
__________, Philosophical Papers, Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 
 
Lingenfelter, Sherwood G., 1996. Agents of Transformation: A Guide for Effective Cross-
Cultural Ministry. Grand Rapids: Baker Books. 
 
Linz, M. 1964. Anwalt der Welt: Zur Theologie der Mission. Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag. 
 
Locke, J. 1928. An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690), Abridged and Edited, 
A.S. Pringle-Pattison. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 
_________, 1894. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Vol. I. Collated 
and Annotated by Alexander Campbell Fraser. Oxford: At The Clarendon Press. 
 
Lodahl, Michel. 1992. Shekhinah/Spirit Divine Presence in Jewish and Christian Religion. 
New York: Paulist Press. 
 
 328 
Longuenesse, Béatrice. 2007. Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics. Nicole J. Simek. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lowe, E. J. 2010. Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Ludz, Peter Christian. 1981. A Forgotten Intellectual Tradition of the Alienation Concept. 
R. F. Geyer & D. Schweitzer. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Lukács, Georg. 1967.  Georg Lukács Werke. Vol. Band 8, Der junge Hegel: Ü ber die 
Beziehungen von Dialektik und Ö konomie. Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag. 
____________, 1973. The Young Hegel: Studies in the relations between Dialectics and 
Economics. Rodney Livingstone. London: Merlin Press. 
 
Macken, John S.J. 1990. Lecture in Theology at the Milltown Institute of Theology and 
Philosophy, Dublin. The Autonomy Theme in the Church Dogmatics: Karl Barth and his 
Critics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mackenzie, C. 2008. Practical Identity and Narrative Agency, in Practical Identity and 
Narrative Agency. Ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Kim Akins. New York: Routledge. 
 
Mackey, J. 1983. The Christian Experience of God as Trinity. London: SCM Press. 
 
 329 
Macmurray, J. 1956. The Self as Agent: being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the 
University of Glasgow in 1953. London: Faber and Faber Limited. 
 
Maker, W. 1994. Philosophy without Foundation. USA: State University of New York 
Press. 
 
Margull, Hans J. 2010. The Third World Dimension in the Theology of Mission. In 
Intercultural Perceptions and Prospects of World Christianity. 150. Eds. Richard Friedli/ 
Jan A. B. Jongeneel/ Klaus Koschorke/ Theo Sundermeier/ Werner Ustorf. Frankfurt am 
Mein: Peter Lang. 
 
Marx, K. 1977. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Moscow: Progress 
Publishes. 
____________, 1988. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One, trans. Ben 
Fowkes. London: Penguin Books. 
___________, 1968. Das Kapital, Vol. 3, Marx and Engels Werke, Band 25. Berlin: Dietz 
Verlag. 
_________, 1975. Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844, Karl Marx Frederick 
Engels Collected Works, Martin Milligan and Dirk J. Struik, vol. 3, Marx and Engels: 1843-
1844. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
_________, 1977. Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844, in: Early Writings: 
Introduced by Lucio Colletti, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
 330 
___________, 1973. Grundrisse, trans., Martin Nicolaus. New York: Vintage Books. 
___________, 2000. Karl Marx: Selected writings, ed., David McLellan, second edition. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
___________, 1996. Karl Marx: Capital, Vol. I, in: Karl Marx Frederik Engels Collected 
Works, Volume 35, trans., Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. London: Lawrence & 
Wishart. 
_________, 1986. Karl Marx Frederick Engels. Volume 28: Karl Marx 1857-61. London: 
Lawrence & Wishart. 
_________, 1987. Karl Marx Frederick Engels. Volume 29: Karl Marx 1857-61. London: 
Lawrence & Wishart. 
__________,1968. Marx Engels Werke, Band. 25, Das Kapital I. Berlin: Dietz Verlag. 
___________, 1969. Resultate des unmittelbaren Produktionsprozesses: Das Kapital I. 
Buch., Der Produktionsprozess des Kapitals, VI. Kapital. Frankfurt: Verlag Neue Kritik KG.  
__________, 1976. The German Ideology, Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works, 
Clemens Dutt, W. Lough and C.P. Magill, vol. 5, Karl Marx Frederick Engels: Marx and 
Engels: 1845-47. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
_____________, 1975. Zur Kritik der Politischen Ŏkonomie (1859), Marx and Engels 
Werke, Band 13. Berlin: Dietz Verlag. 
 
Marx, K. & Engels, F. 1958. Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels 1845-1846: Die deutsche 
Ideologie: Kritik der neuesten deuschen Philosophie in ihren Repräsentanten Feuerbach, 
B. Bauer und Stirner, und deuschen Sozialismus in seinen verschiedenen Propheten. 
Berlin: Dietz Verlag. 
 331 
 
Massey, Marilyn C. 1985. Censorship and the language of Feuerbach's "Essence of 
Christianity"(1841). The Journal of Religion (The University of Chicago Press) Vol.65, No.2 
(April.): 173-195. 
 
McCallum, Bruce J. 1994. Modernity and the Dilemma of Natural Theology: The Barth-
Brunner Debate, 1934. The Doctor of Philosophy diss., Marquette University. 
 
McCormack, Bruce L. 1997. Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its 
Genesis and Development, 1909-1936. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
McDowell, John C. 2002. Much Ado about Nothing: Karl Barth's Being Unable to Do 
Nothing about Nothingness. International Journal of Systematic Theology (Oxford) Vol. 
4, No. 3 (November): 319-335. 
 
McFague, S. 1993. The Body of God: An Ecological Theology. Minneapolis, Fortree Press. 
_____________, 2000. Life Abundant: Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in 
Peril. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. 
 
McGrath, A. 2002. Bridge-Building: Effective Christian Apologetics. Leicester: Inter-
Varsity Press. 
______________, 2008. The Open Secret: A New Vision for Natural Theology. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
 332 
______________, 1996. A Passion for Truth: The Intellectural Coherence of 
Evangelicalism. Leicester: Apollos. 
 
McGavran, Donald A. 1972. Crisis of Identity for Some Missionary Society. In Crucial 
Issues in Missions Tomorrow. Ed. Donald A. McGavran. Chicago: Moody Press. 
______________, 1994. Understanding Church Growth, Third. ed. Grand Rapids: Wiliam 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 
 
McLellan, D. 1982. The Thought of Karl Marx: An Introduction. Second Edition. London: 
The Macmillan Press Ltd. 
______________, 995. The Thought of Karl Marx: An Introduction, Third Edition. London: 
Macmillan Press. 
 
Mészáros, I. 1970. Marx's Theory of Alienation. London: Merlin Press. 
 
Migliore, Daniel L. 2004. Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian 
Theology. Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 
 
Milbank, J. 2005. The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the 
Supernatural. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 
 
 333 
Mills, J. 2002. The Unconscious Abyss: Hegel's Anticipation of Psychoanalysis. SUNY 
Series in Hegelian Studies, William Desmond. New York: State of University of New York 
Press. 
 
Moltmann, J. 2000. Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms of Christian Theology. 
Trans., Margaret Kohl. London: SCM Press. 
_______________, 1985. God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation, The Gifford 
Lecture. Trans., Margaret Kohl. London: SCM Press. 
_______________, 1977. The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Contribution to 
Messianic Ecclesiology. Trans., Margaret Kohl. London: SCM Press. 
 
Montagne, D. Paul La, 2001. Barth and Rationality: Critical Realism in Theology. Doctor 
of Philosophy Thesis. Princeton Theological Seminary. 
 
Morris, Michael. 1986. Causes of Behaviour. In Mind, Causation and Action, ed. Leslie 
Stevenson, Roger Squires and John Haldane. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
 
Negri, A. 1991. Marx beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse. Harry Cleaver, Michael 
Ryan and Maurizio Viano. New York: Autonomedia. 
 
Newbigin, L. 1969. The Finality of Christ. London: SCM Press. 
______________, 1991. The Gospel in a Pluralist Socirty. Geneva: WCC Publication. 
 334 
______________, 1953. The Household of God: Lectures on the Nature of Church. Great 
Britain: SCM Press. 
______________, 1994. The Logic of Mission in New Directions in Mission and 
Evangelization 2: Theological Foundations. Eds. James Scherer and Stephen B. Bevans, 
Maryknoll: Oribis Books.  
______________, 1978. The Open Secret: Sketches for a Missionary Theology. Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 
______________, 1983. The Other Side of 1984: Questions for the Churches. Geneva: 
World Council of Churches. Geneva: World Council of Churches. 
 
Newman, P. A Spirit Christology: Recovering the Biblical Paradigm of Christian Faith.  
 
Neill, S. 1990. A History of Christian Missions. Second edition. London: Penguin Books. 
______________, 1966. Colonialism and Christian Missions. London: Lutterworth Press. 
______________, 1959. Creative Tension: The Duff Lectures, 1958. London: Edinburgh 
House Press. 
______________, 1968. The Church and Christian Union: The Bampton Lectures for 1964. 
London: Oxford University Press. 
 
Nicholls, B. 1986. The Church. UK: Published on behalf of the World Evangelical 
Fellowship by the Patermoster Press. 
 
 335 
Niebuhr, H. R. 1996. Theology, History, and Culture. William Stacy Johnson. New Heaven: 
Yale University Press. 
 
Ng, K. 2009. Hegel's Logic of Actuality. The Review of Metaphysics (New York), 63,1: 139-
172. 
 
Noonan, Harold W. 1980. Objects and Identity: An Examination of the Relative Identity 
Thesis and Its Consequences. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
 
Nozick, R. 1984. Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Oizerman, T. I. 1981. The making of the Marxist Philosophy. Yuri Sdobnikov. Moscow: 
Progress Publishers. 
____________, 1965. Alienation and the Individual. In: Marxism and Alienation: a 
Symposium, ed. Herbert Aptheker. New York: Humanities Press. 
 
O'Neill, J. 1996. Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition: Text and Commentary. John 
O'Neill. New York: State University of New York Press. 
 




Palma, Robert J. 1983. Karl Barth's Theology of Culture: The freedom of Culture for the 
Praise of God. Pennsylvania: Pickwick Publications. 
 
Panikkar, R. 1973. The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon-Person- 
 
Mystery. New York: Orbis Books.  
 
 
Pannenberg, W. 2007. Analogie und Offenbarung: eine kritische Untersuchung zur 
Geschite des Analogiebegriffes in der Lehre von der Gotteserkenntnis. Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
__________________, 1971. Basic Questions in Theology. George H. Kehm. Two vols. 
Bristol: SCM Press. 
__________________, 1968. Jesus: God and Man. Lewis L. Wilkins & Duane A. Priebe. 
London: SCM Press. 
__________________, 1988. Metaphysics and the Idea of God, trans., Philip Clayton. 
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 
__________________, 1968. Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation. In 
Revelation as History. Ed. Wolfhart Pannenberg & trans. David Granskou. New York: 
The Macmillan Company. 
__________________, 1991. Systematic Theology, Vol. I., trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley 
Edinburgh: T & T Clark Ltd. 
 
Pasnau, R. 2002. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A philosophical Study of Summa 
Theologiae Ia 75-89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 337 
Perkins, H., Daniel, H. & Simandjuntak, A. 1976. Let My People Go, in Mission Trends 
No.3: Third World Theologies. Eds. Gerald H. Anderson & Thomas F. Stransky New York: 
Paulist Press. 
 
Pinkard, T. 1994. Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality for Reason. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pippin, Robert B. 2011. Hegel on Self-Consciousness: Desire and Death in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Polkinghorne, J. 1998. Belief in God in an Age of Science. New Heaven and London: Yale 
University Press. 
_______________, 1996. Beyond Science: The Wider Human Context. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
_______________, 2000. Faith, Science & Understanding. London: SPCK. 
_______________, 1994. Quarks, Chaos, and Christianity: Questions to Science and 
Religion. London: Triangle. 
_______________, 1988. Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding. London: 
SPCK. 
_______________, 1989. Science and Providence: God’s Interaction with the World. 
London: SPCK. 
_______________, 1998. Science & Theology: An Introduction. London: SPCK. 
 
 338 
Pope John Paul, 1993. Redemptoris Missio: An Encyclical Letter on the Permanent 
Validity of the Church’s Missionary Mandate. In Redemption Dialogue: Reading 
Redemptoris Missio and Dialogue and Proclamation. Ed., William R Burrows. Maryknoll: 
Orbis Books. 
 
Popitz, H. 1980. Der Entfremdete Mensch, Zeit kritik und Geschichtesphilosophie des 
jungen Marx. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 
 
Quint, J. 1953. Mystik und Sprache: Ihr Verhältnis zueinander insbesondere in der 
spekulativen Mystik Meister Eckharts. Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für 
Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeshichte. Paul Kluckhohn, Hugo Kuhn und Erich 
Rothacker. Vol. 27. Jahrgang, Band XXXVII, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung. 
 
Ramambason, Laurent W. 1999. Missiology: Its Subject-Matter and Method. Frankfurt 
am Main: Peter Lang GmbH. 
 
Rasmusson, A. 2007. “Deprive Them of Their Pathos”: Karl Barth and the Nazi Revolution 
Revisited. Modern Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd), Vol. 23, Issue 3 (July), 
369-391. 
 
Ratzinger, Joseph. 1964. Die Kirche und die Kirchen, in: Reformatio, Jg. 13. 
 
 339 
Reymond, Robert L. 2005. Contending for the Faith: Lines in the sand that strengthen the 
Church. Scotland: Christian Focus Publications. 
 
Rigby, Cynthia L. 2004. Taking Our Place: Substitution, Human Agency, and Feminine Sin. 
International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church (Routledge: Taylor & Francis 
Ltd) Vol. 4, No. 3 (October): 220-234. 
 
Ritscl, D. 1986. The Logic of Theology: A Brief Account of the Relationship between Basic 
Concepts in Theology. Trans., John Bowden. London: SCM Press. 
 
Robertson, R. 1992. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: SAGE. 
 
Robinson, John A. T. 1973. The Human Face of God. London: SCM Press. 
 
Roemer, J. 1986. Introduction, and ‘Rational Choice’ Marxism: Some Issues of Method 
and Substance. In Analytical Marxism, John Roemer. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Rogers, Eugen F. 1995. Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural 
Knowledge of God. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Rosen, M. 1982. Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 340 
Rosenberg Jay F. 1986. The Thinking Self. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
 
Rosental, M. M. 1973. Die dialektische Methode der politischen Ŏkonomie von Karl Marx. 
Trans. Hans Zikmund, Deb. Westberlin: Verlag das europäische buch.  
 
Rotenstreich, Nathan. 1965. Basic Problems of Marx's Philosophy. Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company. 
 
Rovane, C. 1998. The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Rubin, Isaak I. 1972. Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, Milos Samardzija and Fredy 
Perlman, Detroit: Black & Red. 
___________, 2004. Alienation and the Alleged Separateness of Persons. In The Monist, 
Vol. 87. No. 4, (Illinois) 
 
Rütti, L. 1972. Zur Theologie der Mission: Kritische Analysen und neue Orientierung. 
München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag. 
 
Samartha, Stanley J. 1971. Living Faiths and the Ecumenical Movement, ed. Stanley J. 
Samartha. Geneva: World Council of Churches. 
 
 341 
Schachter, Hindy L. 1983. Public Agency Communication: Theory and Practice Chicago: 
Nelson-Hall. 
 
Scherer, James A. 1987. Gospel, Church, & Kingdom: Comparative Studies in World 
Mission Theology. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House. 
 
Schilling, S. Paul. 1966. Contemporary Continental Theologians. London: SCM Press. 
 
Schmitt, Richard. 1997. Introduction to Marx and Engels: A Critical Reconstruction. 
Second Edition. Oxford: Westview Press. 
 
Schoonhoven, Evert J. 1978. Tambaram 1938. International Review of Mission, Vol. LXVII, 
No. 267(July) 299-315. 
 
Sedmak, Clemens, 2007. Die politische Kraft der Liebe: Christein und die europäische 
Situation. Wien: Tyrolia Verlagsanstalt Gm. 
_______________, 2003. Doing Local Theology: A Guide for Artisians of a New 
Humanity. Maryknoll: Oribis Books. 
_______________, 2013. Eine Kultur der Hoffnung bauen. Ragensbury: Pustet Friedrich 
Kg. 
_______________, 1995. Ich kenn mich nicht aus: Theologie-Philosophie-
Problemtheolie. Salzburg: Müller-Speiser. 
 342 
_______________, 2003. Kleine Verteidigung der Philosophie. München: Beck’she 
Reihe. 
_______________, 1995. Vorherwissen Gottes - Freiheit des Menschen – Kontingenz der 
Welt. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 
 
Segal, Jerome M. 1991. Agency and Alienation: A theory of Human Presence. Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Sentilles, S. 2010. Misreading Feuerbach: Susan Sontag, Photography and the Image-
World. Literature & Theology (Oxford University Press) Vol.24, No. 1 (March): 38-55. 
 
Shaull, M. R. 1997. The Revolutionary Challenge to Church and Theology: World 
Conference on Church and Society. Geneva, 1966. in The Ecumenical Movement: An 
Anthology of Key Texts and Voices. Ed. Michael Kinnamon and Brian E. Cope. Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 
_______________, 1968. Toward a Reformulation of Objectives. In Protestant 
Crosscurrents in Mission: Ecumenical-Coservative Encounter. Ed. Norman A. Horner. 
Nashville: Abingdon Press. 
 
Shklar, Judith N. 1996. Self-Sufficient Man: Dominion and Bondage. In Hegel's Dialectic 
of Desire and Recognition: Text and Commentary, John O'Neill. 289-303. New York: State 
University of New York Press. 
 
 343 
Shoemaker, S. 1997. Causality and Properties. In Properties, ed., D. H. Mellor and Alex 
Oliver. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Skinner, B. F. 1953. Science and Human Behavior. New York: The Macmillan Company. 
 
Sobel, David and Wall, Steven. 2009. Reasons for Action, ed. David Sobel and Steven Wall. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sölle, Dorothe. 1967. Christ the Representative: An essay in Theology after the 'Death of 
God'. David Lewis. London: SCM Press 
 
Solomon, Robert C. 1983. In the Spirit of Hegel: A study of G.W.F. Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Soteriou, M. 2009. Introduction. In: Mental Actions, ed. Lucy O’Brien and Matthew 
Soteriou. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Speight, Allen. 2001. Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Spencer, Herbert. 1884. First Principles. Fifth. London: Williams & Norgate. 
 
 344 
Stern, Robert. 2002. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hegel and the Phenomenology 
of Spirit. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Sundermeier, T. 2010. Interkulturelle Theologie im Kontext der Globalisierung. In 
Intercultural Perceptions and Prospects of World Christianity. 150. Frankfurt am Mein: 
Peter Lang. 
 
Taylor, C. 1985. Human Agency and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Taylor, John B. 1974. The Go-Between God: The Holy Spirit and the Christian Mission. 
London: SCM Press. 
 
Taylor, R. 1966. Action and Purpose. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Thalberg, I. 1972. Enigmas of Agency. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
_____________, 1977. Perception, Emotion and Action: A Component Approach. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell.  
 
Thomas, M. M. 1969. The Acknowledged Christ of the Indian Renaissance. London: SCM 
Press. 
_____________, 1976. The Secular Ideologies of India and the Secular Meaning of Christ. 
Madras: The Chriatian Literature Society. 
 345 
Thomas, M. M and Newbigin, L. 1974. Salvation and Humanization: A Discussion.  In 
Mission Trends No.1: Crucial Issues in Mission Today. Ed. Gerald H. Anderson and 
Thomas F. Stransky. New York: Paulist Press. 
 
Thomas, N. 1995. Readings in World Mission. Ed. Norman Thomas. London: SPCK. 
 
Thompson, E.P. 1978. The Poverty of Theory & other essays. London: Merlin Press. 
 
Thompson, J. 1991. The Holy Spirit in the Theology of Karl Barth. Princeton Theological 
Monograph Series 23, Dikran Y. Hadidian. Pennsylvania: Pickwick Publications. 
 
Thomson, Judith J. 1977. Acts and Other Events. New York: Cornell University Press.  
 
Thornton, Stephen P. 1996. Facing up to Feuerbach. International Journal for Philosophy 
of Religion (Kluwer Academic Publishers), 39 (April): 103-120. 
 
Tiffany, E. 2003. Alienation and Internal Reason for Action. In Social Theory and Practice, 
Vol. 29, No 3’ (July). 
 
Tillich, P. 1978. Systematic Theology 1: Reason and Revelation, Being and God. London: 
SCM Press Ltd. 
_____________, 1957. Systematic Theology II. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
 346 
Torrance, Thomas F. 1990. Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian. Edinburgh: T 
& T Clark. 
_________________, 1966. The Mission of the Church. Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 
19.  
________________, 1992. The Mediation of Christ. Edinburgh: T&T Clark. 
 
Trigg, R. 1998. Rationality and Religion. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Tucker, Robert C. 1961. Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Uglik, J. 2010. Ludwig Feuerbach's conception of the religious alienation of man and 
Mikhail Bakunin's philosophy of negation. Stud East Eur Thought (Springer 
Science+business Media B.V.), 62 (2 February): 19-28. 
 
Ustorf, Werner. 2002. The Emerging Christ of Post-Christian Europe. In A Scandalous 
Prophet: The Way of Mission after Newbigin, Thomas F. Foust, George R. Hunsberger, J. 
Andrew Kirk, and Werner Ustorf. 128-144. Grand Rapids: William B. Publishing 
Company. 
____________, 1992. Christianized Africa – De-Christianized Europe? : Missionary 
Inquiries into the Polycentric Epoch of Christian History. Seoul: Tyrannus Press. 
____________, 1995. Die Diskussion der Missionsgeschichte im Protestanttismus seit 
dem 16. Jahrhundert. In Einleitung in die Missionsgeschichte: Tradition, Situation und 
 347 
Dynamik des Christentums. Eds. Karl Müller/ Werner Ustorf. Stuttgart: Verlag W. 
Kohlhammer.  
____________, 2010. The Cultural Origins of “Intercultural” Theology. In Intercultural 
Perceptions and Prospects of World Christianity. 150. Eds. Richard Friedli/ Jan A. B. 
Jongeneel/ Klaus Koschorke/ Theo Sundermeier/ Werner Ustorf. Frankfurt am Mein: 
Peter Lang.   
____________, 1979. Der Kimbanguismus in Zaire-Eine afrikanische Antwort auf 
westliche Missionkonzepte. in Kirchen in Afrika: Eine Sendereihe des Deutschlandfunks, 
Werner Ustorf und Wolfram Weise, Band 50, 42-50. Erlangen: Verlag der Ev.-Luth. 
Mission.  
____________, 1986. Norddeutsche Mission und Wirklichkeitsbewältigung: Eremen, 
Afrika und der “Sclavenfreikauf”. In Mission im Kontext: Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte 
der Norddeutschen Missionsgesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert. Ed. Herbert Ganslmayr. 
Bremen: Im Selbstverlag des Museums.  
____________, 1996. The Philanthropy of God and Western Culture. In Mission in a 
Pluralist World. 97. Eds. Aasulv Lande & Werner Ustorf. Frankfurt am Mein, Peter Lang. 
____________, 2008. The Cultural Origins of "Intercultural Theology." Mission Studies: 
Journal of the international Association for Mission Studies (Leiden) Vol. 25, No.2: 229-
251. 
____________, 2010. Robinson Crusoe tries again: Missiology and European 
Constructions of “self” and “Other” in a Global World 1789-2010. Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.   
 348 
____________, 2000. Sailing on the Next Tide: Missions, Missiology, and the Third Reich. 
Vol. 125. Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang. 
 
Velleman, J. D. 2002. Identification and Identity.  In Contours of Agency: Essays on 
Themes from Harry Frankfurt, ed., Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press. 
 
Verkuyl, J. 1978. Comtemporary Missiology: An Introduction, trans. & ed. Dale Cooper, 
Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 
 
Vicedom, Georg F. 1958. Missio Dei: Einführung in eine Theologie der Mission. München: 
Chr. Keiser Verlag. 
 
Vinzent, Markus. 2011. Christ’s Resurrection in Early Christianity: And the Making of the 
New Testament. United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing Group. 
_____________, 2006. Der Ursprung des Apostolikums im Urteil der kritischen 
Forschung. Germany: Vandenhoeck Ruprecht GmbH Co. KG. 
_____________, 2011. Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion. In 
Journal of Beliefs & Values. Vol. 32.2. 143–160. 
_____________, 2014. Marcion and the Dating of the Synoptic Gospels. Belgium: 
Peeters Publisher. 
 349 
_____________, 2012. Salus extra ecclesiam? Meister Eckhart’s Institutionenskepsis. In 
Mystik, Recht und Freiheit: Religiöse Erfahrung und kirchliche Institutionen im 
Spätmittelalter. Eds. Dietmar Mieth and Britta Müller-Schauenburg. Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer. 
_____________, 2011. The Art of Detachment (Eckhart: Text and Studies) Vol.1, Leuven: 
Peeters. 
_____________, 2004. Theologen: 185 Porträts von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. 
Stuttgart: Metzier.  
_____________, ‘Re-modernity’: Overcoming the Divide of Denominations, Religions 
and Ideological Categories. 2009. In Wege und Welten der Religionen: Forschungen und 
Vermittlungen. Eds. Jürgen Court and Michael Klöcker. Frankfurt: Verlag Otto Lembeck. 
Ward, Keith. 1998. God, Faith & the Millenium: Christian Belief in an Age of Science. 
Oxford: Oneworld. 
 
Ward, P. 2008. Participation and Mediation: A Practical Theology for the Liquid Church. 
London: SCM Press. 
 
Warneck, G. 1897. Evangelische Missionslehre: ein missionstheoretischer Versuch, Erste 
Abteilung: Die Begründung der Sendung. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Berthes. 
____________, 1897. Evangelische Missionslehre: ein missionstheoretischer Versuch, 
Zweite Abteilung: Die Organe der Sendung. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Berthes.  
 
 350 
Wartofsky, Marx W. 1977. Feuerbach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Watson, G. 2004. Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Weaver, Rebecca H. 1998. Divine Grace and Human Agency: A Study of the Semi-
Pelagian Controversy. Patric Monograph Series 15. Georgia: Mercer University Press. 
 
Webster, D. 1962. Local Church and World Mission. London: SCM Press. 
 
Webster, J. 2000. Barth. London: Continuum. 
 
Wedin, Michael V. 1986. Tracking Aristotle’s Nous. In Human Nature and Natural 
Knowledge: Essays Presented to Marjorie Grene on the Occasion of Her Seventy-Fifth 
Birthday, ed. Alan Donagan, Anthony N. Perovich and Michael V. Wedin. Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel Publishing Company. 
 
Werpehowski, W. 2001. Command and History in the Ethics of Karl Barth. Journal of 
Religious Ethics Vol. 9, 81. Fall: 298-320. 
 
Whitehead, Alfred N. 1938. Modes of Thought. Cambridge: At the University Press. 
_____________________, 1934. Nature and Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 351 
_____________________, 1978. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology- Gifford 
Lectures Delivered in the University of Edinburgh during the Session 1927-28. David Ray 
Griffin & Donald W. Sherburne. New York: The Free Press. 
_____________________, 1927. Science and the Modern World: Lowell Lectures 1925. 
Cambridge: At The University Press. 
______________________, 1920. The Concept of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Wiggins, D. 1971. Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
_______________, 2001. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Williams, B. 1973. Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972 Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Williams, R. 2000. On Christian Theology: Challenges in Contemporary Theology. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Wilson, G. 2001. The Use of Reason in Karl Barth. The Doctor of Philosophy diss., 
University of Ottawa. 
 
 352 
Wittgenstein, L. 1972. Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung: Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (1921), trans., D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. London: Routlege & Kegan 
Paul. 
__________________, 2001. Philosophical Investigations (Part I: 1945, Part II: 1947-
1948) trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Wolfram, M. 1976. Political Economy. Chicago: Banner Press. 
 
Wood, Allen W. 1990. Hegel's Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
____________, 2004. Karl Marx. Second Edition. London: Routledge. 
 
World Council of Churches. 1973. Bangkok Assembly 1973: Minutes and Report of the 
Assembly of the Commission on World Mission and Evangelism of the World Council of 
Churches December 31, 1972 and January 9-12, 1973. Geneva: World Council of 
Churches. 
 
Wyatt, J. 1998. Matters of Life and Death: Today's healthcare dilemmas in the light of 
Christian Faith. Great Britain: Inter-varsity Press. 
 




Yong, A. 2011. From Demonization to Kin-domization: The Witness of the Spirit and the 
Renewal of Missions in a Pluralistic World. In Global Renewal, Religious Pluralism, and 
The Great Commission: Towards a Renewal Theology of Mission and Interreligious 
Encounter, eds. Amos Yong & Clifton Clarke. Lexington: Emeth Press. 
